Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label banks. Show all posts

Tuesday, 22 January 2019

Lots of meat in this article on EU & Brexit stance

Bang up to date with so many elements you need to be on top of; in addition, it identifies areas of weakness in the European position - these can be used as "potential issues ahead" as they won't [probably] have arisen by the time of the exam. This really useful stuff- if you can't assimilate it all, come and speak to me. Very interesting times indeed...

Europe is in no fit state to handle the risks of its own Brexit brinkmanship

The EU's Michel Barnier said in Strasbourg that the risk of a no-deal has never been so high. Yet the Commission says not a word of the Withdrawal Agreement can be changed
With the exception of the Dutch, perhaps, the EU is not remotely prepared for a cliff-edge divorce in 10 weeks. The Commission’s contingency plan for a no-deal scenario is mostly political theatre, an instrument of negotiation pressure.

Brussels, Berlin, and Paris suddenly confront an economic threat that they never took seriously and could all too easily spin out of control. A no-deal scenario is “scary for everybody”, said France’s Emmanuel Macron on Tuesday. Well, that is progress. Until this week he has been dismissing it as a British nuisance.

This showdown comes at a hazardous moment for Europe. Germany escaped a technical recession in late 2018 by the skin of its teeth. It is now in a soft slump,  a casualty of China’s deepening slowdown and the Asian credit crunch.

French industrial output is contracting and business confidence has crashed to levels last seen in the eurozone crisis. Barclays has pencilled in GDP growth of 0.1pc in the fourth quarter.

Fading growth and the gilets jaunes have between them derailed the Macron presidency. It is taking all his energy and policy arsenal to contain an 1848 insurrection entering its tenth week. Little remains of his reform drive, and even less of his grand bargain with Germany to fortify the eurozone.

Italy is in full recession. Oxford Economics has pencilled in growth of just 0.3pc for the whole of this year. This sort of lingering malaise plays havoc with the country’s knife-edge debt trajectory. Investors know that a seemingly stable ratio of 131pc of GDP can spiral up towards very quickly 140pc once the denominator effect kicks in, and from there it is a parabolic rise into insolvency.

Rome must refinance debt worth 17pc of GDP this year without the shield of quantitative easing by the European Central Bank, that is to say without a marginal buyer or lender-of-last resort standing behind the Italian debt market. It will take no more than a spark to set off this powder keg. 

What is extraordinary is that the ECB persisted last year with its pre-announced plan of bond tapering even though real non-financial M1 money for the whole eurozone had dropped to recession levels. It then continued to dial down stimulus as the real economy buckled. 

Bond purchases have dropped from a peak of €80bn a month to zero. This is equal to a string of rate rises under the Wu-Xia model. The ECB has been tightening pro-cyclically into a slowdown, repeating the policy errors of 2008 and 2011. 

Mario Draghi must know that this is a mistake but his hands are tied. Germany is no longer willing to tolerate QE, deemed a backdoor transfer to the South. The result is to entrench deflationary forces and undermine the debt solvency of weaker EMU states. The eurozone is now in a Japanese trap. 

The Stability Pact and the Fiscal Compact, married to the ‘rules culture’ of the Commission, inhibit any form of counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus. If it comes at all, it will be too little, too late.

There is still no banking union beyond punishment and surveillance, leaving the sovereign/bank doom-loop of 2012 ever menacing. Nor is there any fiscal union or sharing of debt liabilities. The eurozone is defenceless.

By miraculous twist, the UK has somehow eked out higher growth over the last nine months, which is not to pretend that the British economy is in glorious condition.
We are a long way from the peak EU hubris of December 2017 when Europe’s leaders mistook a catch-up recovery for self-sustaining cycle of growth, and thought they had Britain’s back against the wall. That is when they sprung the trap of the Irish backstop.

In my view, the EU is playing with economic and financial fire even to contemplate a no-deal outcome at this juncture, with all it implies for broken supply chains, severed transport links, lower exports, and lost access to their banker in the City of London.

The EU has a £95bn trade surplus in goods with the UK. This is 4.5pc of British GDP. To the extent that tariff and customs barriers cause this precious demand to be diverted from European exporters to UK producers - or to the rest of the world -  it is a pure net loss to the European economy. Britain gets some degree of net stimulus, ceteris paribus.

The Treasury and academic critics of Brexit like use to ‘dynamic modeling’ to ratchet up the putative losses in British GDP from a no-deal. I have yet to see analysis under such modeling of what it would mean for a European economy that never cleaned up its banking system and is on the cusp of its third recession in a decade. Debt levels are 30pc to 50pc of GDP higher across France and the Latin bloc than on the cusp of the Lehman crisis.

Europe’s leaders have been lining up to say that there can be no renegotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement and no change to the Irish backstop. It is up to the UK to “clarify its intentions,” said the Commission’s Jean-Claude Juncker.

You might equally say that it is up to the EU to clarify its intentions. Is it going to persist in demanding a permanent veto over whether Britain can leave the backstop, and therefore whether it can leave the customs territory and the EU legal orbit.  

Will it demand an arrangement that strips Britain of sovereignty - or would “downgrade Britain to the status of a trade colony” in the words of the German IFO Institute this morning? Will it continue to threaten trade rupture to force submission after having heard the thunderous riposte of Parliament on Tuesday?

Mr Barnier took a fateful step in weaponizing the Irish border, exploiting a neuralgic inter-community issue to push an ulterior agenda, and invoking the Good Friday Agreement even as it ignored one party to that accord.

The perverse logic of this gamble is that in a bid to save Ireland the EU may instead end up injuring Ireland very badly, and do more damage to Anglo-Irish relations than a friendly Brexit would ever have done.

If there is no deal, the EU will face an Irish crisis of its own. The weapon will recoil. Either Brussels tries to force Dublin to erect a hard border - a maniacal proposition - or it accepts ‘British’ border solutions based on technology and trusted traders. This is to admit that the Backstop was a charade all along.   

Perhaps Mr Barnier does not believe his own words about the rising risk of a no-deal. Perhaps the Commission aims to sit back and wait for the Remain majority in Parliament to impose a softer settlement: Norway Plus or revocation.

I leave it to colleagues closer to Parliament to judge how likely this is, and what the odds of a no-deal may be. My guess is that Brussels will get its way.

Yet it is an existential gamble. If the EU refuses to change a single word of its withdrawal ultimatum and by misjudgment causes Britain to walk away, my prediction is that Europe itself will be engulfed in the maelstrom.

It will again expose the fundamental deformities of monetary union. It will trigger the Italian denouement, set off a German banking crisis, and shatter the euro. Could the European Union survive such a chain of events? Possibly.

Friday, 22 June 2018

A smart look at the European banking system

This article from mises.org looks closely at issues in the EU banking arena. It contains some key concepts, and is highly relevant to policy, particularly monetary policy. There is a new emphasis on finance, and this looks at ways banking affects economies, and references the work we have done on credit cycles. Note that Europe is quite different to the UK and the US, as firms rely heavily on banks for loans in the EU, whereas the UK & US use bond markets far more. This means EU banks are huge, but suffer exponentially in downturns. Mises.org is an academic institute named for Ludwig von Mises, a leading Austrian economist. "Austrian" is a school of economics, as is Keynesian economics. Friedrich von Hayek is the best known Austrian economist, and is recognised as a major free-market thinker. Remind me to bring this up when we do monetary policy.



Deutsche Bank's Troubles Raise Worries About the Future of the Euro Zone

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06/19/2018 

The euro banking sector is huge: In April 2018, its total balance sheet amounted to 30.9 trillion euro, accounting for 268 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the euro area. Unfortunately, however, many euro banks are in lousy shape. They suffer from low profitability and carry an estimated total bad loan exposure of around 759 billion euro, which accounts for roughly 30 per cent of their equity capital.

Share price developments suggest that investors have lost quite some confidence in the viability of euro banks’ businesses: While US bank stocks are up 24 per cent since the beginning of 2006, the index for euro-area bank stocks is still down by around 70 per cent. Perhaps most notably, ’Germany’s two largest banks, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, have lost 85 and 94 per cent, respectively, of their market capitalization.

polleit1_0_0.png

With a balance sheet of close to 1.5 trillion euro in March 2018, Deutsche Bank accounted for around 45 per cent of German GDP. In international comparison, this an enormous, downright frightening dimension. It is mostly the result of the bank still having an extensive (though not profitable) footprint in the international investment banking business. The bank has already started reducing its balance sheet, though.

polleit2_5.png

Beware of big banks — this is what we could learn from the latest financial and economic crises 2008/2009. Big banks have the potential to take an entire economy hostage: When they get into trouble, they can drag everything down with them, especially the innocent bystanders – taxpayers and, if and when the central banks decide to bail them out, those holding fiat money and fixed income securities denominated in fiat money.

Banking Risks

For this reason, it makes sense to remind ourselves of the fundamental risks of banking – namely liquidity risk and solvency risk –, for if and when these risks materialise, monetary policy-makers can be expected to resort to inflationary actions. In fact, to fend off these risks from materialising, central banks have committed themselves to pursuing chronically inflationary policies.

Liquidity risk describes the risk that a bank might fail to meet its credit obligations in full. This is an inherent risk as most banks extend long-term loans and refinance themselves with short-term funds. As a result, they have to succeed in rolling-over maturing debt. In a situation in which investors are no longer willing to lend their money, the banks may not be able to obtain new funds and become illiquid.

However, in today’s fiat money system, central banks are in a position to print up any amount of base money at any given time, and they can lend this newly created money to ailing banks at their discretion. As a result, the liquidity risk can be, and actually is taken care of by central banks. A single bank may go under due to a lack of liquidity. But not the banking system as a whole, as in a liquidity crisis, central banks can, and do, decide to prop up the system.

Solvency risk means the risk that banks’ assets are not worth enough to service banks’ debts. It can strike if and when losses on loans make a bank’s incoming cash flow drop below its cash outflows. A bank may well continue to operate for quite a while despite being insolvent: It meets its daily payment requirements because cash outflows remain below the total that will become due at some point in time.

Keep the Fiat Money System Going

If and when insolvency makes liabilities exceed its assets, however, a bank’s equity capital is wiped out, and the bank may even default on its debt, and savers and investors lose their funds. While it is relatively easy for a central bank to prevent a liquidity crisis in the banking sector, it is quite another matter when it comes to an insolvency crisis: Once asset values start falling and losses are getting realized, problems reach a new dimension.

If banks in such a situation fail to raise new equity capital, the government – fearing a collapse of the banking system – typically steps in. It either uses taxpayers’ money to provide banks with new equity capital, or it can issue new debt, which is bought by the central bank against issuing newly created base money, with the latter being paid in as new bank equity capital – and the affected banks being taken over by the government.

In reality, central banks and governments have put a ‘safety net’ under the banking industry. Smaller banks may well go under, but a scenario in which the entire banking system goes belly up will be prevented for a simple reason: Politically speaking, the costs of a fiat money system collapse is simply too high and has to be prevented; no price is viewed as too costly to keep the fiat money system going.

A Vicious Circle

This is what sets a truly vicious circle into motion. For today’s fiat money causes booms which sooner or later must turn into a bust. The liquidity risk and especially the insolvency risk can be expected to hit the banking industry at some point. To prevent it from materializing, the central bank must keep expanding the quantity of (base) money and keep interest rates at artificially low levels, keeping the inflationary scheme going.

Central banks sow the seeds of crisis, and once the crisis unfolds, especially when it affects banks negatively, central banks run bailouts by injecting new money provided at artificially low interest rates, and the vicious cycle starts all over again. Needless to say that such a cycle causes economic and social problems on a grand scale. It makes the purchasing power of money drop. Only a few benefit, while the majority of the people is taken advantage of.

Given the problems of the euro area banking industry, we should indeed wonder what might happen next. The scenario that the euro area economies might grow out of their banking problems would undoubtedly be a rather convenient one, but it is fairly unlikely. Bailing out ailing banks with taxpayers’ money and an inflation-financed recapitalization of banks’ equity capital might be a much less pleasant scenario, but it appears to be more likely.

For one thing is indisputable: If an oversized banking apparatus starts to shrink, the outstanding stock of credit and money will decline. And as the quantity of money goes down, prices across the board trend downwards causing deflation. Needless to say that deflation is a nightmare for highly indebted economies: Falling prices increase the real debt burden, sending the financial and economic system into a cataclysmic downward spiral.

Inflation Is a Policy that Cannot Last

The current president of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, said in July 2012: “[T]he ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” Taken at face value, these words suggest what the ECB is ready to do: to print up ever greater quantities of euro balances to prevent the euro currency from falling apart. Ironically, however, this is precisely what the ECB’s money printing scheme will bring about.

Ludwig von Mises (1881 – 1973) noted in this context wisely: “All governments are firmly committed to the policy of low interest rates, credit expansion, and inflation. When the unavoidable aftermath of these short-term policies comes to pass, they know only of one remedy — to continue their inflationary ventures.”1 These words capture pretty well what has been going on in the euro area.

Without the ECB’s overly generous issuing of fresh fiat money, the euro banking apparatus could not have reached its current size, its bloated dimension. And with its attempt to rectify its inflationary policies of the past – namely preventing the euro banking sector from collapsing, the ECB is about to pursue even more extensive inflationary policies. This doesn’t bode well for the euro’s purchasing power going forward.

The euro area provides a textbook example of a rather unholy alliance between the central bank and commercial banks: It has not only caused an inflationary boom and bust cycle that has resulted in a severe financial and economic crisis. The unholy alliance has also made possible an oversized (and poorly performing) banking industry, and the policy to keep it going will result in a rip off of the majority of the people on a truly grand scale.
  • 1. Mises, L. v. (1998), Human Action, Scholar’s Edition, p. 794.
Dr. Thorsten Polleit, Chief Economist of Degussa and macro-economic advisor to the P&R REAL VALUE fund. He is Honorary Professor at the University of Bayreuth.

Friday, 28 April 2017

Fed tightening cycle as per the lesson

Quick intro, and it is a lot to read - try and identify one or two points that you can use in an essay; for most the sheet we discussed in class will be enough. This is highly technical, but should be accessible for some of you:

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John Mauldin | Apr 26, 2017
Hoisington Quarterly Review and Outlook, Q1 2017
Lacy Hunt and Van Hoisington kick off their Q1 “Review and Outlook” – today’s Outside the Box – with a bang, calling our attention to the fact that in 80% of the 14 Federal Reserve tightening cycles since 1945, a recession ensued, and the Fed managed to keep the Good Ship Economy off the rocks just three times.
And, oops, we’re in the 93rd month of the current expansion, farther out to sea than we were those three times when the Fed brought us safely in to port, in 1968, 1984, and 1995.
It gets scarier:
[T]he last ten cycles of tightening all triggered financial crises. In conjunction with the non-monetary determinants of economic activity (referred to as initial conditions), monetary restraint served to expose over-leveraged parties and, in turn, financial crises ensued.
Lacy and Van then proceed to enumerate four major ways in which those “initial conditions” are different (read: scarier) today than they were in any of the previous 14 tightening cycles.
Got your life jacket ready? Lacy will be helping us hand them out at this year’s Strategic Investment Conference, May 22–25 in Orlando. And you’ve heard me say it before, but I’ll say it again: The President could do far worse than appointing Lacy Hunt to fill one of the two empty Fed governor seats.

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
JohnMauldin@2000wave.com
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Hoisington Quarterly Review and Outlook, Q1 2017
By Lacy Hunt and Van Hoisington
Fed Tightening Cycles – Past and Present
The Federal Reserve has initiated the fifteenth tightening cycle since 1945 (Chart 1). Conspicuously, in 80% of the prior fourteen episodes, recessions followed, with outright business contractions being avoided in just three cases. What is notable today is that the economy is in the 93rd month of this expansion, a length of time that is well beyond periods in prior expansions where soft landings occurred (1968, 1984 and 1995). This is relevant because the pent-up demand from the prior downturn has been exhausted; thus, the economy is extremely vulnerable to a shock, which could lead to recession. Regardless of whether there was an associated recession, the last ten cycles of tightening all triggered financial crises. In conjunction with the non-monetary determinants of economic activity (referred to as initial conditions), monetary restraint served to expose over-leveraged parties and, in turn, financial crises ensued.
Four important considerations exist today that were not present in past cycles and that may magnify the current restraining actions of the Federal Reserve:
  1. The Fed has initiated a tightening cycle at a time when significant differences exist in the initial conditions compared to the initial conditions in prior cycles. Additionally, the Fed is tightening into a deteriorating economy with last year’s growth in nominal GDP worse than in any of the prior fourteen cases.
     
  2. Business and government balance sheets are burdened with record amounts of debt. This means that small changes in interest rates may have an outsized impact on investment and spending decisions.
     
  3. Previous Federal Reserve experiments, primarily the periods of quantitative easings, have led to an unprecedented balance sheet (an action of “grand design”) to which the economy has grown accustomed. The resulting reduction in that balance sheet (reduction in the monetary base) may have a more profound impact on growth than anticipated.
     
  4. The monetary base reduction and the impact of the changing regulatory landscape, both in the U.S. and globally, has meant a significant increase in the amount of liquid reserves that banks are required to hold. Liquidity may have already been sharply restrained by the lowering of the monetary base, despite its massive $3.8 trillion size. This is evident as the monetary and credit aggregates are following the expected deteriorating pattern resulting from monetary restraint, suggesting recessionary conditions may lie ahead.
Poor Initial Conditions
To judge the success or failure of monetary or any other type of policy action, one must analyze in terms of the economic conditions under which the measures are being implemented. In other words, different starting points produce different results. Viewed from this perspective, the Fed’s current tightening is highly risk-prone for the economy.
Several factors that influence the economy (other than monetary policy) are far more problematic than those that existed in any of the prior tightening cycles. For instance, the U.S. is experiencing the weakest population growth since the 1930s and the lowest fertility rate since the records began. There has been a slowdown in the growth rate of household formation, and the U.S. has a rapidly aging society.
Economic growth. For the full calendar year 2016, nominal GDP rose just 3.0%, the weakest reported since 2009. Last year’s growth rate was even less than the cyclical lows associated with the recessions of 1990-91 and 2000-01. Rather unusually, at the March FOMC meeting, the Fed did not change its 2017 economic growth projections even though the broader first quarter indicators were even softer than last year, and their prior forecasts were made before they hiked the funds rate in December. Indeed, all of the key monetary variables that are heavily influenced by Fed policy operations deteriorated in the first quarter. Despite the lowest annual economic growth rate of this expansion and the second straight year of declining growth, no fiscal stimulus is expected for 2017. Monetary restraint implemented in late 2015 and 2016 has been followed by further restraint in 2017. How can the U.S. economy surge ahead this year with this additional restraint?
Debt. Total domestic nonfinancial debt, excluding off balance sheet liabilities such as leases and unfunded pension liabilities, surged to a record 254.8% of GDP in 2016, 5.6% greater than in 2009 when Lehman Brothers failed (Chart 2). Total debt, which includes domestic nonfinancial, foreign and bank debt, amounted to 372.5% of GDP in 2016, compared with 251.9% of GDP in 2006, the final year of previous tightening cycle, which, in turn, was greater than in any earlier time from 1870 through 2006.
The situation in the business sector deserves particular scrutiny. Business debt surged to a record 72.6% of GDP in 2016, for the first time eclipsing the prior peak of 70.2% reached in 2009. With the business sector so levered, not much room for miscalculation exists. As such, the risk is clearly present that the Fed’s restraint will chase out one or more heavily leveraged players, just as was the case in all the previous tightening cycles since the 1960s. Academic studies reflect that economic growth slows with over-indebtedness. Thus a powerful negative headwind is reinforcing the present monetary tightening.
The Fed Encounters Problems of Grand Design
Two macroeconomic textbooks (one written by Andrew B. Able (Wharton Professor) and Ben S. Bernanke (former Fed Chairman) and the other by N. Gregory Mankiw (Harvard Professor) both discuss over several chapters the transmission mechanism of monetary policy operations to the broader economy. Although they differ in some technical aspects, they both describe a very similar process as to how Fed restraint impacts economic conditions. Their independently taught process exactly describes what is unfolding in the reserve aggregates, short-term interest rates, bank loan volumes and the monetary aggregates today. However, the established process may more severely impact the economy because these actions are being taken in the aftermath of three unprecedented rounds of quantitative easing that have led to a massively enlarged Fed balance sheet (an action of “grand design”) coupled with the legislative adoption of the Dodd-Frank Law.
The late American sociologist, Robert K. Merton (1910-2003), who originated the concept of “unintended consequences”, identified the problems that arise when policy implements theories of grand design. Merton believed that middle range theories are superior to larger theories of grand design because larger theory outcomes are too distant for policy makers to realize how actions and reactions will change from the middle range theories under which they have typically operated. Merton argued that when dealing with broader, more abstract and untested theories, no effective way exists to test their success in advance.
We believe these are problems the Fed is already facing as their actions have changed the monetary landscape from previous periods of monetary restraint. The Fed (and the entire economy) is now caught in a new format that never existed, and thus is without the ability to anticipate the outcomes to policy because there is no historical reference point. We suspect that the results of the Fed’s tighter policies will be exacerbated by its own balance sheet and by the larger cash and liquidity requirements mandated by the Dodd-Frank Law. Not only must the textbooks be rewritten because of these legal and structural changes, but the Fed may also have to change the way it thinks about monetary policy’s transmission mechanism.
Contractions in the Monetary Base
To raise the policy rate, i.e., the federal funds rate, it is the theoretical norm for the Fed to act on the reserve aggregates, the most prominent of which is the monetary base and its subcomponents – total reserves and excess reserves. Able/Bernanke and Mankiw detail how changes in both influence economic conditions. The base, which is derived from a consolidated financial balance sheet of the Fed and Treasury, has an asset and liability side. On the latter, the base equals currency and total reserves. While the Fed does not have total command of the reserve aggregates in the short run, effective control is achieved over time.
The base is the key variable. If no fractional reserve-banking system existed, the liability side of the monetary base would be totally comprised of currency in circulation. In such an environment the central bank would have no power to change economic activity. On the other extreme, under a fractional reserve banking system where no one is allowed to hold any currency at all, the liability side of the monetary base would equal total reserves of the banking system. Changes in the Fed’s portfolio of assets would result in dollar for dollar changes in bank reserves. This still might not greatly change the central bank’s economic power. Whether depository institutions would put all of the total reserves to use in creating money and credit would still depend on a whole host of other considerations, including interest rates, the capital of the banks, the balance sheet of the potential nonbank borrowers and numerous other factors.
Historically, the higher funds rate was reached by a slower but still positive growth rate in the monetary base. This caused the upward- sloping credit supply curve to shift inward, thus hitting the downward sloping credit demand curve at a higher interest rate level. In graphic terms, the price of credit, which is the vertical component of a supply and demand diagram, is the policy rate, and the horizontal component is the volume demand for credit. The shift in the supply curve reduces the depository institutions capability to make loans while the higher interest rate also serves to reduce the demand for credit. The textbook writers do not add to the complexity of interest rate changes when, like now, the economy is heavily indebted. A small increase in interest rates leads to a large and quick increase in interest expense. But, current conditions differ from the textbook cases due to two powerful considerations.
First, in the initial quarter of 2017, the year-over-year change in the monetary base was -4.8%. This comes after sharp contractions in each of the previous four quarters, the largest such decreases since the end of World War II (Chart 3). Some argue that this unprecedented weakness in the monetary base is not relevant since the depository institutions still hold $2.1 trillion of excess reserves (defined as the difference between total reserves and required reserves). The textbook writers emphasize that excess reserves are the key to money and credit expansion. But, the multiple expansion of bank reserves so diligently explained in the textbooks was written for a regulatory environment that no longer exists, which is the second different condition.
Beginning in 2015, large banks as well as banks with substantial foreign exposure are required to have a 100% or greater “liquidity coverage ratio” (LCR). This means the banks must hold an amount of highly liquid assets (such as reserve balances at the Federal Reserve Banks and Treasury securities) equal to or greater than the difference between their cash outflows and inflows over a 30-day stress period. Thus, excess reserves are irrelevant to the money creation process if the reserve balances are needed to achieve a 100% LCR. In line with the decline in excess reserves, there has been a dramatic reduction in bank liquidity, which has fallen nearly 17% (Chart 4). This reduction brings bank liquidity much closer to its LCR, altering bank management practices. Based upon an examination of all the monetary indicators closely linked to the policy rate and the reserve aggregates, the probability exists that the Fed, with three small increases in the fed eral funds rate, has now turned the money / credit creation process negative.
The Monetary and Credit Aggregates Respond
Since the Fed raised the federal funds rate in December 2015, the growth rates of the monetary and credit aggregates have slowed. In addition, banks have pursued tightening credit standards. As such, these developments are indicative of the changed ground rules.
In the past six months, the M2 money stock grew at a 5.9% annual rate, down from a 2016 increase of 6.8%, which is near the average increase in M2 since 1900. Thus, in a very short span, M2 has fallen from a trend rate of growth onto a slower path. The additional rate increase in March suggests that M2’s growth rate will moderate further over the remainder of the year. U.S. Treasury balances at the Federal Reserve Banks fell sharply in the first quarter due to extraordinary measures used to avoid hitting the debt ceiling. Dropping Treasury balances, all other things being equal, would boost M2. Thus a normalization of Treasury balances, assuming a debt ceiling resolution, will tend to slow M2 growth further.
Growth in the credit aggregates has slumped even more dramatically than M2, thus confirming and reinforcing the significance of the weakness in money. Growth in total commercial bank loans and leases slowed from an 8.0% rise in the first quarter of 2016 to 5.0% in the fourth quarter of last year. Although the figures for the first quarter are not yet complete and subject to revision, bank loans were essentially unchanged. Commercial and industrial loans, however, actually fell in the first quarter, a substantial turnaround from the 10.8% rate of increase in the first quarter of 2016. Residential real estate loans also fell in the first quarter, compared with a 4.0% rate of rise in the first quarter of 2016. Consumer loan growth remained positive in the first quarter, but the rate of increase was sharply cut.
The most notable credit aggregate – total bank loans and leases plus nonfinancial commercial paper – has turned increasingly weak. In March this broad credit measure was just 4% higher than a year earlier and one half the peak growth rate registered in this current economic expansion that began in 2009 (Chart 5). As seen in Chart 5, the year-over-year changes in this aggregate indicate this is a very cyclically sensitive economic indicator. The year-over-year growth peaked prior to, or in the early stages of, all the recessions since 1969. Moreover, the latest growth rate is slower than at the entry point of the past seven recessions. In the last three months, no growth was registered in total loans and nonfinancial commercial paper. Historically, the three-month growth has not been this weak until the economy is already in recession.
Traditionally, money and credit slowdowns have resulted in tighter bank lending standards, and this is currently the case. In the first quarter survey of senior bank lending officers, almost 10% of the banks were tightening standards for both credit card and other consumer type loans. This was almost identical to the percentage when the economy entered the 2000 and 2008 recessions. Standards for commercial real estate loans have also been raised and in the first quarter were just below the levels when the economy entered the last two recessions.
In summary, monetary restraint is taking hold in all the different ways of measuring the Fed’s actions in a late stage expansion where historically the final result was either a recession, a financial crisis or both.
Repeated Results
A century of Federal Reserve tightening cycles has left an indelible mark on the U.S. business cycle. Looking at the period from 1915 through the present, the Fed has typically tightened too much and/or for too long. From this long history, a well-established pattern is identifiable. The economic growth rate along with inflation receded. A financial crisis was more likely than not. With different lags, which were influenced by the initial conditions, bond yields dropped along with falling inflationary expectations (Chart 6). The cyclical trough in Treasury bond yields typically occurred several years after the end of the economic contraction. This long empirical record, as well as economic theory, indicates that the current Fed tightening cycle will not end any differently.
Looking Ahead
Our economic view for 2017 remains unchanged. We continue to anticipate no more than 2% growth in nominal GDP for the full calendar year. This is in line with the recent trends in M2 growth coupled with an anticipated decline in M2 velocity of 3.6% (M2*V=GDP). The risks, however, are to the downside. M2 was probably boosted by what will eventually be a transitory drop in Treasury balances at the Fed. Although not the main determinant, a rise in short-term rates would negatively influence velocity. The downturn in nominal GDP growth suggests that a rise in inflation to above 2% will be rejected and that by year end the inflation rate will be considerably slower. In such an economic environment long-term Treasury yields should continue to work irregularly lower over the balance of the year.
Our view on bond yields does not change if the Fed further boosts the federal funds rate this year. Any additional increases will place further downward pressure on the reserve, monetary and credit aggregates as well as tighten bank lending standards. Such actions will not allow the economy to regain the economic momentum that was lost in 2016 and in the early part of this year. Thus, the secular low in bond yields remains in the future, not the past.
Van R. Hoisington
Lacy H. Hunt, Ph.D.

Sunday, 28 February 2016

Mervyn King in the Guardian! Who would have thought it?


Mervyn King: ‘Failure to tackle the disequilibrium in the world economy makes it likely that a crisis will come sooner rather than later.’
 Mervyn King: ‘Failure to tackle the disequilibrium in the world economy makes it likely that a crisis will come sooner rather than later.’ Photograph: Philip Toscano/PA

Mervyn King: new financial crisis is 'certain' without reform of banks


Another financial crisis is “certain” and will come sooner rather than later, the former Bank of England governor has warned.


Mervyn King, who headed the bank between 2003 and 2013, believes the world economy will soon face another crash as regulators have failed to reform banking.
He has also claimed that the 2008 crisis was the fault of the financial system, not individual greedy bankers, in his new book, The End Of Alchemy: Money, Banking And The Future Of The Global Economy, serialised in The Telegraph.
“Without reform of the financial system, another crisis is certain, and the failure ... to tackle the disequilibrium in the world economy makes it likely that it will come sooner rather than later,” Lord King wrote.
He added that global central banks were caught in a “prisoner’s dilemma” - unable to raise interest rates for fear of stifling the economic recovery, the newspaper reported. 
A remark from a Chinese colleague who said the west had not got the hang of money and banking was the inspiration for his book.
Lord King, 67, said without understanding what caused the crash, politicians and bankers would be unable to prevent another, and lays the blame at the door of a broken financial system.
He said: “The crisis was a failure of a system, and the ideas that underpinned it, not of individual policymakers or bankers, incompetent and greedy though some of them undoubtedly were.”
Spending imbalances both within and between countries led to the crisis in 2008 and he believes a current disequilibrium will lead to the next.
To solve the problem, Lord King suggests raising productivity and boldly reforming the banking system.
He said: “Only a fundamental rethink of how we, as a society, organise our system of money and banking will prevent a repetition of the crisis that we experienced in 2008.”
Lord King was in charge of the Bank of England when the credit crunch struck in 2007, leading to the collapse of Northern Rock and numerous other British lenders, including RBS, and has been criticised for failing to see the global financial crisis coming.