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“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label bond vigilantes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bond vigilantes. Show all posts

Thursday, 9 January 2025

Get up to date with borrowing costs and associated problems

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JULIET SAMUEL

Bond crisis leaves Rachel Reeves with nowhere to go

Surging borrowing costs have put the chancellor in a precarious position and Trump policies may cause further trouble

The Times

Well, this is awkward. Just months ago Labour swept to victory with a promise to usher in a wonderful new era of extremely boring sensibleness. Out with the clownish, wet lettuce Tories and their car crash economics, in with Rachel “Treasury” Reeves and her menacingly stiff bob. “Stability is the change,” as Keir Starmer inspiringly told a grateful nation.

And now look at what’s happened. Borrowing costs are soaring. They’re higher than when Liz Truss thumbed her nose at bond markets. Long-term borrowing costs are higher than they were just before the financial crisis. The last time His Majesty’s government had to offer investors yields this high, Tony Blair had just taken office and gilt markets were still on their long comedown from Black Wednesday.

It’s looking so bad that all the boffins are already predicting Reeves will have to come crawling back to parliament with more tax rises in the spring, breaking yet another promise (on top of the promise not to raise taxes) that she wouldn’t go around fiddling with fiscal policy all the time.

And thanks to Reeves’s own bill, the Budget Responsibility Act, shoved through parliament within weeks of the election, any fiscal fiddling now requires the Office for Budget Responsibility to produce a full-blown forecast, with charts and slides and lots of chin-stroking showing how utterly awful it all is. Unless, of course, she wishes to make use of the only legal loophole she granted herself, of declaring her measures a “temporary response to an emergency”. This in turn would surely require the chancellor to change her haircut to some kind of Mohican or frazzled professor look, giving the game away completely.

In its extremely lukewarm response to the chancellor’s first budget, the OBR predicted that all her extra spending would raise the cost of government borrowing over time. The yield on five-year gilts (ie the annual interest cost of borrowing for five years) was around 3.8 per cent, which the OBR had forecast would creep up to 4.1 per cent by 2030. The budget, it predicted, would push that up to 4.5 per cent. It turns out this was wildly optimistic. In fact, five-year yields shot over 4.5 per cent yesterday, less than three months after the budget that was meant to bring back sensible.

Reeves’s fundamental mistake was to believe that by demonstrating the proper respect for bond markets she could get everything to go back to normal. She failed to confront the truth that the old “normal” is gone, banished by the Covid borrowing splurge, the return of inflation, the ineptitude of central banks and the can-kicking simply reaching the end of a very long road. The Truss fiasco wasn’t the cause of the change; it was simply the most reckless and destabilising way of revealing it.

• Juliet Samuel: Tech firm’s fate shows Trump is right on China

The proximate reasons why we cannot keep the show on the road any more are that our economy is not productive enough to sustain it, the state, in particular, is too inefficient, our population is ageing too quickly and migration is now costing the exchequer money instead of saving it. But looming over these considerable domestic concerns is a larger, even more intractable global problem in the form of US policy.

Starmer and co have plenty of reasons to loathe the Trump administration, but this week’s kerfuffle in gilt markets gave them yet another one. They could argue credibly that it is market anticipation of Trump economic policies that prompted the sell-off in gilts over here. When Reeves unveiled her budget in the autumn, the conventional wisdom was that global interest rates were generally on their way down, thanks to lower inflation and slowing growth. But the conventional wisdom was wrong, especially after the US election. Inflation does not appear to have been tamed as comprehensively as most investors thought and the usual suspects are now convinced that Trump will make it worse by cutting taxes, raising tariffs and deporting millions of migrant workers.

Whether or not this is correct (and such predictions proved wrong last time around), the US continues to suck in stocks of the world’s surplus cash to feed its vast spending on government programmes and consumption. Every other country that similarly relies on a constant inflow of money from elsewhere to finance itself, funded by constantly selling assets like bonds or houses, is in competition for the same cash. And Britain has relied on foreign cash for years. Our rising borrowing costs are an indication that we are having to work ever harder to keep it all going.

How the Trump show plays out is extremely difficult to predict. Based on what happened last time, tariffs seem unlikely to have too much of a malign effect on their own, especially if the US taxes other countries more than it taxes Britain. But there are so many moving parts: what happens to the dollar and what Trump decides to do about it, whether he embraces a radical new approach, like capital controls, how much he cuts taxes, how many workers America needs and how many it gets, what the impact of artificial intelligence is on jobs and growth and, crucially, whether Elon Musk can fulfil his vow to purge the government of wasteful spending.

This last point, perversely, leaves Starmer and Reeves in the position of having to hope their evil billionaire nemesis can pull it off. Every dollar the US can avoid borrowing potentially leaves an extra 80p in the big global lending pot for Britain.

We all know that Reeves isn’t to blame for how the US taxes widgets, but she has certainly played a bad hand very badly indeed. Entering what promised to be a hugely turbulent era, she left herself almost no room for manoeuvre, fiscally or politically, and six months in, has used it all up and more. In opposition she killed off Labour’s plans for green spending and higher welfare. In government she has annoyed pensioners and attacked business. If, after all of this, she can’t even deliver placid bond markets, then even Starmer will be forced to start asking the question: what exactly is Rachel Reeves for?

In long-form interviews before the general election, the chancellor liked to humble-brag about how, in her geeky university days, she had a treasured picture of Gordon Brown on her college room wall. Politely, no one pointed out how those glory days ended, with that plaintive cry in 2008: “It started in America.” As any keen student of Treasury lore could tell you, the line didn’t work for Gordon and, when the time comes, it won’t work for Rachel either.

Friday, 6 December 2024

Have a look at the options for France:

 

For his next stunt, will Emmanuel Macron invoke emergency powers?

The impact of the French president’s dangerous pyrotechnics is making it easier for him to justify recourse to Article 16

French President Emmanuel Macron, right, and Prime Minister Michel Barnier
Macron could reasonably argue that failure to pass a budget prevents the country from fulfilling its EU treaty commitments Credit: Ludovic Marin/POOL AFP

France will have to face the discipline of the global debt markets on its own. The European Central Bank (ECB) cannot legitimately intervene to hold down French borrowing costs unless, and until, the country faces a full-blown financial crisis.

If the ECB were to abuse its legal powers to let France off the hook, it would set off a political and legal storm, and further erode German confidence in the management of the euro.

“France will have to face fiscal reality and dig itself out of the hole that it has dug itself into,” said Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Germany’s Berenberg Bank.

“Nobody on the governing council wants to get mixed up in a French problem. The ECB will intervene only if there is contagion to other countries, or if the spreads reach ludicrous levels,” he said.

That point has not been reached. There is no contagion. Risk spreads on 10-year French bonds over German Bunds have settled at around 80 basis points, and have not risen further since the collapse of the Barnier government.

The market reaction is so far surprisingly gentle, given the dangerous pyrotechnics of Emmanuel Macron over the last two and a half years – which have rendered France literally ungovernable with a fiscal deficit heading towards 7pc of GDP next year.

Some suspect that he would prefer a harsh verdict from the bond vigilantes. The worse the spread, the easier it is for him to justify recourse to Article 16 – the constitutional clause that allows him to assume emergency powers. The “Korean” solution, without the added touch of stormtroopers.

Agnès Verdier-Molinié, the director of French Institute of Public Administration and Politics (IFRAP), says the sorcerer’s apprentices who blocked the budget and defenestrated Barnier on Wednesday have set off a chain of events that they may regret. She thinks Macron will up the ante, invoking the fiscal crisis to pull the trigger on Article 16.

The powers can be invoked if there is a threat to the “execution of France’s international obligations”. Benjamin Morel, a political scientist at Paris-Panthéon, said Macron could reasonably argue that failure to pass a budget prevents the country from fulfilling its EU treaty commitments.

He told Ouest-France, the French newspaper, that France is the only country in Europe where the president can assume these pleins pouvoirs at his own discretion. “Everywhere else it is a separate body that authorises them,” he said.

Charles de Gaulle invoked Article 16 in 1961 following the Algiers putsch by retired army officers. It gave him the temporary powers of a Roman dictator, which he rolled over for almost six months, spicing it up with eyewash about a Communist “revolution from the inside”.

Activation of the clause requires both a “grave and immediate” threat, and a breakdown in the regular functioning of the state. The Constitutional Council can issue an opinion after 60 days. “It remains only an opinion. It does not oblige the president to change tack,” said Mr Morel.

Would Macron really pull such a stunt? Perhaps, if his next premier faces instant dismissal. He might calculate that his enemies could never command the two-thirds majority in both the assembly and the senate necessary to impeach him. But if he did take this fateful step, the nation would erupt. He raised the spectre of “civil war” in June. Article 16 almost invites it.

France risks slow ruin – as does Britain – but it does not face an imminent financial crisis. French spreads approached Greek levels last week but that is a nonsense story, promoted by Barnier himself in a catastrophist effort to sell his rejected budget. Greece is shielded from market forces. Most of its bonds are held by bail-out bodies.

French debt has an average maturity of 8.6 years. It takes a long time for higher borrowing costs to feed through. The growth rate of nominal GDP is still above the average interest rate. Debt dynamics have not yet succumbed to a snowball effect, though that safety margin could vanish if the eurozone core relapses into recession, which may already be happening.

Nevertheless, French yields have been higher than Spanish or Portuguese yields for months. This is an extraordinary development and a warning to the French political class that their country no longer enjoys an exorbitant privilege as co-anchor of monetary union.

The ECB cannot salve French amour propre. It was able to prop up high-debt countries during the deflation years by purchasing €5 trillions (£4.1 trillions) of bonds under the cover of quantitative easing. That is no longer impossible.

The bank has since invented an anti-spread shield (TPI) but has never dared to use it, and for good reason – it is highly contentious and a flaming violation of the no-bail clause in the Lisbon Treaty.

The ECB arrogated to itself the power to buy distressed bonds as it sees fit, but only on behalf of countries that pursue a) “sound fiscal and macroeconomic policies”; b) are not “subject to an excessive deficit procedure”; c) do not have “severe macroeconomic imbalances”; d) where the “trajectory of public debt is sustainable”; and e) where stress is “not warranted by country-specific fundamentals”.

France is in breach of every one.

Markets are betting that the ECB will find some way around this. No doubt it will, in extremis. But Isabel Schnabel, Germany’s enforcer on the governing council, has a message for them. The TPI can only be used to “tackle disorderly dynamics” and to “prevent destabilising interest rate spirals, which might otherwise drag the euro area into a severe crisis”.

Any sustained help would require a “macroeconomic adjustment programme”, which means an austerity package by the EU bail-out fund (ESM) – and probably an IMF regime, given the scale of France’s €3.3 trillion debt.

This would come with tough conditions and require a vote in the German and Dutch parliaments. There is zero possibility that Left-wing Popular Front or Marine Le Pen’s Eurosceptic nationalists would accept such terms, or any terms at all.

Macron is back at square one, but in an even weaker position, amid mounting calls for his own resignation. “No confidence, no government, no budget, no solution,” was the pithy verdict of Arnaud Marès, chief European economist at Citigroup.

The idea of a technocrat coalition is a fool’s illusion in a great political nation like France. There are only two permutations that can plausibly deliver a government. Both are explosive.

Either Macron swallows his pride, lets the Left take charge as the largest bloc, throws what remains of his inglorious party behind it in cohabitation, and accepts that much of his seven-year edifice will be torn down.

Or, he eats his rhetoric, lifts the cynical cordon sanitaire that is so corrupting French politics, accepts that Le Pen’s 11m voters are a legitimate political community, and reaches a pact with her National Rally, ministers and all.

That is to say, he must do overtly what he has been trying to do on the sly whilst hiding behind Barnier. This would lead to a general strike and mass demonstrations, but it would lance the boil.

Macron caused this crisis by systematically destroying the centre-Left and the centre-Right, aiming to construct a nouvel ordre in the centre for his own Jupiterian glorification.

He succeeded in the first part, even if in nothing else. He refused to back down when this blew up in his face in 2022, opting ever since to ram through his agenda against popular and parliamentary will by executive decree.

Nothing can be resolved until Macron either falls on his sword or learns the meaning of democracy and falls on his knees at Canossa.