Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label deficit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label deficit. Show all posts

Sunday, 17 March 2019

China & Trade Balances

Strange though it may seem China is close to a trade deficit. This has wide-ranging implications - make sure you are aware of them:

That china sells more to the world than it buys from it can seem like an immutable feature of the economic landscape. Every year for a quarter of a century China has run a current-account surplus (roughly speaking, the sum of its trade balance and net income from foreign investments). This surplus has been blamed for various evils including the decline of Western manufacturing and the flooding of America’s bond market with the excess savings that fuelled the subprime housing bubble.

Yet the surplus may soon disappear. In 2019 China could well run its first annual current-account deficit since 1993. The shift from lender to borrower will create a knock-on effect, gradually forcing it to attract more foreign capital and liberalise its financial system. China’s government is only slowly waking up to this fact. America’s trade negotiators, meanwhile, seem not to have noticed it at all. Instead of focusing on urging China to free its financial system, they are more concerned that China keep the yuan from falling. The result of this myopia is a missed opportunity for both sides.

China’s decades of surpluses reflected the fact that for years it saved more than it invested. Thrifty households hoarded cash. The rise of great coastal manufacturing clusters meant exporters earned more revenues than even China could reinvest. But now that has begun to change. Consumers are splashing out on cars, smartphones and designer clothes. Chinese tourists are spending immense sums overseas (see article). As the population grows older the national savings rate will fall further, because more people in retirement will draw down their savings.

Whether or not China actually slips into deficit this year will be determined mostly by commodities prices. But the trend in saving and investment is clear: the country will soon need to adjust to a new reality in which deficits are the norm. That in turn means that China will need to attract net capital inflows—the mirror image of a current-account deficit. To some extent this is happening. China has eased quotas for foreigners buying bonds and shares directly, and made it simpler for them to invest in mainland securities via schemes run by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Pension funds and mutual funds all over the world are considering increasing their exposure to China.

But the reforms remain limited. Ordinary Chinese citizens face restrictions on how much money they can take out. If many foreign investors tried to pull their money out of China at once it is not clear that they would be able to do so, an uncertainty that in turn may make them nervous about putting large sums in. China is terrified of financial instability. A botched currency reform in 2015 caused widespread volatility. But the system the country is moving to, which treats locals and foreigners differently, promises to be leaky, corrupt and unstable.

Eventually, then, capital will need to flow freely in both directions across China’s borders. That is to be welcomed. People outside and inside China will benefit from being able to invest in more places. The need for freer capital flows will have the welcome side-effect of forcing China to reform its state-dominated financial system, not least so that it commands confidence among international investors. This in turn will mean that market forces play a bigger role in allocating capital in China.

You might expect America’s trade negotiators to welcome all of this, and urge China to free its financial system. Unfortunately they seem stuck in the past. Obsessed with the idea that China might depress its currency to boost exports, they are reportedly insisting it commit itself to a stable yuan. That is wrong-headed and self-defeating. Rather than fighting yesterday’s currency wars, America should urge China to prepare for the future.

Wednesday, 27 February 2019

Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) debunked

Modern Monetary Theory was mentioned in a recent CPD event, so some schools will be looking at it. It is extension material, rather than required reading, although the more basic points are elements you will recognise from our lessons on inflation and crowding out. There is a very nice, accessible explanation of the issues associated with using the printing press to fund government investment at the end, worth reading to help explain this particular issue. For those of you interested in how the future will develop you might like to remember (and keep an eye on) the term "AOC" - it is included in a lot of economic and political discussion taking place in America, and thus will affect developments elsewhere. You might want to look at Amazon's decision NOT to build a new HQ in NY as well. Slightly bigger issue than Honda leaving Swindon...

MMT Is Even More Dubious Than AOC's Green New Deal

02/25/2019
One of the most interesting aspects of the “Green New Deal” is that its progressive proponents hardly mention taxes at all—even as some Republican economists continue to champion a carbon tax. Faced with the political defeat of the Waxman-Markey “cap and trade” bill, as well as the failed carbon tax initiatives in Washington State, it seems that Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and the other Green New Deal supporters are just going to accentuate the positive. In other words, they are going to focus on all the goodies contained in their proposals—such as a trillion dollars in spending projects—while downplaying taxes and regulations.
Indeed, some of the Green New Deal proponents have turned this liability into an apparent asset. When asked, “How are you going to pay for this?!” they flip the question around, by bringing up “Modern Monetary Theory,” or “MMT” for short. This is a relatively new economic school of thought that ostensibly overturns much of the conventional wisdom about government finance, in the age of fiat money. By directing the skeptics to MMT gurus like Prof. Stephanie Kelton—who served as Chief Economist for the Democratic Minority Staff of the Senate Budget Committee, before advising Bernie Sanders’ campaign—the Green New Dealers can dodge awkward questions and come out looking quite sophisticated.
In previous IER articles — onetwo, and three — I have directly criticized the Green New Deal. In the present post, I will focus on its relationship to MMT, and then I will explain why MMT is even more dubious than the Green New Deal itself.

Using MMT to Defend the Green New Deal

There is a growing link between the Green New Deal and MMT on social media, but here let me link to an article from Forbes.com that spells out the connection. Author Robert Hockett explains how Ocasio-Cortez has deflected criticism by relying on the new financial framework:
Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s announcement of an ambitious new Green New Deal Initiative in Congress has brought predictable – and predictably silly – callouts from conservative pundits and scared politicians. ‘How will we pay for it?,’ they ask with pretend-incredulity, and ‘what about debt?’ ‘Won’t we have to raise taxes, and will that not crowd-out the job creators?’
Representative Ocasio-Cortez already has given the best answer possible to such queries, most of which seem to be raised in bad faith. Why is it, she retorts, that these questions arise only in connection with useful ideas, not wasteful ideas? Where were the ‘pay-fors’ for Bush’s $5 trillion wars and tax cuts, or for last year’s $2 trillion tax giveaway to billionaires? Why wasn’t financing those massive throwaways as scary as financing the rescue of our planet and middle class now seems to be to these naysayers?
The short answer to ‘how we will pay for’ the Green New Deal is easy. We’ll pay for it just as we pay for all else: Congress will authorize necessary spending, and Treasury will spend. This is how we do it – always has been, always will be.
The money that’s spent, for its part, is never ‘raised’ first. To the contrary, federal spending is what brings that money into existence.
Although Hockett doesn’t use the term “MMT” directly in the article, he is clearly referring to the framework. (Ocasio-Cortez herself has explicitly endorsed MMT.) And so we see the clever rhetorical move: The critics of the Green New Deal who focus on its price tag are cast as Neanderthals—and hypocrites to boot—who don’t understand that Uncle Sam can “pay for” anything he wants.
Indeed, given the shot in the arm from Ocasio-Cortez, MMT is becoming such a hot topic that even Paul Krugman has been moved to gently critique it. (Incidentally, when Paul Krugman warns that your economic philosophy downplays the dangers of government spending, it’s time to reevaluate your life choices.) In the same spirit, then, in the rest of this post I’ll explain why the “insights” of MMT don’t mean what its proponents seem to think.

The U.S. Government Never Needs to Default

Perhaps the single biggest “insight” of the MMT camp is that the United States government, as an issuer of an unbacked fiat currency and an entity that doesn’t carry significant foreign debts, can never become legally insolvent. In short, no matter how many Treasury securities outsiders hold, ultimately the Federal Reserve can simply create more dollars in order to pay them off. Under a gold standard this would not be true, but ever since 1971, the U.S. government has had no official constraints on its spending.
This is why MMTers think it so old-fashioned when the critics ask, “How will you pay for the Green New Deal?”—or Medicare For All, a Universal Basic Income, etc. To ask, “How will you pay for it?” implies that there is a budget, where the federal government must first raise revenue and then spend it. But as the MMT gurus like Warren Mosler explain, under a fiat currency a government first spends the money in order to bring it into existence, and only then is it even possible to tax it back from the citizens. (This MMT mindset is quite clear in Mosler’s interview with me on my podcast.)
I hate to break it to the MMTers, but fuddy-duddy economists already knew this. Indeed, among free-market economists it is a standard pedagogical device to tell the audience that the government has three ways of financing its spending, namely (1) taxes, (2) borrowing, or (3) inflation. So this notion that only the MMTers perceive the possibility of the printing press as a means of “paying for” government programs is silly.
For proof, consider the following excerpt from Austrian economist Murray Rothbard’s economics treatise, Man, Economy, and State, published in 1962:
Many “right-wing” opponents of public borrowing, on the other hand, have greatly exaggerated the dangers of the public debt and have raised persistent alarms about imminent “bankruptcy.” It is obvious that the government cannot become “insolvent” like private individuals—for it can always obtain money by coercion, while private citizens cannot. (Rothbard, p. 1028, bold added.)
Here is another example, this one from Ludwig von Mises, speaking in 1951 on wartime finance:
What is needed in wartime is to divert production and consumption from peacetime channels toward military goals. In order to achieve this, it is necessary for the government to tax the citizens…
Part of the funds may also be provided by borrowing from the public, the citizens. But if the Treasury increases the amount of money in circulation or borrows from the commercial banks, it inflates. Inflation can do the job for a limited time. But it is the most expensive method of financing a war; it is socially disruptive and should be avoided. 
There is no need to dwell upon the disastrous consequences of inflation. All people agree in this regard. But inflation is a very convenient makeshift for those in power. It is a handy means to divert the resentment of the people from the government. In the eyes of the masses, big business, the “profiteers,” the merchants, not the Administration, appear responsible for the rise in prices and the ensuing need to restrict consumption.
A truly democratic government would have to tell the voters openly that they must pay higher taxes because expenses have risen considerably. But it is much more agreeable for a government to present only a part of the bill to the people and to resort to inflation for the rest of its expenditures. What a triumph if they can say: Everybody’s income is rising, everybody has now more money in his pocket, business is booming. (Mises, bold added.)
For a third and final example, here is Henry Hazlitt, writing in his classic book Economics in One Lesson, which came out way back in 1946:
It is because inflation confuses everything that it is so consistently resorted to by our modern “planned economy” governments. We saw in chapter four, to take but one example, that the belief that public works necessarily create new jobs is false. If the money was raised by taxation, we saw, then for every dollar that the government spent on public works one less dollar was spent by the taxpayers to meet their own wants, and for every public job created one private job was destroyed.
But suppose the public works are not paid for from the proceeds of taxation? Suppose they are paid for by deficit financing—that is, from the proceeds of government borrowing or from resort to the printing press? Then the result just described does not seem to take place. The public works seem to be created out of “new” purchasing power. You cannot say that the purchasing power has been taken away from the taxpayers. For the moment the nation seems to have got something for nothing. (Hazlitt, bold added.)
As the above examples illustrate, there is nothing new under the sun. Free-market economists have long understood that modern governments have the legal ability to resort to the printing press to finance their expenditures. The problem is, creating green slips of paper—or electronic bank reserves—doesn’t generate more labor-hours or acres of farmland. The problem of scarcity isn’t banished simply because we’ve gotten rid of the pesky gold standard.

Moving the Discussion From Revenue to Inflation

Now to be fair, the more responsible MMT proponents do not say, “Deficits don’t matter.” (Though see these examples from Bill Mitchell where he does say just that, notwithstanding the other MMTers’ willful refusal to admit as such.) Rather, people like Warren Mosler and Stephanie Kelton merely point out that insolvency is never an issue. In other words, we don’t need to worry that Uncle Sam will “go broke” or be unable to pay the bills, but we might worry that too much spending will lead to undesirably high price inflation.
But if this is the essential MMT insight, then it’s old news. Again, the three examples from the previous section show that classically liberal, free-market economists have known this all along. What those economists recognized, however, is that financing government spending through taxation (and to a lesser extent, borrowing) is more “honest” in the sense that the public can better understand the actual costs involved.
Consider a simple example: Suppose the Green New Deal contains a proposal to spend $24.8 billion on electric vehicle mass transit options in certain cities. If the proposal were financed by a flat $100 tax on every adult American (of which there are about 248 million), then it would be obvious what “the cost” of the proposal was. Every adult American would have $100 less to spend on private investment or consumption, and the government would devote the $24.8 billion in funds to the “green” infrastructure projects.
But what if, instead, the Treasury floated $24.8 billion in additional bonds—thus increasing the federal budget deficit—and the Federal Reserve kept interest rates from rising by creating $24.8 billion in new money with which it bought $24.8 billion in Treasuries from the bond market? This would be a convoluted way of having the Fed effectively “pay for” the projects using the (electronic) printing press.
The political benefit of this method of finance is that no American is apparently “down” any money, and yet the lucky cities get their infrastructure projects, with all of the spillover effects (in terms of construction jobs, etc.) they entail. It seems that inflationary finance is all gain, no pain.
But of course, in reality real resources are still being diverted from the private sector into the channels dictated by the political process. The construction workers who move to the cities in question are now no longer able to work on private buildings or houses. The rubber, cement, steel, glass, lumber, and other materials devoted to the new projects are not available for use in other possible projects elsewhere in the economy.
When all is said and done, the average American still “pays for” the new government spending, but via higher prices. In other words, rather than the average American’s income dropping by $100, instead the prices of other goods and services rise slightly, so that the original income no longer fetches as much stuff in the market.
However, the two methods are not equivalent. Most obvious, the source of the (real) income drain is harder to detect under inflation. If a family can’t make ends meet because of taxes, then it knows to blame the government. But if a family sees prices rising at the store faster than the paychecks from work, it might blame greedy capitalists or trade unions or OPEC; it might not realize the Federal Reserve is the true culprit.

Conclusion

The MMTers are “right” in the sense that yes, modern governments that issue fiat currency need never default on their bonds. But they are wrong if they think this observation absolves Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez from explaining how she will pay for the Green New Deal. The printing press doesn’t create real resources, it only obscures the method by which the government siphons them away from the private sector.
To be sure, MMTers would respond that the economy currently suffers from excess capacity, and then we could safely accommodate large deficit finance without pushing up the CPI. Yet we have now moved beyond accounting tautologies and into competing theories of how the economy works. I am happy to have that debate as well, but much of the existing discussion involves MMTers acting as if they alone understand that the government can buy stuff by printing money. Yes, free-market economists have understood that all along, and have explained in elementary detail why it is such a dangerous option.
Originally published at the Institute for Energy Research
Robert P. Murphy is a Senior Fellow with the Mises Institute and Research Assistant Professor with the Free Market Institute at Texas Tech University. He is the author of many books. His latest is Contra Krugman: Smashing the Errors of America's Most Famous KeynesianHis other words include Chaos Theory, Lessons for the Young Economist, and Choice: Cooperation, Enterprise, and Human Action (Independent Institute, 2015) which is a modern distillation of the essentials of Mises's thought for the layperson. Murphy is co-host, with Tom Woods, of the popular podcast Contra Krugman, which is a weekly refutation of Paul Krugman's New York Times column. He is also host of The Bob Murphy Show.

Tuesday, 20 February 2018

Public Transport - micro analysis

Peak public transport exposes the arrogance of our civic planners 


Tom Welsh Sunday Telegraph 18.2.2018

It’s all very embarrassing for Sadiq Khan, the Mayor of London. Not only is the body that runs transport in the capital on his behalf in crisis, facing a deficit of almost £1 billion following his grossly irresponsible and Corbyn-esque promise to freeze fares, but the number of people using that transport has fallen too.

It can’t be emphasised enough how shocking this is. Londoners have been fed bullish forecasts about demand for trains, the tube and buses for years, and the Mayor’s office only recently set out in great detail its dream of a city essentially free of cars, part of a country-wide obsession with planning away individualised mobility in favour of collectivised transport.

The alternative – that public transport usage has peaked – would shake his ideology to the core. This extends beyond the capital. Regional rail operators are in trouble as the number of passengers is not rising as expected after decades of growth. Bus use is falling in large parts of the country. Professor Tony Travers points out that passenger numbers in New York and Paris are flatlining, at best, too. Khan will be hoping the drop is temporary.

What is going on? A variety of explanations are offered, from the quality and cost of public transport itself, to changing behaviour (a rise in home-working, or an increase in the use of taxi apps like Uber). A hidden recession in the UK, not picked up by the official statistics, seems unlikely and the population is still growing.

But if falling usage persists, admittedly a big if, a zeitgeist will be dead – and well before we once thought, with the exciting future of autonomous electric vehicles still many years away. The implications are enormous. With HS2 already indefensible, its cancellation will become even more urgent. Countless smaller projects will have to be re-examined for whether they remain cost-effective in a very different transport environment.

Schemes to get everyone on public transport are often promoted on the basis of “efficiency”, but that argument only avoids being sinister if officials can claim that their policies are enabling people to more easily do what they already want to. If they persist in making it impossible to use cars as, all the while, public transport usage declines for reasons other than cost, it becomes harder to deny that they’re creating inconvenience for ideological ends.

The risk is of a Leftist backlash. Even if public transport usage is falling because of secular trends – more working at home, more online shopping, businesses moving outside our great cities, cheaper taxis – expect calls for subsidies to be increased to boost demand artificially. Germany is considering introducing entirely free – taxpayer-funded – buses and trains, an idea Labour might find attractive. But this would be to throw good money after bad. Far better to take this as a lesson in the dangers of hubristic central planning, and a reminder that officials are rarely as far-sighted as they think they are. 

Saturday, 28 October 2017

10 myths about government debt - video

Very fitting for the Fiscal Policy topic - but also supply side etc.


Monday, 1 May 2017

Update on fiscal position - know this for the exam!

UK's deficit slashed to level last seen before the financial crisis

 25 APRIL 2017 



The Government borrowed £52bn in the last financial year, a fall of £20bn compared to the year before, as the long struggle to eliminate the deficit moved closer towards its goal.
That amounts to 2.6pc of GDP, the lowest level of borrowing since 2007-08, on the eve of the financial crisis.
But as the UK economy is bigger now, the number is still substantially larger in cash terms - the deficit nine years ago stood at £40.4bn. That ballooned as the recession struck, spiralling up to £151.7bn in 2009-10 - equivalent to 9.9pc of GDP - before slowly falling as the Government has battled to control borrowing.
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The deficit is back to its 2007-08 level. Source: ONS

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2002-2003 Public sector net borrowing as a percentage of GDP: 2.2
The fall in the deficit is bigger than analysts forecast a year ago, before the Brexit vote. The Office for Budget Responsibility had predicted extra borrowing of £55.5bn when it crunched the numbers in March 2016.
Unexpectedly strong economic growth since then has helped to pushed the deficit down.
Corporation tax raked in a record high as businesses paid £55.7bn of tax on their profits, up from £45.7bn in 2015-16.
Business rates raised £26.2bn in the year, up by £25m year on year, while VAT brought in £133.3bn - up from £130.5bn in the previous financial year.
Stamp duty has soared as house prices boomed - and as the tax was increased on both the most expensive homes and on buyers with more than one property. The transaction charge brought in £12.4bn last year, up from £11.3bn the previous year and more than double the £6bn raised in 2010-11.
Pay as you earn income tax brought in another £149.2bn for the Exchequer - up by £3.1bn on the year to hit a new record high - while self-assessment income tax rose by £4.3bn on the year to £28.7bn.
At the same time Government spending increased - total current spending hit a new record high of £685.7bn, up by £6.1bn on the year, while total capital spending fell by £1.4bn to £55.9bn for 2016-17.
The Chancellor, Philip Hammond, loosened the purse strings a touch in his Autumn Statement and his Budget last month which, combined with weaker economic growth forecasts for the years ahead, pushed up predictions of public sector borrowing.
Rather than running a surplus in 2019-20, as former Chancellor George Osborne planned a year ago, the latest OBR forecasts push that expected surplus back into the 2020s.
The pace of deficit reduction may already be slowing, as there are hints that the economic surge may be running out of steam.
Official figures showed weak retail sales in the first three months of the year and that is reflected in the tax numbers.
VAT receipts fell from £35bn in the final three months of 2016 to £32.2bn in the first quarter of 2017, a bigger drop than the usual post-Christmas slowdown.
Income tax in March also fell by 2.8pc compared with the same month a year ago.
"The details of March’s numbers offered cause for concern," said Martin Beck, senior economic advisor to the EY Item Club.
“The steady reduction in public borrowing of recent years may be starting to stutter, but policy implications should be limited.” 
The national debt now stands at £1.73 trillion, excluding bank rescues, and £2.05 trillion including the bailouts.
Analysts said the deficit was still a substantial challenge for the next government.
“Whatever the outcome [of the election] on June 8, it's important to recognise there is still a significant amount of work to be done to repair the public finances - which are projected to stay in deficit for years to come," said Ross Campbell from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.
"Whoever is Chancellor after the election will need to employ robust fiscal measures to tackle the massive level of public indebtedness we currently see today.
"While Brexit may dominate the pre-election narrative, it is equally important that all party manifestos tackle structural problems that plague the UK’s economy – including the longstanding problems of Government spending more that it earns and a lack of incentives to drive economic growth.”
He suggested that extra investment in infrastructure projects was needed “to spearhead the UK's economic reboot in a post-Brexit landscape”.

Tuesday, 7 March 2017

How timely - an article on trade & US trade policy

Almost as if it were written for Year 13:

7 March 2017

The spectacular economic ignorance of Peter Navarro

Those who believed President Donald Trump’s trade policy couldn’t be as bad as suggested might want to reassess. For his adviser Peter Navarro has written a spectacularly economically ignorant article on the subject for the Wall Street Journal, fulfilling all of Robert Colvile’s fears.
His premise is simple: trade deficits are a drain on economic growth, and the capital surpluses necessary to finance them are also harmful to American interests.
Where to start?
1) Navarro does not understand GDP
He begins: “Growth in real GDP depends on only four factors: consumption, government spending, business investment and net exports (the difference between exports and imports). Reducing a trade deficit through tough, smart negotiations is a way to increase net exports – and boost the rate of economic growth.”
But the GDP identity he talks of (think Y = C + I + G + X – M) is not a growth equation, and imports do not “reduce GDP”. The reason that imports are subtracted from the equation is because they are already embedded in the spending of households, businesses and governments. To leave them in there would mean GDP would be overstated by double-counting imports, when in fact imports are not domestically produced. In fact, higher imports tend to be associated with faster growth – they are not a drain on it.
2) Navarro seems to think exports of goods are more important than services
All the time, he refers to a persistent deficit in “trade in goods”. But the US exports services too. In fact, it runs a surplus in them of close to $300 billion. That Navarro has a fetish for manufacturing is a personal issue, but exports generate foreign earnings whatever you’re producing. whether it’s cars or selling insurance or producing a Hollywood movie. In terms of the actual totals, the composition of exports does not matter at all.
3) Navarro implies that trade deficits are always a problem
Navarro simply points at accounting identities and at a trade deficit to imply that it engenders economic weakness. For sure, trade deficits can be a symptom of problems, but his mechanical view that they must be does not hold.
If a country imports more dollar-value goods and services than it exports, it is a result of the individual decisions of its population and the population of the rest of the world. Those imports can be paid for by export earnings, by running down savings or by borrowing. That’s why any trade deficit (net outflow of dollars) is matched by an investment surplus (net inflow of dollars).
A current account deficit is really just an aggregate decision to spend more than your income – the wisdom of doing so really depends on what that borrowing, or the inward investment associated with it, is used to finance.
In the late 19th and early 20th century, for example, the US ran current account deficits as money poured in to invest as industry expanded to the west.
In fact, the US has run trade deficits for the past 41 straight years. As my colleague Dan Ikenson has outlined, this is “a period during which the size of the American economy tripled in real terms, real manufacturing value quadrupled, and the number of jobs in the economy almost doubled”.
Now, current account deficits can be caused by excess demand, as loose monetary policy leads to rising prices at home and more purchases from abroad. But Navarro provides no evidence for this being true today. If it were, we’d expect it to put substantial downward pressure on the dollar, which doesn’t seem to be happening.
4) Navarro seems confused on how a trade deficit interacts with investment
As Tim Worstall has noted, Navarro is desperate to say that America’s trade deficit is in part caused by offshoring, and lower domestic investment. But he then acknowledges, as outlined above, that the flipside of current account deficits is capital account surpluses and thus investment into the US from abroad.
This can manifest itself in purchases of equities or physical assets, or government or corporate debt. Only a portion of these, though, are really generalised debts owed by the American public to foreigners – and that is the portion associated with financing of government borrowing (which could be reduced if the federal government decided to rein in its borrowing).
But one simply cannot imply, as Navarro does, that trade deficits are associated with lower investment, unless one thinks American investment is more worthy than investment from abroad.
In short, Navarro thinks imports reduce GDP. They don’t. He thinks some overseas earnings (those from goods) matter more than others (services). They don’t. He thinks a current account deficit is automatically a problem. It isn’t. He thinks that domestic investment in the US is somehow better than foreign. It isn’t. He thinks that pointing at accounting identities is economics. It isn’t.
If used to inform policy, such an agenda would lead to huge capital flight from the US and deeply damaging new trade restrictions, raising prices and reducing choice for US consumers.
Ryan Bourne occupies the R Evan Scharf Chair for the Public Understanding of Economics at Cato