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“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label trade barriers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label trade barriers. Show all posts

Monday, 19 May 2025

To go with the diagram comparing US & EU

 

Starmer’s ‘EU reset’ is a fairytale There will be no sunny uplands

Britain and the EU remain drawn to each other. Photo by Justin Tallis - WPA Pool/Getty Images.


 
May 19, 2025   6 mins

Back in 2020, when Brexit dawned, the UK was an average economic performer within the EU. Five years on, it is still an average economic performer relative to the EU. From an economic perspective, then, Brexit was a non-event.

Try to tell anyone this though, and both sides will erupt in violent disagreement. The Brexiteers insist it is just a matter of time: the sunny uplands are within reach. The Remainers, too, say it just takes time: the sheer horror of Brexit will yet materialise.

Well, it won’t. And the reason why Brexit has yet to have any visible impact is because, just like in Hans Christian Andersen’s The Emperor’s New Clothes, there was never anything to see. The EU’s single market is simply not what it says on the label. It is not a genuine single market. If it were, Brexit would have been a big shock. But, as Mario Draghi reminded us recently, the EU’s internal trade barriers are actually higher than the ones Donald Trump has just imposed on Europe and the rest of the world.

I am not denying that the EU operates something that is called a single market. And in the years after it was formally introduced in 1992, it did produce higher growth. Where markets were once fragmented and protected, the EU’s single one was more open and liberal. But over the years that has changed drastically. Today, it is hampered by a thicket of rules and regulations, many of which are detrimental to business. It might be large, but the single market is far from free.

A perfect example of this is the EU’s anti-tech legislation, which is particularly leaden — as Draghi’s report on Europe’s competitiveness pointed out. But the UK, while it was still a member of the EU, only ever implemented the first part of the legislation: the general directive on data protection. As the co-owner of a small publishing company that has a lot of European customers, I can confirm that the GDPR requirements are an absolute nightmare. After the UK left, however, the EU doubled down with regulations for AI, the crypto-industry, for digital markets, and for digital services. It made companies responsible for human rights abuses in their supply chains, and it imposed on itself the world’s most stringent Net Zero regulations.

The single market was also meant to be for goods and services. But in reality, it is mostly for goods only. Services are the bigger part of the economy by far, yet the volume of intra-EU trade in services only accounts for 15% of GDP, while that of goods accounts for 50%. For the UK, a country whose main export is services, the single market was even more irrelevant than for the other EU members.

Nonetheless, there is one place where the EU single market lives on: in our minds and our discussions about Europe. I have spent a fair part of my life on panels, and there are always talking heads who will elevate the single European market to be the EU’s crowning achievement. This is a story told too many times by too many idiots, signifying a degree of self-delusion that is at the heart of what the EU has become.

The Europeans are good at putting on a show. And this one has been playing for a long time. Our modern equivalent of the emperor with no clothes is the sight of European leaders taking the overnight train for a photo op in Kiev, with no money and no weapons in the bag.

It’s the same watching Keir Starmer trying to reconnect with the EU. In a year full of critical events, today’s reset is a great big naked non-event. If leaving the single market was an economic anti-climax, then, surely, putting bits and pieces of it back together isn’t going to make a difference either.

“In a year full of critical events, today’s reset is a great big, naked non-event.”

The same logic applies to the UK accession to the EU’s €150bn defence fund. The EU always puts misleading headline numbers on its programmes. What you have to do is to divide the headline total by the number of years. The money is to be disbursed over a period of five years, so the €150bn shrinks to €30bn. If you add the UK to the mix, this translates to 0.1 percent of total economic output. Since EU programmes are frequently not fully disbursed, the actual money will be even less. I did a similar calculation for the Covid recovery fund five years ago and came up with the same sort of numbers. The economic impact is simply statistical noise. But it does give pro-Europeans the opportunity to make some political noise. It allows them to say that the EU does defence now. And it allows Starmer to claim that he is resetting the relationship with the EU when nothing much of substance will change.

Now I am all in favour of the idea of a single market — but not this monster. My idea of a single market is one with low regulatory barriers, a market that would, by definition, have to take the member states out of the equation. But right now, every country implements EU rules in their domestic legislation, which is where Draghi’s internal barriers arise. A genuine single market, and a common financial market, would require nothing less than a smallish federal state. And this is never going to happen.

Instead, the EU will continue to stagnate under the burden of its regulation. The paths of the UK and the EU will continue to diverge. The UK has clearly not made the most of Brexit, but its economy is functioning, more or less. The City of London is doing well despite all the gloomy Brexit forecasts. And one of the things that is driving success is the financial innovation that would not have been possible inside of the EU. The UK currently has more AI business than France and Germany combined, and almost as much as the whole of the EU. While you would struggle to spot the impact of AI in anyone’s national accounts today, in 10 years’ time, AI will certainly be playing a bigger role in our societies and economies.

Britain is well-placed for this. But, hamstrung by its legislation, the EU is going nowhere. The entire thrust of its AI and data regulation is to protect consumers against abuses by companies. An interesting question is why the normally so powerful business lobbies in Europe allowed such an anti-business regulation to happen. I suspect that the lobby groups care about existing businesses more than about new businesses. Modern tech is an exciting new start-up opportunity. The old companies that are so well represented in Brussels are techno-Luddites.

The UK and the US, in contrast, have always been far keener on AI because both have large capital markets. Investors don’t care whether the company that delivers growth is old or new, large or small. And the US, in particular, managed to channel private capital to the new tech industries.

The EU failed to do this. Instead of real investments, it has programmes with fancy names like “Horizon Europe” or “Digital Europe”. The European Commission makes the bold claim on its website that “the EU is spearheading AI research, collaborating with scientists, and funding projects to develop safe and ethical applications of AI, fostering AI ‘made in Europe’, from the lab to the market”. I recall a time when Angela Merkel wanted Germany to be the world leader in AI. This now seems delusional.

My expectation, then, is that the EU will remain in denial for many years, and that the UK will perform a little better because it is not weighed down by bad regulation. But I see no sunny uplands either. Brexit would have been more successful if the UK had used its regulatory freedoms to greater advantage, starting with data and tech. Getting rid of the wretched GDPR would have been a good first step. And today, we have empty, outdated talk from Starmer about dynamic alignment with the EU on product standards — following EU rules on things like safety standards for widgets. I struggle to get excited about stuff like this because it is totally irrelevant to economic success or failure in the future. The 21st century economy is no longer one of standards committees and industrial patents.

So forget the reset. This is about nothing more than good relations with your neighbours. There is nothing wrong with that. Neighbours can organise a street party, or set up a neighbourhood-watch scheme. They can agree to trade more home-made cookies for lemonade. But they are not moving in together.

Europe’s neighbourhood watch scheme is Nato. It is not the EU. In fact, defence is specifically excluded from the most important areas of the EU’s competences, like the single market. That, though, does not stop the EU from having a defence commissioner and politicians talking about nothing else these days. It is a sign of decline when the reality of your existence does not match the image you have of yourself.

This is exactly the story of Andersen’s fairy tale. One day, some kid will remark that there is nothing to be seen. And then, all of a sudden, reality will dawn.

But even then, will anything change? As Anderson’s tale concludes: “The Emperor shivered, for he suspected they were right. But he thought, ‘This procession has got to go on.’ So he walked more proudly than ever, as his noblemen held high the train that wasn’t there at all.”

Tuesday, 11 March 2025

Does the EU really have a "Single Market"?

  

Europe’s Internal Trade Barriers: A Long Way From a Single Market

One remarkable advantage for the US economy is the large size of its internal market. US firms can make investments in new goods and services knowing that they can potentially sell, with only a few limitations rooted in state laws, to a large number of customers across a broad area.

Indeed, the openness of the US internal market is rooted in the US Constitution. Article 1, Section 8, lists the powers of Congress, and the third clause gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce … among the several States.” By giving that power to Congress and the federal government, the Constitution blocked states from setting up barriers to trade with each other–for example, although US states can pass laws that may create indirect costs for companies buying and selling across stated, they can’t impose tariffs or quotas on goods and services imported from other US states.

A primary goal in creating the European Union was to replicate this “single market,” and thus to give European firms the incentives for innovation, investment, and expansion that result from wide-open access to a large internal market. But according to the IMF Regional Economic Outlook report on “Europe: A Recovery Short of Europe’s Full Potential,” the EU “single market” project has a long way to go (October 2024). Here’s a sample (references to text “boxes” have been cut:

Europe’s productivity gap with the global frontier can be traced back to a more limited market size, capital market constraints, skilled labor shortages, and stalled structural reforms. Firm-data analysis shows that Europe’s segmented good and services markets are keeping businesses from becoming larger, spending more on R&D, and exploiting economies of scale. Moreover, fragmented capital markets mean that firms do not draw enough on equity financing. As a result, business dynamics are dampened especially in the services sector where start-ups tend to operate with large intangible capital. …

There is widespread agreement on the sources of Europe’s growth weakness. Recently released expert studies (Letta 2024; Draghi 2024) come to a similar conclusion that Europe’s low productivity is related to lack of market depth and scale. Both reports link Europe’s lack of competitiveness to Europe’s incomplete single market in the trade of goods, services, and factors of production (capital, labor). Remaining barriers are considered to be still substantial and have resulted in less investment and innovation than necessary to accelerate growth and productivity to levels seen in other advanced regions.

A deeper and larger single market offers the potential for a resurgence in productivity growth. European integration delivered tangible growth benefits in the past and could do so again. Following the two EU enlargement waves in 1995 and 2004, EU member countries began trading more with each other (Figure 15, panel 1). As a consequence, in the decade following accession, regions in new member states saw on average GDP per capita rise by more than 30 percent relative to comparable non-accession regions and existing member states gained too.

It is important to note that regions within Europe that were better integrated through value chains and transport networks registered higher gains. However, value chain integration has stalled since the last decade … and substantial barriers to goods and trade flows remain … New IMF analysis finds that in 2020 trade costs within Europe were equivalent to a sizable ad-valorem tariff of 44 percent for the average manufacturing sector compared to 15 percent between US states, and as high as 110 percent in the case of services sectors …

Here is a figure to which the IMF is referring. The darker blue line shows intra-EU trade in goods; the lighter blue line shows intra-EU trade in services. As you can see, intra-EU trade in goods had risen substantially up to about 2008, but has only crept a little further since. Intra-EU trade in services remains less than 10% of their value, 30 years after the birth of the “single market” initiative back in 1993.

Again, the IMF estimates that remaining barriers to trade within the countries of the EU are equivalent to a 44% tariff on trade in goods, and a 110% tariff on trade in services. These high tariffs are bad for economic growth in Europe, just as similar state-level tariffs would be bad for US growth. Of course, the underlying economic reasoning also explains why a global outbreak of tariffs would be disadvantageous for both US and global growth.

Thursday, 22 March 2018

Tariffs, WTO - all going on (or kicking off)!

Donald Trump launches attack on Chinese trade

Tariffs will hurt America too
Now for the real fight. After unveiling tariffs on steel and aluminium which barely grazed China earlier this month, President Donald Trump took direct aim at Beijing on March 22nd. His move to hit China for its trade practices is designed to land three jabs. The first will take the form of tariffs of 25% on up to $60bn of Chinese exports to America. This, Mr Trump argues, is only a fraction of the economic damage China has done to America by stealing or forcibly extracting its companies’ intellectual property. The second blow will come in the form of investment restrictions on Chinese companies, to stop the Chinese from hoovering up American ideas and gaining a strategic advantage. The third will involve litigation at the World Trade Organisation.
China has broken the rules, the president thinks, and needs to be held to account. Plenty agree on that. China has not lived up to the expectations many had of it when it joined the World Trade Organisation back in 2001 (see briefing). Its challenge to American technological supremacy is real enough (see briefing). The metal tariffs have been handled chaotically and were controversial even within the administration; the desire to curb China’s bad behaviour commands much more consensus.

That does not make the Trump administration’s strategy on tariffs a good one. Mr Trump thinks that America’s position in a trade battle is stronger than that of the Chinese, because they send more stuff to America than goes the other way. But imports benefit Americans too. Slapping tariffs on over 10% of Chinese goods exports to America will hit shoppers. Even outfits who are hawkish on China, such as the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a tech-industry-funded think-tank, are critical of the idea of imposing tariffs on ICT products from China. It warns that this would hurt American productivity growth and benefit China's competitors rather than bringing any jobs back to America.

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What would make matters much worse is Chinese retaliation. On the day of Mr Trump's announcement, Cui Tiankai, the Chinese ambassador to America said "if people want to play tough, we wil play tough with them." American agriculture exporters look especially vulnerable. Paul Burke, regional director of the US Soybean Export Council in North Asia, has heard talk of the Chinese commerce ministry meeting soybean consumers to ask how they would cope if access to American soybeans were to be curtailed. On March 20th the Global Times, a Chinese newspaper, published an editorial clamouring for tariffs, arguing that subsidised American soybeans were “an important reason for the world’s soybean oversupply”. Mr Burke thinks that soybeans are an example of how trade with China is working. Now it looks like the exporters he represents will be caught up in the fray.

Such is the self-destructive logic of trade wars. Mr Trump claims to be trying to avoid a scenario of punch and counterpunch. As he signed the punitive measures, he boasted that he was knee-deep in negotiations with the government in Beijing to lower America’s trade deficit with China by $100bn, from $375bn (in goods) in 2017. Set aside the question of whether Mr Trump’s dislike of deficits makes sense (it doesn’t). His latest action is unlikely to help those talks. The Trump administration has signalled that it would defend the interests of American farmers if the Chinese were to treat them unfairly. One blow always tends to lead to another.