Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes

Saturday, 5 October 2024

How to fund education improvement without putting VAT on fees

 Good economic analysis of an alternative to the current plan, plus there is a petition you can sign at the bottom:

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In a Sun interview on 5 September, Education Secretary Bridget Phillipson challenged opponents of the imposition of VAT on private schools to ‘put up or shut up’, and suggest another way to pay for her education reforms other than the Government’s new education tax. This article answers her question directly.

First, let’s agree: we all want to improve our state schools. Second, let’s assume that doing so requires money: we want to spend £1.5bn. Third, let’s not quibble Labour’s spending plans: 6,500 new teachers and all.

Let’s also correct a common mistake. We’re often told that education is a ‘public good’. This is incorrect. National defence and the criminal justice system are public goods. Education is a ‘merit good’, which delivers both private and public benefits, calls for a mixture of private and public funding, and suggests that private investment should be encouraged.

The best solution for funding a merit good is a freely-transferable voucher that can be topped up, giving all households control over where and how much to spend, encouraging investment, choice and competition, while ensuring a universal baseline provision. However, vouchers do not directly answer Bridget Phillipson’s question: how best to raise £1.5bn. 

So we need a second-best solution. We could find £1.5bn from general taxation. We could find savings within the Government’s spending plans and £9.4bn public-sector pay increases. Or we could question who really needs free state education.

The case for ‘free-at-the-point-of-delivery’ is strong for households unable to pay. It is weak for the wealthiest households who can afford to pay for education. It comes at a cost in terms of choice, family, innovation, competition and diversity, while curtailing desirable private investment. It fails to deliver on the collective promises of social mixing and engagement, often cited as benefits of the system.

The existence of ‘free’ taxpayer-funded education, often enhanced by exclusive catchment areas, PTAs with six- or seven-figure budgets (benefitting from Gift Aid) and tutoring allows wealthier households the attractive option of retaining all their disposable income to support their lifestyle. These arrangements secure strong educational outcomes for the recipients but are of little benefit to the wider system. So why are taxpayers fully-funding education for the rich?

Analysis of data from UCL indicates the diversity of income backgrounds of independent school families. Attendance is unsurprisingly skewed towards higher incomes, but not as much as you might think. Around 90,000, or 15%, of independent school pupils come from below median income households; a further 116,000, or 19%, from outside the top two deciles. The inverse is also true: many children from top-income households attend state schools, to an extent that may surprise you.

The following table combines the UCL data with households’ income after tax. It uses the IFS calculator based on two adults, two primary-age children and a council tax bill of £300/month, and assumes a housing cost of £24,000. Income cut-offs in column (c) are conservatively low as the IFS calculator represents the entire population (including younger people and older people on lower incomes), while the UCL data was limited to families with school-age children, who are often at peak lifetime earnings.

Based on roughly 600,000 independent school children and 8.8 million state school children: 

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If we want to raise money for state education, with certainty, from those with the ‘broadest shoulders’, there is a strong case to call on these top deciles in state education first, ahead of independent school families, whose incomes, as we have seen, are more diverse. Top-two-decile families could pay for the entirety of their education in either state or private settings. Universal, free-at-the-point-of-use provision by the Government leaves them with far more disposable income than those already paying school fees.

A £1,000 contribution on behalf of each of the 1.5m children in state education shown in column (e) of the table above would raise exactly the £1.5bn that Bridget Phillipson seeks. This meets the Government’s own objectives of raising revenue certainly, fairly and with minimal administrative burden. 

This approach would be better at raising net revenue with certainty than the education tax. It is a smaller tax on a much broader base, representing around 1.5% of disposable income (column c) per child, compared to 6-12% of disposable income for the £2,550 education tax (column g). Being a proportionally small measure, it is unlikely adversely to affect the labour market; cliff-edge effects could be avoided by smoothing the application in smaller increments. It does not appear to generate the array of costly unintended consequences to the education economy and labour supply which the Adam Smith Institute has highlighted in its papers Short-Term Thinking and Tuition Tensions.

This approach ensures everyone pays their fair share, with the cost falling on broadest shoulders. Affluent state school families would pay 8-12% towards the £8,000–£12,000 cost of state education (£8,000 being variable cost, plus £4,000 fixed cost); comparison of columns (d) and (g) shows how ‘broad shouldered’ these state school families are. Their peers in independent schools continue to pay their taxes towards state education, as they always have done. Meanwhile this approach avoids touching middle- and lower-income families at all, unlike the education tax, for whom VAT would be a very large share of disposable income and very likely to drive unwanted behaviour shifts.

In terms of administrative costs, imposing a state school contribution could be an extension of the existing income tax code, not requiring hurried system changes by schools and HMRC. It is easily enforced, since it is hard to ‘hide’ children attending school. It does not present any of the avoidance and enforcement challenges and related deadweight costs that come with the Government’s proposed education tax.

A Government wishing to be ‘unburdened by doctrine’ and to ‘tread lightly on people’s lives’ should also appreciate the lack of distortion between education settings. We avoid the needless distortions of the education tax which taxes boarding, music lessons and after-school clubs in independent schools but not in state schools.

Finally, this measure creates a strongly pro-social incentive that has the potential to save more taxpayer money and encourage social mobility, by encouraging more households to pay for their own children’s schooling and free up places in ‘preferred’ state schools – exactly the opposite of Labour’s new education tax. It creates the same beneficial incentives as a partial voucher in reverse.

To do less harm than the education tax is not difficult. A small charge on top-income state school families is superior in every economic dimension. This raises the question of why the Government has chosen the path that it is currently on, especially the imposition of VAT midway through a school year. Regrettably, the answer to that question appears to be that the harm is an intentional part of the policy.

The Education Not Taxation campaign aims to support quality education and protect children, in both state and private sectors, by persuading policymakers of the harm of imposing VAT on independent school fees. You can follow the campaign on X/Twitter, and sign a petition against Labour’s education tax at the following link: Petition · Stop Labour from adding 20% VAT to private school fees and forcing kids to change schools.

Wednesday, 2 October 2024

A broad-brush look at migration and data -

 

The full, alarming truth about mass migration is finally being exposed

Robert Jenrick is right – the risks have become so great they should be impossible to ignore

Passport control at Gatwick Airport
Oli Scarff/Getty

There are few more inconvenient truths in modern Britain than the failure of mass migration. We wanted to believe the myth, that we could fling open our doors and into the UK would flow migrants from across the globe, transforming our nation into a prosperous melting pot. But wishing it so was not enough, and with each new dataset the economic miracle looks more and more like a mirage.

The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) recently showed that a “low-wage migrant” who comes to Britain aged 25 will cost the taxpayer £150,000 net by the time they reach 66, £438,000 by 80, and £1.2 million if they live to 100. That we’ve recently experienced the worst GDP per capita growth since the 1970s suggests immigration does not magically boost living standards. In 2023 net migration totalled 685,000, yet still we are plagued by flatlining productivity, a fiscal squeeze, a ballooning welfare bill and stagnant growth. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) has just revealed GDP per head shrank by 0.3 per cent between April and June compared with a year earlier.

And that’s before you get to what the OBR refers to as “dilution of capital stock”: how the rate of immigration far exceeds the ability of our state to adapt. So we have a decaying NHS, clogged up roads, crumbling infrastructure. And it’ll only get worse: in the 27 years since 1997, net migration added six million people to the country. In the next 13 years, we could easily add half that number again.

But here’s the thing about awkward truths: people will go to great lengths to cover them up. In fact, there’s good evidence this is happening already, with former immigration minister Robert Jenrick warning this week that migrant crime statistics are being hidden from the British public. We cannot have a serious discussion about immigration without the data. Denmark has league tables compiled from government figures showing the crime rates of the top four nations – Kuwait, Tunisia, Lebanon and Somalia – are eight times those of Danish nationals. We have a ruling class who are either too incompetent, or too reluctant, to tell the people paying for this political project what it’s really costing. What we do know is that 12 per cent of our prison population is currently foreign born. Will we remove them? Fat chance: Britain couldn’t even boot out Rochdale grooming gang ringleader Qari Abdul Rauf, even after he was ordered to be deported by a judge nearly a decade ago.

As Neil O’Brien MP has pointed out, sensible countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and so on all do a much better job than the UK of measuring the net tax contribution of different groups of migrants. In the UK the data is frustratingly patchy and limited. The ONS is becoming a national embarrassment – first it allowed trans extremism to contaminate the latest census and now it is complaining that it’s too difficult or costly to dig out information on migrants. HMRC used to publish data on the amount of tax paid by nationality, but this has been discontinued.

This obfuscation confuses what is really happening in our society. Left-wing charities churn out publications on our “widening inequality”. But we know that migrant incomes are bimodal – many will be on low incomes, but significant numbers will be seriously well-off people, as rich lists illustrate. Large-scale migration stretches the income distribution and gives the impression of greater unevenness, validating demands that we take more from the wealthy to give to the poor.

The elites expect everyone to swallow the idea that everything is fine. That mass migration is an unalloyed good, and unrelated to such issues as our chronic housing crisis.

The trouble is, people no longer believe that everything is fine. They want the nation to welcome genuine asylum seekers whose survival depends on our compassion. They want our doors open to the best and brightest. What they don’t want is for Britain to open its welfare state to the world. 

European politics is shifting before our very eyes. British policymakers should view the rising support for the AfD in GermanyGeert Wilders’s triumph in the Netherlands, the Freedom Party’s parliamentary election victory in Austria, as a portent of what is to come. If they continue to cover their ears and denounce those who raise concerns over mass migration as bigots, they may find themselves marooned by the rising tide of Right-wing populism.

A quick look at public investment and infrastructure

 Analysis (David C. Stevenson)

Birmingham has spent £245m on 1.05 miles of tram track

Focus on the supply side

Boosting potential economic output through public investment is crucial, says David C. Stevenson

“The evolution of potential output (or the ‘supply-side’) is the most important determinant of long-term economic prospects, is a key driver of our economic and fiscal forecasts and has been a major focus of economic policy under successive governments.”

This is the tale of two recent reports that should interest everyone worried by our long-term economic record. The dry comment above introduces a report that is unlikely to be read by millions, but should be.  It is by a gaggle of economists who work for the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), that august economic body that has found itself, uncomfortably, in the political spotlight in recent years. 

It’s as clear a statement as anyone can make about why those of us who fret about poor productivity and meagre economic-growth rates need to think about the supply side and, more pertinently, about public investment, especially in infrastructure – cue much discussion about HS2, bridges, tunnels, etc. This matters, and courtesy of the report, we can at least now begin to put some numbers on how much it matters.

America races ahead

But I mentioned two reports, the first of which will probably be read by many more people, especially across the English Channel. It’s by Mario Draghi, who you might remember from his days as president of the European Central Bank and then Italian prime minister. “The future of European competitiveness: a competitiveness strategy for Europe” is actually a fascinating read and a wake-up call for the eurozone about why the GDP gap between the EU and the US has widened from 15% in 2002 to 30% in 2023. Compounding that challenge is the fact that around two million workers a year will be leaving the labour market by 2042. 

Draghi focuses on factors, including (the lack of) innovation and access to venture capital, to which we’ll return in our next column. A key statistic is that Europe hasn’t created a single company currently valued at more than €100bn. By contrast, the US has produced six worth more than €1trn. To quote the respected economic historian and commentator Adam Tooze, unless this is rectified, “Europe faces the ‘slow agony’ of economic decline”.

But the most interesting revelation is that investment as a share of GDP in Europe has declined over the last half-century. Most of us would assume – as I did – that given America’s small-government leanings, US public-sector investment was lagging behind Europe’s. You’d be wrong. Sure, the French might boast shiny new high-speed trains while the Americans don’t even have a single high-speed train network. Yet US government investment has been much more pronounced, even if a large slug of it might be related to the so-called military-industrial complex, or Silicon Valley (or both).

This brings us to the UK, where public-sector investment, especially in infrastructure, has – surprise, surprise – been lagging even that of Europe. Looking at the records here in the UK, public sector net investment (PSNI) has averaged around 2.1% of GDP since 2010-2011, rather low by global standards.

And it’s not getting any better soon unless Rachel Reeves finds a new money tree (via property and wealth taxes) near Downing Street. Capital spending on public investment has been cut back repeatedly in the UK, including by the latest administration, which promptly scaled back several projects, including the tunnel near Stonehenge, blaming the previous government. 

That said, this government has pledged £3.4bn of additional capital departmental expenditure limit to boost NHS productivity and a further £0.8bn for other public services, both to be spent from 2025. But the capital expenditure challenge is big. Hospitals alone have a maintenance backlog of £10.2bn, while the criminal courts and prisons have a combined backlog of £2.4bn. The problem, as cynical readers will already have surmised, is that while everyone says they think public investment is significant, in truth, most voting citizens aren’t entirely convinced, especially if it means, say, a new prison being built near them. They might prefer that money to be spent on more doctors to cut their waiting lists. 

Building infrastructure is too expensive

It is grist to the mill of various Nimby-minded folk that when we do undertake major public-sector projects, it takes forever and costs far too much. Typical of this is a recent observation (on public transport infrastructure) by Ben Hopkinson of the think tank Britain Remade, which revealed that “it costs more to build new tram networks in Britain than it does almost anywhere else in the world”. 

“Birmingham’s Eastside Extension is a 1.05-mile addition to the city’s tram network that will run to the future HS2 station at Curzon Street. Barring any further price rises, it will cost £245m, just a little less than the £260m BesanÇon spent on its entire nine-mile network.” And for trams, read power stations, trains, hospitals, prisons, and so on.

Faced with these challenges, one can easily see why quietly cutting public investment, especially in infrastructure, is the easy way out. This brings us to the OBR report, which valiantly fights its corner by building various models that show the relationship between public investment and its impact on potential economic output. It’s that supply-side again. What’s  so interesting about this report is that the authors  are forensic in their analysis and diligent in their number crunching. 

This isn’t simply an “all public investment is a fab idea” study designed to delight Guardian readers. It carefully evaluates both the demand side impact (creating jobs and increasing household income), which can be short-lived, and the supply side, where potential output is permanently pushed higher – and productivity, hopefully, is also boosted. The devil is always in the detail, of course, especially with contested infrastructure projects, so the economists carefully analyse lags and timescales (time to spend, time to complete and time to use) and then build up a model that spews out likely impacts with various elasticities (an economist’s way of saying results vary by context). 

The bottom line of this very detailed report is that a sustained 1% increase in public investment could plausibly increase potential output by just under  0.5% after five years and by around 2.5% in the long run (50 years). These numbers sound small, but cumulatively, they will make a huge difference to our nation’s wealth and pay for all those extra public services we say we need.

Remember the bigger picture

Dig into the report, and you’ll find subtle observations. Not least that not every public project dreamt up by civil servants makes sense. But perhaps the most important point is in the conclusion, when the authors declare that “The implied internal rates of return are positive [for many public investment projects], although the return to the exchequer is likely to be much smaller than the return to the economy”. Therein lies the challenge. The models used by the Treasury may be a tad short-sighted as they sometimes miss the more comprehensive economic benefit to the broader economy. 

That message also needs to be repeated to voters and constituents. Stop always focusing on what a project will do for your particular neighbourhood and think about how a project can boost the national growth rate and kick-start a decade of higher productivity. Public-sector investment matters; we don’t spend enough money on it (a claim nearly every political party would agree with), and we need to spend more now if we’re not, like the rest of Europe, going to fall further behind the US.