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“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label education. Show all posts
Showing posts with label education. Show all posts

Tuesday, 8 April 2025

Long but very useful post on human capital and levelling up:

 

Focusing on Human Capital has failed to level up Britain. We should change course.

Tom Forth.

In late 2021, the Chief Executive of Centre for Cities Andrew Carter interviewed three academics with jobs in East Germany. They spoke about that country’s experience of reunification and the levelling up of the former DDR that followed it. I listened to it at the time and I thought it was good. I must have been tired or in a bad mood back then because I listened to it again recently and now I think it’s brilliant.

The three Germans start by going back to 1990 and describing North England.

Infrastructure built a century ago and barely maintained since the war. Towns reliant on single industries still using century-old technologies. Depopulated cities constrained by continued political dispreference and disempowered by political centralisation.

Just kidding, they were describing East Germany. But it felt a bit too familiar.

Of course, East Germany had it much worse than us here in North England. And while we don’t know how much worse, we can be sure that East Germany upon reunification had a much weaker economy.

Communism is bad.

Communism is really bad and after forty years of trying to make it work, the people of East Germany voted overwhelmingly for parties who promised to give it up quickly. Reunification was not a merger, it was the rapid imposition of West Germany’s economic and political model on the East.

State-owned industries including the housing stock were quickly privatised. Infrastructure was transformed — electrical grids and sewage systems were upgraded, railways were electrified, new train stations were built, metro systems were extended, trams were replaced, and motorways were built from scratch where necessary. Research institutes were improved and added to.

Importantly, West Germany’s model of federalism was imposed. The six states that had been abolished and replaced with central control from East Berlin (and Moscow) under communism were re-established. These New States were given substantial freedom to raise taxes, get those taxes generously topped up by solidarity funds from the rest of the country, and helped to spend much of their money as they felt best.

The results have been astounding.

From well behind in 1990, the economy of the new states overtook North England’s in 2010. By 2016 this was true even ignoring Berlin, whose status as a national capital probably gives it some economic advantages.

From well behind in 1990, East Germany's economy has overtaken North England's.

This has involved hard choices and difficult trade-offs. Deindustrialisation that had taken two decades in North England happened in less than a decade in East Germany. A very similar social pain was experienced even more deeply.

Deindustrialisation which took two or three decades in North England and the Midlands happened in less than a decade in East Germany.

In a dash for growth and modernity, all of Germany’s new states focused their energy on the large cities which had been suppressed under communism. East Germany’s large city economies have all enormously outperformed North England’s. Their success is why East Germany is richer today.

The five largest East German cities have strengthened their economies about twice as quickly as their equivalents in North England since 2001. Their outperformance since 1990 is even greater but there is no good comparable data.

But small cities and towns in East Germany have fallen well behind and shrunk rapidly. The socialist model town of Hoyerswerda today has less than half the population it did in its centrally-planned prime. Unemployment and out-migration have left many of the people who remain there miserable and ignored.

In the 2021 German federal elections over a third of the people in Hoyerswerda’s constituency voted for the far-right Alternative for Deutschland (AfD). The party easily won the seat, just as they had in the previous election. This week they even more strongly backed AfD in the European Elections.

Skills.

Back to the podcast. We’re just about to reach the 30 minute mark. We’ve heard about a hugely successful example of levelling up where regions with a weak economy outperform and close the gap with regions with stronger economies. We’ve heard about huge investment in infrastructure, huge investment in science and technology, and tax raising powers backed up by large fiscal transfers to powerful local units of democratic government with lots of freedom to create and carry out local plans for growth.

No-one has mentioned skills yet. Nor has anyone mentioned human capital, the economics jargon which means more or less the same. This is astonishing.

In a 2023 Spectator podcast with Tyler Cowen, after a day of conference discussions with some of Britain’s top London-based thinkers on economic growth, it takes just three minutes for him to suggest to Kate Andrews that North England’s economic weakness could be due to persistent Human Capital issues. In the UK government’s 2022 levelling up white paper, Human Capital is listed top of the six capitals we need to consider to get levelling up right. Back in 1997 when he was preparing for government Tony Blair famously said that his three priorities were “education, education, education,… because nothing matters more to the future prosperity of the country”.

In over a decade of experience at conferences and roundtables working on levelling up strategy and industrial policy in Britain I’ve found that skills is almost always promoted as the top thing to invest in to achieve economic growth in lagging regions of Britain.

 

No doubt shell-shocked, Andrew Carter intervenes at the half hour point. What about human capital? he asks.

Dr Matthias Brachert at IWH Halle explains that “in the first period there was more investment in physical capital and now we are trying to shift policy in favour of investing in human capital”.

Carter, relieved, says — “we hear this a lot in Britain that one of the ways we’re going to level up is large investment in physical capital whether it’s land or buildings and transport and actually as we all know it’s investment in human capital that makes a material difference over time”.

But we just heard that Germany’s success at levelling up its new states in the East following reunification was based on a focus on physical capital, not human capital. Why do we think it is human capital that makes the material difference when the opposite seems to be the lesson here?

I don’t often hear the focus on physical capital that Andrew reports. Much more often I hear the importance of physical capital talked down, often sneeringly, and the focus shifted to human capital and investment in skills. I don’t agree that it’s investment in human capital that makes the material difference.

Focusing on human capital has failed.

I am often quite a lonely voice in arguing against a focus on human capital. Andrew’s statement is the dominant opinion in the large number of meetings and conferences I’ve attended on regional development, economic growth, and levelling up in Britain, especially in South East England.

And as a result we are a country which spends more on education than our more prosperous neighbours.

The UK has consistently spent more on education as a percentage of GDP than other countries in North Europe who have done better at levelling up their lagging regions. The gap is especially large with Germany.

We achieve a lot with this investment.

According to recent PISA results, our schools outclass France, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and many other countries of Northern Europe. We have accumulated more human capital in terms of graduates than our neighbours too. Far more of our workforce, both young and old, possess a tertiary (university equivalent) education for example.

By many measures of human capital accumulation, the UK, including North England, has outperformed competitor countries whose economies have nevertheless grown more quickly.

These strengths are not just reserved for our prosperous regions. By our best estimates, North England has just as high a graduate population percentage as the Netherlands and a far higher graduate population percentage than Germany. By international rankings North England’s universities are better than the best in those nations.

North England certainly has a much higher intensity of graduates than East Germany. And again, if we trust international rankings, vastly better universities.

And yet it is Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and the rest of Northern Europe who are economically well ahead of North England and Britain as a whole. And it is East Germany that from a starting position well behind us has caught, overtaken, and is now pulling away economically from North England. They haven’t done this by reindustrialising either, but rather by beating us in a high value services world with a high value service economy.

Why? I’ve long argued it’s because while North England was trying and failing to level up with a human capital approach, those places did things that worked better.

Better transport, spending on research and development, and replacing central planning with local power.

An outsider’s perspective.

I have made myself sound more alone in my pushback against what I see as a British over-emphasis on human capital as the route to levelling up than I am. And Andrew and I agree on this much more than I’m suggesting. I won’t name people who share my opinions in local government and academia, mostly in North England and Scotland, without their permission. But I will name a researcher whose work I hope could mark a turning point in British thinking on levelling up.

In Anna Stansbury’s “Tackling the UK’s regional economic inequality: Binding constraints and avenues for policy intervention” paper in 2023, she and her co-authors argue that British second cities have unusually poor transport infrastructure, enjoy unusually low public spending on science and technology, and are unusually disempowered by their central governments.

This is useful but not groundbreaking. More innovatively, they show in findings since reproduced by the Resolution Foundation that the graduate premium in these cities is falling and is now well below the level in London, suggesting that further increases to graduate levels in the cities will deliver diminishing returns.

Falling graduate premiums in large UK cities outside of London suggests that further increasing human capital in those cities should not be a priority while other barriers to growth persist.

I don’t think it is a coincidence that Anna wrote that paper at MIT, outside of the UK national policy circles that I feel overweigh human capital as a route to levelling up.

If our current approach to levelling up of focusing on human capital isn’t working what should we do instead?

Doing what works.

A good place to start would be to do something similar to what East Germany did. Of course we would do it in our way, I am not a simplistic “copy Germany” person and indeed many other countries in Europe were achieving similar success to East Germany well before it. I think we could do even better in many ways, especially given our significant advantage of proximity London, Paris, and Amsterdam. But we should move in the direction that we have seen work. Instead of education, education, education, we should pick the three priorities that worked. Infrastructure, research, and local power.

We should invest in physical capital, especially in better transport systems, with a strong focus on our big cities. East Germany has twice as many metro stations, eight times as many tram stops, and high speed railway lines — both new and upgraded — connecting its cities. It has nearly completely electrified its mainline railway. It has built new underground railway stations of the kind we have had cancelled.

Meanwhile North England is home to the largest city in Europe without a metro (Manchester), the largest city in Europe without any mass transit system (Leeds), the largest city in Europe except Tirana, the capital of Albania, without a single electric rail service (Sheffield), and probably the largest pair of neighbouring cities in the rich world not connected by a motorway of some form (Sheffield and Manchester).

We should set up lots of research institutes and triple public spending on R&D to fund them. In 2018 UK public spending on R&D in North England was €2.2bn. In East Germany in 2019 it was €8bn. This is not an appeal for reindustrialisation. East Germany beats North England with a service economy, not a manufacturing one. It is an appeal for a more efficient allocation of research funding in Britain.

We should reduce central control and central planning by the UK government and decentralise power to more local levels of government. In Germany, 34% of total tax is raised locally: 25% by states and 9% by local government. This is the same percentage as in the USA. Meanwhile in the UK, all local government combined raises less than 5% of total tax and has correspondingly limited freedom to plan for growth and fund its plans.

We shouldn’t abandon the brilliant work we’ve done as a country on education. There may be some parts of education, especially around further and adult education, where there’s still a lot of work to do. But we should probably be judging how good our plans for levelling up are by how low down the list of priorities education comes. And we should be mindful that our great success on education has delivered poor economic results for much of our country.

Why change course?

Where we have tried this approach, it has worked. Scotland’s economy has rapidly outgrown North England and the Midlands since it voted for and achieved devolution in 1999. It did this by following quite a lot of the East German playbook. We should expect similar outcomes here if we try something similar.

But my feeling is that most of England doesn’t want to level up its North like Germany wanted to level up its East. Not really. Our desires often feel closer to East Germany before reunification.

There, the arguments of Marx and Engels against agglomeration meant that central planning was used to promote towns instead of cities. When Rishi Sunak vetoed the Treasury’s recommendation to place a Northern outpost in Manchester or Leeds and insisted on Darlington instead, he was doing the same.

In the old East Germany, local and state government was replaced with central planning from East Berlin. Where Britain’s levelling up funds are deliberately designed to circumvent existing local governments and deliver money directly to new smaller units such as Towns Boards via competitive bids or micro-managed dispersal of central funds they are doing something very similar, but from London.

Much of our national discussion on the topic of levelling up assumes that North England, and the people of North England, lack some necessary features needed to prosper that East Germany and East Germans have. With a varying mix of solidarity and condescension we are told that we would be better off quietly enjoying decent public services paid for with Southern money as our relative decline is managed.

I reject this evaluation and this vision of the future emotionally. But even for those with cooler heads, there is a problem with continuing on that course that seems increasingly insurmountable; the cost of economic failure in North England and the Midlands is more and more unaffordable.

Upon reunification huge amounts of money started flowing from West Germany to the East. A new solidarity tax was set up to make such flows more visible. The fiscal transfers within Germany at the time were almost certainly far higher than those within the UK.

But by 2010, the success of the East German economy meant that fiscal transfers there had shrunk to be lower than those within the UK. At the time that East Germany’s economy was overtaking North England’s it was receiving about the same inward transfer of money from the rest of the country.

Reunification led to huge transfers of money from West Germany to East Germany but strong economic growth in the East had reduced these to similar levels of fiscal transfer to those within England by 2010. Further economic growth in East Germany since then means that fiscal transfers within Germany are almost certainly lower than within the UK.

Since 2010, East Germany’s economy has closed the gap further on the rest of Germany and its need for fiscal transfers from the West has decreased as a result.

In Britain we have moved in the opposite direction. As places like North England and the Midlands have fallen further behind the rest of the nation’s economy, and especially far behind London’s economy, their needs for fiscal transfers to maintain public services has increased.

Twenty-five years of weak economic growth in the UK outside of London and Scotland has increased fiscal transfers within the UK substantially and left the UK's public services ever more reliant on taxes raised in London.

Without levelling up North England and the Midlands, home to nearly half of all Britons and Europe’s third largest metropolitan area, I doubt that we have a plan to reverse this trend. London’s success will increasingly have to support public spending across the whole country. And while many people in and around power in Britain seem happy to continue flying the economy on only one engine, it is unclear for how much longer that engine can support the ever-increasing fiscal weight.

 

Sunday, 12 January 2025

The economics of poverty starts right at the beginning

 

author-image
ROBERT COLVILE

A boy of 14 stabbed on a bus — another victim invisible to elites

Something in Britain is broken but a ruling class dominated by the comfortable too often fails to notice

The Sunday Times

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On Tuesday, Kelyan Bokassa was murdered. Stabbed on the upper deck of the 472 bus, in the middle of the afternoon, as it travelled down Woolwich Church Street in south London. The most striking thing about this awful crime wasn’t the tearful tributes from his mother and teachers. Or the grim details of the 14-year-old’s life that she and others provided: groomed by gangs from the age of six; living on the streets for a year; turning up on her doorstep sick, underweight and tattooed; the time in care; the looming court date for possession of a machete. It wasn’t even that his attackers didn’t bother to cover their faces. It was that they were, reportedly, both teenagers too.

The headlines last week were — thanks to Elon Musk — dominated by the rape gang scandal first exposed by Andrew Norfolk of The Times. An awful lot of people have been asking why the scandal was ignored for so long. And there is a simple answer. Yes, a lot of well-meaning, middle-class people were terrified of being thought to be racist. But even once the scandal was exposed, the victims were largely invisible. It had happened to them, not to us.

It’s the same when it comes to knife crime. In 2022-23, of the 244 people killed by “sharp instruments” 26 per cent were black, more than six times the share of the population. Of those, 40 per cent were under 25, versus 24 per cent for white victims of the same crime. Yet for most of us — at least most of us reading The Sunday Times — gang violence is something done by other people to other people.

Kelyan Bokassa’s story is heartbreaking, but unutterably distant from our day-to-day concerns.

And it’s not just crime. There are all kinds of statistics that show how divided we are as a nation. One in nine schoolchildren in Newham, a borough in east London, are classified as homeless. The richest parents are more than twice as likely to be married as the poorest. There are huge variations in employment rates, levels of family breakdown, even life expectancy.

This isn’t just about pockets of deprivation, but a wider malaise. Fraser Nelson pointed out in a recent Channel 4 documentary that sickness benefit approvals and renewals have now passed 3,000 a day, up threefold since the pandemic. About 3.2 million people are “on the sick” — in particular in places like Birmingham, Glasgow and Manchester, where roughly a fifth of people are on some kind of out-of-work benefit. Welfare dependency, knife crime, antisocial behaviour, derelict high streets — all are concentrated where the middle classes don’t see them.

Sometimes such low-income communities are neglected by politicians: a striking report from the Stonehaven consultancy recently found that all the constituencies that swung to Reform had a “missing” road project, long promised but never built.

But in many cases they find themselves bearing the brunt of politicians’ decisions. Last year the think tank I run, the Centre for Policy Studies, produced a big report on immigration. One of our most striking findings was how disparate the effects have been. There were constituencies, such as East Ham in London, where only 27 per cent of school pupils had English as their first language; and constituencies, such as Workington in Cumbria, where the figure was 98 per cent. There were places where less than 5 per cent of the population had arrived since 2001, and places where the figure was more than a third.

Inevitably, therefore, experiences of migration had been very different. For the rich it meant cheap labour — in shops, on hospital wards, in their homes. For the poor it meant increased competition for jobs and housing, plus an unprecedented transformation in the communities around them.

Indeed, as the writer Ed West pointed out last week, it has always been the poor who have had more reason to be resentful of mass migration — and had their concerns fobbed off. He tells the story of two women from Barking & Dagenham, which went from 81 per cent white British in the 2001 census to 31 per cent 20 years later. They pleaded with their MP, Margaret Hodge, to “live here for two or three weeks and see what it’s like”. She told them she was there “pretty often”, but “times have changed and we have to move on with them”.

Even when we do make policy for the left-behind, it is often laced with the most patronising of assumptions.

In 2016 I visited New Orleans to study its school system. The city was for a long time home to some of America’s poorest people and worst schools — even before Hurricane Katrina wiped large parts of it off the map. Yet after Katrina something extraordinary had happened. New Orleans rebuilt its school system on the same lines as the academy revolution in England — handing power to head teachers and school chains, rather than imposing top-down control. The result was a flourishing of brilliant schools that were unapologetic about demanding the highest standards from the worst off.

At Samuel J Green Charter School — 95 per cent African-American, 95 per cent on free school meals — the walls were plastered with pictures of the first black president, the first black senator and so on. Even the year groups were named after the date the kids would graduate from university — historically a foreign concept. City-wide, standards soared and failure plummeted.

It may seem a long way from charter schools in Louisiana to a stabbing on the 472. But the education reformers in New Orleans, and their allies in England, shared a sense of moral mission: a belief that high standards, knowledge and discipline shouldn’t just be for the middle classes. That you helped the worst off not by pandering to them, but by giving them the same opportunities, structures and support as their better-off peers.

This is why I was so upset about the last government’s failure to make reversing the scandalous rates of post-Covid truancy a national crusade. And it’s why I’m even more upset about the new government’s education plans. So much of the coverage has been about the taxation of private schools. But far more corrosive, as Michael Gove has argued, is what is being done to free schools and academies, not least via the new schools bill. Reasserting Whitehall control over everything from salaries to school uniforms.

Cancelling funding for new free schools, or for academy chains that want to take over their struggling counterparts. Rewriting the curriculum to make it less challenging and more “diverse”. Taking responsibility for failing schools away from visionary educators and handing it to civil servants. Giving unions everything, and parents nothing.

The murder of Kelyan Bokassa — and the rape gang scandal — show that something in Britain is broken. That a ruling class dominated by the comfortable too often fails to notice the travails of those who are not. How depressing that Labour is sabotaging one of the few programmes that is doing anything to help.

Saturday, 5 October 2024

How to fund education improvement without putting VAT on fees

 Good economic analysis of an alternative to the current plan, plus there is a petition you can sign at the bottom:

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In a Sun interview on 5 September, Education Secretary Bridget Phillipson challenged opponents of the imposition of VAT on private schools to ‘put up or shut up’, and suggest another way to pay for her education reforms other than the Government’s new education tax. This article answers her question directly.

First, let’s agree: we all want to improve our state schools. Second, let’s assume that doing so requires money: we want to spend £1.5bn. Third, let’s not quibble Labour’s spending plans: 6,500 new teachers and all.

Let’s also correct a common mistake. We’re often told that education is a ‘public good’. This is incorrect. National defence and the criminal justice system are public goods. Education is a ‘merit good’, which delivers both private and public benefits, calls for a mixture of private and public funding, and suggests that private investment should be encouraged.

The best solution for funding a merit good is a freely-transferable voucher that can be topped up, giving all households control over where and how much to spend, encouraging investment, choice and competition, while ensuring a universal baseline provision. However, vouchers do not directly answer Bridget Phillipson’s question: how best to raise £1.5bn. 

So we need a second-best solution. We could find £1.5bn from general taxation. We could find savings within the Government’s spending plans and £9.4bn public-sector pay increases. Or we could question who really needs free state education.

The case for ‘free-at-the-point-of-delivery’ is strong for households unable to pay. It is weak for the wealthiest households who can afford to pay for education. It comes at a cost in terms of choice, family, innovation, competition and diversity, while curtailing desirable private investment. It fails to deliver on the collective promises of social mixing and engagement, often cited as benefits of the system.

The existence of ‘free’ taxpayer-funded education, often enhanced by exclusive catchment areas, PTAs with six- or seven-figure budgets (benefitting from Gift Aid) and tutoring allows wealthier households the attractive option of retaining all their disposable income to support their lifestyle. These arrangements secure strong educational outcomes for the recipients but are of little benefit to the wider system. So why are taxpayers fully-funding education for the rich?

Analysis of data from UCL indicates the diversity of income backgrounds of independent school families. Attendance is unsurprisingly skewed towards higher incomes, but not as much as you might think. Around 90,000, or 15%, of independent school pupils come from below median income households; a further 116,000, or 19%, from outside the top two deciles. The inverse is also true: many children from top-income households attend state schools, to an extent that may surprise you.

The following table combines the UCL data with households’ income after tax. It uses the IFS calculator based on two adults, two primary-age children and a council tax bill of £300/month, and assumes a housing cost of £24,000. Income cut-offs in column (c) are conservatively low as the IFS calculator represents the entire population (including younger people and older people on lower incomes), while the UCL data was limited to families with school-age children, who are often at peak lifetime earnings.

Based on roughly 600,000 independent school children and 8.8 million state school children: 

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If we want to raise money for state education, with certainty, from those with the ‘broadest shoulders’, there is a strong case to call on these top deciles in state education first, ahead of independent school families, whose incomes, as we have seen, are more diverse. Top-two-decile families could pay for the entirety of their education in either state or private settings. Universal, free-at-the-point-of-use provision by the Government leaves them with far more disposable income than those already paying school fees.

A £1,000 contribution on behalf of each of the 1.5m children in state education shown in column (e) of the table above would raise exactly the £1.5bn that Bridget Phillipson seeks. This meets the Government’s own objectives of raising revenue certainly, fairly and with minimal administrative burden. 

This approach would be better at raising net revenue with certainty than the education tax. It is a smaller tax on a much broader base, representing around 1.5% of disposable income (column c) per child, compared to 6-12% of disposable income for the £2,550 education tax (column g). Being a proportionally small measure, it is unlikely adversely to affect the labour market; cliff-edge effects could be avoided by smoothing the application in smaller increments. It does not appear to generate the array of costly unintended consequences to the education economy and labour supply which the Adam Smith Institute has highlighted in its papers Short-Term Thinking and Tuition Tensions.

This approach ensures everyone pays their fair share, with the cost falling on broadest shoulders. Affluent state school families would pay 8-12% towards the £8,000–£12,000 cost of state education (£8,000 being variable cost, plus £4,000 fixed cost); comparison of columns (d) and (g) shows how ‘broad shouldered’ these state school families are. Their peers in independent schools continue to pay their taxes towards state education, as they always have done. Meanwhile this approach avoids touching middle- and lower-income families at all, unlike the education tax, for whom VAT would be a very large share of disposable income and very likely to drive unwanted behaviour shifts.

In terms of administrative costs, imposing a state school contribution could be an extension of the existing income tax code, not requiring hurried system changes by schools and HMRC. It is easily enforced, since it is hard to ‘hide’ children attending school. It does not present any of the avoidance and enforcement challenges and related deadweight costs that come with the Government’s proposed education tax.

A Government wishing to be ‘unburdened by doctrine’ and to ‘tread lightly on people’s lives’ should also appreciate the lack of distortion between education settings. We avoid the needless distortions of the education tax which taxes boarding, music lessons and after-school clubs in independent schools but not in state schools.

Finally, this measure creates a strongly pro-social incentive that has the potential to save more taxpayer money and encourage social mobility, by encouraging more households to pay for their own children’s schooling and free up places in ‘preferred’ state schools – exactly the opposite of Labour’s new education tax. It creates the same beneficial incentives as a partial voucher in reverse.

To do less harm than the education tax is not difficult. A small charge on top-income state school families is superior in every economic dimension. This raises the question of why the Government has chosen the path that it is currently on, especially the imposition of VAT midway through a school year. Regrettably, the answer to that question appears to be that the harm is an intentional part of the policy.

The Education Not Taxation campaign aims to support quality education and protect children, in both state and private sectors, by persuading policymakers of the harm of imposing VAT on independent school fees. You can follow the campaign on X/Twitter, and sign a petition against Labour’s education tax at the following link: Petition · Stop Labour from adding 20% VAT to private school fees and forcing kids to change schools.