Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label devaluation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label devaluation. Show all posts

Saturday, 9 March 2024

Egypt has plenty to offer for essays on LEDCs

 BRIEFING

TOURISM, WHICH BROUGHT IN £14BN LAST YEAR, HAS COLLAPSED

The slow-motion collapse of Egypt

The country of 110 million people is in economic dire straits, but it’s also in a strategically crucial region that is already aflame. Egypt is simply too big to fail. Simon Wilson reports

WHAT’S HAPPENING?

Fears are growing over the slow-motion collapse of Egypt’s economy, and the possible knock-on effects on the Middle East and wider region, including Europe. For decades, Egypt has been a chronic underperformer, with a sclerotic economy dominated by state interests – in particular by those of the country’s all-powerful military. But in recent years things have taken a sharp turn for the worse. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the ex-general who took power in a 2013 coup and assumed the presidency the following year, has proved a disastrous economic manager. Rather than dismantle the military’s long-standing chokehold over the economy, Sisi has reinforced it – and gone on a debt-fuelled spending splurge on prestige mega-projects that the country can’t afford. Egypt was already badly hit by the sharp rise in food prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And now the conflict in Gaza, and its spillover into the Red Sea – restricting access to the Suez Canal – has made things even worse. 

IN WHAT WAY?

Tourism brought in about $14bn last year, accounting for 14% of dollar inflows, but has collapsed since the start of the Gaza war, on Egypt’s northeastern border, in October. The Suez Canal normally accounts for about 30% of container-ship traffic, and earns Egypt almost $10bn a year – but the attacks on shipping by the Houthi rebels who control much of western Yemen have cut traffic by about half. In addition, Egypt is home to the eastern Mediterranean’s only two gas liquefaction facilities, where it processes and re-exports gas from Israel’s southern gas fields. But those re-exports have fallen 50% as a result of war-related disruption. Egypt, already struggling with an influx of 450,000 Sudanese refugees since conflict re-erupted in its southern neighbour ten months ago, is now facing a second humanitarian crisis on its doorstep, and the possibility of more than a million Palestinian refugees. Another big source of income – remittances home from Egypt’s large diaspora – is drying up due to fears over transferring money into the country’s tanking currency, the Egyptian pound. Foreign investors are also withdrawing capital, or demanding ever higher interest rates. 

“PUBLIC DEBT IS OVER 90% OF GDP AND 60% OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET GOES ON SERVICING IT”

WHAT ARE THE FIGURES?

The Egyptian pound has been devalued three times since early 2022, losing 70% of its value. And that’s if you value it at the official exchange rate of 30-31 pounds per dollar in the formal banking sector, where the supply of foreign currency is minimal. In reality, a parallel market has emerged, with the pound more than halving again, to about 70 per dollar. The plunging currency helped push inflation to an annual rate of 34% in December, up from 6% two years ago. Over the past decade, fiscal deficits have averaged 9.5% of GDP. As such, the government has accumulated a massive public debt of more than 90% of GDP. And with the currency in free fall, it now spends 60% of the national budget servicing it. External debt, including IMF credit, rose from an average of $40bn in the early 2010s to $130bn by 2020, including nearly 70% in long-term debt. Since then it has risen further, to around $160bn, and debt repayment obligations are forecast to reach $29bn this year, or 8% of GDP. 

WHAT ARE THEY SPENDING IT ALL ON?

The “mightiest and most obscene” of Sisi’s grand projects is the new capital being built in the desert east of Cairo, says Steven Cook in Foreign Policy. With work still in its first phase, some $60bn has already been spent, but planned financing from the UAE and China has been pulled. Other costly projects include a new “summer capital” on the north coast, a nuclear-power plant (in a country with excess electricity), a new “sustainable” city in the Nile delta, and the revival of a wildly ambitious Mubarak-era project, known as Toshka, that would in effect create a second Nile valley by diverting water using canals. What the projects have in common is that they are all of dubious economic value, but are politically important. “The message may have been that Egypt can still do great things,” says Cook. But they’ve become “unsustainable burdens on the country.”     

HOW IS EGYPT STAYING AFLOAT?

For the time being, the Egyptian economy and government are being propped up by a mix of new loans from allies in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and repeated IMF bailouts; it’s now the fund’s second-biggest debtor. Two weeks ago, Abu Dhabi stepped in with $35bn of investment, a sum that should help secure further IMF support. In the long term, the country’s prospects depend on cutting the role of the state and bureaucracy, controlling the public finances, and building on its growing sectors – such as agricultural, herbal and horticulture businesses, building materials, garments and light manufactured goods, and information technology. In the short run, it needs to kick-start economic reforms by devaluing its currency formally, says The Economist. But to do so would see its dollar debts surge relative to GDP, and raise the price of food, especially grains, where Egypt relies on imports. 

WHAT SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DO?

Ideally, restructure its debts, live within its means and get the army out of business. But there’s no sign that Sisi, who was re-elected in an unfree and unfair election in December, has any intention of doing so. And indeed, “such austerity would be highly dangerous”, says The Economist – raising the prospect of years of default, mass unrest and violence. Egypt’s problems are “threatening to tip it over the edge”, and losing it diplomatic clout to the likes of the UAE and Qatar. But the same problems are, paradoxically, “increasing its negotiating power” when it comes to attracting outside help. When so much of the Middle East is aflame, a major nation of 110 million people, in such a strategically crucial location, is simply too big to fail. “So the world should hold its nose and bail Egypt out again.” 

Saturday, 15 October 2016

Forget the pound, the yuan is the bigger story - exchange rates:

While we are all watching the pound, wondering what's next, there is a far bigger story unfolding on the other side of the world. The key point is that China is happy to let the yuan fall to try and boost its economy, because it dare not tackle other issues building up internally (property bubble). There are more and more warnings about the bubble, and in the meantime China is exporting deflation:

Albert Edwards: China’s Yuan Could Fall To 9.1 As Growth Slows

   

While the world has been watching Brexit and the British pound’s meltdown, China’s currency devaluation has gone relatively unnoticed, although Société Générale’s Albert Edwards has been keeping a watchful eye on developments within China. China’s yuan devaluation and the further slowdown in the country’s economy is the topic of Edwards’ weekly Global Strategy research note this week, specifically about the yuan and has some potential good news for hedge funds.
The Chinese have accelerated the renminbi devaluation, taking it to six-year lows versus the US dollar this week, which is a much more important story for the global economy than the troubles of the UK. As Edwards notes, even though Chinese policy makers have accelerated the yuan’s depreciation, they have taken no action to curb borrowing levels in the country. 
The IMF recently became the latest organization to warn that China is edging towards “financial calamity” and must wean itself off its debt addiction.


Edwards believes Chinese authorities will continue to let the yuan fall. The currency had already breached the psychological 6.7 yuan to the dollar level earlier this week before Chinese trade data showed exports falling 10% year-on-year in September. The weak trade data just accelerated the decline. 
As the yuan ticks lower, the authorities are, at the same time, facing the prospect of another Chinese property bubble. 
As I reported a few weeks ago, it’s clear a property bubble has been inflating within China over the past six months. A report from Deutsche Bank published at the end of September showed that in a group of 19 large and medium-sized Chinese cities, property price rose almost 20% on average during the past 12 months. In some key cities, property prices are up 30% year-to-date in some districts property prices are up over 50%. Price-affordability ratios in a few big cities have risen to record levels of nearly 20 years of annual income.

Authorities have brought in measures to cool the housing market recently and Edwards’ colleague, Wei Yao believes that from past experience, these measurers could successfully drive a contraction, “to the tune of 15-20% in housing sales nationwide at some point during the next six months.” He continues, “Since early 2000, the Chinese economy has never been able to avoid a slowdown when real estate investment decelerates. We do not expect this time to be an exception.” 
How might the Chinese authorities seek to counter this a property driven economic slowdown? Edwards has the answer, “devaluation.”
He believes that the yuan could fall much further in value against the dollar as authorities grapple with an economic slowdown and re-ignite export growth. Société Générale Asian currency strategist Jason Daw believes the USD-CNY rate could fall to 7.1 by the third quarter of next year, but Edwards believes it could fall to 8.1 or 9.1, which would help a lot of hedge funds
With this dismal forecast in place, Edwards ends his weekly note with the following signoff:


“Investors are underestimating the magnitude and deflationary impact of renminbi devaluation. Sterling, bah!”


Sunday, 29 November 2015

Some thoughts about the global "soft patch"



     A Hard Look at a Soft Global Economy




MILAN – The global economy is settling into a slow-growth rut, steered there by policymakers’ inability or unwillingness to address major impediments at a global level. Indeed, even the current anemic pace of growth is probably unsustainable. The question is whether an honest assessment of the impediments to economic performance worldwide will spur policymakers into action.

Since 2008, real (inflation-adjusted) cumulative growth in the developed economies has amounted to a mere 5-6%. While China’s GDP has risen by about 70%, making it the largest contributor to global growth, this was aided substantially by debt-fueled investment. And, indeed, as that stimulus wanes, the impact of inadequate advanced-country demand on Chinese growth is becoming increasingly apparent.

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Growth is being undermined from all sides. Leverage is increasing, with some $57 trillion having piled up worldwide since the global financial crisis began. And that leverage – much of it the result of monetary expansion in most of the world’s advanced economies – is not even serving the goal of boosting long-term aggregate demand. After all, accommodative monetary policies can, at best, merely buy time for more durable sources of demand to emerge.

Moreover, a protracted period of low interest rates has pushed up asset prices, causing them to diverge from underlying economic performance. But while interest rates are likely to remain low, their impact on asset prices probably will not persist. As a result, returns on assets are likely to decline compared to the recent past; with prices already widely believed to be in bubble territory, a downward correction seems likely. Whatever positive impact wealth effects have had on consumption and deleveraging cannot be expected to continue.

The world also faces a serious investment problem, which the low cost of capital has done virtually nothing to overcome. Public-sector investment is now below the level needed to sustain robust growth, owing to its insufficient contribution to aggregate demand and productivity gains.

The most likely explanation for this public investment shortfall is fiscal constraints. And, indeed, debt and unfunded non-debt liabilities increasingly weigh down public-sector balance sheets and pension funds, eroding the foundations of resilient, sustainable growth.
But if the best way to reduce sovereign over-indebtedness is to achieve higher nominal GDP growth (the combination of real growth and inflation), cutting investment – a key ingredient in a pro-growth-strategy – is not a sound approach. Instead, budget rules should segregate public investment, thereby facilitating a differential response in fiscal consolidation.

Increased public-sector investment could help to spur private-sector investment, which is also severely depressed. In the United States, investment barely exceeds pre-crisis levels, even though GDP has risen by 10%. And the US is not alone.

Clearly, deficient aggregate demand has played a role by reducing the incentive to expand capacity. In some economies, structural rigidities adversely affect investment incentives and returns. Similarly, regulatory opacity – and, more broadly, uncertainty about the direction of economic policy – has discouraged investment. And certain types of shareholder activism have bred short-termism on the part of firms.

There is also an intermediation problem. Large pools of savings in sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and insurance companies could be used, for example, to meet emerging economies’ huge financing needs for infrastructure and urbanization. But the channels for such investment – which could go a long way toward boosting global growth – are clogged.
Meanwhile, technological and market forces have contributed to job polarization, with the middle-income bracket gradually deteriorating. Automation, for example, seems to have spurred an unexpectedly rapid decline in routine white- and blue-collar jobs. This has resulted in stagnating median incomes and rising income inequality, both of which constrain the private-consumption component of aggregate demand.

Even the one factor that has effectively increased disposable incomes and augmented demand – sharply declining commodity prices, particularly for fossil fuels – is ultimately problematic. Indeed, for commodity-exporting countries, the fall in prices is generating fiscal and economic headwinds of varying intensity.

Inflation – or the lack of it – presents further challenges. Price growth is well below targets and declining in many countries. If this turns to full-blown deflation, accompanied by uncontrolled rising real interest rates, the risk to growth would be serious. Even very low inflation hampers countries’ ability to address over-indebtedness. And there is little sign of inflationary pressure, even in the US, which is near “full” employment. Given such large demand shortfalls and output gaps, it should surprise no one that even exceptionally generous monetary conditions have proved insufficient to bolster inflation.

With few options for fighting deflation, countries have resorted to competitive devaluations. But this is not an effective strategy for capturing a larger share of tradable global demand if everyone is doing it. And targeting exchange-rate competitiveness doesn’t address the aggregate demand problem.

If the global economy remains on its current trajectory, a period of intense volatility could destabilize a number of emerging economies, while undermining development efforts worldwide. That’s why policymakers must act now.

For starters, governments must recognize that central banks, however well they have served their economies, cannot go it alone. Complementary reforms are needed to maintain and improve the transmission channels of monetary policy and avoid adverse side effects. In several countries – such as France, Italy, and Spain – reforms designed to increase structural flexibility are also crucial.

Furthermore, impediments to higher and more efficient public- and private-sector investment must be removed. And governments must implement measures to redistribute income, improve the provision of basic services, and equip the labor force to take advantage of ongoing shifts in the economic structure.

Generating the political will to get even some of this done will be no easy feat. But an honest look at the sorry state – and unpromising trajectory – of the global economy will, one hopes, help policymakers do what’s needed.

Read more at https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/examine-reasons-for-slow-global-growth-by-michael-spence-2015-11#pEJeWssUuW7Jl0Pt.99