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“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label france. Show all posts
Showing posts with label france. Show all posts

Wednesday, 27 November 2024

France is ahead of us (just) in the shaky fiscal position stakes:

 

France is playing with fire: an IMF bailout is no longer unthinkable

The collapse of the European project’s twin-anchor threatens dramatic consequences for the Continent

Emmanuel Macron
Emmanuel Macron’s ‘grand bargain’ with Berlin has failed Credit: Sarah Meyssonier/Pool/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock

France is pushing its luck. The country has long enjoyed an “exorbitant privilege” within the EU, able to borrow at rock-bottom German rates because it is deemed to be the twin-anchor of the European project.

Markets assume that the EU institutions will always coddle France whatever it does. We may soon find out whether this is a political narrative beyond its sell-by date.

There is a high likelihood that the Barnier government will collapse over the next month without passing a budget, unable to rein in runaway fiscal deficits that subvert the cohesion of monetary union.

“The governability of France is being called into question more than I have ever seen in my lifetime,” said Moritz Kraemer, ex-head of sovereign ratings at Standard & Poor’s.

The risk spread of 10-year French bonds over German Bunds spiked to 83 points on Tuesday, the highest since the eurozone bond crisis in 2012, though that metric does not fully capture the underlying gravity of events.

“The markets are waiting for a credible response but nobody can see where it is going to come from and there doesn’t seem to be any sense of urgency,” said Mr Kraemer, now chief economist at the German Landesbank LBBW.

“The French are playing with fire. Nobody in the markets still thinks that France is still part of the eurozone core. These spreads are a loud and clear warning,” he said.

His words have weight. S&P will decide on Friday whether to downgrade French debt yet further, after cutting the rating to AA- in May.

France is not at any imminent risk of a Greek default crisis, any more than Britain was at risk during the Truss mini-storm. But it is moving into the grey zone.

Mr Kraemer said the European Central Bank may ultimately be forced to intervene, invoking its untested “spread protection tool” (TPI) to buy French debt on the open market. “This could only go on for a couple of months; then there would have to be a proper adjustment,” he said.

This would require combined action by the International Monetary Fund and EU’s bail-out fund (ESM), together imposing the IMF’s usual medicine of spending cuts, tax rises, and harsh reform – if they could even handle a big beast with €3.3 trillion (£2.8 trillion) of public debt.

“It would be really brutal upfront austerity. The politics would be absolutely toxic because the ECB’s president is a former French finance minister,” he said.

Any use of the rescue machinery would require the assent of the German Bundestag, the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the northern creditor states. It is hard to imagine a more explosive political showdown.

The chances that the current French parliament would agree to draconian terms is close to zero. Two prickly animals hold the balance of power: the Left-wing Popular Front, and the Right-wing National Rally. Both defend France’s sacred – and unaffordable – welfare model.

The EU’s Mercosur trade treaty with Latin America adds another stick of political dynamite to the mix. If this treaty is imposed on France against its vehement protest – as seems likely – it risks an emotional rupture between the French people and the EU power structure.

For now there seems to be a widespread assumption that the ECB will suppress French bond yields as it did for Italy over the years. As cynics say, isn’t that why Emmanuel Macron pushed so hard to secure the top job for France’s Christine Lagarde?

But the institution can no longer mop up Club Med debt with no questions asked under the cover of quantitative easing. Post-Covid inflation has made this patently illegal. Any attempt to do so at scale would lead to a knife-fight within the governing council.

The French government understands the risks as the budget deficit hits 6.1pc of GDP this year and heads for structurally higher levels through the 2020s. “If we don’t act, the mechanical dynamic of public spending could push it to 7pc in 2025,” said Laurent Saint-Martin, the budget minister.

Premier Michel Barnier wants fiscal tightening of €60bn – in reality nearer €45bn – in mixed cuts and taxes, warning of a debt trap as interest service costs spiral higher. “Retrenchment is unavoidable, otherwise we are heading straight into a financial crisis,” he said last month.

Yet he cannot even count on the parties of his own loose coalition. His finance minister – a Macron loyalist – has publicly rebuked him for trying to raise taxes. Other Macronistes are acting as if they are in opposition. Party discipline has disintegrated.

The National Assembly has become a seething hotbed of self-promoting potentates pursuing their own power plays. It is an unedifying spectacle.

The government survives on the sufferance of National Rally’s Marine Le Pen, poetic justice after an election manipulated to deprive her 11m voters of genuine franchise.

As Henry Samuel reports from our Paris bureau, Le Pen is threatening to plant the “kiss of death” on the hapless coalition by joining the Left in a vote of no confidence triggered by attempts to force through the budget by decree power.

She has imposed a “red line” over the cost of living. The real reason is that 73pc of her party’s supporters want rid of Mr Barnier, one of the last great gentlemen of modern politics.

Michel Barnier, the French prime minister
Most of Marine Le Pen’s party want rid of Michel Barnier, the last great gentleman of French politics Credit: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

Professor Thomas Mayer, ex-chief economist at Deutsche Bank and author of Europe’s Unfinished Currency, said the political foundations of monetary union are coming apart. “The eurozone core is melting down. Markets can see that public finances are out of control and that France is moving into the Italian camp,” he said.

The German economic establishment is splitting into two camps as it watches the soap opera unfold. “The orthodox view is that Germany must stick to sound finances even if it becomes the sole anchor of the euro. At least we will still have a halfway respectable currency,” he said.

“The second view you are hearing more and more is that if others don’t bother, why should we? To hell with it, let’s just get rid of our debt-brake, and if the euro goes down the drain, that’s just too bad. The coalition imploded over this,” said Prof Mayer, now director of the Flossbach von Storch Research Institute.

“What you are seeing in the bond markets is that investors are beginning to doubt whether the German debt-brake will continue,” he said. Danish yields are now 20 points below German yields even though the krone is pegged to the euro. This is unprecedented.

Prof Mayer said the EU had turned into a bureaucratic leviathan that posed an increasing threat to Germany’s fundamental interests.

“Our government is going to have to confront the European Commission head on. It is imposing more and more directives on everything. It is impinging on personal freedoms, on production, on supply chains. It’s simply horrific,” he said.

“I don’t know how long Scandinavians will go along with it, or the Netherlands: they can all see the writing on the wall,” he said.

One thing is absolutely clear: President Macron’s “grand bargain” with Berlin has failed. He came to power in 2017 pledging to restore fiscal probity and make France fit for the euro. This would supposedly unlock German assent for a “Hamiltonian” leap forward: joint debt issuance and a muscular EU treasury with borrowing powers.

“It is dead in the water. There is no realistic constellation of political parties in Germany that would agree to it,” said Mr Kraemer.

France will probably muddle through and avert a full-blown financial crisis for now. But the larger damage is done.

There will be no fiscal union after all. Without that the euro is a chronically unstable construction on borrowed time.

Friday, 11 October 2024

If you thought a "£22bn black hole" was bad, consider France:




French PM Michel Barnier unveils shock therapy in 2025 budget 

Minority government bets on mix of spending cuts alongside tax rises on companies and the wealthy 

 Prime Minister Michel Barnier said: ‘We cannot sacrifice the future of our children or continue to write bad cheques that will fall on them’  Leila Abboud in Paris 

The French government has proposed a budget for next year with some €60bn worth of spending cuts and tax increases on companies and the wealthy, as it seeks to narrow its widening deficit. Prime Minister Michel Barnier has cast tackling France’s “colossal” public debt as his biggest priority, despite the political risk such measures entail for his fragile minority government. 

 “We cannot sacrifice the future of our children or continue to write bad cheques that will fall on them,” Barnier said on Thursday. “The attractiveness [of France] and credibility of the French signature must be preserved.” 

 In the proposed budget, some 440 large corporations with revenues above €1bn would be hit by an “exceptional” tax lasting two years with the aim of raising a total of €12bn. Share buybacks would also be taxed. The state-owned electricity utility EDF will pay a special dividend to government coffers — together these changes, and others affecting business, would raise €13.6bn. 

 If passed, the moves would break with the economic policies espoused by Macron since 2017 that include lowering taxes and curbing strict labour protections in an effort to boost growth and competitiveness. 

 Passing the budget in the fragmented National Assembly will be Barnier’s first real test since Emmanuel Macron named him premier in August. His appointment came after shock snap elections which forced the president’s centrist camp into an awkward power-sharing government with Barnier’s conservative Les Républicains. 

 Few lawmakers believe the budget can be adopted without Barnier using a constitutional clause that allows him to override parliament, but doing so could open him up to the risk of a no-confidence vote.

 At stake is Barnier’s ability to both calm investors’ jitters about lending to France and withstand pressure from Brussels, which has admonished Paris for its excessive deficit. French borrowing costs now exceed not only those of Germany, but also Spain’s. 

 The government claims two-thirds of the €60bn effort in 2025 will come from spending cuts, such as on medical costs, unemployment, and reducing the number of public servants. The rest will come from tax increases. 

 But an independent government advisory body, using a different calculation method, recently estimated taxes will account for 70 per cent of the effort. The divergence matters because Macron’s centrists staunchly opposes tax increases, while Barnier’s own party also wants more spending cuts. 

 Barnier has said the budget draft is a starting point for lawmakers, but warned them not to derail the goal to reach a deficit to 3 per cent of national output by 2029. 

 Another hit to companies will come from delaying a planned cut in production taxes, which groups pay on their activities regardless of whether they are profitable. Cutting these was a hallmark of Macron’s supply-side strategy. 

 Airlines and private jets face a new levy on flights to generate €1bn next year, while container shipping companies, including Marseille-based CMA-CGM, will be slapped with a separate levy that would raise 800mn in the next two years. 

 Businesses will also be affected by higher labour costs caused by scrapping tax breaks on low-income workers and phasing out apprenticeship subsidies. Although Barnier has argued working people will be insulated, households will be affected by higher taxes on electricity bills. 

Individuals are also likely to face higher healthcare costs if the government scales back reimbursements of doctors’ visits and medicines as planned. In another shift from Macron’s approach, France’s wealthiest are being asked to contribute €2bn in a new tax on those who earn about €500,000 annually, who are estimated to represent 65,000 households. 

 The deficit will stand over 6 per cent of GDP by year end. The government aims to trim it to 5 per cent by the end of 2025, although public spending will still increase next year because all the spending cuts and taxation will only slow the pace of increase. 

 France has repeatedly overshot its deficit targets since last year, prompting concern that the government has lost control over spending and also cannot accurately predict tax inflows. Its debt pile represented 110 per cent of GDP as of July, the third-worst in the EU behind Greece and Italy. Successive French governments have not presented balanced budgets for decades. 

The public has a renowned appetite for costly welfare programmes and supports a high level of income redistribution. One of Barnier’s particularly controversial proposals asks retirees — long protected by politicians as a key voting bloc — to delay the annual inflation-adjusted increase to their state pensions by six months. The move would save about €3.6bn. Several parties have already railed against it, including the far-right Rassemblement National. Pushing the issue is risky for Barnier because Marine Le Pen’s RN is the key swing voting bloc needed for a no-confidence vote to pass.

Monday, 3 June 2024

France's credit rating downgraded - Financial Times

 France has been downgraded by S&P Global in a blow to Emmanuel Macron’s credibility as a steward of the economy, once the bright spot of his presidency. 

The credit rating agency changed France’s long-term issuer rating from AA to AA- with a stable outlook, citing concerns that the trajectory of government debt as a share of gross domestic product would increase through 2027 and not fall as previously forecast.  

S&P also said France’s lower-than-expected growth was a factor. It expressed concern that “political fragmentation” would make enacting reforms to boost growth or “address budgetary imbalances” difficult for Macron’s government. 

The downgrade risks precipitating significant political fallout for Macron, but the financial impact is likely to be limited as was the case the last time significant downgrades were made in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis roughly a decade ago. 

The bad news on public finances comes as Macron’s centrist alliance is poised for a broad defeat in European elections on June 9. Polls show it 17.5 points behind Marine Le Pen’s far-right Rassemblement national party, according to Ipsos. Opposition parties are gearing up to debate two no-confidence motions on Monday to object to the government’s handling of the budget, although at this stage they have little chance of passing.  

Macron no longer boasts a parliamentary majority so he has more difficulty in passing legislation or a budget, although the French constitution allows the government to override lawmakers on budget matters. 

“The downgrade by S&P is legitimate because, of all the countries in the Eurozone, only two are left with such high debt-to-GDP ratios that are only getting worse — France and Italy,” said Charles-Henri Colombier, a director at Rexecode economic institute. 

“It is a warning to the government that it needs to do more to cut spending, not just seek to boost growth.” The government has been bracing for a downgrade since it revealed in January that its deficit was wider than expected last year, at 5.5 per cent of GDP compared to a forecast of 4.9 per cent.  

While deficits are typical in a country that has not balanced its budget in decades, the Eurozone’s second-largest economy suffered an unforeseen shortfall of €21bn in tax revenue in 2023. 

  Issuer ratings of G7 economies Country (S&P credit rating & outlook, Moody’s credit rating & outlook, Fitch credit rating &outlook):

France AA- / stable; Aa2 / stable; AA- / stable 

US AA+ / stable; Aaa / negative; AA+/ stable 

Japan A+ / stable; A1 / stable; A / stable 

Germany AAA / stable; Aaa / stable; AAA / stable 

UK AA / stable; Aa3 / stable; AA- / stable 

Canada AAA / stable; Aaa / stable; AA+ / stable; 

Italy BBB / stable; Baa3 / stable; BBB / stable

The situation has shown the limits of Macron’s strategy since he was first elected in 2017 — to cut taxes on companies and enact business-friendly reforms in a bet that such moves would boost growth enough to pay for France’s generous social welfare model. 

While unemployment has fallen to its lowest levels in decades and foreign investment has risen, the government has continued to spend heavily on public services, as well as on exceptional measures to protect businesses and households from the fallout of the pandemic and the energy crisis. That has widened the deficit and led to the national debt ballooning. 

When interest rates were low repercussions were few, but borrowing costs have ticked up from €29bn in 2020 to above €50bn this year — more than the annual defence budget. They are set to reach €80bn in 2027. France says it still aims to bring its deficit back to 3 per cent of output, an EU threshold, by 2027, the end of Macron’s second term. However, economists see that as highly unlikely and S&P’s new forecast is for the deficit-to-GDP ratio to stand at 3.5 per cent in 2027.  

“We believe the French economy and public finances overall will continue to benefit from structural reforms implemented over the past decade,” said S&P. 

“However, without additional budget-deficit-reducing measures . . . the reforms will not be sufficient for the country to meet its budgetary targets.”  

General government debt as a share of GDP “will continuously increase” to 112.1 per cent of GDP in 2027, from 109 per cent last year.  Macron’s finance minister Bruno Le Maire has been scrambling to find savings on everything from climate policies to subsidies for hiring apprentices so as to cut a further €10bn this year, after reductions of €10bn in January. 

At least another €20bn in cuts will be needed next year, according to the budget ministry, but the risk is that these will dent growth. The government has also insisted it will not raise taxes on households or companies, a hallmark of Macron’s economic policy. 

Opposition parties have criticised the stance as unrealistic given the hole in the budget. The government is forecasting growth of 1 per cent this year, higher than the Bank of France’s 0.8 per cent prediction.

Experts have said the S&P downgrade is not expected to have a big effect on French borrowing costs because investors still see the country as a reliable entity. The spread between German and French 10-year bonds has even slightly narrowed this year. “Our debt easily finds buyers on the market,” Le Maire told Le Parisien newspaper after the downgrade. “France still has a high-quality reputation as an issuer, one of the best in the world.”

Thursday, 24 January 2019

Let's take a quick look at EU economic data again



When will the ECB ease monetary policy again?

Sometimes life catches up with you really fast and we have seen another example of this in the last 24 hours, so let;s get straight to it.
Analysts at Deutsche Bank say European Central Bank’s Mario Draghi indicated the possibility of a one-off interest rate hike at his last press conference. With his next appearance due on Thursday, the president may choose to feed or quell that speculation. ( Bloomberg)
I found this so extraordinary that I suggested on social media that Deutsche Bank may have a bad interest-rate position it wants to get rid of [ask me if you want to know what this means - JB]. After all at the last press conference we were told this and the emphasis is mine.
Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We continue to expect them to remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.
Now Forward Guidance by central banks is regularly wrong but it is invariably due to a cut in interest-rates after promising a rise rather than an actual rise. The latter seems restricted to currency collapses. So let us move onto the economic situation which has been heading south for a while now as the declining money supply data we have been tracking has been followed by a weakening economic situation.
France
This morning brought more worrying news from the economy of France from the Markit PMI business survey. It started well with the manufacturing PMI rising to 51.2 but then there was this.
Flash France Services Activity Index at 47.5 in January (49.0 in December), 59-month low.
So firmly in contraction territory as we look for more detail.
Private sector firms in France reported a further
contraction in output during the opening month of
2019. The latest decline was the fastest for over four
years, even quicker than the fall in protest-hit
December. The strong service sector that had
supported a weak manufacturing sector in the
second half 2018 declined at a faster rate in January.
Meanwhile, manufacturers recovered to register
broadly-unchanged production.
These numbers added to the official survey released only yesterday.
In January 2019, the balances of industrialists’ opinion on overall and foreign demand in the last three months have recovered above their long-term average – they had significantly dropped over the past year.
They record a manufacturing bounce too, but the general direction of travel is the same as the number for foreign demand has fallen from 21.8 at the opening of 2018 to 3.6 now and the number for global demand has fallen from 21.7 to 1.0 over the same timescale.
Perhaps we get an idea of a possible drop from wholesale trade.
The composite indicator has fallen back by five points compared to November 2018. At 99, it has fallen below its long-term average (100) for the first time since January 2017.
But in spite of a small nudge higher in services the total picture for France looks rather poor as we note that it looks as though it saw a contraction in December and that may well have got worse this month.
Germany
There was little solace to be found in the Euro area’s largest economy.
“The Germany PMI broke its recent run of
successive falls in January thanks to a stronger
increase in service sector business activity, but the
growth performance signalled by the index was still
one of the worst over the past four years.
“Worryingly for the outlook, the recent soft patch in
demand continued into the New Year.”
So some growth but not very much and I note Markit are nervous about this as they do not offer a suggestion of what level of GDP ( Gross Domestic Product) grow is likely from this. This of course adds to the flatlining we seem to have seen for the second half of 2018 as around 0.2% growth in the fourth quarter merely offset the 0.2% contraction seen in the third quarter.
Also the recovery promised by some for the manufacturing sector does not seem to have materialised.
Manufacturing fell into contraction in January as
the sector’s order book situation continued to
worsen, showing the steepest decline in incoming
new work since 2012.
The driving force was this.
Weakness in the auto industry was once again widely reported, as was a slowdown in demand from China.
Euro area
The central message here followed that of the two biggest Euro area economies we have already looked at. The decline in the composite PMI suggests on ongoing quarterly GDP growth rate of 0.1%. Added to it was the suggestion that the future is a lot less than bright.
New orders for goods fell for a fourth successive
month, declining at a rate not seen since April
2013, while inflows of new business in the service
sector slipped into decline for the first time since
July 2013
Inflation
The target is just below 2% as an annual rate so we note this.
The euro area annual inflation rate was 1.6% in December 2018, down from 1.9% in November
Of course being central bankers they apparently need neither food nor energy so they like to focus on the inflation number without them which is either 1.1% or 1% depending exactly which bits you omit, But as you can see this is hardly the bedrock for an interest-rate rise which is reinforced by this from @fwred of Bank Pictet.
More bad news for the ECB. Our PMI price pressure gauge fell by the largest amount since mid-2011, to levels consistent with monetary easing along with activity indicators.
Comment
The situation has become increasingly awkward for Mario Draghi and the ECB as a slowing economy and lower inflation have been described by them as follows.
When you look at the economy, well, you still see the drivers of this recovery are still in place. Consumption continues to grow, basically supported by the increase in real disposable income, which, if I am not mistaken, is at the historical high since six years or something, and households’ wealth. Business investments continue to grow, residential investment, as I said in the IS [introductory statement] is robust. External demand has gone down but still grows.
Yet as we can see the reality is that economic growth looks like it has dropped from the around 0.7% of 2017 to more like 0.1% now. If we were not where we are with a deposit rate of -0.4% and monthly QE having only just ended they would be openly looking at an interest-rate cut or more QE.
Whilst we have been observing the slow down in the M1 money supply from just under 10% to 6.7% the ECB has lost itself in a world of “ongoing broad-based expansion”. It is not impossible we will see some liquidity easing today via a new TLTRO which would also help the Italian banks but we will have to see.
As to why there has been talk about an interest-rate rise well it is not for savers it is for the precious and the emphasis is mine.
As a result, reductions in
rates can end up having a similar effect as a flattening of the yield curve, as banks interest
revenue drops along with rates, but interest costs only adjust partially because of the zero
lower bound on retail deposits. In this situation, lowering rates below zero can pose a threat to banks’ profitability. ( ECB November 2018)

Tuesday, 22 May 2018

German fiscal surplus

Things are never straightforward - has Germany achieved a budget surplus through fiscal prudence, or is it squeezing spending that is causing problems elsewhere? This fits in to a European stability, fiscal prudence/austerity or government spending question:

Germany’s Great European Heist

, 
Two seemingly reasonable principles guide German thinking about eurozone integration: responsibilities and control must be aligned; and legacy risks must be settled before any pooling of risks among euro members takes place. But what if France applied Germany’s approach to eurozone integration to the question of mutualizing defense commitments?

NEW YORK – Two mantras guide German thinking about eurozone integration: responsibilities and control must be aligned (so no mutualization of risk without shared jurisdiction); and legacy risks must be settled before any pooling of risks among euro members takes place. Since 2010, these two refrains have shaped the entire discussion of how to shore up the euro, and they largely account for the anemic progress being made on the creation of a European banking union. Germany is ready to embark on a common future, its leaders say, but only if Europe starts from a clean slate.

At first sight, that proposition seems reasonable enough. But to understand its full implications, try applying the same logic to another policy field: security and defense.
What if France applied Germany’s approach to eurozone integration to the question of mutualizing defense commitments? What if the French were to insist, as an absolute precondition for further security cooperation, that Germany not only increase its defense budget immediately, but also make good on its accumulated backlog in defense spending from recent decades?

Germany has not always been a free rider on other people’s defense spending. West Germany was a reliable player in NATO’s Cold War system of burden sharing, and the Bundeswehr in the 1980s was a capable force. For better or worse, it stood in the tradition of German armies since the Kaiserreich. National service was the norm. Defense spending ran at 3% of GDP.

Then came the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Germany embraced the peace dividend with a vengeance. Reductions in Germany’s armed forces and disavowal of weapons of mass destruction were written into the treaties that reunified Germany. But demilitarization also reflected societal shifts. Something in the political culture of the Federal Republic had changed.

More and more young men chose civilian over military service. In 2011, conscription was suspended. As a practical matter, that decision probably should have come sooner. Today’s best-functioning militaries are professional, not conscripted. But, in Germany, no positive image of the Bundeswehr’s new role emerged from the end of the Cold War model. Morale and functional capacity collapsed along with spending.

At NATO meeting after NATO meeting, Germany would commit to spending 2% of its GDP on defense. It never delivered. Spending slumped toward 1% of GDP, with the majority going to salaries and pensions. The latest NATO data show German spending on defense equipment and on research and development running at only 0.17% of GDP in 2017, compared to 0.42% in France and 0.47% in the UK.

Germany’s dearth of military investment has created a daunting gap between its defense capacity and that of the rest of Europe. Only a fraction of Germany’s weapons and military vehicles are operational. On Europe’s eastern border, only nine of the 44 tanks promised for the Bundeswehr unit that is supposed to anchor NATO’s 5,000-strong rapid-reaction force in the Baltics next year are fit for use. The unit also lacks other equipment essential for the mission, such as tents, winter clothing, night vision equipment, and body armor.

For the German left, which opposes the use of hard power, there is no reason to lament this lack of resources. But the gutting of the Bundeswehr also disables Germany’s ability to exercise soft power. In 2014, Germany’s humanitarian team to deliver assistance to Ebola-stricken Liberia was stranded in the Canary Islands. The German Navy’s large supply ships – those most useful for refugee rescue operations in the Mediterranean – will be out of commission for 18 months, owing to a lack of spare parts.

If the Bundeswehr’s guns don’t work, its frigates are in dry dock, and its logistical capacity is zero; what other commitments might the French taxpayer be taking on? By agreeing, year after year, to the mutualization of defense costs, what sort of incentives is France providing to Germany to undertake reform?

If the French were to apply a simple spending rule, they would find that since 1990 they had cumulatively spent 30% of GDP more than Germany on defense. If what the Germans are most interested in is France’s nuclear deterrence, the costs over the same period total approximately 4.5-5 % of French GDP.

So the legacy issues are considerable. Furthermore, given Germany’s ingrained post-military habits, backsliding is to be expected. What is French President Emmanuel Macron to make of the German budget announced earlier this month, which shows a marginal increase in defense spending but not enough to meet the NATO target, let alone to close past deficits?

German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s new grand coalition government may not look like a reliable security partner, but does that mean France should hold out until Germany has made good on its legacy defense debt before considering defense investments and mutualization in Europe?

Europe’s need to develop a twenty-first century security strategy is urgent, not only because Donald Trump’s America is unreliable, but also because humanitarian emergencies demand it. It must develop a shared culture and build democratic governance to decide on the deployment of its defense forces. That will involve deep cultural and political adjustments on all sides. Both Germany’s habit of free riding and France’s tendency toward trigger-happy postcolonial forays will have to be debated.

These issues are at the heart of developing a European sovereign, backed by democratic institutions and decision-making processes that enable the common use of force. But Europe cannot start from some imaginary tabula rasa. It must start from the place to which history has brought it. The quid pro quo that France should demand for cooperation on security policy is that Germany recognizes the same reality with regard to economic policy.
Here, too, the past must be taken as given. Starting positions are unequal and incentive structures are imperfect. But Europe must agree to move forward together nonetheless, or risk being torn apart.