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“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label fiscal prudence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fiscal prudence. Show all posts

Wednesday, 27 November 2024

France is ahead of us (just) in the shaky fiscal position stakes:

 

France is playing with fire: an IMF bailout is no longer unthinkable

The collapse of the European project’s twin-anchor threatens dramatic consequences for the Continent

Emmanuel Macron
Emmanuel Macron’s ‘grand bargain’ with Berlin has failed Credit: Sarah Meyssonier/Pool/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock

France is pushing its luck. The country has long enjoyed an “exorbitant privilege” within the EU, able to borrow at rock-bottom German rates because it is deemed to be the twin-anchor of the European project.

Markets assume that the EU institutions will always coddle France whatever it does. We may soon find out whether this is a political narrative beyond its sell-by date.

There is a high likelihood that the Barnier government will collapse over the next month without passing a budget, unable to rein in runaway fiscal deficits that subvert the cohesion of monetary union.

“The governability of France is being called into question more than I have ever seen in my lifetime,” said Moritz Kraemer, ex-head of sovereign ratings at Standard & Poor’s.

The risk spread of 10-year French bonds over German Bunds spiked to 83 points on Tuesday, the highest since the eurozone bond crisis in 2012, though that metric does not fully capture the underlying gravity of events.

“The markets are waiting for a credible response but nobody can see where it is going to come from and there doesn’t seem to be any sense of urgency,” said Mr Kraemer, now chief economist at the German Landesbank LBBW.

“The French are playing with fire. Nobody in the markets still thinks that France is still part of the eurozone core. These spreads are a loud and clear warning,” he said.

His words have weight. S&P will decide on Friday whether to downgrade French debt yet further, after cutting the rating to AA- in May.

France is not at any imminent risk of a Greek default crisis, any more than Britain was at risk during the Truss mini-storm. But it is moving into the grey zone.

Mr Kraemer said the European Central Bank may ultimately be forced to intervene, invoking its untested “spread protection tool” (TPI) to buy French debt on the open market. “This could only go on for a couple of months; then there would have to be a proper adjustment,” he said.

This would require combined action by the International Monetary Fund and EU’s bail-out fund (ESM), together imposing the IMF’s usual medicine of spending cuts, tax rises, and harsh reform – if they could even handle a big beast with €3.3 trillion (£2.8 trillion) of public debt.

“It would be really brutal upfront austerity. The politics would be absolutely toxic because the ECB’s president is a former French finance minister,” he said.

Any use of the rescue machinery would require the assent of the German Bundestag, the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the northern creditor states. It is hard to imagine a more explosive political showdown.

The chances that the current French parliament would agree to draconian terms is close to zero. Two prickly animals hold the balance of power: the Left-wing Popular Front, and the Right-wing National Rally. Both defend France’s sacred – and unaffordable – welfare model.

The EU’s Mercosur trade treaty with Latin America adds another stick of political dynamite to the mix. If this treaty is imposed on France against its vehement protest – as seems likely – it risks an emotional rupture between the French people and the EU power structure.

For now there seems to be a widespread assumption that the ECB will suppress French bond yields as it did for Italy over the years. As cynics say, isn’t that why Emmanuel Macron pushed so hard to secure the top job for France’s Christine Lagarde?

But the institution can no longer mop up Club Med debt with no questions asked under the cover of quantitative easing. Post-Covid inflation has made this patently illegal. Any attempt to do so at scale would lead to a knife-fight within the governing council.

The French government understands the risks as the budget deficit hits 6.1pc of GDP this year and heads for structurally higher levels through the 2020s. “If we don’t act, the mechanical dynamic of public spending could push it to 7pc in 2025,” said Laurent Saint-Martin, the budget minister.

Premier Michel Barnier wants fiscal tightening of €60bn – in reality nearer €45bn – in mixed cuts and taxes, warning of a debt trap as interest service costs spiral higher. “Retrenchment is unavoidable, otherwise we are heading straight into a financial crisis,” he said last month.

Yet he cannot even count on the parties of his own loose coalition. His finance minister – a Macron loyalist – has publicly rebuked him for trying to raise taxes. Other Macronistes are acting as if they are in opposition. Party discipline has disintegrated.

The National Assembly has become a seething hotbed of self-promoting potentates pursuing their own power plays. It is an unedifying spectacle.

The government survives on the sufferance of National Rally’s Marine Le Pen, poetic justice after an election manipulated to deprive her 11m voters of genuine franchise.

As Henry Samuel reports from our Paris bureau, Le Pen is threatening to plant the “kiss of death” on the hapless coalition by joining the Left in a vote of no confidence triggered by attempts to force through the budget by decree power.

She has imposed a “red line” over the cost of living. The real reason is that 73pc of her party’s supporters want rid of Mr Barnier, one of the last great gentlemen of modern politics.

Michel Barnier, the French prime minister
Most of Marine Le Pen’s party want rid of Michel Barnier, the last great gentleman of French politics Credit: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

Professor Thomas Mayer, ex-chief economist at Deutsche Bank and author of Europe’s Unfinished Currency, said the political foundations of monetary union are coming apart. “The eurozone core is melting down. Markets can see that public finances are out of control and that France is moving into the Italian camp,” he said.

The German economic establishment is splitting into two camps as it watches the soap opera unfold. “The orthodox view is that Germany must stick to sound finances even if it becomes the sole anchor of the euro. At least we will still have a halfway respectable currency,” he said.

“The second view you are hearing more and more is that if others don’t bother, why should we? To hell with it, let’s just get rid of our debt-brake, and if the euro goes down the drain, that’s just too bad. The coalition imploded over this,” said Prof Mayer, now director of the Flossbach von Storch Research Institute.

“What you are seeing in the bond markets is that investors are beginning to doubt whether the German debt-brake will continue,” he said. Danish yields are now 20 points below German yields even though the krone is pegged to the euro. This is unprecedented.

Prof Mayer said the EU had turned into a bureaucratic leviathan that posed an increasing threat to Germany’s fundamental interests.

“Our government is going to have to confront the European Commission head on. It is imposing more and more directives on everything. It is impinging on personal freedoms, on production, on supply chains. It’s simply horrific,” he said.

“I don’t know how long Scandinavians will go along with it, or the Netherlands: they can all see the writing on the wall,” he said.

One thing is absolutely clear: President Macron’s “grand bargain” with Berlin has failed. He came to power in 2017 pledging to restore fiscal probity and make France fit for the euro. This would supposedly unlock German assent for a “Hamiltonian” leap forward: joint debt issuance and a muscular EU treasury with borrowing powers.

“It is dead in the water. There is no realistic constellation of political parties in Germany that would agree to it,” said Mr Kraemer.

France will probably muddle through and avert a full-blown financial crisis for now. But the larger damage is done.

There will be no fiscal union after all. Without that the euro is a chronically unstable construction on borrowed time.

Tuesday, 19 November 2024

The bit in the middle has what I was talking about with Germany keeping policy tight

 

German coalition collapses

Political turmoil couldn’t have come at a worse time. Emily Hohler reports

Olaf Scholz
Scholz has “finally lanced the boil”

German chancellor Olaf Scholz has “just pulled the plug on his coalition and lost his parliamentary majority”, with polls implying that his Social Democrat party will be defeated in the snap election called for 23 February, says Guy Chazan in the Financial Times. The current government will be put to a confidence vote on 16 December, which it is expected to lose. 

Despite Scholz’s low approval ratings and the wish of some in the SPD that he be replaced by the popular defence minister Boris Pistorius as SPD leader, party leaders have “rallied round” and most expect Scholz to be the name on next year’s ballot. His standing among some colleagues has “paradoxically improved” since the government’s collapse – he has been hailed as a hero who “finally lanced the boil, ending a dysfunctional government riven by ideological conflict”. Last week, Scholz fired finance minister Christian Lindner, leader of the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP), for refusing to suspend the debt brake to allow more funding for Ukraine, effectively ejecting the party from the coalition.

Back to 2006

Donald Trump’s victory couldn’t have come at a worse time, says The Times. His plans to impose more tariffs on imported European goods are likely to be “particularly catastrophic for Germany” since America is its largest trading partner. Trump has suggested tariffs may be between 10% and 20%, possibly much higher for cars, Germany’s main export. The EU may respond in kind. The German Economic Institute estimates that a trade war could cost Germany €120bn-€180bn over Trump’s four-year term. Then there’s a possible Putin victory in Ukraine, “with all that this implies for the survival of the EU”, says Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in The Telegraph.

Last year, the US had a $170bn trade deficit with the EU; Germany accounted for half of that. This “touches on a deeper problem”. The country has relied on a current-account surplus of 6%-8% of GDP for much of the past 20 years, the result of a “tax and regulatory structure, allied to fiscal ideology, that suppresses internal consumption and wages to the benefit of the exporting elites”. A large surplus would normally partially self-correct via the exchange rate, but Germany “jammed the adjustment mechanism by launching the euro”, leading Washington to accuse Berlin of “gaming monetary union to lock in a stealth devaluation”.

Germany’s “original sin” was a collective refusal by elites to embrace modern technologies, says Wolfgang Munchau in The Times. As time went on, leaders “continued to double down”, with a heavy dependence on a few industries such as cars and chemicals and increasing reliance on Russia for gas and China for exports. The “neo-mercantalists in the government” turned a “bad bet by a single industry” – the car industry’s refusal to embrace the rise of EVs – into a “bad bet for the whole country”. Industrial production has fallen back to 2006 levels this year; the economy as a whole has seen virtually no growth since 2018. Unless Germany repeals its constitutional debt brake and starts to generate some domestic demand, it will “sink into atrophy”, says Evans-Pritchard. “The last chicken has come home to roost.”

Thursday, 7 November 2024

Anyone want to talk about bond vigilantes?


Markets called Trump right — but what do they do now? 

The bond vigilantes have woken up and taken note of the former president’s big win KATIE MARTIN

 Investors called this US election correctly, the result is swift and unambiguous, and it bakes in American exceptionalism. All of that is good news for US stocks. But sliding bonds are an ominous sign of the simmering tension over debt levels that Donald Trump’s victory brings.

 Some last-minute doubt and an iffy Iowa opinion poll notwithstanding, for weeks the message from markets had been a clear conviction that the former president would cruise his way back to the White House.  The evidence for that certainty was dotted in various places around global markets. 

In the round, Trump’s economic agenda points to tax cuts and continued high spending, plus large tariffs on imports and a squeeze on labour supply through a process one fund manager recently diplomatically described to me as “de-immigration”. 

All of that is inflationary. This is a drag on bonds, which are never fans of rising prices due to their fixed returns, and which do well when interest rates are falling — a more complicated task for the Federal Reserve in the event that Trump’s policies rekindle those inflationary pressures. 

At the same time, though, it helps the dollar, which should be a beneficiary of higher-for-longer US interest rates and of import tariffs intended to dent American purchases of foreign goods. A broad platform of deregulation is also, all things being equal, good for stocks. 

 All of that had been playing out with considerable force since mid-September. Over that period, the dollar index had gained more than 3 per cent, even before the results of the election were known. 

Stocks had also ground out roughly 5 per cent gains in the benchmark S&P 500 index. At the same time, benchmark 10-year Treasury yields have swept up from around 3.6 per cent to around 4.3 per cent, reflecting a chunky drop in prices. 

 On Wednesday, as it became clear that Trump was on course to win, all of this accelerated markedly. In particular, US bond yields pushed higher again, and fast, taking benchmark yields to 4.46 per cent. 

Some context here matters. Yields were higher as recently as this summer. Still, this is shaping up to be one of the biggest jumps in US yields since the shortlived government bond crisis in the UK a little over two years ago. This, not stocks, is the shift to watch carefully. 

 Some of this is about the Fed. Can it keep on cutting rates, as it is expected to do again on Thursday, into next year, if Trump follows through on his tariff threats and jacks up inflation? 

“Will they be hiking next year? It’s a valid question to ask,” says Salman Ahmed, global head of macro at Fidelity International in London. 

 Some of it, though, is about even trickier issues around fiscal sustainability. Trump’s Democratic rival Kamala Harris was hardly a fiscal hawk — both candidates intended to keep on spending. But Trump’s willpower here is perceived to be weaker, and this downdraft on bond prices, if sustained, could send US borrowing costs spiralling higher. 

As German asset manager DWS put it, “The fear of a decline in fiscal discipline is likely to be particularly decisive”. This is the bogeyman that has been haunting investors for years. At what point will investors say enough is enough on government spending and refuse to foot the bill, or at least demand much higher returns? 

 It is an age-old question that tends to ignite whenever bond prices are sliding for whatever reason, and whenever shifts in political direction occur. The final make-up of Congress will be key for investors now — a Republican clean sweep would remove any possibility of meaningful resistance to Trump’s agenda.  

 Money managers will now spend the coming months and years unpacking which bits of Trump’s campaign rhetoric on tariffs and taxes are for real, which are negotiating tactics with trade partners, and which are just locker room talk. 

The fact that benchmark yields have not blasted above 5 per cent suggest bondholders believe at least some of it was for show. Trump’s pick of Treasury secretary will be key. 

 While those details are thrashed out, though, something else sticks out: while US yields are rising, those in the UK and Germany initially fell. 

“It’s very rare for that to happen,” said Ahmed at Fidelity International. “It tells you the market’s view is that growth will be transferred. Tariffs and fiscal policy are taking growth away from someone,” he said. 

China’s knee-jerk decline in stocks is also telling. America first is clearly in play. Make no mistake: the bond vigilantes have woken up and taken note of Trump’s big win. 

This immediate drop in bond prices is alarming. Fiscal sustainability remains a serious concern, and investors will have a tough time unpicking this, and tariff policy, in the coming months. The counterbalance, though, is something even more powerful than the bond market: Trump’s ego. He loves winning, and he loves buoyant equities. With luck, that should restrain him from doing anything sufficiently disruptive on debt and inflation to upset stocks. katie.martin@ft.com

Wednesday, 8 May 2024

Fiscal Imprudence

 

America’s reckless borrowing is a danger to its economy—and the world’s

Without good luck or a painful adjustment, the only way out will be to let inflation rip

Dollar coins coming out of a purse hole.
illustration: carl godfrey
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If prudence is a virtue then America’s budget is an exercise in vice. Over the past 12 months the federal government has spent $2trn, or 7.2% of gdp, more than it has raised in taxes, after stripping out temporary factors. Usually such a vast deficit would be the result of a recession and accompanying stimulus. Today the lavish borrowing comes despite America’s longest stretch of sub-4% unemployment in half a century. The deficit has not been below 3% of gdp, an old measure of sound fiscal management, since 2015, and next year Uncle Sam’s net debts will probably cross 100% of gdp, up by about two-fifths in a decade. Whereas near-zero interest rates once made large debts affordable, today rates are higher and the government is spending more servicing the debt than on national defence.

How has it come to this? The costs of wars, a global financial crisis and pandemic, unfunded tax cuts and stimulus programmes have all piled up. Both Republicans and Democrats pay lip service to fiscal responsibility. But the record of each side in office is of throwing caution to the wind as they indulge in extra spending or tax cuts. The biggest economic decision facing the next president is how generously to renew Donald Trump’s tax cuts of 2017, a step that will only worsen America’s dire fiscal trajectory.

chart: the economist

This profligacy cannot go on for ever—at some point, interest costs will rise to intolerable levels. The binge must therefore come to an end in some combination of three ways.

The least painful is that good fortune comes to the rescue. Until recently, falling global real interest rates contained the cost of servicing debts even as these grew in size. Today Japan just about manages with net debts about half as big again as America’s, relative to gdp, thanks to near-zero rates. If inflation is defeated and real interest rates fall back from their present highs, America could be off the hook, too. Another source of relief could be productivity growth. If it surges, say because of artificial intelligence, America could outgrow its debts.

Yet good luck cannot be assumed. The most responsible way for politicians to end the budget binge would be to correct course as the interest bill rises. The imf estimates that America will need to cut spending, excluding debt interest, or raise taxes by 4% of gdp to stabilise its debts by 2029. It has managed a similar adjustment before, between 1989 and 2000, when “bond vigilantes” were said to have cowed Washington into submission.

The trouble is that the circumstances were then well-suited to belt-tightening. The end of the cold war yielded a peace dividend: falling defence spending accounted for fully 60% of the fiscal adjustment. As a share of the population the labour force climbed to an all-time high. A real-wage boom made the pain of higher taxes more bearable. But today war and rising global tensions are pushing defence spending up and baby-boomers are retiring in droves.

That leaves the third and most worrying option: making creditors pay. America would never be forced by the markets to default, because the Federal Reserve can act as a buyer of last resort. Fiscal laxity could cause inflation, though, which would mean bondholders and savers taking a big real-terms hit.

One way this could happen is if a populist like Mr Trump were to take control of the Fed. His advisers have floated ideas for influencing monetary policy that include appointing a pliant chairman and giving Congress oversight of interest rates. Mr Trump likes low rates; if they were combined with a growing deficit, inflation would surge.

Even if the Fed kept its independence, it could become impotent if Congress allowed debt to rise without limit. When the government’s response to rising interest rates is to borrow still more to service its debts, then tight money can stoke inflation rather than containing it—a feedback loop with which Latin America is all too familiar and which mavericks say is already under way in America. Their doomsaying is premature, but higher rates can feed into the budget very quickly. After accounting for the Fed’s balance-sheet, the median dollar of debt is on a fixed interest rate only until June 2025.

A less stable America would cause pain at home because of higher interest rates, more uncertainty and an arbitrary redistribution from creditors to debtors. But the costs would also be felt globally. The dollar is the world’s reserve currency. Through it America provides a unique service: a supply of plentiful assets backed by a vast economy, the rule of law, deep capital markets and an open capital account. No other asset can perform this role today. Even if the dollar attracted a risk premium to compensate for the danger of inflation, the world would probably have to keep using it.

A world whose reserve currency was being debased, however, would be a poorer one. Capital would be more expensive everywhere; the global financial system would be less efficient; and investors would be on a constant search for a viable alternative to the greenback, with the threat of a chaotic transition if one ever emerged. America’s fiscal mess is home-made. But make no mistake: it is the whole world’s problem. ■