Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label oligopoly. Show all posts
Showing posts with label oligopoly. Show all posts

Monday, 19 April 2021

House building and oligopoly - a new report

 

Time for the big builders to lose their plots

As the ranks of “generation rent” swell it is vital we overcome the powerful vested interests responsible for this housebuilding gridlock

The news is dominated by Covid-19 – and plans to lift lockdown. Northern Ireland and the Westminster lobbying scandal – plus Prince Philip’s funeral, of course – are also rightly generating reams of coverage.

Yet away from the bulletins, perennial policy issues remain unresolved, blighting the lives of millions. Perhaps the most pressing is housing.

The UK has a chronic housing shortage. We need around 250,000 new homes each year to meet population growth and household formation. Housebuilding hasn’t reached that level since the late 1970s.

The shortage of homes to both buy and rent means adults aged 25-45 now spend more on housing and are more likely to rent than any generation since the 1930s – as sky-high prices deny home ownership. And over the last decade, a dearth of social housing has seen overcrowding and homelessness escalate among low-income families.

Lockdown has highlighted the gulf between the comfortably housed and those in cramped conditions. An ongoing stamp duty holiday and now vaccine rollout has meanwhile sparked a buying frenzy, fuelling house prices even more – with the average home now costing eight times the average annual wage, double the long-term earnings multiple. And localities with a high share of sub-standard housing have seen far more Covid deaths.

Average house prices in the UK hit an all-time high in March

Line chart with 13 data points.
Property prices rose by £15,430 over the year
The chart has 1 X axis displaying Time. Range: 2020-02-26 08:24:00 to 2021-03-04 15:36:00.
The chart has 1 Y axis displaying Average house price (£). Range: 235000 to 260000.
Halifax
End of interactive chart.

As the ranks of “generation rent” swell, Boris Johnson often says he wants to “fix housing” – given the Conservatives’ long-term reliance on owner-occupying voters. Better social housing provision would also be popular in “red wall” Northern and Midlands seats the Tories hope to retain.

Last August, the Government proposed a “radical planning shake-up”, with ministers claiming “a lack of land with planning permissions” explains why we’ve built two to three million too few homes since the turn of the century. That’s nonsense, as this column has previously argued.

Four-fifths of residential planning applications are now accepted and permissions for over a million homes remain unused. The real problem is ever-lengthening delays between permissions being granted and homes being built.

That’s because the big, powerful developers who hoover up most permissions are staging a deliberate building go-slow. They make higher profits overall by producing fewer homes so prices keep rising. Unless ministers tackle this massive market failure, the lack of competition within a housebuilding sector dominated by a few large players, our chronic housing shortage will remain – as I detailed in my book Home Truths.

As such, I welcome a new study by Alex Morton, a former Downing Street adviser and noted housing policy specialist. His report “The Housing Guarantee” was published last week by the Centre for Policy Studies – arguably Westminster’s most influential thinktank, boasting senior staff who helped write last year’s Conservative election manifesto.

Planning reforms, resulting in councils granting more permissions, “haven’t fixed the problem of insufficient housing supply …. a decline in new homes that reaches back to the 1960s,” writes Morton. “The assumption was new permissions would axiomatically be turned into homes,” he observes. Yet despite various recent reforms that have seen permissions “soar” – from under 200,000 in 2010 to over 350,000 in 2019 – the number of homes built each year “has risen much more slowly”.

The problem, says Morton, is that planning permissions are “a one-way gift which boosts the value of the land from say £20,000 a hectare to £2-£3 million, in return for no obligation to do anything beyond breaking ground”. As a result, “housebuilding is largely in the hands of a few large builders and a cottage industry of land promoters, pushing up the value of land with permissions and meaning permissions don’t necessarily translate into homes”.

So the current system “incentivises large house builders to acquire and control land”, says Morton, with the six largest now holding over a million plots, 90pc controlled by the biggest three. No wonder a recent House of Lords report concluded our housebuilding industry “now has all the characteristics of an oligopoly”.

The big players’ grip has tightened significantly in recent years as once ubiquitous small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been wiped out. Countless such firms, which build-out quickly to aid cashflow, helping to keep the industry competitive, perished when their bank finance was withdrawn during the 2008 financial crisis. In the late 1980s, firms building fewer than 100 homes each year accounted for two-fifths of all new supply, reports Morton. Now it’s just one-tenth.

“The current major housebuilder model traps us in a slow build-out system,” concludes this CPS report. The Government’s proposed planning reforms – which include “planning zones” to reduce uncertainty – “have many positive elements”, says Morton. “But they don’t tackle the issue of ensuring supply by reforming how planning permissions operate.”

Morton wants “delivery contracts” so permissions come with legal obligations to build out within a certain timeframe – or the original applicant gives up land to other builders at a pre-set price. “This would force the existing model of housebuilding to focus more on delivery, not land speculation,” he says.

Councils should be set targets relating to houses actually built, not just making land available. And some public sector acreage should be sold off to SMEs, “at a pre-set price”, also with delivery targets, “to help level the playing field between smaller firms and large”.

This is an important report, in which a genuine government insider puts forward some radical ideas – many of which I proposed in Home Truths. But it doesn’t go far enough.

What’s needed is a reversal of the 1961 Land Compensation Act, so when land gets planning permission and valuations surge, often several-hundred-fold, this massive “planning uplift” is shared with local authorities – an idea backed by successive Parliamentary inquiries. That would dampen land speculation, making building plots – and ultimately housing – more affordable. It would also fund new infrastructure as new housing appears, revolutionising the local politics of planning.

On top of that, a full Competition and Market Authority inquiry is now vital. Powerful vested interests benefit mightily from this high-price-low-build gridlock. They make big political donations to protect the status quo.

But the harsh reality – hinted at in this CPS report, but not spelt out – is that our housebuilding industry is denying millions of hard-working people the chance to rent or buy a reasonably priced home. It’s time to shake it up.

Monday, 2 March 2020

Competition again -

This relates to the article on blogger posted on 17th Feb







Thomas Philippon’s “The Great Reversal” spies in tech giants a risk to economic dynamism

Finance and economicsDec 12th 2019 edition







When thomas philippon moved from France to America in 1999 to begin a phd in economics, he found a consumer paradise. Domestic flights were dazzlingly cheap. Household electronics were a relative bargain. In the days of dial-up modems Americans, who were charged a flat rate for local calls, paid far less than Europeans to get online. But over the past two decades, Mr Philippon writes in “The Great Reversal”, this paradise has been lost. Europeans now enjoy cheap cross-continent flights, high-street banking, and phone and internet services; Americans are often at the mercy of indifferent corporate giants. Perking up their economy might mean cutting those giants down to size.
Much that has happened to the American economy since the 1990s has not been to the typical worker’s advantage. Growth in output, wages and productivity has slowed. Inequality has risen, as have the market share and profitability of the most dominant firms. Economics journals are packed with papers on these trends, many of which argue that the dominance of big firms bears some blame for other ills. Between 1987 and 2016 the share of employment accounted for by firms with over 5,000 employees rose from 28% to 34%. Between 1997 and 2012, this newspaper reported in 2016, the average share of revenues accounted for by the top four firms in each of 900 economic sectors grew from 26% to 32%.
Two rival stories vie to explain the rise in concentration. One is that domestic competition has been weakened by lax antitrust enforcement, anticompetitive practices and regulatory changes friendly to powerful firms. This is Mr Philippon’s view. Some economists reckon, though, that concentration is rising because of the success of superstar firms—highly innovative and productive companies that have shoved aside unfit competitors. Either explanation could account for the size and persistent profitability of industry-dominating companies. But the implications of each for future growth—and policy—differ greatly. Which is right?
If concentration is caused by ultra-productive firms outcompeting weaker rivals, then investment ought to rise as those firms scale up to exploit their competitive edge. Investment, however, has been disappointing across the American economy. In the 1990s a statistic called Tobin’s q (a measure of a firm’s market value relative to the cost of replacing its assets, named after an economist, James Tobin) closely tracked rates of net investment. A high Tobin’s q indicates that future profits are likely to be high relative to the cost of expanding production. That suggests leading firms should scale up or see a flood of investment by competitors seeking to divert part of that profit stream. In this millennium, however, investment has lagged behind what one would expect, given the level of Tobin’s q across the economy. A finer-grained analysis shows that the most concentrated sectors account for nearly all the investment shortfall. The change could be caused in part by a shift in investment from tangible capital, such as buildings and machines, to harder-to-measure intangible capital, such as intellectual property, brand value and firm culture. Superstar firms may invest more in intangible capital. But accounting for intangibles, says Mr Philippon, narrows but does not close the investment gap.
Then there is productivity. If concentration is mainly caused by the triumph of superstar firms, it should be rising. Here the data are murkier. The authors of “The fall of the labour share and the rise of superstar firms”, a forthcoming paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, find a clear link between size and productivity (bigger firms are more productive) and between industry concentration and patenting (which they use as a proxy for innovation). But the relationship between concentration and measures of productivity is less clear, particularly outside manufacturing. Mr Philippon, on the other hand, finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between concentration and productivity in the 1990s but not more recently. What seems clear is that even as concentration has risen across the economy over the past two decades, the rate of productivity growth has not. If superstar firms are indeed a force for concentration, their unique capabilities have not translated into broader gains for the American economy.
Few economists—or Americans—would deny that there are problems with competition in certain sectors, including health care, finance, telecoms and air travel. The most heated arguments about corporate power, however, concern tech giants. They have not, for the most part, used their market power to raise prices; on the contrary, much of what they provide to consumers is free. The most aggressive invest heavily and eke out rather modest profit margins. Comparisons with Europe are not very helpful, since the continent has mostly failed to produce big and innovative rivals to Google, Apple and Amazon. Would it really be wise for America to carve up its tech champions?

The harder they fall

As Mr Philippon notes, economic power is not all that matters. America’s tech giants have gobbled up competitors and spent lavishly on political donations and lobbying. There is no guarantee that superstars, having achieved dominance, will defend it through innovation and investment rather than anti-competitive behaviour. And even if large platform firms are perfectly efficient, economically speaking, Americans might worry about their influence over communities, social norms and politics.
There is no obvious right answer to the question tech giants pose. It was far from clear, in 1984, whether dismembering at&t would be remembered as a triumph, a fiasco—or simply nothing much. The choice facing American regulators is harder now, precisely because of America’s lack of dynamism. Since innovative, productivity-boosting, socially useful firms come along so rarely, it seems risky to tackle tech behemoths too vigorously, lest doing so weaken the economy’s most vibrant parts. But that reticence may prove a recipe for long-run stagnation.

Monday, 17 February 2020

Essential reading on competition

Europe’s free market outshines America

A new book argues that the US economy has grown uncompetitive while EU regulations give consumers more choice

Gerard Baker
The Times
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Love it or hate it, most Americans would probably agree that their economy is a model of capitalism. Competition, choice, free markets; for good or ill, these seem to define the way America works. By contrast, fans and critics alike look across the Atlantic and see a different model with less choice, more regulation, more government intervention.
But what if, in at least one critical respect, this is the wrong way around? A new book by a French economist who lives and works in the US is making Americans think again about the health of their capitalism.
The Great Reversal by Thomas Philippon of New York University argues, with copious data and rigorous analysis, that in the past 20 years America has gone from being a highly competitive free-market economy to one dominated by huge companies that are eliminating choice, raising prices, increasing inequality and impairing dynamism.
In most key sectors, mergers and acquisitions and a system in which big companies are able to exploit the regulatory system for their benefit have diminished competition, to Americans’ detriment. Meanwhile in Europe, the reverse has happened. The same sectors have become more competitive, ironically perhaps, under the direction of regulatory authorities which, far from stifling economic dynamism, have actually stimulated it.
It’s easy to test Mr Philippon’s thesis. Take airlines. In the past few decades consolidation in the sector has resulted in a handful of companies controlling the market. If you want to fly from New York to St Louis, Missouri, these are the options according to the travel website Expedia: Delta Airlines will fly you from John F Kennedy International Airport on a round trip for $299. Shop around and you’ll discover that American Airlines will do the same journey . . . for $299.

Maybe you want to fly a little later in the day, to give yourself more time to get through the ninth circle of hell that is JFK. Prices for a lunchtime flight rise. On Delta you’d pay $340. But now American offers a real bargain. They’ll fly you there and back for a mere $339. You can use that extra dollar perhaps to buy a fifth of a cup of coffee from one of the 85 branches of Starbucks there.
Now look at Europe. London to Rome is almost the same distance as New York to St Louis: about 800 miles. According to Expedia, for a round trip you can get a flight on Vueling for $88. EasyJet will set you back $118. And if you’re feeling really flush you can pay $178 for a luxurious British Airways flight.
In sector after sector the story is the same on either side of the Atlantic. If you want a high-speed broadband internet connection in New York you have two choices. Verizon Fios will charge you $79.99 a month. Never knowingly undersold, Time Warner Spectrum will charge you . . . $79.99 a month.
This lack of choice means that prices are higher, of course. The average monthly cost of a broadband connection in the US is $68. In the UK it is $40, in Italy $30, in France $31.
Mobile phone service is similar: American users pay about $100 a month, while subscribers in Europe pay about half that.
A recent study estimated that concentration — the reduction in the number of companies that dominate a sector — had increased in three quarters of all American domestic industries between 1998 and 2012.
It wasn’t ever thus. Mr Philippon discovered when he moved to the US in the late 1990s that prices were much lower than they were in Europe. But in 20 years there has been a great reversal. Since the completion of the single market, Europe has adopted many of the pro-market, pro-competition policies that the US has long been renowned for.
In the US, takeovers have been a big factor. The number of mergers increased in the 30 years to 2017 from an average of just over 2,000 a year to more than 15,000 a year. More important has been the power that large American companies have to use lobbying to get favourable conditions from regulators and policymakers at the federal and state level. Mr Philippon estimates that uncompetitive markets cost Americans $300 a month, a total for the economy of $1.5 trillion in the space of 20 years.
The phenomenon is a key driver of the growing inequality in the US. Often immune from serious competition, companies are able to generate profits, the proceeds of which go to shareholders and top management, widening the disparity between those at the top and the rest of the country.
“Most US domestic markets have become less competitive, and US firms charge excessive prices to US consumers,” says Mr Philippon. Excess profits are used to pay our dividends and to buy back shares, not to hire and invest.
Of course, overall US economic performance has been stronger than Europe’s, though Mr Philippon notes that in terms of output per head the gap is much smaller. It’s also true that the US has innovated more in the past 20 years. But here too is a twist: since the big tech companies such as Apple, Amazon and Alphabet have grown to exercise enormous power in the sector over the past decade, innovation has declined.
There is, by the way, a Brexit coda to all this. If it leaves the EU, the UK may no longer benefit from Europe’s competitive markets. On the other hand, Mr Philippon points out that Europe deregulated its markets in part at least because the UK was among the strongest advocates of competition and choice inside the EU. Will a post-Brexit EU result in another great reversal

Saturday, 19 October 2019

Technology & innovation

I thought I'd post this article from the Times as it gives some idea about the way companies have to approach innovation - optimising existing models while developing new ones. This is a good example of the way the private sector leads innovation, and shows how a company has to make sufficient profit to be able to invest in R&D - some of these projects will be decades before they provide a return on the investment. It fits well with oligopoly, and could be an example where government does not want to encourage new entrants, but instead support a single "national champion".

It is also interesting because Rolls Royce is a world-leader, and could be used as an example of an exporter that does gain from a weaker pound. It does face problems (its business model involved selling engines at a loss and making money on the subsequent service contracts, which is not efficient anymore, and it is having to change shape rapidly), but think about how the government could support it in maintaing its global position.


How AI is leading the way on transport tech

Rolls-Royce technology chief Paul Stein on why the firm’s electrifying ideas could herald a zero-carbon future
Paul Stein CTO at Rolls-Royce (portrait by Alex Sturrock)
For Rolls-Royce, the world’s second largest manufacturer of aero engines and a company with a distinguished history of pioneering R&D, technology strategy is all about the play-off between optimising existing products and simultaneously leading the charge on developing the low carbon power systems of the future.
“The most pressing issue is how to get the right balance between new technology-led opportunities and existing product evolution,” says the firm’s chief technology officer, Paul Stein. “People will still be buying gas turbines [conventional aero engines] for the next 40 or 50 years, so we have to make sure we keep those products competitive for the long term. But we also have to free up as many resources as we can for driving productivity and for investing in the new.”
Stein explains how technologies such as digitisation and AI are already paying big dividends in design and operational efficiency. After a flight, for example, data from Rolls-Royce’s engines is analysed not only to help schedule maintenance requirements but also to establish the best possible operational parameters. “We pull huge amounts of data from our engines and an artificial intelligence agent crawls all over it to extract behavioural information,” he says. “Did that particular flight use a bit more fuel or a bit less and, if so, why?”
AI is also used to improve the analysis of engineering X-rays and scans, determining the health of engine parts just as doctors use similar systems to help diagnose their patients. “It’s the same technology,” Stein explains. “AI visual processing engines can look at a CT scan of a turbine blade, for example, and make a decision on whether it is good or bad.”
But the most significant technological change on the horizon is the shift towards electric power plants, not just in the aviation field where Rolls-Royce is best known but also in its marine and railway power businesses. Stein is enthusiastic about the possibilities. “Electrification is exciting and fast-moving – and it’s already making an impact. One of our most successful examples is our hybrid electric-train power pack. It’s a Toyota Prius for suburban railways – it’s brilliant because it means that trains can recover energy as they are coasting into the station and also that, when they are sitting waiting, the engine is not running and they are not creating any local pollutants.”
Electric power for airliners is also coming, he says, but is a more complex challenge and will take time. “We are not going to be flying battery-powered A380s but for aircraft carrying up to, say, 90 people there will be hybrid electric technology. For the big stuff – A320 and upwards – the technology becomes even more complex; long term, we don’t really see the impact of electrification there before 2035.” The challenge for this, and other radical technologies that are still some way from commercial viability, is not so much whether to invest but when, he says. “What I worry about is getting the pace right. We want to hit the market at just the right time.”
Quantum computing is another case in point. It offers a dramatic change in potential computer power but for Rolls-Royce it’s a question of picking the right moment and the right applications. “We are keeping a watching brief. There are some applications that fascinate us – materials discovery, for example. If quantum could be applied to that it could be quite interesting.”
When it comes to the skills that Rolls-Royce will require to deliver on its plans for the future, Stein reckons that competing for electrical and electronic expertise is going to be crucial. “Electrical skills are becoming a battleground across Europe – skills in power electronics, battery technology and electrical machine design.” Digital skills are also increasingly important, he adds, but the risk of shortages is offset by the fact that expertise can be more readily bought in. “It’s a bit easier to outsource digital than to do so for some traditional skills because you can create an ecosystem of smaller companies that provides talent to supplement your own.”
How I work: Paul Stein, CTO, Rolls-Royce
My days tend to be quite disparate. I spend some of my time on technical reviews, finding out how our various teams have been doing with their existing developments, and also listening to their analyses of new technologies.
I spend time as an executive team member; all of us on the executive team wear two hats: our functional hats and the hat that is about how we can all make Rolls-Royce an even greater company. That second hat is about people. As senior leaders we devote a good deal of our time to our people. It sounds trite but it’s true – we really are a people business.
I talk a lot to governments around the world – in the UK, Germany, Singapore and the US – as they have a big role to play in creating the right environment for new technology.
And recently I have been talking more to the media, to get the message across about how Rolls-Royce can be part of the solution to this changing world that we find ourselves in.
CV
1978 – Graduates in electrical & electronic engineering, Kings College London
1996 – Managing director, Roke Manor Research
2006 – Director-general, research and technology, Ministry of Defence
2010 – Joins Rolls-Royce as chief scientific officer
2016 – Director, research and technology, Rolls-Royce
2017 – Chief technology officer, Rolls-Royce. Appointed to executive leadership team
The view from IBM by Andy Stanford-Clark
The combination of sophisticated computer modelling with the power of artificial intelligence to crunch real-world data has already kicked off a revolution in high-tech engineering, according to Andy Stanford-Clark, chief technology officer of IBM UK & Ireland. “You can build a software model of a physical system and feed it with data from Internet of Things sensors so you can go through all the ‘What ifs?’ in the model before you go into the physical system.”
This is known as a Digital Twin; it enables companies like Rolls-Royce to build and test incredibly accurate computer facsimiles of aircraft engines in the same way the likes of Airbus build flight simulators to help train pilots on their planes before they graduate to flying the real thing. “Digital Twin modelling is going to have a huge impact across a whole range of industries.”
When it comes to deciding when to invest in up-and-coming new technologies where the business case is not so clear-cut, FOMO plays a part in decision-making, he adds. Take quantum computing. “In the future, a quantum computer might be able to quickly solve a problem that would become extremely large or time-consuming to do on a conventional computer.” So its potential to tackle intractably complex problems is almost mind-boggling, even though it is a long way off being commercially practical, yet. “Even though it’s early, now is the time to explore quantum. Those who delay until the technology is perfected risk falling behind on the shorter term benefits we are already starting to discover, today.”