Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes

Wednesday, 15 May 2019

Should the UK have an Industrial Strategy?

The debate over whether the Chinese telecoms company Huawei should be involved in building Britain’s 5G network has centred on two questions: was the former defence secretary Gavin Williamson the source of the leak from the National Security Council, and would Huawei represent a security threat?
These are certainly important questions, but there is a third issue that deserves an airing – namely, why a country that emerged from the second world war with a technological edge in computers and electronics should require the assistance of what is still classified as an emerging economy to construct a crucial piece of national infrastructure.
It is indeed a sign of how diminished Britain is as a manufacturing force that it now passes almost without comment that the rivals to Huawei are not the great names of the past such as Marconi and Plessey, but Finland’s Nokia and Sweden’s Ericsson.
UK’s balance of payments
Pinterest
 The UK’s balance of payments Photograph: Office for National Statistics
The Huawei affair should help to puncture a few myths. In the early years of China’s rapid industrialisation, the UK took comfort from the fact that it was only low-cost manufacturing that was migrating east. Developed countries like Britain, it was said, would do all the clever, high-end, profitable stuff, while the Chinese would have to be content with churning out cheap toys and clothes.
It seemed highly complacent to assume that China – a country which was making technological breakthroughs while Europe was stuck in the dark ages – would be content with being an assembly plant for western consumer goods, and so it has proved. China is now one of the world leaders in artificial intelligence and solar panels. When the government wanted to build a new nuclear power station at Hinkley Point, the Chinese got the contract, albeit using French technology.
A second myth that China has well and truly busted is that all will be well provided market forces are not hampered by state interference. China has had an industrial strategy over many decades, and has stuck to it, while during the same period Britain has seen the state’s role wane and manufacturing become an ever smaller part of the economy.
Britain’s mid-20th century edge in computing, jet engines and radar was a direct consequence of putting the economy on a war footing between 1939 and 1945. What’s more, the reason the UK retains a global presence in aerospace and pharmaceuticals is that companies have been able to rely on the state – in the form of the Ministry of Defence and the NHS – being an important customer.
There were, of course, plenty of other reasons for the decline of UK manufacturing. In part, it was the result of complacency: British industry, for many years after the war, relied too heavily on the captive domestic and imperial markets. While Germany and Japan were forced to modernise as a result of the devastation caused by military defeat, British firms rested on their laurels.
This failure to compete with more efficient and hungrier rivals was not helped by prolonged periods during which the pound was overvalued. Again, attempting to cling on to the remnants of empire played a part. It was thought vital to have a strong exchange rate to sustain the pound as a reserve currency and to protect the overseas investors who kept their money in London. This was good for the City, but not so good for exporters.
Governments of both left and right knew there was a problem, and came up with a succession of different cures. These included indicative planning copied from the French; a national plan; industrial reorganisation; bailing out “lame duck” businesses; and attempts at trade union reform.
Yet these well-meaning attempts foundered through a lack of consistency and a series of policy blunders. Harold Wilson’s national plan, for example, was thwarted by the determination to resist devaluation until 1967, by which time it was too late.
And then there was Margaret Thatcher and her monetarist experiment of the late 1970s and early 80s. High interest rates were used to squeeze inflation out of the system, but proved fatal to manufacturers already struggling with weak global demand and the appreciation of sterling caused by the arrival of North Sea oil in the mid-1970s.
There were debates – as firm after firm went bust – about whether it really mattered that a good chunk of industry was wiped out. Nigel Lawson, when he was chancellor in the 1980s, said it didn’t, because services would fill the gap. Over the years, as Britain has become more and more services-dominated, that theory has been fully tested, and the results are now in. Britain is certainly good at exporting services – especially financial and business services – but it can’t sell enough of them to compensate for a whopping deficit in trade in goods. It is more than two decades since the UK ran a current account surplus.
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Turning Britain into a global money hub has had two other harmful consequences. It has made the economy more vulnerable to financial crises, as was witnessed by the damage caused by the banking crash of 2008. And it has made Britain more socially riven by concentrating wealth in one corner of the country.
To all that can now be added another conclusion: the benign (and sometimes not so benign) neglect of manufacturing now poses a threat to national security. What should be done? The answer is to learn lessons from the City, the one sector that has been blessed with long-term bipartisan planning and plenty of tender, loving care.
That means having a vision for where manufacturing should be in 25 years’ time, deciding which industries are the future, not the past, having a strategy that has buy-in across the political spectrum – and sticking to it.

Tuesday, 14 May 2019

Extension Material - Why Savings are the core of an economy

You could skim read this - Austrian School writing is always very detailed and meticulous, and thus quite turgid; the core point worth carrying into the exam is that economies require a certain level of savings (postponed consumption, i.e Harrod-Domar) to provide funds to build the tools needed to increase productivity; increasing the money supply via QE devalues the pot of savings by encouraging instant consumption without any input into the production (real wealth creating) process. This is the background to asset price inflation and the growing inequality, which is in the news again today (report from the IFS):

The Subsistence Fund Is the Heart of Economic Growth

05/11/2019
What characterizes the modern economy is its complex structure of production that seemingly generates an endless amount, and an endless variety, of goods. It seems that the production structure has, as it were, a self-generating mechanism. Careful examination, however, shows that without a key ingredient, the entire infrastructure could not have emerged. The ingredient that makes it all possible is the subsistence fund. The following simplified example will allow us to ascertain the essence of this fund.

The Basics of the Subsistence Fund

To maintain life and wellbeing, man must have at his disposal an adequate amount of final consumer goods. These goods, however, are not readily available — they have to be extracted from nature. Without tools at his disposal, man can only secure from nature very few goods for his survival.
For instance, take an individual John, stranded in a forest. In order to stay alive, he can only pick up some apples from apple trees. Apples are the only good available to him that can sustain him. Let us say that by working 20 hours a day, he manages to secure 20 apples, which keep him alive. The 20 apples that John has secured from nature is his subsistence fund, which sustains him.
Being a sophisticated individual, John realizes that if he had a special tool this would allow him to become more productive. His daily production of apples could be 40 apples (i.e. double his current production). The problem, however, is that the tool is not available — it must be made. To make the special tool requires two days of work. If John were to decide to make the tool, he would have a problem. By spending his time on making the tool, he would not be able to pick up the apples that are required to keep him alive.
The only way out of this predicament is for John to put aside an apple a day for the next forty days. By saving an apple out of his daily production and enduring hunger, after forty days he will have an adequate stock of apples that will sustain him while he is busy making the tool. (We make the unrealistic assumption here that apples can be preserved in edible form for forty days to illustrate the importance of saving). Thus, after forty days, John’s subsistence fund will be comprised of 40 apples, which will see him through while he is making the special stick. We can see here that the saved or unconsumed 40 apples enable the making of the tool, which raises the production of apples and lifts John’s living standard.
Now, let us slightly alter the previous example and introduce an individual Rob who specializes in making these tools. Because he is an expert in tool making, it takes him only one day to make the special tool that John requires. Rob also has to have 20 apples a day to keep him going. Note that rather than saving 40 apples John needs to save only 20 apples now, which will enable him to hire the services of Rob.
Observe that John’s saved 20 apples sustain Rob the toolmaker, while John is maintained by the current daily production of apples, which is also 20 apples.
Note that the making of the tool is a burden — John has to make a sacrifice and save 20 apples thereby endangering his health and wellbeing. However, after 20 days he will be able to use the tool, which will allow him to double his production of apples. If he continues to consume 20 apples a day, this will allow John to increase his subsistence fund.
Thus on the first day, his subsistence fund will be 40 apples, of which 20 are allocated for consumption and 20 are saved. On the second day, his fund will comprise of 20 saved apples + 40 apples from current production (i.e., his fund is 60 apples of which 20 is consumed and 40 are saved). On the third day, his fund will be 80 apples (i.e. 40 apples from the daily production and 40 from savings). Out of this John consumes 20 apples and saves 60 apples, etc. As the subsistence fund expands, this allows John to hire the services of other individuals that can maintain and enhance his production structure, and thereby raise further the production of apples.
The state of the subsistence fund determines the quality and the quantity of various tools that can be made. If the fund is only sufficient to support one day of work, then the making of a tool that requires two days of work cannot be undertaken. The size of the fund sets the limit on the projects that can be implemented. It also means that the size of the fund determines so-called economic growth. (As the fund increases this permits a greater production of apples).
On this, Richard von Strigl wrote:
Let us assume that in some country production must be completely rebuilt. The only factors of production available to the population besides labourers are those factors of production provided by nature. Now, if production is to be carried out by a roundabout method, let us assume of one year’s duration, then it is self-evident that production can only begin if, in addition to these originary factors of production, a subsistence fund is available to the population which will secure their nourishment and any other needs for a period of one year……..The greater this fund, the longer is the roundabout factor of production that can be undertaken, and the greater the output will be. It is clear that under these conditions the “correct” length of the roundabout method of production is determined by the size of the subsistence fund or the period of time for which this fund suffices.1
The essence of the subsistence fund, which we have established with respect to an individual, John, can be widened to include many individuals that trade with each other. John, who produces apples, can now secure meat and clothing from other individuals. This means that the subsistence fund now comprises of a greater variety of final goods ready for human consumption. According to Bohm-Bawerk:
The entire wealth of the economical community serves as a subsistence fund, or advances fund, and, from this, society draws its subsistence during the period of production customary in the community.2
Note again that the improvement in the infrastructure is what sets in motion economic growth. The improvement in the infrastructure in turn can take place only as a result of the increase in the subsistence fund. Hence, anything that weakens the subsistence fund undermines the prospects for economic growth.

The Subsistence Fund and Money

The introduction of money does not alter the essence of what the subsistence fund is. Various producers who have exchanged their produce for money can now exchange their money for various consumer goods (i.e., they can access the subsistence fund whenever they deem this to be necessary). Observe, when an individual exchanges his money for goods, all that we have here is an act of an exchange and not an act of payment — money is just the medium of exchange.

What About Intermediate Goods?

If the subsistence fund is comprised of final consumer goods, how does a producer of an intermediate goods — like a producer of tools & machinery — contribute to this fund?
An individual who exchanges his money for the tool will employ the tool in the production of final consumer goods or in the production of intermediate goods that, in turn, will contribute to the production of final consumer goods sometime in the future. The producer of the special tool, or a producer of any intermediate good, does not directly supply final consumer goods. However, he does offer a means to secure these goods. Additionally, he also offers time.
According to Rothbard:
Crusoe without the axe is two hundred fifty hours away from his desired house; Crusoe with the axe is only two hundred hours away. If the logs of wood had been poled up ready-made on his arrival, he would be that much closer to his objective; and if the house were there to begin with, he would achieve his desire immediately, he would be further advanced toward his goal without the necessity of further restriction of consumption.3
In addition, with the introduction of more advanced tools and machinery various new consumer goods can be produced, which prior to the making of these new tools were not available at all to individuals. Obviously, if the tools and equipment acquired turn out to be useless, then the savings of purchasers of these tools and equipment are squandered.
Saved final consumer goods that were transferred to the producers of tools and equipment are therefore simply consumed by them and they make no contribution to the subsistence fund. We could also say that the production of useless tools and equipment weakens the subsistence fund.

Monetary Expansion and the Subsistence Fund

When money is created out of “thin air,” it leads to a weakening of the subsistence fund. What is the reason for this? The newly created money sprang into existence out of “thin air,” so to speak. The holder of the newly created money can use it to withdraw final consumer goods from the subsistence fund with no prior contribution to the fund. Hence, this act of consumption, or non-productive consumption, puts pressure on the fund. (The consumption is non-productive because the individual consumes goods without contributing to the subsistence fund).
We can infer from this that when money is generated out of “thin air” it diverts the means of sustenance away from wealth producers who have contributed to the subsistence fund towards the holders of the newly created money. For a given subsistence fund this will imply that wealth producers will discover that the purchasing power of their money has fallen since there are now less goods left in the fund.
As the pace of money creation out of “thin air” intensifies, it puts more pressure on the subsistence fund. This in turn makes it much harder to implement various projects as far as the maintenance and the improvement of the infrastructure is concerned. Consequently the flow of production of various final consumer goods weakens, which in turn makes it much harder to make provisions for savings.
All this, in turn, further weakens the infrastructure and so undermines further the flow of production of final consumer goods. Note that without the maintenance of the infrastructure its ability to generate final consumer goods is going to weaken.
The maintenance of the infrastructure requires the allocation of savings towards various individuals that maintain the infrastructure. In our example with the tool if John will not add more tools to his inventory at some point the tool will break and the production of apples will halve. In order to have more tools in his inventory John would have to allocate savings for this.
We can thus conclude that contrary to the popular way of thinking, monetary growth cannot produce general expansion in economic activity. On the contrary, by diverting the means of sustenance from wealth generating activities towards non-wealth generating activities monetary expansion only weakens economic growth.
Loose monetary and fiscal policies, which aim at growing the economy, are in fact achieving the exact opposite. As long as the growth rate of the subsistence fund stays positive, this can continue to sustain productive and non-productive activities. Trouble erupts when, on account of loose monetary and fiscal policies, a structure of production emerges that tie up much more consumer goods than the amount it releases. (The consumption of final consumer goods exceeds the production of these goods).
This excessive consumption relative to the production of consumer goods leads to a decline in the subsistence fund. This in turn weakens the support for individuals that are employed in the various stages of the production structure, resulting in the economy plunging into a slump.
Once an economy falls into a recession because of a decline in the subsistence fund, then any government or central bank attempts to revive the economy is going to fail. Not only will these attempts fail to revive the economy, they will deplete the subsistence fund further, thereby prolonging the economic slump.
The shrinking subsistence fund exposes the erroneous nature of the commonly accepted view that loose monetary and fiscal policies can grow an economy.
This policy ineffectiveness is always relevant whenever the central authorities are attempting to “grow an economy.” The only reason why it appears that these policies “work” is because the subsistence fund is still expanding.
On this Mises wrote,
An essential point in the social philosophy of interventionism is the existence of an inexhaustible fund which can be squeezed forever. The whole system of interventionism collapses when this fountain is drained off: The Santa Claus principle liquidates itself.4
  • 1.Richard von Strigl, Capital & Production, Mises Institute, p 7
  • 2.Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, The Positive Theory of Capital, Book 6, chapter 5, Macmillan and Co, 1891).
  • 3.Murray Rothbard, Man Economy and State, Nash Publishing, p.45.
  • 4.Human Action 3rd edition Contemporary Books p 858.
Frank Shostak's consulting firm, Applied Austrian School Economics, provides in-depth assessments of financial markets and global economies. Contact: email.

Tariffs are a tax on small business

With New Tariffs, Trump Hikes Taxes on American Small Business Owners — Again

05/10/2019
Since I don't exactly live in the world's most crime-free neighborhood, I recently had to replace my house's 30-year old steel doors. They weren't cheap, but as I spoke with the salesman, he noted I had lucked out because their prices would be going up significantly in the near future due to new steel tariffs.
The company was unsure how just much this would impact sales and staff, but higher prices would naturally have a negative impact on revenue and hiring.
This, of course, is the expected result of a tax increase on American businesses — which is all the Trump tariffs are.
Now, thanks to the President — and the Congress which ceded its taxing authority to the White House — the tax burden on all Americans is going up even more.
Due to Trump's insistence that taxes go up as part of his so-called "art of the deal," consumers and businesses will now pay more for steel, bicycles, toys, luggage, and more.
Companies that use any of these products in producing a good or service will naturally be hurt — as will retailers whose main business is delivering retail items directly to consumers.
For example, as Reuters reported this week :
Sherrill Mosee, owner of Philadelphia-based MinkeeBlue, which sells work and travel tote bags for women on websites like Amazon.com Inc, said her company cannot absorb the new 25 percent tariff on top of the 10 percent tariff hike last year, which itself added to the existing 17.6 percent tariff on synthetic leather used to make her bags.
Mosee, who put in a new order for 1,500 bags from China just days before Trump announced plans to increase the tariff rate to 25 percent, said she plans to raise the price “a little” on the new bags, which are scheduled to arrive by early July.

Taxes are Not Simply "Passed On to Consumers"

It's important to keep in mind that taxes (i.e., tariffs) on goods are not simply something paid by consumers.
There is a common misconception that business owners can just "pass on to consumers" higher costs. In fact, while consumers certainly bear some of the brunt of higher costs imposed by governments (or other factors) it is rare that any business facing competition will simply jack up prices in an amount equal to the rise in the cost of doing business.
Mosee, the luggage merchant mentioned above, will only dare to raise prices "a little" because she knows every price hike on consumers will mean a loss of market share. Neither Mosee nor her competitors want to increase prices relative to the competition, so each business will attempt to absorb at least some of the extra cost themselves. Yes, some of the higher cost will be paid by the consumers, but much of it will also be paid by business owners who will scramble to economize in order to keep selling the same goods at a low price. This means the business owners and their families must accept a lower wage for themselves, or the business can but back on staff or cut benefits for employees. Otherwise, the business facing declining sales, which may end up leading to layoffs in any case.
Thus, when PBS reports, "U.S. retailers [must] decide between three options: absorb the cost of the tax, pass it along to consumers, or search for an alternative supplier from a country other than China," they're only sort of right. Yes, business could pass the cost along to consumers, but that if usually a prescription for lost revenue.
It's true that businesses can attempt to replace Chinese-made goods with imports "from a country other than China," but if those other places provided goods as economically as China does, merchants would already be buying those other goods.
By imposing new taxes, business owners must completely re-arrange their supply chains to deal with a completely unnecessary tax imposed by the US government.
This, of course, means little to the wage-workers who think tariffs are just a way to stick it to the bad guys (whether they be evil American corporations or the "Red Chinese"). Wage-workers, who make up 90 percent of the population, are usually quite unaware of what it takes to run a business and get goods from producers to consumers.

The "Seen vs. the "Unseen"

Trump supporters apparently continue to imagine that high taxes "create jobs" so long as those taxes are called "tariffs." This is only true so long as we don't consider "net job creation." Naturally, a tax on foreign steel, for example, will create some steel jobs.
That's the "seen." But what is "unseen" are all the jobs that were either lost or not created as a result of declining spending in other sectors. This is the result of every tax, including tariffs.
In fact, as Fox News reported yesterday ,
For each new steel job created, the average U.S. consumer pays a staggering $900,000, said Gary Hufbauer, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute; at best, that could create 8,700 jobs across six to eight steel firms.
In other words, consumers have less money to spend in the non-steel sector, and that means less job creation overall, and a declining standard of living for the overwhelming majority of consumers.
But even this won't convince those who insist on supporting tax hikes in the name of "winning" against allegedly unfair foreign tariffs.
The narrative they employ is one in which the administration's tax increase are only temporary, and the new taxes will be removed just as soon as all other countries buckle under US demands and remove all their own tariffs imposed on US goods. And they're all so sure this will happen so very soon.
But just how far away is "soon"? One year? Five years? From the point of view of a small business, a year is a verylong time when it comes to making payroll, paying the rent, and planning for the future. The blasé and arrogant attitude of the administration and its supporters toward business owners in this regard is shocking indeed. It is essentially this: "you business owners should just accept declining income and shrinking sales for years so long as its in the service of Trump's grand plan.
And never mind the stagnant wages and lack of hiring that small business must impose on their workers in order to cope with the tax hikes.
In the real world, though, people can't stop paying their rent for six months or a year while the Trump administration works out its tariff strategy.
The fact that American tariffs are also unpleasant for Chinese firms is, I suppose, swell for nationalists who are more committed to hurting the Chinese than to helping the Americans. But the fact remains the nationalists are cutting off their noses to spite their faces, and the empirical evidence shows it. 
In this recent study from by Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding and David Weinstein on the 2018 trade war, the researchers found "the full incidence of the tariff falls on domestic consumers, with a reduction in U.S. real income of $1.4 billion per month by the end of 2018."
And the picture is even more grim when retaliatory tariffs are considered, with this NBER report finding:
Annual consumer and producer losses from higher costs of imports were $68.8 billion (0.37% of GDP). After accounting for higher tariff revenue and gains to domestic producers from higher prices, the aggregate welfare loss was $7.8 billion (0.04% of GDP). U.S. tariffs favored sectors located in politically competitive counties, but retaliatory tariffs offset the benefits to these counties.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has already admitted defeat in rural America where the administration approved new subsidies to make up for the fact far revenues are down as a result of the administration's trade war.
It's unlikely that any of this will hurt Trump politically with his base, though. Terribly economics often make great politics, and the fantasy that high taxes will make "America great again" is apparently very attractive to many.
Ryan McMaken (@ryanmcmaken) is a senior editor at the Mises Institute. Send him your article submissions for Mises Wire and The Austrian, but read article guidelines first. Ryan has degrees in economics and political science from the University of Colorado, and was the economist for the Colorado Division of Housing from 2009 to 2014. He is the author of Commie Cowboys: The Bourgeoisie and the Nation-State in the Western Genre.

Wednesday, 1 May 2019

May 2019 - UK Car Finance Down (context/monetary policy)

Bit tricky to read/digest; I've highlighted the bits you should try to embed (and can use):

The plunge in UK car finance will make the Bank of England nervous

This week has brought another example of part of the famous Abraham Lincoln phrase when he pointed out that you can fool some of the people all of the time. This is the financial media and in this instance Reuters who on Monday told us this.
A six-month delay to Brexit gives Britain’s central bankers space to take a broader view of the economy this week, but persistent uncertainty over leaving the European Union makes them unlikely to raise interest rates any time soon.
There are various issues with this including the fact that in a month’s time it will be five years since Governor Carney gave us this Forward Guidance.
There’s already great speculation about the exact timing of the first rate hike and this decision is becoming more balanced. It could happen sooner than markets currently expect.
In the coded language of central bankers that was seen as not only a green light but a double green. Yet he did nothing for two years before then cutting interest-rates in August 2016 and of course promising another cut in November of that year. Net he has managed a 0.25% rise to 0.75% in the six years of his tenure yet the financial media still write articles as if he is itching to raise interest-rates as he did not back in the days when Brexit seemed unlikely, to him anyway.
Last night was especially unkind to the Reuters views as the man [Trump] who has tightened his grip on US monetary policy gave us his view.
Our Federal Reserve has incessantly lifted interest rates, even though inflation is very low, and instituted a very big dose of quantitative tightening. We have the potential to go ….up like a rocket if we did some lowering of rates, like one point, and some quantitative easing.
So there you have it President Trump would like US interest-rates 1% lower ( as well as more QE to help finance his fiscal deficit) and the story of the last six months or so is that he has got what he wants. I doubt he will get it tonight at the Federal Reserve announcement but the sands feel like they are shifting.
House Prices
This is something else confirming my theme of today as we note this from the Nationwide.
UK house price growth remained subdued in April, with prices just 0.9% higher than the same month last year….Prices rose 0.4% month-on-month, after taking account of seasonal factors
So there is not much of a spring boost going on here. The Nationwide does a sterling job in spinning the line that houses are affordable to first-time buyers but even it has to admit this.
The exception is in London and parts of the south of England where affordability pressures are more acute, and the monthly cost of servicing a mortgage, as well as raising a deposit, poses a greater challenge.
It is London that has pulled down the rate of house price growth and let me welcome the fact that whilst there are many different micro markets overall we now have real wage growth of around 2% per annum.
The Bank of England thinks differently and this is highlighted by the Nationwide chart which shows the average house price being around £160,000 in April 2013 as opposed to £214,920 now. That ladies and gentlemen has been the effect of its Funding for Lending Scheme which it argued reduced mortgage rates by around 2%. Of course we can never look at anything in outright isolation but it was a big player and the stopping of the rises will not be good news for any researcher there explaining this to Governor Carney.
Anyway it would appear that mortgage providers are ignoring the Forward Guidance rhetoric too. From MoneySavingExpert.com.
On top of that, there’s currently fierce mortgage competition, so the cheapest 5yr fixed-rate mortgage is 1.79%, which is seriously cheap, and 2yr fixes are as low as 1.39%.
As ever, the Nationwide numbers are flawed as they only cover its customer base but they do add to our total database.
Car Finance
This is an area which regularly concerns us and the quote below from the UK Financing & Leasing Association shows why.
In 2018, members provided £46 billion of new finance to help households and businesses purchase cars. Over 91% of all private new car registrations in the UK were financed by FLA members.
That amount continues to rise as I recall it being 86% not so long ago. So if you purchase your car outright you are now a rarity. Also this gives us a direct link between credit and what most regard as unsecured credit ( Governor Carney argues it is secured) and the real economy.
The Bank of England is usually reticent about its data on this subject ( I have asked….) but look at this from earlier.
The fall in net lending on the month was due to weaker net borrowing for other loans and advances, which fell from £0.8 billion in February to £0.2 billion. Within this, new borrowing for car finance fell sharply, alongside weaker car registration numbers in March 2019 than in previous years.
If we stay with unsecured finance the impact was as follows.
The extra amount borrowed by consumers to buy goods and services fell to £0.5 billion in March (Chart 1). This was the lowest monthly flow since November 2013 and well below the average of £0.9 billion since July 2018……The annual growth rate of consumer credit has continued to slow, reflecting the relatively weak flows of consumer credit over the past twelve-months. It fell to 6.4% in March, well below its peak of 10.9% in November 2016.
As you can see some context is needed as that overall rate of growth is still around double the rate of growth of wages and around quadruple economic growth. But as we have expected car finance has changed from being the engine for this to a brake on it.
Is anybody still expecting a Bank of England interest-rate increase?
Business Lending
This is rather eloquent as I remind you that the Funding for Lending Scheme was supposed to boost this.
Annual growth in lending to SME’s remains weak at -0.1%.
Six years of economic growth as well has made little or no difference as opposed to mortgage lending.
 The annual growth rate of mortgage lending was 3.3%. It has been around 3% since the beginning of 2016,
Actually the Bank of England thinks that the latter is “modest” so I dread what it really thinks of lending to smaller businesses.
Comment
Those believing the Forward Guidance mantra have three main problems from today’s data if we look at things from the Bank of England’s point of view. Firstly there are few wealth effects from house price inflation fading to less than 1%. Next there is the sharp slow down in car finance and what that implies. Thirdly there is this from the Markit Manufacturing PMI.
The headline seasonally adjusted IHS Markit/CIPS Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®) fell to 53.1 in April, down from March’s 13-month high of 55.1. Alongside weaker growth in production, new orders and stocks of purchases, the lower PMI level also reflected job losses in the sector.
Actually this number worked beautifully with the estimate that stockpiling had raised the index by 2.0. But care is needed as the Bank of England does not think like that and is presumably now afraid of further falls. None of that suggests an interest-rate rise and nor does the rate of economic growth and of course inflation is below target.
Moving onto the money supply data it is hard to read on a couple of counts. Sadly the Bank of England in another mistake stopped publishing narrow money data some years back. All we have is broad money and that looks like it is improving a little. I say looks like because the Gilt Market has two big flows in March. The Operation Twist style QE I have been reporting on added £9 billion but a large Gilt matured ( £36 billion) and will have sucked much more out. Thus I think we should focus on M4 lending at 3.7% that the total M4 growth at 2.2% but we will only really know when we get the April and May data and the maturity gets replaced.