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“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label bank of england. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bank of england. Show all posts

Sunday, 5 November 2023

Get with the (monetary) programme:

 


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DAVID SMITH | ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Higher interest rates are working, but beware the risks of overkill

The Sunday Times
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It has been hard to ignore the actions of central banks, even after a week in which the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve merely held interest rates steady. In time, the rate-setters will get less attention than over the past couple of years, when they have been racing to catch up with runaway inflation.

We should soon be entering a period when the main question about the current central bank mantra — “higher for longer” — will be how much longer? When you have reached peak rates, the issue is when they will come down again — and that should be the case at some stage next year, if not for a few months.

In the meantime, not far from where I am writing this, there is a living example of a textbook monetary policy experiment at work. I am not talking here about our own dear Bank, which is still troubled by aspects of inflationary pressure. Three members of its monetary policy committee (MPC) voted to raise Bank rate from 5.25 to 5.5 per cent on Thursday, though they were outvoted by the six who opted to hold. In what was described by analysts as “a hawkish hold”, Andrew Bailey, the governor, reiterated that the Bank “will be watching closely” to see whether further hikes are needed.

No, my attention was grabbed by developments a little farther away, across the Channel. Figures published a few days ago by Eurostat, the EU’s statistical agency, showed two things. One was that eurozone inflation is dropping sharply, and on its preferred measure fell to just 2.9 per cent last month, from 4.3 per cent in September.

The other was that this has been achieved by snuffing out growth. Gross domestic product in the eurozone fell by 0.1 per cent in the third quarter and rose by 0.1 per cent in the EU as a whole. In both cases, GDP was up by a tiny 0.1 per cent on a year earlier, implying an absence of growth. You can debate whether this was achieved by tighter monetary policy — higher interest rates – alone, but this is what central banks would be looking for if they were seeking to drive inflation out of the economy: significant weakness in demand.

As always, there were big variations in the performance of individual countries in the eurozone, and the quarterly figures for the bloc were dragged negative by another big fall in Ireland’s volatile GDP figures. Some countries are showing negative annual inflation rates, including Belgium and the Netherlands.

Europe’s performance contrasts with America, where the Federal Reserve held rates despite an acceleration in GDP growth to an annualised 4.9 per cent in the third quarter, its best for nearly two years, and where analysts cannot be sure that the job is done.

It also contrasts with the UK, where the Bank appears to have done better with the snuffing out growth part, predicting the economy will be “broadly flat” for the next few quarters, than the inflation bit, which it does not expect to drop below 3 per cent until early 2025.

A flat economy, with zero growth predicted next year (election year) and the risk that it could be worse, means the issue of whether the Bank has over-tightened — raised interest rates too much — has become a live one. I used to feature the Institute of Economic Affairs’ (IEA) shadow MPC a lot in these pages, and indeed was instrumental in getting it to announce a “decision” before each actual MPC meeting — but we lost touch.

The latest recommendation from the IEA was very interesting. It called on the Bank to cut rates by a quarter of a point to 5 per cent on Thursday, and to scale back its “quantitative tightening” — the reversal of the earlier quantitative easing. It is worried by the downturn in M4 money-supply growth, broad money, which has turned significantly negative.

“There is mounting evidence that the UK’s monetary policy is too tight and could lead to price deflation in a few years and potential recession in the interim,” said Trevor Williams, who chairs the IEA committee. “The Bank of England should lower interest rates.”

There was never any real possibility of that happening on Thursday, not least because the money supply does not feature prominently, if at all, in the actual MPC’s decisions. It was also too soon for a majority on the MPC to contemplate a cut in rates after running them up so aggressively.

This will, however, become very relevant in the coming months. We will know more about what is happening to the UK economy, despite uncertainty over the data, this week. Friday will bring monthly GDP figures for September and the first release of GDP data for the third quarter as a whole.

The context is that monthly GDP rose 0.2 per cent in August after a 0.6 per cent fall in July. If previously published figures are not revised, this means September must show a rise of 0.4 per cent or more for GDP not to have fallen in the third quarter. The Bank thinks third-quarter GDP will have been flat.

If it were to show a small fall, this would not be a huge moment — quarterly GDP dropped slightly in July-September last year, though the Queen’s death and funeral was a factor. A weak third quarter would confirm the view that UK monetary policy is hurting, with many sectors in retreat.

It would also add to the belief that it is working, and not before time. But the Bank, and its central bank counterparts, must be sure that it is not working too well. A flatlining economy is one thing, a proper recession another.

A former MPC member I was talking to the other day described the problem the Bank would face if over-tightening led to recession. It would be caught on the other side of the problem it has faced up till now, which is that the lags between its actions and their impact have got longer.

That is true when raising rates, as so many people are now on fixed-rate borrowing, but it would also be true for rate reductions. Rate cuts used to offer a speedy economic stimulus, heading off recession or lifting the economy out of it. That is harder now. Despite its hawkish tone, the Bank has a vested interest in avoiding too much pain.

Thursday, 15 June 2023

Data, Bank of England and bad forecasting


https://www.ft.com/content/504e9db8-bc7c-4962-b515-7b42efdaeb6d

How did the Bank of England get its migration forecasts so wrong?
(In addition to all the other things it got wrong) 

 Bryce Elder JUNE 13 2023 

 The Bank of England is having a bad decade. Not only has its credibility been undermined by egregious forecasting errors, the debate has gone mainstream around whether its independence mandate is a useful fiction or an obstacle. 

 Energy costs help illustrate one problem. Last summer’s surge in wholesale gas prices went straight into Monetary Policy Reports based on the retail price cap methodology and financial support packages of the time, rather than accounting for a widely-expected state intervention. 

Independence locked the BoE into forecasting based on announced government policy rather than the likely path ahead. But independence also makes the BoE’s unforced errors, such as around UK population growth, harder to overlook. 

 The bank has “very materially underestimated the supply-side potential of the UK economy because it failed to update its migration assumption — despite a body of evidence already in the public domain that net migration into the UK was poised to come in well ahead of the 2020-based population projections,” says Panmure Gordon chief economist Simon French in a note published today. 

 The projection he refers to is an Office for National Statistics estimate for net migration of 692,000 over the three years from 2021/22 to 2023/24. When the figure went into the BoE’s February 2023 supply-side stock take it was already stale. An ONS update from November 2022 was disregarded and a January revision apparently arrived too late for inclusion. As a result, based on recent data, the projection used by the BoE was out by nearly 100 per cent. 

Net migration will probably be about 1.2mn over the same three-year period, more than 70 per cent of whom are working age. “Given the materiality of the difference, and the pessimism of the broader supply side stock take, this was a poor judgment from the BoE,” French says: We have no evidence — and are not suggesting — that there was political pressure brought to bear on the bank given the salience of migration to UK public policy. 

However, it is either that or a poor attempt to use the latest data to accurately estimate the supply side capacity of the UK economy. Whichever way, it does not look good. When defending its record the BoE tends to highlight that price predictions come from the market, so failures are the fault of gas futures traders and forex dealers rather than its own economists. 

As governor Andrew Bailey said last month, forecasts are “conditional on commodity prices, they’re conditional on government policies. So, as those conditions change, we change our forecasts.” 

 It’s an approach that looks increasingly flawed, says French, as it “introduces the potential for the market path and the expectations of Monetary Policy Committee members to decouple — with obvious challenges in standing, rhetorically, behind their central economic forecast”: The result of this is that communications resulting from [Monetary Policy Reports] have been frequently undermined as the MPC scrabble to disown or qualify their own forecasts. 

 For the BoE, the path of interest rates should not be presented as a conditional assumption, says French, who argues in favour of adopting Federal Reserve-style dot plots. “That the MPC should know more than the market on the most likely forward path for UK interest rates should be a feature, not a bug, of their economic forecasts.” 

 Berenberg economist Kallum Pickering was arguing something similar last week around policy uncertainty, and how using market forecasts “blurs its reaction function and contributes to often unreliable guidance about the policy outlook”: Pickering also wants dot-plots introduced, as well as some deeper reform around forecasting and guidance: The BoE should no longer base any forecast on the market curve assumption and instead produce one central forecast based on the assumption of no change in monetary policy. [ . . . ] The BoE should temporarily introduce state-contingent forward guidance with “knockouts” to commit policymakers to keeping the bank rate at least at the current level until inflation is brought back under control on a sustained basis.

 But there’s also a question of whether the BoE is even listening to itself. Bailey told Jackson Hole in August 2020 about the value of “going big and fast” with quantitative easing, then kept buying bonds in what French calls “autopilot volumes” until December 2021, when financial conditions were exceptionally loose. 

The same speech now gets cited to explain why a short, sharp £80bn a year of quantitative tapering won’t make financial conditions tighter. Not only has the decision to keep adding to its balance sheet aged badly, it “looks like making policy that is at odds with the bank’s own research on the efficacy of asset purchases,” Panmure tells clients. 

 All in all, the BoE “has managed to dent a well-deserved reputation for competence” in ways that can’t be blamed on fuel inflation alone. A functionally independent yet politically constrained central bank cannot be a market-leading forecaster because it’s compelled to apply policy positions that lack credibility; this “cannot be a sustainable position”, says French: The reputational road back will require difficult conversations with lawmakers, but it is very clear to us that those conversations need to happen.

Monday, 27 June 2022

Pay rises and inflation - can the CB head off a wage-price spiral?

 

Can high interest rates ‘hurt to work’ without causing recession?

The Times
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Astrike is crippling the country’s transport system and ministers seem powerless to do anything about it, apart from plead from the sidelines. It is almost as if decades of union reform and rail privatisation never happened. All it needs now to complete the 1970s scenario is for Boris Johnson to call a “Who governs Britain?” election — though that did not work out too well for Sir Edward Heath in 1974.

Meanwhile, the government’s story on pay has undergone a 180-degree shift. A year ago, when furlough-distorted figures suggested, misleadingly, that pay was racing ahead, the prime minister celebrated it as evidence of a high-wage economy. Now the government is pleading for pay restraint, echoing Andrew Bailey, the beleaguered Bank of England governor. Both are worried that big pay settlements now will mean prolonged high inflation later, though on the face of it, there is not too much to worry about.

The latest figures from the specialist consultancy XpertHR, just published, showed that median basic pay settlements in the three months to May were 4 per cent, well below an inflation rate now running at 9 per cent and set to hit 11 per cent later in the year, according to the Bank.

Pay awards are accelerating — a year ago the median increase was 2 per cent, at the beginning of the year 3.2 per cent — but remain modest.

That leaves two worries for the authorities. The first is what comes next? Settlements so far may not reflect the full horrors of an inflation rate that is so far above the official 2 per cent target it might as well be in a different solar system.

The second is the disconnect between regular pay, rising by 4.2 per cent in the latest figures, and total pay, including bonuses, up 6.8 per cent. Bonuses these days may reflect not just awards to “fat cat” bankers but also what employers are shelling out to recruit and retrain staff in a tight labour market. The good news is that the bonus effect may be fading after an April peak.

The other bit of good news, though that depends on where you stand, is that the exceptionally tight labour market — a product of a shrinking workforce — may already be starting to loosen under the impact of a sharply slowing economy.

The Treasury has another worry. Last October, when he unveiled his comprehensive spending review, Rishi Sunak announced that he was lifting the one-year pay freeze unveiled a year earlier and would now allow “fair and affordable” public sector pay increases.

The chancellor had in mind an increase of about 2 per cent, the kind of figure the pay review bodies for public sector workers have been working with. At the time, Sunak had an official forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility that had inflation peaking at 5 per cent this spring before falling rapidly to 3 per cent or so. This was an underestimate, even without the additional upward pressure from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The fear now is that bigger public sector pay settlements could be another nail in the coffin of Sunak’s deficit reduction plans. He has been forced to unveil expensive support packages in response to the cost-of-living crisis; soften his national insurance hike; and is under pressure to abandon some of his planned tax increases, including next year’s raise in corporation tax from 19 per cent to 25 per cent. A big increase in public sector pay, which make up between a fifth and a quarter of government spending, would be a further blow.

As for the Bank, one concern was put well by Sir Charlie Bean, its former deputy governor, in a Mouradian Foundation webinar I chaired a few days ago. This was that, even if settlements are not high at present, private sector workers will seek in next year’s pay round to make up for the drop in real wages suffered this year.

Private sector workers are not heavily unionised, as I wrote recently. Just one in eight belongs to a one. But they are still capable of pushing for higher pay and bigger increases next year, implying that high inflation could become “embedded” and thus harder to get rid of.

This was the context of a speech by a member of the Bank’s monetary policy committee (MPC) earlier this week, one of the more hawkish I can remember. Catherine Mann, who voted for a half-point rise in interest rates last week (the majority decision was for a quarter-point), hinted strongly she will do the same at the next meeting on August 4.

She is worried about “robust wage growth”, “widespread bonuses” and that element of inflation caused not by international energy and food prices but domestically generated. She is also concerned that, if the Bank raises rates at a much slower rate than America’s Federal Reserve, an already weak pound will fall further, adding to inflation.

More aggressive policy “reduces the risk that domestic inflation already embedded is further boosted by inflation imported via a sterling depreciation”, she said, while also opening the way to bring down rates in the medium term once the danger has passed.

Bank of England rate-setter Catherine Mann raised fears about wage growth
Bank of England rate-setter Catherine Mann raised fears about wage growth
GETTY IMAGES

The warning from other MPC members is that they too will respond with higher rates if pay growth accelerates. Will it work? Wage bargainers do not stop mid-negotiation and decide that they had better moderate their demands because the Bank is putting up interest rates. The process is more brutal than that. Higher rates work instead by slowing the economy (not difficult at present), risking recession and pushing up unemployment.

Sir John Major, who was chancellor for a year before he became prime minister, coined the phrase “if it isn’t hurting, it isn’t working”. The high interest rates of the late 1980s did work, tipping the economy into the 1990-92 recession.

We must hope the worries about pay are overdone, and that that will not be necessary this time.

David Smith is Economics Editor of The Sunday Times

Friday, 19 November 2021

Inflation and the importance of CB credibiltiy

 
Bank of England’s credibility is crumbling
When it comes to inflation, central banks are badly behind the curve

“Did you ever think you’d be paying this much for a gallon of gas?” declared Joe Biden last Wednesday. “In some parts of California, it’s $4.50 a gallon!”

The average price of a gallon of petrol in California was $3.76 as recently as May. Last week, according to the American Automobile Association, that average hit $4.64 across the Sunshine State – even more than Biden’s estimate.

California has seen a 24pc rise in fuel costs in just six months. Despite that increase, the price of litre of petrol in Britain – which just topped a record £1.46p per litre – is still half as much again as in the States.

Biden was speaking in the aftermath of some pretty shocking US inflation data. In October, the US Consumer Price Index was 6.2pc up on the same month last year – far higher than financial markets expected.

Inflation in the world’s biggest economy is now at a 30-year high. And even if you take the “core” measure, which excludes volatile items like food and energy, US inflation was still 4.6pc last month – again, much higher than expected.

It’s not just the US, of course. Eurozone inflation surged to 4.1pc in October – significantly above market expectations. And the latest UK data shows CPI inflation of 3.1pc in September, well above the Bank of England’s 2pc target.

Just weeks ago, the Bank maintained price pressures were “transitory”. The Office for Budget Responsibility has since forecast inflation looks set to average 4.5pc next year. Even the Bank of England now accepts we could see CPI price growth peak above 5pc – with many private forecasts much higher than that.

US consumer price inflation has jumped to a 30-year high of 6.2pc

Line chart with 129 data points.
Prices were up 0.9pc on a month-on-month basis
The chart has 1 X axis displaying Time. Range: 1989-09-03 17:02:24 to 2022-02-24 06:57:36.
The chart has 1 Y axis displaying CPI (%). Range: -2 to 8.
SOURCE: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
End of interactive chart.

Across the world, global demand is rebooting but “the supply side” has yet to catch up. Spiralling oil prices and labour shortages are combining with pandemic-related logistical snarl-ups, sending business costs soaring.

Producer prices in China are now rising at their fastest pace in more than a quarter of a century. Chinese “factory gate” inflation ­– reflecting prices at which wholesalers buy materials from producers – hit 13.5pc in October, up from 10.5pc the month before.

Businesses of all kinds – from manufacturers to service providers, from West to East – are enduring much higher bills for labour, energy, raw materials and logistics. Slowly but surely, such rising input costs are being passed on, developing into political-explosive headline cost-of-living rises.

Earlier this month, the Bank of England held interest rates at the ultra-low emergency level of 0.1pc. With inflation well above target, this was widely viewed as a surprise. The money markets were betting the Monetary Policy Committee would bear down on price pressures, by raising rates to 0.25 per cent.

Yet, despite weeks in which market expectations of a rise were stoked by comments and speeches from MPC policymakers, the committee voted by 7-2 to keep rates on hold. Members also voted 6-3 to continue the Bank’s bond purchases under its quantitative easing programme. So, despite upward inflationary pressures, the virtual money-printing goes on.

Reflecting this surprise, the pound plunged against the dollar – a trend which extended into last week. Traders had expected higher rates, and therefore higher returns on money held in sterling. When that didn’t happen, they sold billions and billions of pounds.

When a central bank signals a rate rise, a rising currency tends to make imports cheaper, helping keep a lid on inflation. This is particularly true in the UK, given the public’s voracious import demand. But signalling a rate rise, without then delivering one, is a dangerous business.

Whether you think rates should go up or not – and I’ve been arguing for higher rates literally for years – leading central banks stand or fall on their credibility. Lose that and markets rebel, ignoring future signals, lurching through peaks and troughs, causing financial chaos.

Just weeks ago, Governor Andrew Bailey was arguing the Bank of England “had to act to tackle inflation” – words building on speeches and remarks from other MPC members. The money markets clearly moved to prepare. As such, Bailey spread confusion and dented the confidence of financial markets.

Given the extent of the UK Government’s borrowing, and the broader fragility of our stock and bond markets, bloated after years of QE, this is by no means an insignificant issue.

The UK economy is still expanding, but the pace of recovery is slowing. Our GDP between June and September was just 1.3 per cent higher than during the same period in 2020, we learnt last week. The same figure between April and June was 5.5 per cent – so growth has fallen considerably.

Ministers insist we are doing better than other advanced nations – and UK growth remains quicker than most. Yet while the US has now fully recovered, with GDP 1.4pc bigger than at the end of 2019, prior to the pandemic, the UK economy remains 2.1pc smaller.

In Germany, there’s a 1.5pc GDP shortfall, falling to 1.4pc in Italy and just 0.1pc in France. In his budget statement last month, Rishi Sunak based all his sums on full-year growth projections of 6.5pc this year and 6pc in 2022. I can’t see that happening.

The UK now faces spiralling inflation and a looming growth slowdown – which will further weaken our public finances. This is not a good time for the Bank of England’s credibility to be in play.

On Monday, though, the House of Lords will debate a hard-hitting report published in July by the Economic Affairs Select Committee.

“Quantitative Easing: A Dangerous Addiction” clearly got on the nerves of the Bank of England and the Treasury. Both institutions published somewhat dismissive responses, despite the committee being stacked with some of the UK’s most influential economists, including former Bank Governor Mervyn King.

Peers argued that the UK’s QE programme – which has ballooned during this pandemic, the Bank now on course to own no less than £875bn of government debt, bought using newly-created money – poses “inflationary dangers” and risks “a loss of credibility”.

Ahead of tomorrow’s debate, I’ve spoken to several peers, united only by their economic expertise. They are alarmed – rightly – about confused Bank of England messaging.

When it comes to inflation, the vast majority of policymakers, from the US President downward, are badly behind the curve.