Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label forecasts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label forecasts. Show all posts

Sunday, 14 April 2024

Helicopter Ben's review of the Bank of England is here - and it isn't good:

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We should all have a vested interest in how successful the Bank of England is in carrying out its objectives. Sadly, the Bank’s track record in recent years has left much to be desired, both in its ability to meet those objectives and its inability to communicate the thinking behind its decisions. Thus, the release today of Dr Ben Bernanke’s review of forecasting at the Bank is of prime importance.

Despite the Bank’s Governor, Andrew Bailey, calling it a ‘once in a generation’ review, the scale of the criticism and of the overhauls Bernanke proposes mean that it should not be seen as the last, or a one-off, but hopefully one in a series of reviews and reflections on the Bank’s performance. Criticism of the Bank has all too often been seen as an attack on its independence and integrity when it is not – and certainly should not be – but rather, in this case, is a challenge to its credibility and competence.

First, there is a damning indictment of how the Bank is run. Bernanke doesn’t pull any punches. The ‘most serious problems’, the review states, are ‘deficiencies of the Bank’s forecasting infrastructure’. Indeed, it is a tad ironic, given how often the Bank highlights the lack of investment in the UK economy, that the review describes a deep lack of investment in its own forecasting infrastructure.

A number of years ago, I highlighted the fact that one could read the Bank’s reports and not see ‘money’ or monetary indicators mentioned. One does not have to be a monetarist to appreciate that monetary and financial indicators need to be part of any policymaking dashboard. They have not been at the Bank. This has been one factor in its many mistakes.

One recommendation outlines steps to take, notably, ‘rich and institutionally realistic representations of the monetary transmission mechanism’. Given that the world’s second largest financial centre is on its doorstep, one might expect the Bank to be better on top of monetary and financial flows and transmission.

The review recommends several other updates that one would have expected to be already included in any basic monetary policy framework: ’empirically based modelling of inflation expectations’, ‘models of wage-price determination’, ‘detailed models of the financial sector, the housing sector, the energy sector, and other key components of the UK economy’ and greater attention to ‘supply-side elements’.

One is tempted to ask what they all do at Threadneedle Street, and whether the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is on top of these aspects when they make their policy decisions – as opposed to the blunt guesses at output gaps which often appear to frame their current approach. To be fair, there is much good publicly available research from the Bank’s staff. But perhaps this needs to resonate more with the policy process.

The second element of the review focuses on ways to better deliver a forecasting process that supports the MPC’s decision-making. My reading of the recommendations here is that a fresh approach should be taken at each meeting, given ‘the current bias toward making incremental changes’ and ‘the use of human judgements that paper over problems with the models, may slow recognition of important structural changes in the economy’. In other words, MPC members may need a better understanding of the changing global economic climate and how it impacts the UK.

Another recommendation is a good one: ‘staff should be charged with highlighting significant forecast errors and their sources’. In a nutshell, you should understand why the forecasts may be wrong before you make your next policy decision. Again, one might ask why it was necessary to consult externally to determine something so basic.

Positively, a further recommendation called for the central forecast to be augmented regularly with alternative scenarios. Such a scenario approach could be better used across UK economic forecasting generally, including at the OBR, too.

The third broad focus of the review was on more effective communication. The need for better communication is clear, based on recent years, in which the Bank’s anti-inflation credibility was rightly questioned by the markets, and the general public were shocked by the speed of the cost of living crisis. Castigating workers for daring to ask for pay increases was another resounding comms failure.

But while Bernanke encourages the Bank to better communicate with the market – and it should – one has to ask whether it should also be more on the front foot and guide, rather than being so reactive.

The review also correctly identifies the need to learn from best practice, highlighting better methods used by other central banks. Noting recent communication shortfalls, it calls for the Bank to be ‘exceptionally clear’ when it sees the market’s rate path as being inconsistent with its view.

As expected, the review calls for the elimination of the fan charts that the Bank has used. It was a more open question whether Bernanke would recommend that individual MPC members outline their own forecasts, as is the case at the US Federal Reserve. In the event, he has kicked this can down the road, ‘leaving decisions on this issue to future deliberations’. For what it’s worth, I think that they should go down that route – and would feel vindicated if they did, as I called for it back in 1997 after independence was granted.

The final recommendation is for a phased introduction of the changes. That is understandable. But it should also be the case that this is the start of a process to improve monetary policy – and ultimately economic policymaking decisions in the UK.

When it comes to the Bank, it is about policies, processes, plus personalities. Improving the processes is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to ensure a good outcome. In other words, addressing the issues raised in the Bernanke review will help, but not guarantee that all works well in the future.

In particular, a focus on the infrastructure of the Bank should not divert attention from its poor policy judgements. Indeed, given the fundamental problems that Bernanke has highlighted, a major overhaul may be necessary.

Dr Gerard Lyons is an economist and Research Fellow at the Centre for Policy Studies.

Thursday, 15 June 2023

Data, Bank of England and bad forecasting


https://www.ft.com/content/504e9db8-bc7c-4962-b515-7b42efdaeb6d

How did the Bank of England get its migration forecasts so wrong?
(In addition to all the other things it got wrong) 

 Bryce Elder JUNE 13 2023 

 The Bank of England is having a bad decade. Not only has its credibility been undermined by egregious forecasting errors, the debate has gone mainstream around whether its independence mandate is a useful fiction or an obstacle. 

 Energy costs help illustrate one problem. Last summer’s surge in wholesale gas prices went straight into Monetary Policy Reports based on the retail price cap methodology and financial support packages of the time, rather than accounting for a widely-expected state intervention. 

Independence locked the BoE into forecasting based on announced government policy rather than the likely path ahead. But independence also makes the BoE’s unforced errors, such as around UK population growth, harder to overlook. 

 The bank has “very materially underestimated the supply-side potential of the UK economy because it failed to update its migration assumption — despite a body of evidence already in the public domain that net migration into the UK was poised to come in well ahead of the 2020-based population projections,” says Panmure Gordon chief economist Simon French in a note published today. 

 The projection he refers to is an Office for National Statistics estimate for net migration of 692,000 over the three years from 2021/22 to 2023/24. When the figure went into the BoE’s February 2023 supply-side stock take it was already stale. An ONS update from November 2022 was disregarded and a January revision apparently arrived too late for inclusion. As a result, based on recent data, the projection used by the BoE was out by nearly 100 per cent. 

Net migration will probably be about 1.2mn over the same three-year period, more than 70 per cent of whom are working age. “Given the materiality of the difference, and the pessimism of the broader supply side stock take, this was a poor judgment from the BoE,” French says: We have no evidence — and are not suggesting — that there was political pressure brought to bear on the bank given the salience of migration to UK public policy. 

However, it is either that or a poor attempt to use the latest data to accurately estimate the supply side capacity of the UK economy. Whichever way, it does not look good. When defending its record the BoE tends to highlight that price predictions come from the market, so failures are the fault of gas futures traders and forex dealers rather than its own economists. 

As governor Andrew Bailey said last month, forecasts are “conditional on commodity prices, they’re conditional on government policies. So, as those conditions change, we change our forecasts.” 

 It’s an approach that looks increasingly flawed, says French, as it “introduces the potential for the market path and the expectations of Monetary Policy Committee members to decouple — with obvious challenges in standing, rhetorically, behind their central economic forecast”: The result of this is that communications resulting from [Monetary Policy Reports] have been frequently undermined as the MPC scrabble to disown or qualify their own forecasts. 

 For the BoE, the path of interest rates should not be presented as a conditional assumption, says French, who argues in favour of adopting Federal Reserve-style dot plots. “That the MPC should know more than the market on the most likely forward path for UK interest rates should be a feature, not a bug, of their economic forecasts.” 

 Berenberg economist Kallum Pickering was arguing something similar last week around policy uncertainty, and how using market forecasts “blurs its reaction function and contributes to often unreliable guidance about the policy outlook”: Pickering also wants dot-plots introduced, as well as some deeper reform around forecasting and guidance: The BoE should no longer base any forecast on the market curve assumption and instead produce one central forecast based on the assumption of no change in monetary policy. [ . . . ] The BoE should temporarily introduce state-contingent forward guidance with “knockouts” to commit policymakers to keeping the bank rate at least at the current level until inflation is brought back under control on a sustained basis.

 But there’s also a question of whether the BoE is even listening to itself. Bailey told Jackson Hole in August 2020 about the value of “going big and fast” with quantitative easing, then kept buying bonds in what French calls “autopilot volumes” until December 2021, when financial conditions were exceptionally loose. 

The same speech now gets cited to explain why a short, sharp £80bn a year of quantitative tapering won’t make financial conditions tighter. Not only has the decision to keep adding to its balance sheet aged badly, it “looks like making policy that is at odds with the bank’s own research on the efficacy of asset purchases,” Panmure tells clients. 

 All in all, the BoE “has managed to dent a well-deserved reputation for competence” in ways that can’t be blamed on fuel inflation alone. A functionally independent yet politically constrained central bank cannot be a market-leading forecaster because it’s compelled to apply policy positions that lack credibility; this “cannot be a sustainable position”, says French: The reputational road back will require difficult conversations with lawmakers, but it is very clear to us that those conversations need to happen.