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“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label current account. Show all posts
Showing posts with label current account. Show all posts

Tuesday, 5 July 2022

UK's balance of payments is a big issue - and getting bigger:

 

We are on track for a currency crisis – and bankruptcy

Our leaders fail to grasp that taking back control also means taking back responsibility

rishi sunak
Britain's current account deficit is easily the biggest such deficit ever CREDIT: Yui Mok /PA

Jeepers! We may be all tightening our belts in response to the cost of living squeeze, but as a nation, we are still spending far more than we are earning. Indeed, we are doing so in record amounts.

Living beyond our means has long been a national habit, so it shouldn’t perhaps come as any surprise. The sheer size of the addiction is nonetheless quite a shock.

According to the latest national accounts, published last week, Britain’s current account deficit widened in the first quarter of this year to an astonishing 8.3pc of Gross Domestic Product, easily the biggest such deficit ever.

In layman’s terms, what this means is that overall expenditure in the UK is exceeding national income by nearly a tenth of the value of the entire economy.

All other things being equal, there would be nothing left at all in the national coffers in little more than ten years from now if we were to carry on like this.

Fortunately, the balance of payments doesn’t work quite like that; the deficit is paid for by inflows of capital from overseas, so the fact that we are still able to finance such a high level of consumption might be taken as a vote of confidence in the UK, rather than a cause for panic.

What is more, the Office for National Statistics has changed the way it collects the data, which may make the deterioration look worse than it really is. 

All the same, the situation looks alarming enough; even excluding sales of gold and other precious metals, which can be volatile, the deficit was still an eye watering 7.1pc, against an average of just 2.6pc last year.

It is hard to be certain about the exact causes of this deterioration. Certainly the soaring costs of imported energy and food were a major factor. But the UK also exports quite a lot of oil and gas, so there was a big offset in this regard.

The main factor was instead a big leap in imports of finished and semi manufactured goods. There was also a marked deterioration in exports of goods, though not as large as the increase in imports. Whatever ministers say to the contrary, it is hard to escape the conclusion that this is at least in part a Brexit effect. 

As demand came surging back, post the pandemic, the flaws in Boris Johnson’s “oven ready” trade deal with the EU have been cruelly exposed.

The EU trades pretty much freely with us - our choice, by the way, so as not to further add to inflation with increased bureaucratic restrictions on trade - but our exports to them are already encountering the full panoply of barriers that afflict non EU members that are not part of the single market.

The surge in imports may also have something to do with acute labour shortages in key sectors. British companies may as a consequence have found it harder to satisfy domestic demand than otherwise. 

In any case, there is no denying where the balance of power in our new trading relationship with Europe lies; it is predictably with the much larger jurisdiction - the EU. So much for the much touted claim that because we import far more from them than they do from us, Britain would maintain the whip hand in any ongoing relationship.

The total trade deficit has widened

Combination chart with 4 data series.
The chart has 1 X axis displaying Time. Data ranges from 2019-03-01 00:00:00 to 2022-03-01 00:00:00.
The chart has 1 Y axis displaying £bn. Data ranges from -62.2 to 37.
SOURCE: ONS
End of interactive chart.

Small wonder that the Government still refuses to commission an economic impact assessment of Brexit; the findings would not reflect well on our exit deal.

In the circumstances, it is perhaps a surprise that the pound is not under more pressure in foreign exchange markets than it is. So far this year, it has fallen more than 10pc against the dollar, but it has been broadly flat against the euro, and is off only 3pc on a trade weighted basis.

There is little sign as yet of a fully blown currency crisis, where interest rates have to be jacked up precipitously to guard against the inflationary consequences of a collapsing pound.

A big current account deficit doesn’t necessarily matter if there are enough investors willing to finance it with inflows of capital. But it does leave the country reliant on what Mark Carney, former Governor of the Bank of England, called “the kindness of strangers”.

For the moment, there seems to be no particular problem in this regard, despite the rising interest rate differential with the US. Anecdotally, there is still a long queue of foreign buyers looking to buy up British companies, and even to invest in UK Government debt. Net investment in the UK increased by £158.9 billion in the first quarter.

It may be that appetite for British assets is about to plummet, but this is by no means set in stone. Those who think that UK gilts are “sitting on a bed of nitroglycerin”, as the self styled bond king, Bill Gross, famously said of them at the time of the financial crisis, should consider this; Britain is virtually alone in the world in having never defaulted.

Theoretically more creditworthy countries such as the US and Germany most certainly have, the latter massively on at least four occasions in the last century. This enviable and almost unique record of creditworthiness is not something the UK Treasury is about to surrender. However bad things get, Britain will always pay its debts.

Nonetheless, looking at the latest balance of payments statistics, there are some worrying straws in the wind that are eventually going to require huge and politically difficult changes in policy. 

Portfolio investment overseas decreased by £103.6bn in the first quarter, reflecting a quite widespread sale of overseas shares. This is tantamount to selling off the family silver to finance current consumption, and is plainly not sustainable on an indefinite basis.

The ONS also struggled to reconcile the recorded current account deficit of £55.7bn with the £29.6bn of net inflows. Since the balance of payments must by definition always balance, the shortfall is listed as unexplained “net errors and omissions”.

Either the current account deficit is not as big as reported, or there is another possibly quite unstable source of inflow which is not being recorded.

Whatever the truth, the UK plainly cannot keep running up current account deficits of this order of magnitude indefinitely, or for that matter expect the rest of the world to keep financing them - not in any case while it remains a relatively high tax, big state economy. 

Taking back control also means taking back responsibility, and yet our Brexiting Government doesn’t seem to have grasped the fact. The remorseless logic of Brexit is that of the small state, low tax economy, yet we seem headed in the opposite direction. Uncorrected, our present trajectory can only end in a currency crisis and bankruptcy.

To finance a trade deficit of the current size, and eventually bring it back into balance, you need to attract a lot of foreign investment. You do not go about this task by whacking up income tax, corporation tax, and other forms of business taxation. Let’s hope that we don’t require another mega crisis for this brutal truth to sink in.

Monday, 22 October 2018

Current account deficits, surpluses and more

The first section looks at the German c/a surplus, in a readily digestible way. It also explains Target2 - how the ECB balances out surpluses & deficits within the Eurozone - removing the requirement for individual central banks to hold large reserves. The last section looks at the storm clouds looming in Europe; take from that what you will - the author is a eurosceptic:

Flip side of Italy’s woes is a German economy with a suspect engine

Last week I wrote about the inter-relationship between Italy’s financial plight and its underlying economic difficulties, now finding expression in its government’s conflict with the EU. It has been told by the EU to come up with a different budget. If its budget isn’t modified, the EU will probably reject it. We shall see if the Italians bend the knee to Brussels.
But the Italian difficulties represent only one side of the euro problem. The flip side is to be seen in Germany and, contrary to popular misconceptions, it isn’t rosy either. On the face of it, Germany is an amazing economic success story. The economy is growing strongly and unemployment is only 3.4pc.
Yet recent German economic performance is not outstanding. Since the formation of the euro in 1999, Germany’s economy has grown by about 32pc while the poor old UK has grown by 43pc. Meanwhile, the figures for the US and Canada are 49pc and 53pc respectively. In the same period, Sweden has grown by 56pc and Switzerland by 46pc.
Yet it is when you look at the figures for consumption that it really dawns on you that things aren’t quite right. Since 1999, spending by German consumers has risen by only 20pc. How come the discrepancy between GDP and consumption? This is explained largely by the shift in the trade balance. Since the euro was formed, Germany has gone from a small deficit of about 1pc of GDP to a whopping great surplus of almost 8pc of GDP. 

The explanation for relatively weak consumption is largely not more saving by German consumers, whose caution is legendary; rather, German workers have not been paid that much. Since the formation of the euro, the average real pay of German workers has risen by only 23pc, or 1.2pc per annum. It is German companies that have done spectacularly well, largely thanks to strong exports, greatly helped by subdued wage increases and the competitive euro. Meanwhile, the government’s budget is in surplus to the tune of 1.3pc of GDP. The German economy is completely lopsided with excessive reliance on exports and domestic demand too weak. 
But some day German workers will benefit, won’t they? Perhaps. The counterpart to these huge current-account surpluses is the build-up of claims on other countries. These are effectively IOUs from countries that have bought German goods, well in excess of what Germany has bought from them. But debts aren’t always repaid, as Germany should know. 
Within the euro system there is a special sort of IOU. These are the so-called Target2 balances, representing claims by one central bank on another as a result of imbalances in the flow of money between member countries.
This is how it works. Suppose someone withdraws euros from an Italian bank and deposits them with a German bank. The German bank now has surplus euros and the Italian bank has a shortage of euros. Through their respective central banks and the ECB, the euros are recycled from the German bank to the Italian bank. 
But someone has replaced a claim on an Italian bank with a claim on a German bank. Matching this switch, the German central bank has acquired a claim on the ECB and the ECB has acquired a claim on the Italian central bank. That doesn’t sound to me like an equal exchange.
The scale of these claims is staggering. Germany has net claims on other countries within the Target2 system of some €1,000bn. That amounts to roughly 30pc of German GDP. The Target2 liabilities of the Bank of Italy come to almost half that figure. The stock of both German claims and Italian liabilities is far greater now than it was at the height of the euro crisis in 2012. 
If Italy were to leave the euro, would it fully honour these debts? The lawyers will tell you that legally it must. But then that’s why they are lawyers. If I were the ECB I would not want to bank on it – as it were. What will happen if the stand-off between the Italian government and the euro authorities continues and the Target2 balances get ever larger? And suppose that there is a run on the Italian banks. The Bank of Italy cannot issue euros. It would be the ECB that would have to provide the dosh. Would it? These problems for Germany and Europe have arisen from the abolition of the Deutschmark. The exchange rate is a hinge that allows countries as different as Germany and Italy to be different, yet to remain connected. Without it the union must break.  

The replacement of the Deutschmark by the euro has also been responsible for a significant global problem, namely the fact that the eurozone as a whole is running the largest current-account surplus in the world, thereby acting as a deflationary force and contributing to the growth of protectionist sentiment, especially in the US. 
The solution is obvious: bring back the Deutschmark. But I wouldn’t hold your breath. Germany does not want to be the cause of another major European upset. If Germany doesn’t leave the euro, then Italy should. As and when either of these happens there will be financial mayhem across Europe. But carrying on with the current system would be worse.
Apparently the UK’s policy establishment wants us to stay in the EU, if not permanently then at least for as long as possible. If we leave without a deal on a continuing close relationship they are worried about “disruption”. Disruption? Has anyone in Whitehall noticed the storm gathering across the channel? I would have thought that the sensible thing for us would be to clear off out of it PDQ, before the balloon goes up. Still, I am a humble economist, not one of our Olympians charged with the task of managing Brexit. They evidently understand these complex European economic matters in a unique way. 
Roger Bootle is chairman of Capital Economics 

Sunday, 17 December 2017

ECB wind down of QE threatens £

Great short article encapsulating monetary policy impact on exchange rates - indirectly. This could form a solid paragraph in any analysis of UK national debt, interest rates, sterling, external shock:

From The Sunday Times

A “tsunami” of cash flowing from the eurozone into Britain is set to dry up as the European Central Bank winds down its quantitative easing (QE) programme — potentially placing the pound under greater pressure.
According to Oxford Economics, about €50bn (£44bn) a year has been pouring into UK debt for the past few years as a response to the ECB’s bond-buying programme, which has pushed up asset prices across Europe, making British debt more attractive for continental investors. The consultancy’s analysis predicts that the volume of cash will halve next year.
The ECB’s huge programme of asset purchases has crowded out private investors in eurozone bond markets, causing them to look overseas to countries, including Britain, for better returns, according to the Oxford Economics research by Guillermo Tolosa, a former senior economist at the IMF.
With the Frankfurt-based central bank set to halve its monthly bond buying to €30bn from next month, Tolosa expects that flow of cash to slow. Once the ECB stops buying, eurozone investors will stop pumping cash into overseas markets altogether, he said. That process could be more disruptive to financial markets than the US Federal Reserve’s own exit from QE, according to Tolosa.
The shift could be felt acutely in Britain. Figures due this week are set to show the UK is on course to run up a current account deficit of £90bn this year, down from last year’s all-time high of £115bn. The deficit means that Britain earns less from exports and income from overseas investments than it pays for imports and dividend payments to foreign investors.
Last year’s widening was partly a result of the fall in oil prices, which meant UK oil companies earned less from their operations worldwide. A rebound in oil prices, along with the fall in the value of sterling since the EU referendum, has helped close the gap slightly, but not by as much as many economists were expecting earlier in the year.
Funding the deficit requires a constant stream of foreign cash flowing into UK assets. Bank of England governor Mark Carney has previously warned that this leaves Britain dangerously reliant on the “kindness of strangers”.
If the eurozone cash dries up, British assets may need to get a bit cheaper before other foreign investors step in, according to Tolosa. That could put pressure on the pound and on the price of UK government and corporate bonds.
“It’s likely there will have to be an inducement for investors from elsewhere,” he said.