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“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label fiscal drag. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fiscal drag. Show all posts

Thursday, 31 October 2024

The best read on the budget so far

 The Sunday Times 100

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JULIET SAMUEL

Reeves missed her chance to bet on growth

The budget was much like those of the past 16 years: a funnel for pouring money into an unsustainable state sector

The Times

Having the government dig holes in the ground, Keynes once claimed, is better than having it do nothing. And from Rachel Reeves’s first budget, a moment that will define an era of Labour governance, we can conclude she too is a believer in the utility of digging holes. The chancellor wants us to believe she “discovered” a particular “black hole” in the public finances and that her budget is all about filling it in.

To be fair, there are black holes aplenty in the public finances, but no one can credibly argue they were hidden from view. Since 2008, British indebtedness has been stuck in a one-way ratchet, from 35 per cent of GDP before that crisis to 90 per cent today. Every few years the Treasury has a crack at trying to close the gap between public revenues and expenditure, only for another crisis to come along and blow its efforts out of the water. But the underlying ratchet is not actually operated by these crises. It is a function of two factors: slow growth and a failing state, at the centre of which lies the super-massive black hole of the NHS.

Reeves makes much of her supposed determination to address Britain’s economic stagnation. But growth was not at the heart of this budget. In fact, she chose largely to stick with the existing model, in which the productive economy is increasingly cannibalised to feed the beast of our ageing population and the unreformed services it relies upon.

• A ‘traditional’ Labour budget — but will it actually spur growth?

This is evident in the choice to raise the majority of additional revenues, some £25 billion a year, from higher employer national insurance contributions. This is indisputably a tax on work, whatever sophistry the government may deploy about sparing the “payslips” of “working people”. It opens up an ever wider black hole, so to speak, between what it costs to hire and what the employee takes home, extracting yet more from the working-age population to fund unsustainable pensions and inefficiently delivered medical care.

Likewise with the rise in capital gains tax on shares, but not on property, the second-largest tax rise in the budget. This will see the Exchequer yet again whack productive, risk-taking investments rather than increasing the tax burden on passive property ownership. Where the budget does tax property more, it does so in the worst way by raising stamp duty on second homes, a choice that is far inferior to the alternative of sorting out council tax.

And while the promise to unfreeze income tax thresholds is welcome, it won’t be implemented for another four years — until the next election year, in other words. At least the chancellor held off raising taxes on fuel, though she seems determined, with her oil and gas tax rises, to ensure we should buy more of it from abroad.

It is, in the end, always the NHS that is used to justify the pain. Even during the coalition’s austerity years, total spending on the health service rose 15 per cent, while local council and welfare budgets were almost halved and transport was slashed by more than 60 per cent.

• Budget 2024 key points: a summary of the highlights

It was the NHS that Brexit campaigners stuck on their big bus and the NHS we were told we had to save from Covid, when its productivity went through the floor to a level from which it still hasn’t recovered. It is the NHS that will suck in all of that national insurance tax rise and more, yet again without a convincing plan to get back even to pre-Covid levels of productivity, let alone to levels that would make it sustainable in the long run.

Despite its co-operation in the digging of Reeves’s politically convenient black hole, the Office for Budget Responsibility provided little cover for the chancellor’s claim that her budget will enhance growth. The economy will get a boost from the budget, the quango declared, but only for one year, after which we will sink back down to an ever lower baseline.

In short, the OBR concludes, the government is borrowing more up front to bring forward economic activity that might have occurred in later years, without changing anything substantive about the country’s real ability to generate wealth.

There was, however, one counterpoint to this rather gloomy picture and it is an important one. That was the decision to raise capital spending. Reeves began her tenure, in July, by slashing infrastructure projects, a bizarre act for a chancellor who claimed to want greater prosperity. But in the budget, rather than allowing public investment to shrink, as the Tories had planned, she has now found the money to keep it at a higher level for the length of this parliament. This includes a big expansion of capital spending in the health service, one of the few tangible ways in which the government has shown an interest in improving its performance. In her decisions on capital spending, then, Reeves is at least partly following through on her promise to prioritise growth.

But this brings us back to digging holes. Productive investment is not just about what you spend — how many holes the government can make us dig — but whether these resources are spent wisely. The OBR’s current model assumes that higher government investment will largely displace private sector investment: if both are competing for a fixed supply of workers and resources, after all, the overall production of houses or infrastructure or services does not necessarily rise.

But why should the supply be fixed? It is only fixed because incentives to reallocate resources, assess opportunities, train new staff and deploy capital are thwarted, in both public and private sectors, by our dire planning system, bad management, poorly designed environmental regulation, high energy costs, expensive housing, a terrible migration policy and so on.

If the government can address some of these problems, in part by spending wisely on capital investments like roads and power plants, then, as the OBR predicts, Britain’s potential growth rate can rise over time. That timescale, however, runs beyond the electoral cycle, which is why governments facing tight finances always end up cutting their long-term capital budgets. Reeves has refrained from doing so and, for that decision, should be applauded.

For 16 years British fiscal policy has been a story of servicing pensioners at the cost of everyone else. George Osborne chose to visit pain upon the country via spending cuts. Reeves is doing so with large tax rises on the working population. But even with £40 billion of new tax rises and a slug of extra borrowing, the numbers are barely adding up any more.

This ought to have been a budget aimed single-mindedly at changing the game by betting everything on growth. Instead, growth played a distant second fiddle to spending. In the long run, it won’t be enough.

Sunday, 28 April 2024

Taxes and labour mobility - the Scottish experience

 

Don’t expect Rachel Reeves to learn anything from the SNP’s disastrous rule

The fact Scotland’s high earners are fleeing south should be a warning

How can we put the brakes on the ambitions of Rachel Reeves to find ways to tax us more? She has surrounded herself with advisers who back high tax, and when she gives speeches she is very careful to use coded phrases that leave the possibility of more, and higher, taxes on the table.

Fortunately we can point to Scotland as an example of how leftist economics risk sending public finances into a tailspin.

As a Scot, it gives me no pleasure to state it, but the destination of travel for Scotland’s public services must be to fall further behind the performance levels of the rest of the UK.

Why? Because more of Scotland’s highest tax contributors will join those already choosing to move their tax domicile to England, ensuring a widening gap between budgeted and actual tax revenues, which in turn will ensure diminishing funds for quality public services.

It is this lesson that Rachel Reeves and any other prospective chancellors must learn. When the top earning 10pc of UK taxpayers contribute 60pc of the revenues it is this group of people – who also happen to be the most mobile – that tax policy has to be careful to consider. 

To emphasise this lesson the lowest earning 50pc of taxpayers contribute only 9.5pc of revenues. 

If governments of any colour want to protect revenues they cannot afford to lose even a small number of the highest earning taxpayers.

A government study into the effects of having different tax rates in Scotland from the rest of the UK has provided valuable evidence that fears about a Scottish brain drain are indeed taking place. 

Here’s how it has happened. In 2018/19 the SNP split Scotland’s basic rate tax band into three while also increasing the tax rate for higher and top rate taxpayers, creating five tax bands – in contrast to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, where there are three.

Now, in this tax year of 2024/25 the SNP has introduced a new “advanced rate” band at 45pc for those earning between £75,000 to £125,140 and increased the top rate to 48pc. 

In general, the Scottish Government has uprated the lower tax bands by inflation, but by freezing the higher rate threshold at a lower level than the rest of the UK, more people earning £40k-£50k in Scotland will now pay at the higher-rate tax bracket.

Anyone having an income of more than £28,867 in Scotland now pays significantly more income tax than someone with the same earnings elsewhere in the UK. Those under it pay slightly less.

The Treasury study found the changes introduced in 2018/19 led to 1,030 higher earners moving south, losing Scotland £61m of tax receipts that year.

While the analysis could not find “reliable evidence of a change in net cross-border migration” for those paying the SNP’s new 19pc “starter rate”, or its new 21pc “intermediate rate”, it did find changes for those liable for the increased 41pc higher rate – 1p higher than England – which applied to income between £43,430 and £150,000.

As if this study is not worrying enough it is fair and reasonable to believe the reality is already far worse, for the Treasury limited its study to only 2018/19 and not the effects of the further SNP tax hikes that followed. 

Add the impacts of the top rate becoming 48pc, now having lower starting levels for higher tax bands than the rest of the UK, and the introduction of an “advanced” intermediary tax band at 45pc and the carnage for tax revenues must be worse.

A Scottish taxpayer with an income of £125,000 will pay £5,221 more in income tax than in the rest of the UK – equivalent to a 7pc hit to their post-tax income.

There’s no need to take my word for it, the Scottish Government’s own Scottish Fiscal Commission estimates that “behavioural responses” will offset 90pc of the latest increase in the top rate of tax in Scotland. 

For behavioural responses read tax planning by moving tax domicile or sheltering earnings. It takes an especially distorted view of the world to increase a tax rate when you have already been advised it will realise only 10pc of the potential benefit and lose previously content taxpayers to another jurisdiction.

Research showed more than a third of Scots would consider leaving Scotland if income tax rates were increased before Humza Yousaf followed through with his tax hikes, with almost 48pc of 18- to 24-year-olds saying they would think about leaving.

Where will they go? Most will simply relocate to attractive parts of England that keep them within easy reach of Scotland, where they can still work and play, but as English taxpayers.

Amusingly, it was revealed in January some 300 Scottish civil servants actually live in England to avoid high Scottish taxes. Others will look for warmer and more fiscally attractive climes.

Many may consider moving to the US, where incomes are not only much higher but you also get to keep far more of your money. The top federal income tax rate of 37pc in America cuts in at £465,000 whereas in Britain the state snatches 40pc when you earn over a measly £50,270. 

Likewise Dubai is another attractive option, not least because take-home pay is double that in Britain, helped by the absence of any income tax.

This is why Ms Reeves and others like her must wake up. Low tax jurisdictions such as Dubai and countries such as Switzerland, Portugal and Italy do not hang back in advertising themselves as places to relocate to. They know the value of a small share of something big rather than a large share of nothing at all.

Despite warnings from Scottish Financial Enterprise, the Scottish Chambers of Commerce, the Institute of Directors – all representing employers who are struggling to attract or keep the best talent for their Scottish members – the SNP insists people are beating a path to work in Scotland. 

The British Medical Association, the British Dental Association and even the Scottish Government-owned Prestwick Airport all disagree – complaining it is getting harder to recruit and retain skilled workers.

The SNP is cherry-picking its figures by ignoring who pays the lion’s share of taxes and relying on improved tax take thanks to higher earnings and frozen tax allowances pulling in higher revenue – but the brain drain is real and its financial impact will grow.

Rachel Reeves and other prospective chancellors must learn the lesson of talented higher earners escaping Scotland so brain drain does not infect the whole of the UK.

Wednesday, 10 January 2024

Good stuff on tax changes from Paul Johnson (Fiscal Policy next)

 

Tax changes could point to a policy shift ahead of the election

The chancellor’s recent adjustments will be welcomed by those of working age on average and somewhat above-average earnings

The Times
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The two big announcements from last year’s budget and autumn statement are just starting to take effect. They tell us rather a lot about how this year’s election campaign may pan out. They also suggest something rather counter to the accepted narrative about where this government’s priorities might lie.

No doubt you’ll be aware that the national insurance cut, announced in November, came into effect on Saturday. The 2p cut in the employee rate will benefit the average earner on £35,000 a year by about £450. Anyone earning £52,250 or more will gain £754. Gains are less for lower earners.

All very welcome. The less welcome news, of course, is that we are in the middle of a much bigger income tax increase. The national insurance cuts will cost the Treasury about £9 billion. Six years of planned freezes to income tax allowances and thresholds will raise more than £40 billion. The chancellor is giving back less than a quarter of what he is planning to take. This year’s freezes alone will outweigh the effect of the national insurance cuts for all those earning less than about £29,000.

The other big announcement came in the March budget. It’s about 20 years too late for me, but last week working parents in England (so long as neither earns more than £100,000) were able to start applying for 15 hours a week of free childcare for their two-year-old children. The actual entitlement kicks in from April. From September it extends to children, in working families, aged nine months and over. And from September 2025 the number of free hours will double to 30 hours a week. This will pretty much double the amount that the government spends on free childcare provision.

Here are two popular policies, a tax cut and a substantial extension to the scope of the welfare state, both no doubt nice in themselves, but I suspect you are starting to see the tension here. Or at least the hidden costs of such retail offers. The national insurance cut is accompanied by some rather bigger, but less salient, income tax increases. The extra spending on childcare has been accompanied by eye-wateringly tight spending plans for other public services. The only way that Jeremy Hunt can make his numbers add up is by planning another period of austerity for many parts of our already struggling public realm.

I expect a conspiracy of silence about all this from both main parties. Confront the problems of local authorities struggling to provide statutory services, of ever-rising NHS waiting lists, of backlogs in the justice system, of prisons full to overflowing and you have to admit the need for tax rises. Undo the tax increases that have already occurred or are planned and you have to make explicit where you are going to reduce spending. Much easier to pretend you are cutting taxes when you’re not and to make nice new offers of spending without saying what will happen to core public services. Or, if you are the opposition, it’s easier to pretend that trivial changes to taxation of private schools and of “non-doms” will make all the difference, while supporting the national insurance cuts, than to confront the reality of what will be needed simply to prevent public services deteriorating further.

Note, though, the particular set of choices embodied in these policies. When it came to tax, the chancellor chose to spend £9 billion cutting national insurance specifically. That only helps people of working age, in work. His childcare package also helps only a particular group of people of working age, in work. Neither policy helps the poorest. Neither is of any benefit to pensioners. That’s rather counter to the established narrative that this is a government bending over backwards to support the old at the expense of the young.

That narrative has some solid foundations, most notably in the continuation of the pension triple lock and the maintenance of other pensioner benefits, whilst cutting many working-age benefits. The continued failure to effect a radical transformation of the planning system or to meet housebuilding targets also has hurt the young. Meanwhile, monetary policy (not under government control) has benefited the older and wealthier by supporting asset prices.

Yet look at other choices and that narrative starts to look too simplistic. The cut in the national insurance rate comes off the back of a big increase in the point at which national insurance starts to be paid, another policy helping only those in work and of working age. Admittedly, that threshold, too, is being frozen now, but the relative burden of tax has moved away from workers.

Jeremy Hunt has brought in extra help for childcare costs that benefit working families
Jeremy Hunt has brought in extra help for childcare costs that benefit working families
STEFAN ROUSSEAU/WPA POOL VIA GETTY IMAGES

Even more striking is what has happened to the income tax personal allowance over a longer period. A six-year freeze in its value is unprecedented. But don’t forget that it was increased, at huge expense, during the 2010s. For those of working age, the present freeze will undo only between a half and two thirds of that increase. Pensioners, though, used to get an enhanced tax-free allowance. George Osborne took that away. Recent freezes mean they already have a lower tax-free allowance than they did back in 2010.

Put that together with the extra money for childcare and you see a different sort of priority emerge, one of support, at least in relative terms, for those of working age on average and somewhat above average earnings. There is a degree of the accidental about this. The national insurance threshold was raised only as a partial offset to the new-fangled health and social care levy — effectively an increase in the national insurance rate. The threshold increase remained despite the levy’s abolition being one of the few things to survive the ill-fated Liz Truss mini-budget.

Accidental or not, perhaps this is a sign that, peeking through the broader fog and obfuscation, some new distributional priorities are beginning to emerge.

Paul Johnson is the director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies

Tuesday, 27 June 2023

Who is Dan Neidle and what does he do?

 

Five big ways to fix Britain’s broken tax system

It is possible to encourage growth without crashing the economy. Here are the fatally flawed policies that need sorting now, says tax expert Dan Neidle

Dan Neidle retired to Norfolk but has taken up a mission to reform the taxation system and ensure the rich are paying their fair share
Dan Neidle retired to Norfolk but has taken up a mission to reform the taxation system and ensure the rich are paying their fair share
TERRY HARRIS FOR THE SUNDAY TIMES
The Sunday Times

Former chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng’s “fiscal event” last September was widely perceived as a disaster, but at its heart was a kernel of undoubted truth: there are features of our tax system that discourage growth — and we should fix them. Some of our tax rules are contradictory and occasionally downright mystifying, often punishing people and businesses for being successful. Anyone completing their tax return this January may run into them - particularly if they earn between £50,000 and £60,000 or £100,000 and £120,000.

Stop income tax hitting the ‘comfortably off’ hardest

The boldest, and most criticised, element of the mini-budget was the decision of Kwarteng and Liz Truss to scrap the 45p top rate of income tax to “simplify taxes” and “incentivise growth”. The problem with this is that, even if you accept the premises of Kwarteng’s position, 45p is not even close to the highest marginal tax rate in the UK.

The marginal tax rate at any given income is the tax rate you pay on the next pound you earn. That’s crucially important, because it affects your incentive to earn that extra pound.

I’ve charted the marginal rate of income tax and employee national insurance for different incomes, and it looks like this:

STR.CHART_1

This should immediately start ringing alarm bells. The comfortably off — people earning between £100,000 and £120,000 — pay a higher marginal rate of tax of 62 per cent. Why are they paying a bigger proportion than those on really high incomes? Because at this point the personal allowance starts to taper away — with every £1 of income earned above £100,000, the personal allowance reduces by 50p.

Correct the childcare trap

But we’re only getting started. What if you have three children all qualifying for child benefit? Well . . .

Child benefits starts to be withdrawn at £50,000, resulting in a marginal rate of 68 per cent between £50,000 and £60,000.

Unfortunately, we can make even that outcome look good if we throw in the effect of the government’s much-heralded “tax-free childcare” scheme. This entitles you to up to £2,000 per child. The catch is that it completely disappears if your earnings hit £100,000. In an astonishing flaw, a couple could each be earning £99,000 (a combined household total of £198,000) and they keep the benefit; but if one earns £100,000, even if the other earns nothing at all, they lose it.

What marginal tax rate is that? Well, if you’re claiming tax-free childcare for three children, and earn £99,999, your take-home pay is £69,884. If you earn £1 more, your take-home pay decreases to £63,942. That’s an infinite marginal tax rate, which is a slightly tricky concept to demonstrate in a chart. Instead, here’s a chart that depicts gross v net wages:

STR.CHART3

The dip at £100,000 demonstrates the drop in post-tax income, which isn’t recovered until you earn £120,000.

In practice, this means that people who can control their hours usually think very carefully before putting themselves willingly in the £50,000-£60,000 or the £100,000-£125,000 pay bracket. If they’re employed, they often make additional pension contributions, use salary sacrifice schemes, or find other ways to earn the money, but not pay tax on it. If they’re self-employed they often just stop working for the year. These are not good things for the UK economy.

And, worse still, all of these tapering effects are triggered, like the childcare flaw, by one person in a family’s income hitting the £50,000 or £100,000 thresholds. That means that the Smiths, for example, who each earn £60,000, are much better off than the Joneses, where Mrs Jones earns £120,000, and Mr Jones doesn’t work. The Smiths take home £93,000 after tax; the Joneses £75,000. There are many reasons why the Joneses may have decided that only one of them should work – it’s mystifying why the government should choose to slap an £18,000 penalty on their decision.

These inadvertent fallouts from the tax system are worth so much more than the deliberate tax policies that governments announce with much fanfare. The “marriage allowance” is worth a fairly pathetic £252 a year.

Why isn’t there outrage about this? I think in part it is because many people earning £50,000 or £100,000 feel it’s ungrateful or, worse, “un-British”, to complain about paying tax. Furthermore, people earning less don’t want to hear the complaints. But it’s not about whether people on high incomes should pay more tax — it’s about whether they should pay more tax in a fair and rational way, or in an unfair and irrational way.

Therefore, a truly reforming chancellor would declare war on marginal tax rates above 50 per cent. Jeremy Hunt can do this without giving a handout to people on high incomes as the cost can be recovered by slightly increasing the top rate of tax. The cost may be less than the Treasury historically thought, given that people are going out of their way to avoid paying these rates. And those on benefits also face ridiculously high marginal tax rates of up to 96 per cent as benefits are withdrawn, creating a perverse incentive not to work.

Here’s the challenge from a political standpoint: politicians on the right have to accept slightly higher taxes for some high earners, and politicians on the left have to accept slightly lower taxes for some others. Will they?

Stop VAT punishing small businesses for being successful

This chart should keep Jeremy Hunt up at night:

STR.CHART4

This piece of evidence shows, for a given pound of turnover/revenue, how many businesses there are in the UK at that level of turnover/revenue.

You’d expect a reasonably smooth curve, falling from a large number of small businesses on the left side to a smaller number of larger businesses on the right. However, we don’t see that at all — we observe a dramatic cliff edge right on the VAT registration threshold, which is now set at £85,000 a year (the graph shows the drop at the old cut off of £81,000). Businesses whose revenue hits the threshold suddenly have to charge VAT, meaning that — overnight — they must either raise prices or suffer a profit loss of up to 20 per cent.

This chart tells us that many businesses respond to this by suppressing their turnover so it never hits that £85,000 threshold. A cynic would say that they do this by taking cash under the table, and therefore not telling HM Revenue & Customs. But there’s recent academic evidence that the cynic is wrong: businesses are genuinely holding back their growth as they approach the £85,000 threshold. The data is compelling, but I hear plenty of first-hand stories too — plumbers going on holiday for the rest of the tax year; electricians not hiring an apprentice; coffee shops deciding not to open another branch.

As a result, there’s powerful evidence that the UK tax system has created a break on the growth of small companies, some of which might, in time, grow into large companies.

There are two uninviting possible fixes for this problem, and one acceptable but difficult one.

The first poor option is that we should increase the threshold. This would cost the Treasury a lot of income and doesn’t solve the problem, but simply moves it.

The second bad option is that, given that the UK has one of the highest VAT thresholds in the world, we should reduce it to the average, which is about £30,000. However, the sudden impact that this would have on tens of thousands of businesses would require a chancellor to be not just brave but politically suicidal.

The potentially positive — but difficult — answer is that we shouldn’t have this kind of cliff-edge threshold at all. It can be argued that the proliferation of apps and digitalisation mean that now we don’t need it. Instead of VAT suddenly coming in at 20 per cent at £85,000, what if it applied at 1 per cent at £30,000, and then slowly crept upwards, hitting 20 per cent at £140,000? We’d collect the same amount of tax, but without creating an incentive to halt growth.

Until recently, expecting anyone to operate a system like that would’ve been delusional, but the modern digital systems HMRC has put in place make it achievable. It would take years of planning, with HMRC having to provide free apps and compliance solutions to small businesses, but the challenge is less technical and more political — politicians have to sell, and voters have to accept, the idea that raising tax is necessary for growth.

Abolish council tax, business rates and stamp duty

We have three taxes on land in the UK: council tax, business rates and stamp duty, which come together to form three parts of a very broken puzzle.

Here’s a chart showing how much council tax is paid as a percentage of the value of a property:

The more expensive the property, the less significant council tax becomes. That’s not how any tax should work. And in England, council tax is based on valuations made in 1991 that bear little relation to the housing market today.

The equivalent tax for businesses is almost as bad as council tax. The most common criticism — that it’s not fair to tax retail businesses — is wrong. All the evidence shows that, in the long run, most of the economic burden of business rates falls on landlords (because rents are lower than they would be if business rates didn’t exist).

However, there are other big problems with the tax. It’s based on the “rentable value” of a property, but the rentable value is so infrequently updated that you can end up with a situation where rents have fallen and the business rates haven’t caught up (which is where we are now in many cases). A further problem is that business rates are taxed on the rental value of a property, taking into account whether it’s been improved. That’s a disincentive to invest in improving property.

The final broken piece of the puzzle is stamp duty. It’s a good rule of taxation that we shouldn’t be discouraging transactions. Yet, as everyone who buys a house knows, that’s exactly what stamp duty does. It distorts the housing market and, by punishing people for moving in search of work, distorts the labour market too.

How can we solve the land-tax puzzle? By scrapping all three broken taxes and replacing them with a land-value tax — an annual tax based on the unimproved value of land. Instead of acting as a brake on investment, it would encourage it. Moving house would become a tax-free event. The economic burden would fall on landlords, not tenants.

Land-value tax has political support from economists across the political spectrum. All we need are politicians with courage to sell the idea that if we want to repeal bad unpopular taxes, then we have to create new, better ones.

Make corporation tax simpler

From 1997 to 2017, according to the Office for National Statistics, the UK had the lowest level of investment as a proportion of GDP in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

STR.CHART6

Is tax one of the reasons behind this?

It’s trite economics that businesses do things they’re incentivised to do. The problem is that UK tax relief for investment exhibits the two deadly sins of tax policy: it’s really complicated and it changes all the time. This means that you’d have to be brave or foolish to make long-term investment plans on the strength of today’s tax-relief rules — you can’t be sure you’ll qualify, and you certainly can’t be sure the rules will be the same when your investment actually comes to fruition. This is another way of saying that the tax relief rules fail to achieve their purpose of incentivising investment.

We need a radical solution. What if we didn’t have complicated rules governing what kinds of investments get tax relief, but just gave tax relief to all investment, paid for by increasing the rate of corporate tax, so the reform was tax-neutral overall and guaranteed to remain unchanged for the length of a parliament. This would be ideally made with cross-party agreement that gives reasonable assurance for the longer term. Suddenly we’d create a powerful incentive to invest, made all the greater by the increased tax rate.

This isn’t my invention — it’s called “full expensing” and it’s supported by the Confederation of British Industry and economists across the political spectrum. But, again, we’d need politicians and voters to accept the counterintuitive truth that, to encourage growth, sometimes taxes have to go up.

Dan Neidle was head of tax at a large global law firm and now runs Tax Policy Associates.

@danneidle, taxpolicy.org.uk