Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label free market. Show all posts
Showing posts with label free market. Show all posts

Thursday, 28 May 2020

A very basic dilemma in economics

If you understand the dilemma outlined in this piece you can use it to inform your essays, micro and macro. There are no easy answers, so showing you understand that is absolutely key in any 25 mark answer:

Are we back  on the road  to serfdom?


The coronavirus crisis has led to levels of state intervention unprecedented in peace time. The Austrian School reminds us of the dangers, say Dan Greenwood and Stuart Watkins

This year marks the centenary of the publication of “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth”, an essay by Ludwig von Mises that began the so-called “socialist calculation debate”, a fundamentally important, long-standing argument among scholars of economics and politics about whether socialism is possible. 

That might sound rather arcane and indeed the debate remains barely known outside of academia and political circles of the radical left and libertarian right. Given that the debate was especially concerned with the feasibility of a global communist system that had abolished trade and money, you may wonder what relevance it can possibly have given that few advocates of socialism or social democracy these days envisage the kind of centrally planned, entirely non-market communism sought by the Bolsheviks and stringently critiqued by Mises and his fellow Austrian School economist Friedrich Hayek. A closer look at Mises’ arguments, however, reveals that they remain pertinent. In the 1945 election, Winston Churchill famously paraphrased Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom and worried about the consequences of electing a Labour government committed to socialising the economy. Today in the wake of the coronavirus crisis, which has seen a massively expanded role for the state, we would do well to remind ourselves of these arguments.

WHY SOCIALISM DOESN’T WORK

Mises and Hayek were classical liberals who believed that the state should have a strictly circumscribed role – primarily that of enforcing private property rights, supplying a minimal range of public goods, as well as minimal welfare provision only for those in most severe need – in a broader context of private ownership and free markets. Socialists and social democrats today, while not necessarily advocating full communism instead, would see the last 100 years as providing strong grounds for challenging the wisdom of this. 

Inequalities of wealth and income, severe economic crises and ecological destruction would seem to challenge the idea that such a system inevitably leads to the best of all possible worlds. The profundity of market failures and the vital importance of public goods that cannot be provided through the market alone is widely recognised, not least in the current public-health crisis. The rapidity with which the state had to step in and take control of everything from the railways to paying workers’ wages in the wake of the spread of the coronavirus would seem to have placed the Austrian case for markets under significant strain.

“THE CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM IS BASED UPON SOME DEEP AND COMPELLING ARGUMENTS” 

Yet as the economic calculation debate of 100 years ago highlighted, the case for classical liberalism is based upon some deep and compelling arguments, the force of which has been underestimated by the left. They need to be kept in mind even at a time when there is a strong imperative for state intervention and planning in the heat of a crisis.

Mises and Hayek saw their scholarly role in terms of developing ideas that would percolate through society. Their ideas, which evolved in the course of the calculation debate, did indeed pass into our everyday understanding of markets as indispensable drivers of economic efficiency and innovation. We are used to hearing these arguments rehearsed when politicians pursue the privatisation of industries, for example, or hear them deployed against those who seek nationalisation. Alongside this more familiar case for markets, the Austrians developed a stringent critique of central planning and more generally of state intervention to achieve social goals.

Perhaps the more familiar aspect of that critique has to do with incentives – that only market processes can reliably establish the incentives required for achieving economic efficiency. We can rely on entrepreneurs to solve problems for us as they are motivated to act by the prospect of profit and are spurred on to greater heights by competition. We can rely on the world’s workers getting out of bed on time if the monetary reward is sufficient. A non-market, planned economy would lack such incentives, the argument goes. 

This idea gained prominence with the rise of “public choice theory”, which assumes that political actors, like economic ones, are self-interested individuals acting rationally to maximise satisfaction. This model seemed to explain well at least some of the failures we have come to associate with government control, such as corruption and inefficiencies. Mises and Hayek, however, writing at a time of large-scale socialist movements and indeed revolution, recognised the need to avoid relying entirely upon this argument. What if people with non-monetary incentives and impeccable intentions were in charge, say? Mises and Hayek’s claim was stronger – that attempts to plan an economy without markets, however well-intentioned and motivated the planners might be, would inevitably fail due to the complexity of modern economies. 

THE KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM

As Hayek in particular emphasised, the fundamental problem for a socialist economy concerns knowledge. The highly decentralised market process of exchange and price generation captures and communicates a vast amount of dynamically changing knowledge, responding to highly complex and ever-changing demand and supply levels and reflecting the locally situated goals and decisions of individuals across society. By contrast, state planning, even at a local scale and most certainly at national and international level, necessarily involves an element of centralisation. Attempting to achieve coordination of knowledge of the kind facilitated by markets is a profound problem for non-market planning. Decision-making is more susceptible to unforeseen consequences and failures to capture important local knowledge and expert insights. Hayek’s view of the inevitable error and arbitrariness of state interventions being a road to dictatorship and serfdom may be exaggerated, as many critics have argued. But his articulation of this “epistemological” challenge raises questions of vital relevance to contemporary governance where the aim is to shape market outcomes rather than remove markets entirely. 

Hayek’s philosophical approach challenges the rationalistic presumption, evident across the political spectrum, that politicians can straightforwardly access technocratically defined solutions to social problems. Such assumptions may now be more widespread than ever, explaining, at least in part, current scepticism about politicians as they inevitably fail to deliver what they imagine and promise they can achieve. Austrian scepticism was not a postmodernist rejection of the potential for social progress, but rather a call to recognise the need for a political economy that fosters processes of knowledge discovery and innovation in the face of complexity and uncertainty.

Anthony Giddens’ famous vision of the “third way” tried to marry Hayek’s insights with social-democratic ambitions to correct for perceived market failures. New Labour’s programme aimed to put those ideas into practice, promoting state engagement with the private and third sectors in an effort to overcome Hayek’s epistemological challenge. Where markets could not solve social and economic problems of society, ways were tried to mimic market competition. Yet this entailed some new, often problematic forms of technocracy. Performance measures and targets were imposed in a range of fields, from health and education to climate-change mitigation and social care. These were, as we now appreciate all too well, far from a complete success, to say the least. As Hayek warned, performance measures established outside of the market run the risk of failing adequately to capture public value, leading to unintended consequences.

“IN ALL BUT THE MOST UNLIKELY SCENARIOS, MONEY AND MARKETS WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE”

New Labour’s performance measures created perverse incentives and led to the gaming of targets – for example, schools manipulated exam results to meet their targets; ambulance drivers delayed patients’ entry to A&E to keep within maximum waiting limits once inside; police priorities were skewed to focus on the crimes most easily solved. The response to such failings, some of which have persisted or taken new forms under the Conservatives, need not be sceptical rejection of targets as such, however, but might instead be a search for new, smarter forms of intervention – ones that appreciate and seek to respond to Hayek’s insights. 

The challenges states face today of protecting public health, promoting ecological sustainability and stabilising the climate are unprecedented. Profound inequalities remain entrenched. But just how can state capacity be improved and the failings of markets  corrected for, in the face of complexity? The Austrians’ philosophical perspective cautions us against simplistic assumptions that introducing any particular set of targets or regulations will be the answer. Fundamental threats to human life and security in the coronavirus crisis create the need for public goods, but delivering them requires a careful balancing of profoundly difficult trade-offs and uncertainties that we hear about every day, and which are not entirely measurable either by money or any other quantitative measure. Mises and Hayek are famous as advocates of free markets, but their arguments were founded on a fundamental recognition of the profound limitations of any form of decision-making, market or otherwise, in the face of the countless, continually changing array of individual priorities and economic choices across society.

AN OPEN QUESTION

None of this is to dismiss the case for state intervention in some circumstances. But the question of the most suitable forms of intervention in different contexts is best viewed as inevitably an open one. Politicians go wrong when they see their task as being to promise and then deliver pre-given solutions, rather than constructing frameworks within which socially dispersed knowledge can be discovered, captured and put to use. The Corbyn Labour party, for example, was quick to advocate specific kinds of state intervention as the solution to social problems, but reflection on the complexities involved and the dangers inherent in central planning had seemingly vanished entirely. 

Mises’ century-old challenge should spur a rethink about how states can effectively achieve goals that will not be secured by markets. Latter-day Lenins may be sad to learn that, in all but the most adventurous and unlikely scenarios, money and markets, or something very like them, will continue to play an important role. We can all gain from reflecting on the reasons why. 

Dr Dan Greenwood is Reader in Politics at the University of Westminster. His book, Effective governance: complexity, coordination and discovery, is published by Palgrave early next year

MONEYWEEK

Saturday, 19 October 2019

Contestable markets and capitalism

The streaming wars between Netflix, Apple, Amazon and HBO represent capitalism at its best

Okay, okay, I will admit most of us could probably live without Inspector Gadget 2 or The Princess Diaries available immediately and on-demand on every device we own. Even so, when Disney launches its hyped streaming service to rival Netflix early next month it will have some great content. From Star Wars to Snow White, there will be feast of fantastic programmes both classic and completely new. With Apple and HBO joining the fray as well, and with Amazon ramping up its service, streaming promises to be a battle every bit as epic as one of the fight scenes in the Game of Thrones prequel coming to HBO.
Over the next few months, there will be lots of attention on the cost of that, the stakes for the different companies, and the billions that will potentially be made or lost. But amid all the red ink that will no doubt be spilled one thing should be clear. This is capitalism at its best. We are witnessing a burst of innovation; we are seeing a new form of creativity emerge; and consumers are being subsidised by investors. Free markets don’t have many defenders at the moment. But the streaming wars will be a lesson in how they remain the most powerful way of organising an economy so it works for everyone.
Netflix was never going to have the market to itself. With 160 million paying subscribers around the world, it has proved that there is a vast demand for a pay-tv service delivered over the internet with lots of high-quality original content mixed in with a few classics. Other media and technology companies were always going to want to take a slice of that pie.
Amazon has already pumped billions into its Prime service which offers TV as an add-on to its delivery service, and that will get even better later this year when it starts showing live Premier League football. But the competition is now turning serious. Next month Disney-Plus will launch, first in the United States, and then globally, with its vast library of films and plenty of new shows.
Apple will launch its streaming service, potentially bundling it with music, and with shows featuring Jennifer Aniston (surprisingly the equivalent of a tactical nuclear weapon in the streaming wars) and Reese Witherspoon. Next year, they will be joined by HBO Max, which along with lots of new content will screen classic shows such as Friends (Jennifer again!). There will be at least five big budget streaming services to choose from.
How that plays out remains to be seen. One, two or perhaps even three might be able to operate in the market at the same time, even if it seems unlikely that all of them can find a place. Apple and Amazon’s ability to mix TV with other services might prove decisive: streaming could turn into a loss-leader for an array of other products.
Or else a completely new player might emerge that combines the best of all the different services. We will find out over the next couple of years. One thing should surely be clear, however. The streaming wars are a reminder of what a free market gets right. Here’s why.
First, it drives innovation. We are currently witnessing the greatest change in the way television is made and delivered since it first became a mass medium way back in the 1970s. The old model of advertising or licence fee funded broadcasting, organised on national lines, is dead in the water. It is being replaced by a voluntary subscription model, delivered globally. Instead of watching free British, American or German TV according to where we live, we all watch Netflix or Prime. You can go anywhere in the world and have a conversation about whether you enjoyed Stranger Things or House of Cards. You can argue about whether that is better or worse – but there is no question something completely new has been created.
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Next, it has ignited a burst of creativity. As the critics rightly point out, we are living through a golden age of television. The Crown is not quite the most expensive TV show ever made (that remains the final series of Friends – Jennifer again!) but it is very close. Roma, from Netflix, collected lots of awards, including the Oscar for best director, and Martin Scorsese’s The Irishman, released next month, presumably to detract attention from Disney-Plus, promises to be one of the films of the year.
In truth, the streaming box set is a whole new art form, somewhere between film and the novel. Some of it is rubbish. Some of it is a bit meh. But some of it is among the most exciting art being created this decade – and that is surely of significance as well.
Finally, consumers end up as the real winners. Right now, none of the streaming services makes a profit. Netflix has turned into a giant machine for taking money from Wall Street and transferring it to writers, actors and directors, and ultimately to consumers in the form of amazing programs at very, very cheap prices. Both Apple and Disney will dip into their cash reserves as they roll out their services. Sure, the plan for all those companies is to tolerate the losses for a while, and then make lots of money once they have a lock on the market. We will see. At the moment, viewers are being massively subsidised.
In the wake of a financial crash, with stagnant growth, and rising worries about inequality, free markets don’t have many defenders. Regulation, taxes and state control are back in fashion. But unfettered, sometimes brutal, always hectic, competition between companies and entrepreneurs remains a system with an unparalleled ability to drive innovation, and to provide fantastic choice at bargain prices. The streaming wars will deliver some great shows. But, more significantly, it will be a lesson in what makes free market capitalism such a powerful way of organising an economy – and that will be worth remembering as you settle down to re-watch Toy Story on Disney Plus.

Monday, 16 May 2016

Excellent Unit 3 article on monopoly vs competitive markets

63

Monopoly’s New Era


NEW YORK – For 200 years, there have been two schools of thought about what determines the distribution of income – and how the economy functions. One, emanating from Adam Smith and nineteenth-century liberal economists, focuses on competitive markets. The other, cognizant of how Smith’s brand of liberalism leads to rapid concentration of wealth and income, takes as its starting point unfettered markets’ tendency toward monopoly. It is important to understand both, because our views about government policies and existing inequalities are shaped by which of the two schools of thought one believes provides a better description of reality.

For the nineteenth-century liberals and their latter-day acolytes, because markets are competitive, individuals’ returns are related to their social contributions – their “marginal product,” in the language of economists. Capitalists are rewarded for saving rather than consuming – for their abstinence, in the words of Nassau Senior, one of my predecessors in the Drummond Professorship of Political Economy at Oxford. Differences in income were then related to their ownership of “assets” – human and financial capital. Scholars of inequality thus focused on the determinants of the distribution of assets, including how they are passed on across generations.

The second school of thought takes as its starting point “power,” including the ability to exercise monopoly control or, in labor markets, to assert authority over workers. Scholars in this area have focused on what gives rise to power, how it is maintained and strengthened, and other features that may prevent markets from being competitive. Work on exploitation arising from asymmetries of information is an important example.

In the West in the post-World War II era, the liberal school of thought has dominated. Yet, as inequality has widened and concerns about it have grown, the competitive school, viewing individual returns in terms of marginal product, has become increasingly unable to explain how the economy works. So, today, the second school of thought is ascendant.

After all, the large bonuses paid to banks’ CEOs as they led their firms to ruin and the economy to the brink of collapse are hard to reconcile with the belief that individuals’ pay has anything to do with their social contributions. Of course, historically, the oppression of large groups – slaves, women, and minorities of various types – are obvious instances where inequalities are the result of power relationships, not marginal returns.

In today’s economy, many sectors – telecoms, cable TV, digital branches from social media to Internet search, health insurance, pharmaceuticals, agro-business, and many more – cannot be understood through the lens of competition. In these sectors, what competition exists is oligopolistic, not the “pure” competition depicted in textbooks. A few sectors can be defined as “price taking”; firms are so small that they have no effect on market price. Agriculture is the clearest example, but government intervention in the sector is massive, and prices are not set primarily by market forces.

US President Barack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, led by Jason Furman, has attempted to tally the extent of the increase in market concentration and some of its implications. In most industries, according to the CEA, standard metrics show large – and in some cases, dramatic – increases in market concentration. The top ten banks’ share of the deposit market, for example, increased from about 20% to 50% in just 30 years, from 1980 to 2010.

Some of the increase in market power is the result of changes in technology and economic structure: consider network economies and the growth of locally provided service-sector industries. Some is because firms – Microsoft and drug companies are good examples – have learned better how to erect and maintain entry barriers, often assisted by conservative political forces that justify lax anti-trust enforcement and the failure to limit market power on the grounds that markets are “naturally” competitive. And some of it reflects the naked abuse and leveraging of market power through the political process: Large banks, for example, lobbied the US Congress to amend or repeal legislation separating commercial banking from other areas of finance.

The consequences are evident in the data, with inequality rising at every level, not only across individuals, but also across firms. The CEA report noted that the “90th percentile firm sees returns on investments in capital that are more than five times the median. This ratio was closer to two just a quarter of a century ago.”

Joseph Schumpeter, one of the great economists of the twentieth century, argued that one shouldn’t be worried by monopoly power: monopolies would only be temporary. There would be fierce competition for the market and this would replace competition in the market and ensure that prices remained competitive.

My own theoretical work long ago showed the flaws in Schumpeter’s analysis, and now empirical results provide strong confirmation. Today’s markets are characterized by the persistence of high monopoly profits.

The implications of this are profound. Many of the assumptions about market economies are based on acceptance of the competitive model, with marginal returns commensurate with social contributions. This view has led to hesitancy about official intervention: If markets are fundamentally efficient and fair, there is little that even the best of governments could do to improve matters. But if markets are based on exploitation, the rationale for laissez-faire disappears. Indeed, in that case, the battle against entrenched power is not only a battle for democracy; it is also a battle for efficiency and shared prosperity.