Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label public investment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label public investment. Show all posts

Friday, 16 May 2025

Supply-side/red tape but from a slightly different perspective:

 

America’s Democrats should embrace “abundance liberalism”

Two new books contain much to commend them

illustration of a large rubber stamp labeled 'U.S. GOVERNMENT' with an official seal, pressed into a cracked surface
Illustration: Álvaro Bernis
Listen to this story

Think of America as a vast economic experiment. The country left the covid-19 pandemic full of stimulus, and with a roaring stockmarket. Which places managed to channel this vigour into new companies, houses, power stations and intellectual property? And which let rents and prices surge instead?

Three years on, early results make painful reading for Democrats. Red states have comfortably outgrown blue states. The gap is particularly striking among the largest: Florida and Texas have left California and New York in the dust. In last year’s presidential election, some of the sharpest swings against Kamala Harris could be found in city centres, where the party has had its tightest political control—and free rein to put ideas into practice.

On economics as well as politics, therefore, the left must work out what has gone wrong. Two new books—“Why Nothing Works” by Marc Dunkelman of Brown University and “Abundance” by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson, a pair of journalists—suggest an answer: that excessive regulation has hurt America by blocking housebuilding, infrastructure and innovation. The books crystalise ideas that have been swirling around newspaper columns, think-tanks, city-council initiatives and social media.

Online supporters say that they are “abundance-pilled”, adopting a trope from “The Matrix” (in which the protagonist takes a pill to escape his humdrum computer-simulated existence). And the serious label for these ideas, especially in their left-leaning incarnation, is “abundance liberalism”. For his part, Mr Dunkelman argues that progressives must move away from so-called Jeffersonian instincts, which favour localism, diffuse power and plentiful vetoes, and towards Hamiltonian ones, which point to centralising power in order to get things done.

Lingering over both accounts is the spectre of Robert Moses, an all-powerful bureaucrat who from the 1920s to 1960s built the bridges, roads and tunnels that undergird modern New York, and is the subject of Robert Caro’s cutting biography, “The Power Broker”. Today’s regulatory mess began to emerge in the 1970s in large part as an immune response to the domineering methods of Moses and his imitators, who chopped through neighbourhoods with motorways, leaving urban blight behind.

Nowadays “You could have Robert Moses come back from the dead and he wouldn’t be able to do shit,” complains Michael Skelly, a businessman quoted by Mr Dunkelman. Mr Skelly spent nearly a decade attempting to connect wind farms in Oklahoma to the Tennessee Valley grid, but was unable to do so despite the support of the Obama administration. That, abundance liberals would argue, reflects a colossal overcorrection from Moses’s time. Rules offering local communities vetoes on housing and infrastructure projects have tied the hands of governments and businesses, hindering efforts to tackle America’s housing shortage, speed up its transition to green energy and build high-speed rail.

Chart: The Economist

This diagnosis suggests that the Democrats should shift onto economic terrain more commonly associated with the political right. The first change would be to switch attention from the demand-side to the supply-side of the economy. Throughout the 2010s many progressives, including Mr Klein, complained that America’s economy was understimulated after the global financial crisis of 2007-09, hurting its recovery. Support for higher spending survived into the pandemic, when the Biden administration juiced the economy, stoking inflation, and then persisted as the deficit drifted above 6% of GDP in 2023. An abundance-pilled approach would instead focus on making supply inputs, such as energy, housing, transport and skilled workers, plentiful and cheap.

The second change—shifting from a focus on redistribution to one on growth—might be more difficult. Democrats have long sought to improve the lot of the downtrodden, whether they are poor, from an ethnic minority or suffering as a consequence of deindustrialisation. Notoriously, the Biden administration saddled its signature semiconductor initiative with fiddly requirements to favour minority-, veteran- and female-owned businesses. Now California is struggling to build a high-speed rail line in part because federal funding is tied to measures to tackle air pollution in poor communities. Abundance liberals are happy to forgo these sorts of policies: economic growth must first be secured before it can be redistributed.

Power, broken

Such an agenda would make America’s liberals more liberal in the British sense of the term. But there is one place where abundance types are woollier: on how far the state, rather than the market, should orchestrate economic growth. What animates them most is reviving the government’s ability to act. Messrs Klein and Thompson agonise about how the Biden administration sabotaged its industrial policy with red tape; Mr Dunkelman marvels at how the New Deal-era government built megaprojects like the Tennessee Valley Authority, a dam network still in operation.

Anxiety about Moses-like overreach is not the only reason to be cautious about such an approach. Insulated from competitive pressure, even the best-intentioned public bureaucracies have a habit of atrophying, as, for example, NASA has done in recent decades. And there are risks, too, in relying on a centralised bureaucracy when DOGE-style destruction will only ever be one election away. Ultimately, the right balance between a market- and state-led approach will differ from case to case: high-speed rail probably does require state direction, whereas the private sector can do the heavy lifting when it comes to homebuilding. Abundance liberals are correct to focus on the supply-side of the economy. The danger is that, in doing so, they replace bureaucratic kludge with overactive government. 

Saturday, 15 February 2025

Cheer up time! AEP reckons "things can only get better":

 

Stop moaning – the economy is in better shape than it looks

Labour’s Budget was terrible – but we have more to fear from pathological doom-mongering

Rachel Reeves and Sir Keir Starmer
Britain’s economy is showing green shoots despite Rachel Reeves’s first Budget Credit: Leon Neal/Getty Images Europe

If Britain is hurtling towards a sterling crash, nobody has told the global currency markets.

The pound is today trading at the top of its post-Brexit referendum range against the euro near €1.20. It is massively overvalued against the Japanese yen. The sterling trade-weighted index is near a nine-year peak.

And if this country is insolvent and heading into the arms of the International Monetary Fund – an article of faith on the British political Right – nobody has told the debt markets either.

Credit default swaps (CDS), which measure bankruptcy risk on five-year UK debt, are a well-behaved 23 points, lower than for the US (31), France (35), Canada (40), China (55), Italy (56), Saudi Arabia (62) and Brazil (171).

Few countries are lower. These contracts strip out inflation risk, and therefore offer a quick and dirty insight into residual default risk.

The sophisticated view among hedge funds and global wealth managers is that the British economy is gradually recovering from a string of shocks – Covid, Putin’s gas squeeze, disentangling itself from the barbed wire of Brussels – and may prove to be an outperformer in the late 2020s.

The UK is more open than Europe to disruptive tech and artificial intelligence, despite much exhilarating talk from Emmanuel Macron in Paris this week. The UK is less prone to erecting regulatory and trade barriers at the slightest excuse, and is therefore likely to see a faster spurt of catch-up productivity growth.

The notion that Britain may soon need an IMF bailout akin to the sterling crisis in 1976 plays fast and loose with historical context. “It is nonsense,” said Dario Perkins, global strategist at TS Lombard.

Denis Healey was borrowing in dollars, which the Bank of England cannot print, in order to defend an indefensible exchange rate. The post-war model was disintegrating. Class war had reached fever pitch. The fiscal deficit was 10pc of GDP and inflation had just peaked at 27pc. Opec petrostates were pulling their money out of London.

“In 1976 we hit a complete crisis point. The politics were broken, the economy was broken, the UK was still hanging on to being a reserve currency,” Perkins said.

“None of that is happening today. We have a flexible exchange rate. We’re not going to have a sudden tipping point and a balance of payments crisis: we’re in a totally different world.”

Nor is this anything like the ERM crisis in 1992, when the Bank of England had to raise rates to 15pc during a deepening recession and a property crash, in order to defend sterling against the D-Mark just as the Bundesbank was on the war path over Germany’s reunification boom. Cardinal lesson: never subcontract your monetary policy to another country by pegging your currency.

This is not to forgive Labour for its awful first Budget. Slumpflation fears set off genuinely alarming moves on the markets a few weeks ago, chiefly because global investors felt duped. Strenuous efforts to soothe them ever since – and a recognition that global capital stays only where it is loved – have mended the rift.

Yields on 10-year UK bonds have dropped half a percentage point from their peak and are no longer trading at a penalty over US treasuries. Nor are they now out of alignment with the eurozone core, which “enjoys” lower structural yields only because it is a dead zone in the grip of Japanification.

The latest data on foreign direct investment from UN Trade and Development (Unctad) show that the UK was a star performer last year, capturing a 32pc rise in greenfield projects to $85bn (£69bn). Europe saw a 45pc drop in total FDI, with falls of 60pc in Germany and Poland.

The UK’s top project was Blackstone’s £10bn plan to build Europe’s biggest hyperscaler at Blyth, on the Northumberland coast. Data centres are now deemed “critical national infrastructure”, making it easier to bulldoze through planning obstructionism. The campus – Project Wind – will be powered mostly by North Sea wind turbines.

Blackstone is a hard-nosed $1.1 trillion US asset manager. It would not spend £10bn on an electricity-devouring data centre if it believed scare stories about a coming British power crisis. It is betting on the opposite outcome.

As a Conservative, my advice to the Tories is to stop wasting political capital railing against clean tech because a) it makes you look economically primitive, and b) it will come back to bite you in four years. There are genuine reasons to attack Labour, not least its levelling-down assault on British schools.

From my angle covering the world economy, the UK looks better than it does when seen from the inside. Most of the globe is in some sort of trouble. Bond and currency markets are ultimately a contest of the least ugly.

Lord Agnew, a Tory ex-Treasury minister, portrays Britain as a particular basket case, on “suicide watch”, borrowing and squandering as if there were no tomorrow.

I agree that the UK has long been living beyond its means, relying on foreign capital to cover trade and fiscal twin deficits. It has racked up a net international investment position of minus £837bn – though the US worries me more, at minus $23.6 trillion.

Nevertheless, I think our bad predicament is getting better rather than worse.

The UK’s current account deficit was 6.2pc of GDP in early 2016, evidence of insidious macroeconomic imbalances under EU membership, but also of depleting North Sea oil and gas reserves.

The structural deficit has since closed to 2.8pc. The big beast in the remaining gap is energy, biting again this week as gas prices spike to a two-year high.

But energy imports are on a descending path as electric cars and hybrids displace petrol vehicles, renewables displace gas in power plants, and heat pumps displace gas boilers in homes. The UK will eventually become a large exporter of offshore wind to Europe, regaining the position it once had as a regional energy powerhouse.

The National Institute of Economic and Social Research says the UK needs sustained public investment of 4-5pc of GDP per year to escape decline and catalyse a hi-tech economy.

Labour talked big before the election but then spent most of its £142bn in extra borrowing this parliament on pay deals for its friends. Net public investment will be just 2.4pc of GDP by 2029, better than recent history, but still below the G7 average.

It is hard to be giddy with enthusiasm but the UK has other strengths, thankfully, and the curse of paralysing Nimbyism has been lifted. The Bank of England is cutting rates. Less fiscal drag is coming from austerity.

This year may not be as bad as many fear.

If there is a major threat to the UK’s long-term prospects it comes chiefly from the un-British and feral character of our current political discourse.

We gracelessly hounded Rishi Sunak from office for sins that most cannot remember, and there seems to be a pathological urge to do much the same to Sir Keir Starmer.

We all need to lay off social media for Lent and calm down.

Tuesday, 5 November 2024

This column about the budget could have been written for your mock essay:

 

Rachel Reeves thought she was being clever: punishment has been swift

The Chancellor’s tax-and-spend Budget has paved the way for an illusory boomlet to become a very real bust

It takes a miracle of bad composition to borrow an extra £140bn and still end up with lower growth and lower real living standards by the end of this parliament than would have been the case under Tory austerity.

The International Monetary Fund may profess satisfaction at this sorry state of affairs, but the lesson of fiscal upsets from Greece to Argentina is that the IMF can be the kiss of death.

Jagjit Chadha, director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, said acidly that Rachel Reeves would do better to come up with a coherent economic plan, and do “less gallivanting around the world seeking external validation from bodies who do not really understand what is happening in Britain”.

Global bond markets thought they were going to get a Nordic-style package of muscular but disciplined public investment. Instead they get an Old Labour package of tax and spend, with a dash of green Bidenomics. The debt vigilantes are not happy.

“When they looked at it in the cold light of day, they realised that the Budget won’t do what it says on the can,” said Marc Ostwald, a bond expert at ADM.

“The taxes crush small companies and can’t catalyse growth and investment. They just raise inflation,” he said.

It is oddly reminiscent of the Truss mini-Budget. Liz Truss flagged a series of measures that were more or less tolerated by the debt markets, but then triggered revulsion by springing large surprises on Budget day, and doing so in the middle of a wider global bond sell-off.

The wild moves in gilt prices over the last two trading sessions are of a different character to the global debt sell-off that has been rumbling for the last six weeks. Yields on 10-year UK debt are no longer rising in tandem with 10-year US Treasuries, a collateral casualty of hot US data and investor bets on a Trump victory.

Borrowing costs have jumped

Line chart with 255 data points.
10-year gilts
The chart has 1 X axis displaying Time. Data ranges from 2023-10-31 00:00:00 to 2024-10-31 00:00:00.
The chart has 1 Y axis displaying %. Data ranges from 3.436 to 4.512.
Source: Bloomberg
End of interactive chart.

The intraday spike in UK yields to 4.57pc on Thursday is entirely sui generis. Sterling has fallen hard at the same time, a sure sign that these moves are more than the normal repricing of inflation risk.

There is a whiff of worry about the £300bn of debt issuance planned for this fiscal year, though not yet a worry about the integrity of UK sovereign debt itself. “It is not a Kwarteng red card, but it is a Reeves yellow card,” said Mr Ostwald.

We do not yet have the same cocktail of a crashing currency and rocketing yields, a mix that really was alarming two years ago – albeit not as existentially dangerous as supposed. The Bank of England can always backstop the gilt market with electronic money in extremis. That is the beauty of borrowing in your own currency, backed by your own sovereign lender-of-last resort.

Nevertheless, Britain has broken a cardinal rule by lifting its head above the parapet at a hazardous time, on this occasion because bond funds are starting to choke on the exorbitant volume of global debt supply.

Britain has even managed to eclipse France, which takes some doing since France is in chaos, with a phantom government, and a fiscal deficit of 6pc of GDP as far as the eye can see.

The Office for Budget Responsibility says the Chancellor’s front-loaded blast of extra day-to-day spending – 8pc over two years in real terms – will cause the economy to hit capacity constraints and overheat. The self-defeating stimulus will leak into higher inflation and higher interest rates.

Britain risks lurching from an illusory boomlet to a very real bust in three years as the Chancellor is forced to tighten fiscal policy violently to meet her “stability rule”. This sequencing has no political credibility.

If the Chancellor will not tighten at this benign point of the electoral cycle, said Ben Nabarro from Citigroup, “when plausibly might she be willing to do so?”

Like others, I feel cheated. I had genuinely hoped for an industrial strategy and a blitz of public investment that might “crowd in” three times as much private investment, lifting the economy out of its low-growth trap.

I was willing to suppress my irritation over Labour’s class-war assault on private schools, made worse by trying to dress it up as a revenue-spinner. Ditto for the ideological hit on landlords, which will snarl up the rental market. Ditto for driving wealthy non-doms into the open arms of Giorgia Meloni’s Italy. Ditto for the £22bn black lie.

I was willing to bite my tongue over an energy policy that perpetuates demand for petrol and diesel by freezing fuel duty, while at the same curtailing domestic supply by killing the North Sea industry. The result of this mix is to worsen the trade deficit, and to import more oil with a higher carbon footprint.

But now we learn that the offsetting prize is not what we hoped. Only a third of the £72bn of extra spending by 2029 will be for public investment, the turbo-charged segment with a multiplier above 1.0 that lowers the debt-to-GDP ratio in a virtuous circle.

Some extra borrowing will not be used for investment at all. It will go to pay higher wages to Labour’s union friends.

Public sector wage bill has spiralled 

Line chart with 121 data points.
Central government spending on pay
The chart has 1 X axis displaying Time. Data ranges from 2014-09-01 00:00:00 to 2024-09-01 00:00:00.
The chart has 1 Y axis displaying £bn. Data ranges from 8.89 to 17.84.
Source: ONS
End of interactive chart.

The Chancellor has public investment of around 2.5pc of GDP through the late 2020s. This is better than the fall to 1.7pc planned by Jeremy Hunt but it still leaves the UK at the lower end of the G7, and far below the OECD’s stars – Korea and the Nordics. It will not close the infrastructure gap that has built up over three decades.

Niesr said the UK needs sustained public investment of 4-5pc of GDP to escape the stagnation trap once and for all. The Chancellor snatched some extra “headroom” by tweaking the debt rule but she has kept the restrictive structure that prevents a truly radical experiment.

“The Government has widened the fiscal straitjacket rather than throwing it off. The Budget is a missed opportunity,” said the institute.

Higher public investment may pull in more private funding than the OBR assumes, and therefore propel higher growth. You can argue that an immediate splurge on the NHS is a “supply-side” measure that will raise output by clearing the backlog of the untreated sick.

But the main thrust of the Budget is to restrict supply by loading taxes and burdens on productive business. It would have been infinitely healthier to raise income taxes and be done with it.

At the end of the day, Labour is perpetuating the core pathology of the British disease: we produce too little, we save too little, and we consume too much. We have a structural current account deficit near 4pc of GDP. The UK’s net international investment position has crashed to minus £1.05 trillion.

It is the portrait of a country living far beyond its means, and borrowing from foreigners to plug the gap. Neither party has grasped the nettle over the years. Labour is certainly not doing so in this Budget. One weeps, as ever.