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“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes
Showing posts with label zombie firms. Show all posts
Showing posts with label zombie firms. Show all posts

Sunday, 8 October 2023

For those of you who like a challenge and want to understand how markets shape the economy

 As with any forecast, this may not come to pass, but (for me) the signals are very troubling; after the GFC the Queen asked "Did no one see it coming?", to which the answer was yes, some did; everyone else chose to ignore the signs:

Is Britain heading for another Black Monday?

Worrying parallels emerge between 1987’s stock market crash and 2023’s bond sell-off

Britain Black Monday

Even almost four decades later, it remains an event scarred into the memory of the financial markets. After a violent storm had ripped across the country, knocking down trees and shuttering roads, trading systems that still relied on brokers shouting at each other across open floors had closed early for the weekend as the damage was cleared up.

As London trading re-opened on Monday, after closing jitters in New York the Friday before, the reaction was swift and brutal. The FTSE-100 fell 11pc in a single session, while in the United States the Dow Jones ended the day down by a terrifying 20pc.

It became known as Black Monday, the worst single day of trading since the great stock market crash of 1929, and one that shaped policy for the rest of the decade.

As we approach October 19th, the 36th anniversary of that fateful day, could the British and global markets be heading for a replay? To many financial experts, there are already worrying parallels between the two eras.

The bond markets are crashing around the world, just as they did in the run-up to the crash of 1987. Debts have been ramped up. The equity markets are overstretched, with company values stretched to the point of breaking in many cases. A seemingly indestructible bull market is coming to an end. It is not hard to see how that could end in a gale of destruction blowing through the markets.

If it came to pass, a market crash on the scale of 1987 would prove a cataclysmic political and economic event. It would send interest rates soaring, increasing costs for mortgage holders and for highly indebted companies, especially in the property sector. Business would fail and pension funds would be hard.

Perhaps most importantly of all, the already-high cost of servicing national debts would climb even higher. It would force profligate politicians to finally face up to the consequences of their wild spending.

There is plenty about the financial markets over the last few weeks that looks very similar to the late 1980s. There is, however, an important difference. Policy makers still had fiscal room to respond to the crash of Black Monday. After two decades of easy money, and constant buffering of the markets with quantitative easing to prevent a crash, that no longer exists.

It remains to be seen whether we witness a rerun of 1987. One point is certain, however: if we do, this time around it will be far worse.

Bond market blitz

Investors are beginning to fret about a repeat of Black Monday primarily because of a sell-off in the bond market, where companies and governments issue debt and promise a guaranteed rate of return. Usually a sleepy corner of financial markets, the bond market has been gripped by a wave of selling in recent weeks.

If you want a vivid illustration of the rout in the bond markets, the place to look is Vienna. At the height of the bull market in government debt, Austria very smartly launched a 100-year bond, and then reissued it in 2020. With a coupon of just 0.85pc, investors would have to wait a whole century to get their money back, and for all that risk and patience they would get less than a 1pc return.

Amazingly, in retrospect, the issue was 16 times oversubscribed as investors scrambled to give away their money for practically nothing until long after they were dead. And today? The bond has, perhaps not very surprisingly, crashed in value. If you sell it, you will get back only 33 euros for every 100 you invested.

Why anyone wanted to lend the Austrian government money for 100 years is perhaps a question that only psychologists can answer. What is certain is that the bond market has fallen in value on a spectacular scale over the last few months. The Austrian 100-year bond is an extreme example, but the value of most of the major bonds have fallen by between 40pc and 50pc over the last year, with the losses accelerating over the last month.

The crisis is most often measured in yields – the rate of return offered by a bond, which moves inversely to price.

Yields have spiked to levels that even seasoned market professionals can barely remember. The yield on a 10-year US Treasury Bill, the key instrument that determines prices across the world, was closed to 4.9pc on Friday, a level not seen since 2007. In Britain, the government is now paying above 4.5pc on a 10-year gilt, significantly more than when Liz Truss supposedly “crashed” the economy a year ago.

The Italian government is paying close to 5pc, the highest level since 2011 when the eurozone came close to falling apart. Germany, which has had negative yields for most of the last decade, meaning investors were effectively charged a fee for lending money to the government, is now paying close to 3pc. In every major market, the cost of money is rising rapidly.

The bond market does not get the same kind of attention as equities or property. Most of us are not aware of owning any bonds, in the same way as we might own our home, or a portfolio of shares. But bonds are the crucial underpinning of the financial system, and your pension fund will certainly own lots of them, as will your bank, while your employer and of course the government will depend on the debt market for its financing.

In total, the global bond market is worth $133 trillion (£109 trillion), or rather it was when it was last properly measured in 2022. When it crashes, it has far more impact on the everyday economy than any other part of the financial system.

High interest rates are not ‘transitory’

There is no great mystery about why prices are crashing and, as a result, yields are going up. Investors are beginning to believe interest rates will remain high for longer than previously thought. As a result, they are demanding a higher rate of return on their investments. 100-year Austrian bonds that pay out 0.85pc no longer cut it.

The latest surge in government borrowing costs began with messaging from the US Federal Reserve in early September that interest rates will need to stay higher for longer.

Continued strong jobs figures in the world’s biggest economy have also stoked concerns – a tight labour market drives inflation. Bond yields lurched higher on Friday after figures showed the US economy added nearly twice as many jobs as expected in August.

Investors and economists are also concerned about high levels of government borrowing. Both Italy and France have raised their deficit forecasts over the last month, and show little willingness to bring borrowing back under control, while President Biden’s wild spending carries on regardless of the impact it might have on the economy.

In the background, the huge spike in inflation in the wake of the Covid pandemic and the war in Ukraine has proved stubbornly resistant to higher interest rates. The central bankers who only a few months ago complacently assured us that the rise in prices was merely “transitory” have started to concede that inflation has become embedded in the same way it did in the 1970s, and that rates will have to “stay higher for longer” to control that again.

We won’t be seeing rates of less than 1pc again for a long time. The result? Bonds have been massively repriced, even five or ten years out, for a world in which money is far more expensive than it has been for a generation.

Stock markets remain wildly over-stretched

So far, we have not yet seen the sell-off in the bond market feed through to equities, even though higher borrowing costs will mean lower growth potential for companies. But it may well be only a matter of time.

In a note sent to clients late last week, Barclays argued that the only way the rout in the debt market could finally stabilise would be if equities effectively crashed as well, amid a general re-pricing of financial assets.

“We believe that the eventual path to bonds’ stabilising lies through a further re-pricing of lower risk assets,” the bank’s analysts argued. “We believe stocks have substantial room to re-price lower before bonds stabilise.”

More pertinently, as the chart shows, the rise in bond yields looks very similar to the surge in borrowing costs that led up to the Black Monday crash of 1987. In the year before the crash, US bond yields had been steadily rising, following almost exactly the same trajectory as they have done over the last six months. That only ended with the massive sell-off that came in October.

In 1987, equities were not even significantly over-priced compared to their long-term averages; most share prices reflected a realistic assumption of profits, growth and value.

Now most indices, with the exception of a few dogs such as Britain’s FTSE-100, stock markets are already wildly over-stretched by any historical comparisons – meaning they have much further to fall if a crash does materialise.

There are of course plenty of signs of stress in the financial markets. The first tremors were felt here in the UK in the wake of the mini-Budget last September. The markets were unnerved by the scale of the borrowing planned by the Government. Sterling crashed and borrowing costs spiked.

The surge in bond yields triggered the LDI crisis, with pension funds over-committed to instruments that assumed bond markets would not move for years. A fire sale began and the Bank of England was in short order forced to step in and stop things spiralling out of control.

It was a vivid illustration of how issues in the bond market can spill over but perhaps will prove to be a relatively minor one in future.

There are plenty of warning signals elsewhere as well. In the US, there was a small-scale panic in the spring prompted by the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, caused at root by its over-exposure to a falling bond market. Only intervention from the Federal Reserve, in much the same way as the Bank of England had to step in over the LDI debacle, prevented that from spreading to other banks in the US, and several other regional financial institutions were hustled into mergers.

SVB
Amid nervousness about the losses Silicon Valley Bank had suffered on its bond holdings, customers rushed to get their money out CREDIT: Anadolu Agency

In Germany, there is a growing property crisis, with values falling by almost 20pc so far this year and developers starting to go bust. In China, the country’s debt-fuelled property bubble is rapidly running out of air.

If there is a crash, it will be easy for anyone to look back at all those events and conclude that the warning signs were all in plain view.

Growing global debt mountain

If the financial contagion does spread, the main casualties are not hard to work out. In the UK, we have already witnessed a steep rise in mortgage rates and some modest falls in house prices, but if there is a full blown crash it will get much worse.

It is just as bad elsewhere. In the US, the average mortgage rate has hit 7.5pc, the highest level since the millennium. House prices are falling at an annual rate of 7pc in Germany, the steepest decline in 23 years.

A market crash will be felt by companies that borrowed cheaply, and complacently assumed that rates would never rise again, especially in the private equity industry. The sector bought up huge swathes of the economy with cheap money and will have to start selling at huge losses once all that debt has to be refinanced at far higher rates.

The consultancy firm Alvarez & Marsal estimated in a report last week that $500 billion of corporate debt will have to be refinanced next year; all of those companies will find they have to pay far higher rates, putting pressure on their businesses.

But it will be felt most painfully by governments, for the simple reason that they have borrowed so much over the last decade.

In the UK, the cost of servicing our huge debt mountain has risen to £100 billion a year, double the amount only a year ago, and almost 11pc of total government spending. In France, debt costs are now the biggest single budget item, forcing the free-spending Macron government to make savings elsewhere. Interest on Italy’s debts already consumes 4pc of GDP every year and that is only going to rise as it borrows more and more simply to stay where it is.

In the US, interest payments on the national debt are forecast to rise from $475 billion last year to $1.2 trillion by the end of the decade: all President Biden’s investment in “green technologies” will have to generate huge returns to make all that borrowing look worthwhile.

In reality, all the major governments across the developed world will have to start cutting their spending, and reducing their borrowing, simply to bring their cost under control. Add it all up, and it is going to be very tough to adjust to higher rates.

What would happen if there was a financial crash as spectacular as the Black Monday collapse in 1987?

“Back then, we didn’t have a big recession in the UK, for example, until the early 1990s,” says Neil Shearing, group chief economist at Capital Economics. “This time, the UK economy is adjusting to a sustained period of rate rises which means the economy is already struggling. There will be no buffer for a shock.”

Western economies lose their lustre

There are some big differences between 1987 and 2023. The overall debt levels were far lower back then, and government debts far less burdensome. In the US, the debt to GDP ratio was just 48pc then, compared to 120pc now, and the UK was also comfortably below 50pc, compared with 100pc now. Interest rates were significantly higher and households and companies were holding significantly less debt, which gave them a lot more flexibility to cope with the crash.

Perhaps more significantly, governments had already started the hard work of making their economies more competitive. The 1987 crash came in the middle of the Reagan-Thatcher project of rebooting the Western economies, curbing the overwhelming power of the trade unions, privatising inefficient state owned monopolies, and handing power back to companies and entrepreneurs.

All of that was just starting to pay dividends, unleashing a wave of innovation and growth that enabled economies to grow even through periods of financial turbulence. That is not to say it didn’t matter. The loosening of financial policy in the wake of the Black Monday crash led to a round of inflation that arguably led to the fall of the Thatcher administration in 1990, and the defeat of Reagan’s successor Geoge HW Bush in 1992. But it also came at a time when the major developed economies were getting stronger.

That is certainly not true today. In reality, all the Western economies have been steadily enfeebled over the last fifteen years. State spending has grown exponentially, much of it paid for by printed money. Regulation has been endlessly increased. Governments have been captured by lobby groups, and corporations have fallen under the sway of ideologically driven managers committed to social values instead of innovation and growth.

The corporate raiders who disciplined bloated management hierarchies in the 1980s are a distant memory. The crash of the 1980s proved in retrospect to be little more than a punctuation mark instead of the closing of one chapter and the opening of another.

That won’t be true of the crash of 2023, if it happens. It may well mark the point at which two decades of relentless government expansion, increased welfare entitlements, and soaring debt levels, all of it financed by cheap money, starts to unravel. Governments, corporations and households will all have to start living within their means again, and growth will only be possible through greater innovation and productivity instead of through printed cash.

When we look back from the 2030s or 2040s, that may well be seen as a good thing. A collapse will force us to focus on restoring real growth. But there will be a lot of pain getting to that point. We have already seen that in the bond markets over the last few weeks – and very soon we may see it everywhere else as well.  

Wednesday, 18 May 2022

Housing crash? Opposing view:

 

Matthew Lynn author headshot

Matthew Lynn

Get set for another debt binge

Despite the fuss about rising interest rates, they’re falling in real terms. That will blow up a wild bubble

BANK CHIEF ANDREW BAILEY: DON’T BE FOOLED BY WHAT HE SAYS

It says something about how we have acclimatised to interest rates at 300-year lows that the move by the Bank of England to put rates up to a whole one percentage point was treated as a shock. On one level, of course it is. It is the highest rate we have seen since the dramatic cuts that followed the financial crash of 2008/09. In the space of just a few months the price of money has risen ten-fold, and that is a dramatic rise, at least in percentage terms. At the margins it will make a difference. Yet the really important number is the real rate; the cost of money after you allow for inflation. And that tells a different story. Inflation is already above 7%. The Bank now expects it to rise to 10% by the end of this year or early next. Right now, the real interest rate is -6%, and soon it is going to hit -9%, historically an extraordinarily low figure.

SAILING INTO UNCHARTED WATERS

This is uncharted territory. No major developed economy has ever seen real rates as deep into negative territory as that. When inflation spiked at 8% in 1992, the last time we saw a surge in inflation at the rate we are seeing it today, interest rates were at 12%, a real rate of plus 4%. Even when rates were cut close to zero in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, inflation was close to nothing as well, so the real rate hovered around -1% or -2%. In the inflationary spiral of the 1970s, inflation touched 20% in the UK, but interest rates also went as high as 16%, so the real rate remained relatively stable. A real rate of -9% is something very new.

It’s not just the Old Lady, of course. Every major central bank is engaged in a similar experiment. In the US, real interest rates are now -8% and will probably go deeper into negative territory. In the eurozone, the numbers are even more dramatic. With inflation hitting 16%, Lithuania now has negative rates of 15.9%, given that the European Central Bank still hasn’t moved to raise the cost of money. Most eurozone countries are already at -6% or -7%.

The upshot is that we should expect all the distortions that affect an economy when money is massively cheap. Such as? First, a boom in consumer credit. Individuals will borrow more to pour into property or other real asset. And why not? When the value of your debt is falling by 9% a year in real terms it will be wiped out very quickly, assuming that house prices keep up with inflation. At the same time, savings will be all but wiped out. There is no point at all in keeping cash in the bank when it is losing almost a tenth of its value by sitting there. We will see a huge expansion of credit, while the saving to finance it collapses – hardly the recipe for a healthy economy.

Second, companies will go on a borrowing spree as well, leveraging themselves to the hilt. Again, why not when money is this cheap? You can  borrow a ton of money, take over a business with stable cash flow, and then, assuming it can raise its prices in line  with inflation, you can easily pay back the price you paid from its own revenues. Given that many major British companies started out with too much debt on their balance sheet to start with, that can hardly be a positive development either.

A SHOT IN THE ARM FOR ZOMBIES

Finally, zombie companies will be kept afloat. We have lived with this problem ever since rates went down close to zero. Businesses that had no real future could stagger on because they could borrow to keep going even though they were hardly profitable. But real rates of -9% will make this problem far, far worse. In the long run, that will be a disaster for the economy.

It is easy to be fooled by quarter-point rises into thinking that rates are being tightened. That is what the Bank says it is doing, and that is what the headlines say. That is to completely mis-read what is actually happening. In truth, as inflation continues to accelerate at a far faster rate than the cost of money, in real terms rates are being cut, and dramatically so. We have a few decades of history to tell us that is only going to stoke another wild bubble in borrowing and asset prices – and with this one we don’t even know when it will end.

Sunday, 28 February 2021

Loose monetary policy & zombie companies

Japan's Well-Fed Zombie Corporations

TAGS Money and Banking

The corona crisis has intensified the discussion about the zombification of the economy; enterprises have become more dependent on government bailouts, loans, subsidies, short-time working benefits, and loans from central banks. Governments around the world claim the measures to be only temporary. Yet Japan’s experience suggests that the reliance of enterprises on public support can continue in one form or another. Japan’s enterprises have long relied on the state and more so during the corona crisis, a path that the US and Europe seem to be following.

There is no formal definition of zombie enterprises. Investopedia defines an enterprise as zombie if it earns just enough to keep operating and to service its interest but is unable to pay off the interest or to invest. An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study views a zombie as a firm that cannot cover its interest payments with profits for several years (Adalet McGowan et al. 2017)Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyab (2008) pay attention to the role of banks, which extend financing to otherwise insolvent borrowers at the expense of profitable firms. Such a lenient practice of extending loans to distressed borrowers is also referred to as forbearance lending (Sekine et al. 2003).

Seen through the lens of Adalet McGowan et al. (2017), the number of zombie firms decreases if central banks gradually lower interest rates. Yet, the number of zombie firms is supposed to increase when central banks ease financing conditions such that enterprises with weak profitability are kept alive. If the loose monetary policy is perpetuated, the efforts of enterprises to increase efficiency and innovate diminish (Leibenstein 1966). Enterprises are "evergreen" (Peek and Rosengreen 2005), while aggregate productivity gains and real growth decline. The high stock of (potentially) nonperforming loans lies with zombie banks, which survive because the government provides explicit or—through persistently loose monetary policy—implicit guarantees (Schnabl 2015).

Zombification in Japan begins with the bursting of the Japanese bubble in December 1989. In the second half of the 1980s, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) had fueled a stock and real estate bubble through sharp interest rate cuts. When the bubble burst, bad loans piled up on banks' balance sheets. The Bank of Japan cut interest rates toward zero in an attempt to insulate the economy from the ravages of bad loans. This plan had seemed to work, with outflows of Japanese cheap money toward Southeast Asia; yet the plan failed with the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, which triggered the Japanese financial crisis in 1998. The stock of (potentially) bad loans further grew.

Japan: Equity-to-Asset Ratio by Enterprise Size

Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan. The equity-to-asset ratio is defined as the equity divided by the total assets. 

The increasing leniency came from politicians. Members of the legislature from all regions of the country feared the anger of their voters in the event of bankruptcies. Because the persistently loose monetary policy kept reducing the banks' net interest revenues, the distressed banks were destabilized further (Schnabl 2020). The Japanese banks hesitated to sufficiently price default risks and to close weak companies' credit lines, because the risk of additional nonperforming loans seemed too high.

The lenient bank lending policies were supported by the government, which softened corporate lending requirements through numerous pieces of legislation. Many small and medium-sized enterprises received public loan guarantees in the course of the 1998 and 2008 crises. The Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Financing Facilitation Law in 2009, for example, gave banks the incentive to grant very generous credit facilities and extensions to small and medium-sized enterprises. Enterprises just had to submit a business plan that promised an improvement in their situations. Many loans that were actually nonperforming were reclassified as healthy loans. In 2012, further measures, such as deferrals, ensured that the credit burden of small and medium-sized enterprises at risk of default was kept bearable.

The upshot is that the brakes were put on restructuring enterprises. Economic growth was paralyzed, business expectations remained negative, and domestic sales stagnated. However, corporate profits tended to remain stable, because the Bank of Japan decreased the interest expenses of enterprises and the never-ending crisis led to restrained wage demands. The average wage increase of large enterprises through the so-called Shuntô wage negotiations remained stuck at nearly 2 percent after 1998, in contrast to 9 percent on average from 1956 to 1997. The real wage level has been decreasing since 1998 (Latsos 2019).

Despite stable corporate profits, however, Japanese companies did not invest. Sitting idle on the liquidity, they repaid loans and expanded equity (see chart). The corporate sector changed from a net borrower to a net saver. Small and medium-sized enterprises are holding their retained earnings mainly in the form of bank deposits. Large enterprises invest in the international expansion of their business activities, in particular in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as well as the establishment of foreign branches. The equity-to-asset ratio of Japanese enterprises increased, because corporate profits failed to recirculate into the Japanese real economy.

The ever-increasing equity ratios of Japanese companies can thus be seen as the outcome of subsidization by the government, by the Bank of Japan, by commercial banks, and by households (employees). Many companies are in economic distress due to the never-ending stagnation but survive thanks to comprehensive aid. The corporate sector as a whole is zombified, despite a high equity ratio, because it does not invest in market adjustments and relies on government aid and restrained wage demands by workers. As the falling wage levels since 1998 depress consumption demand, it would be irrational to invest in larger capacity. The survival of enterprises increasingly depends not on their efficiency, but on the low interest rate environment created by the Bank of Japan: enterprises need to generate just enough profits for survival and for a gradual reduction of liabilities, which turns into a gradual increase of the equity ratio—a corollary of zombification.

It is thus the Bank of Japan that can pave the way out of the zombie economy. If the Bank of Japan slowly raised the key interest rate, the government would reconsider costly lenient legislation and enterprises without a business model would have to exit the market. To remain in the market, they would have to invest in efficiency gains and innovation. The exceptionally high equity ratios would decline. The resulting productivity gains would allow for wage increases, which would strengthen consumer demand and growth. Investment would become worthwhile again, and the living dead would be reanimated. The once proud Japanese economy could rise like a phoenix from the ashes.

Authors: 

Contact Gunther Schnabl

Gunther Schnabl is a professor of international economics and economic policy in the department of economics at Leipzig University, Germany.

Tuesday, 25 September 2018

A downside of very loose monetary policy - part of the productivity puzzle

QE and its role in the Dollar shortage, zombie banks and productivity woes

Overnight there have been some intriguing releases from the BIS (Bank for International Settlements), which if you were not aware is the central bankers' central bank. The BIS has, although it would not put it like that, been reviewing some of the problems and indeed side-effects of the QE era. So what does it tell us? Well one major point links to yesterday’s post on India and indeed to the travails of Argentina and Turkey.
The second defining feature is the rise of foreign currency US dollar credit . US dollar-denominated debt securities issued by non-US residents have been the key driver of this trend, surpassing bank loans for the first time in the second half of 2017 . The overall amount of dollar credit to the non-bank sector outside the United States has climbed from 9.5% of global GDP at end-2007 to 14% in the first quarter of 2018. Since end-2016, however, the growth in dollar credit has been flat.
So the US Dollar has been used as a new form of carry trade as people and businesses choose to borrow in it on a grand scale. Also as global GDP has been growing the 14% is of a larger amount. But to me the big connection here is the way that this pretty much coincides with plenty of US Dollars being available because the US Federal Reserve was busy supplying them in return for its QE bond purchases. Correlation does not prove causation but the surge fits pretty well and then it ends not long after QE did. Or more precisely seems to have faded after the first interest-rate increase from the Fed.
Zombie Companies and Banks
This development has been brought to you be the financial world equivalent of Hammer House of Horror. All the monetary easing has allowed companies to survive that would otherwise have folded, or to put it another way, the road to what is called “creative destruction” or one of the benefits of capitalism was blocked. A major form of this was the way that banks were bailed out, and some of them continue to struggle a decade later - but also took us down other roads: For example the debt model of the Glazers' at Manchester United looked set to collapse but was then able to refinance more cheaply in the new upside down world. Ironically it was then able to thrive at least financially as in football terms things are not what they were.
The BIS has its worries in this area too.
In this special feature, we explore the rise of zombie companies and its causes and consequences. We take an international perspective that covers 14 countries and a much longer period than previous studies.
It is willing to consider that the era of lower interest-rates and bond yields which covers my whole career and some has had consequences.
A related but less explored factor is the drop in interest rates since the 1980s. The ratcheting-down in the level of interest rates after each cycle has potentially reduced the financial pressure on zombies to restructure or exit. Our results indeed suggest that lower rates tend to push up zombie shares, even after accounting for the impact of other factors.
So cutting interest-rates for an economic gain looks to have negative consequences as time passes. How might that work in practice? The emphasis below is mine
Mechanically, lower rates should reduce our measure of zombie firms as they improve ICRs by reducing interest expenses, all else equal. However, low rates can also reduce the pressure on creditors to clean up their balance sheets and encourage them to “evergreen” loans to zombies . They do so by reducing the opportunity cost of cleaning up (the return on alternative assets), cutting the funding cost of bad loans, and increasing the expected recovery rate on those loans. More generally, lower rates may create incentives for risk-taking through the risk- taking channel of monetary policy. Since zombie companies are risky debtors and investments, more risk appetite should reduce financial pressure on them.
The reason for the emphasis is that in essence that is the rationale for QE. That is something of a change on the past but as inflation as measured by consumer inflation mostly did not turn up the central banks got out their erasers and deleted that bit. It has been replaced by this sort of thing which links to the Zombie companies and banks theme.
In addition, QE can stimulate the economy by boosting a wide range of financial asset prices. ( Bank of England )
Note the use of the word can so that even the Take Two version can be erased! But the crucial point is that yet again the Zombies are on the march via central banking support. I guess most of you have already guessed the next bit.
Visual inspection suggests that the share of zombie firms is indeed negatively correlated with both bank health and interest rates.
Why are Zombies such a problem?
The have negative effects on economic life.
a higher share of zombie firms could depress productivity growth,
Could? Later we get more of a would as we see an old friend called “crowding out” return to the picture.
Zombies are less productive and may crowd out growth of more productive firms by locking resources (so-called “congestion effects”). Specifically, they depress the prices of those firms’ products, and raise their wages and their funding costs, by competing for resources.
But there is a deeper consequence.
We find that when the zombie share increases, productivity growth declines significantly, but only for the narrowly defined zombies………. The estimates indicate that when the zombie share in an economy increases by 1%, productivity growth declines by around 0.3 percentage points.
Comment
There is a fair bit to consider here. The first is the role of the BIS in this which in some ways is welcome but in others less so.  The former is an admission of some of the side-effects of easy monetary policy, but the latter is the way we are getting it a decade late. Or in the case of Japan a couple of decades or so late! To my mind intelligence also involves an element of timeliness. Although to be fair to do quantitative research you do need an evidence base. The catch as ever for the evidence in economics is the way that some many things are varying not only with each other but also with themselves over time. Or if you prefer heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity.
As to the issues they tend to be on the back burner because they are inconvenient for the establishment. The career path of economists at central banks is unlikely to be improved by research into the collateral damage of its policies, especially ones which it may not be able to reverse. At the moment both ZIRP and QE are in that category even in the US. So should the period of QT lead to the issue below rising in volume get ready for the claims that it could not have been expected and is nobody’s fault.
On that subject I note that a bank borrowed 563 million Euros from the ECB overnight which is odd with so much Euro liquidity around. Next we come to the issue of the productivity puzzle which seems likely to have a few of its pieces with zombie companies on it. The same zombie companies and especially banks that have been so enthusiastically propped up.