England dominates European football. It looks as if it will take home the trophy for economic success, too, says Matthew Lynn.
Dramatic last-minute comebacks, nail-biting penalty shoot-outs, spirit, determination and the occasional flash of sublime skill. It’s a been a great month for English football. Both the Champions and Europa League finals will be played between English teams, the first time any single country has so dominated the continent’s most popular sporting spectacle. Three of the four finalists are from London. European football is turning into an extension of English sporting rivalries.
Money isn’t everything, but it helps
Across Europe, the leading clubs have feared for some time that English clubs would come to dominate. Why? Simply because they have so much more money, and because that wealth is relatively evenly spread around the league. Six of the ten richest clubs in the world are English, and nine of the top 20, with even a relatively middle-ranking team such as West Ham close to AC Milan in annual revenues. Real Madrid might remain the richest team overall, but it is the Premier League that has the greatest overall wealth. Money doesn’t automatically buy success – just ask increasingly long-suffering Manchester United supporters – but it certainly raises the chances of it. And over the medium-term, the richest clubs are going to have the best players and the best results.
That is just an early signal of a bigger trend that will become increasingly apparent as the 2020s unfold: the UK is becoming the dominant economic power in Europe, too. Just take a look at the figures. The British population is rising steadily, while other countries are about to go into steep demographic decline. Eurostat predicts the UK population will hit 77 million by 2050, up from 67 million now. By the same year, Germany will have shrunk to 74 million from its current 80 million. France will be roughly the same. No other country will be even close to matching our growth.
How will that translate into total GDP? It is hard to say, but a few points are clear. The UK is growing faster than both Germany and France, and has been for some time now. Right now, Germany still has a slightly higher GDP per capita than the UK – $44,000 against $39,000 – but that may well close. France’s GDP per capita is already slightly lower than the UK’s. And with ageing populations, both will have far fewer working people. On current trends, the UK should become the largest economy in Europe sometime in the 2030s.
There are other signs of growing British dominance. London is by far the largest city in Europe, with nine million people. Berlin is the next closest with only three million. London is much the richest, too. Inner London has a GDP per capita of six times the EU average; Luxembourg is in second place on just 2.5 times the average. The largest national stock exchange in Europe is London’s, with more than 3,000 listed companies with a combined value of £3.7trn. Of the top ten universities in the world, three are British (Oxford, Cambridge and Imperial). The rest are all in the US – there are none in the rest of Europe. London has produced 17 tech unicorns, compared with seven for its closest rival, Berlin, while a third of all tech start-ups worth more than a billion dollars are UK-based.
It’s not just football that’s coming home
We have become used to a European economy dominated by Germany, with the UK as a middling player ranking roughly alongside France and Italy. That is starting to change. Driven by demographics, as well as an incredibly high employment ratio, the UK is on course to become Europe’s dominant economy, and London its dominant city. British companies, ideas, science, technology, entrepreneurs, think-tanks and sports teams will become increasingly influential simply because they have a much larger domestic market. Meanwhile talent will increasingly migrate toward UK cities, universities and financial centres simply because that is where the money and the prestige are. Football may be coming home. Global economic dominance may well be too, Brexit or no Brexit.
Trade deficit looks symptomatic of an unbalanced economy
oliver kamm
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Amid huge political ructions, Britain’s economy is still expanding. Latest figures show GDP growth of 0.3 per cent in the three months to February. Yet there is some evidence that stockpiling, to mitigate the risk of a no-deal Brexit, had an effect and the growth rate is appreciably slower than in the same period in 2018. Moreover, Britain’s trade balance is deteriorating. And that, on the face of it, is surprising. Whatever happens in Brexit negotiations, this is likely to be a stubborn problem for Britain’s economic prospects.
Or is it? What exactly is wrong with a trade deficit? It’s not as clear as conventional commentary, with its stress on exports as a desirable thing, makes out. It all depends on the reasons for the deficit.
Data released this week shows that Britain’s total trade deficit (goods and services) widened in the three months to February by £5.5 billion to £13.6 billion. Essentially, the goods deficit expanded by a lot and the services surplus expanded by a little. And it’s the goods part of the equation that is most significant: Britain’s goods exports fell by £1.6 billion while imports surged by £4.9 billion.
You can’t base too much on three months of data but the goods deficit is persistent and it’s intuitively surprising that imports should be so strong when the economy is merely chuntering along. There were big increases in imports of machinery and transport equipment (mainly cars) and of chemicals.
Part of this, again, is due to Brexit uncertainty. The chemicals figure includes pharmaceutical imports, which would be vulnerable to a no-deal Brexit. But the goods deficit is widening both with the European Union and non-EU countries, suggesting that it’s not likely to be reversed even under the rosiest of assumptions to do with Brexit.
It’s not inherently a problem but it may become one under certain scenarios. Though politicians and businesses often refer to a supposed need to boost exports, economists would typically see exports as a cost and imports as a benefit. Exports are what we give up in order to enjoy the benefit of expanded choice and quality. In addition, imports put competitive pressure on domestic industries in price and quality; consumers are the beneficiaries.
A widening trade deficit is a factor contributing to Britain’s longstanding current account deficit. This means that, by definition, there is a surplus on Britain’s capital account. Essentially, an inflow of capital from abroad enables British consumers to enjoy a higher standard of living than would otherwise be possible. That’s the benign way of looking at it. And a big current account surplus, such as Germany enjoys, can be a problem — it means that the surplus country can’t easily boost growth in a downturn by stimulating domestic demand. Growth will depend on the willingness of foreign consumers to carry on spending.
For all that, a deficit can be a problem. It indicates an imbalance of investment and savings: there aren’t enough domestic savings to fulfil profitable investment opportunities. The gap is filled by foreign companies buying UK assets, which will generate cash flows for their owners away from Britain. And a persistent deficit may show, as it very probably does in Britain’s case, an unbalanced economy whose growth relies excessively on consumption. When consumption relies on drawing down savings, there’s a limit to the sustainability of growth. That broadly is where Britain now is. The economy isn’t collapsing but it is unbalanced. If Brexit takes place, it won’t correct that problem. It will instead make trade more difficult with our closest partners while transplanting the problems of a deficit to our trade with other markets. Britain’s fortunes do to some extent depend on selling more goods (and services) in those markets.
Oliver Kamm is a Times leader writer and columnist. Twitter: @OliverKamm
Today brings UK credit growth especially unsecured credit growth and the Bank of England into focus so let me open with the market view on interest-rate prospects.
Interest rate swap markets have cut expectations of a quarter-point rate hike from the Bank of England by the end of 2019 to 52 percent on Wednesday, compared to a previous 64 percent expectation.
The latest leg down in market expectations of a rate hike comes after overnight political developments that has sown fresh uncertainty for the British economy in the near term. ( Reuters)
Personally I find that rather odd as I think a cut is about as likely as a rise. Indeed with slowing world economic growth in ordinary circumstances people would be looking for a cut. I can understand those who think that in a disorderly Brexit the Bank of England might be forced to raise interest-rates to defend the value of the UK Pound £. But the catch is that when the Pound fell after the EU Leave vote Governor Carney and his colleagues decided to cut rather than raise Bank Rate. So it would require a collapse in the Pound for the Bank of England to raise rates.
Money Supply and Credit
These are hot topics on two counts. Firstly slowing money supply growth proved to be a reliable indicator of weak economic growth in 2018 and secondly soaring unsecured credit growth showed vulnerabilities in the UK economic structure.
So we first observe a welcome move.
The total amount of money held by the UK private sector (broad money or M4ex) increased by £11.5 billion in December. Within this, money held by households increased £5.5 billion, significantly above the £3.2 billion average over the past six months. This increase was driven by deposits in interest-bearing instant access savings accounts. Money held by UK private non-financial corporations (PNFCs) increased £1.5 billion, in line with the recent average.
This means that the annual rate of growth has risen from 2.2% to 2.5%. This is still weak but a more hopeful sign emerges if we look at the latest three months because they show an annualised rate of growth of 4.3%.
If we switch to a lending side style analysis we see this.
Households borrowed £4.1 billion secured against property in December, slightly above the average of the previous six-months……The amount businesses’ borrowed from UK banks………. Borrowing from banks remained robust in December at £2.3 billion.
If we add in unsecured credit and the other components we see that lending growth rose to 3.7% from the recent nadir of 3.1% in September.
Unsecured Credit
Here are the numbers.
The extra amount borrowed by consumers to buy goods and services fell to £0.7 billion in December . Within this, credit card borrowing was particularly weak at only £0.1 billion, compared to an average of £0.3 billion since July. The overall consumer credit monthly flow was slightly below the £0.9 billion monthly average since July, and significantly below the average between January 2016 and June 2018 of £1.5 billion.
We need to take care with phrases like “particularly weak” as credit card borrowing has been on something of a tear in the UK meaning that at £72.2 billion it is 7.1% higher than a year ago. Perhaps Deputy Governor Dave Ramsden wrote that but as he of course described 8.3% growth as “weak” not so long ago.
The annual growth rate of consumer credit has been slowing gradually since its peak of 10.9% in November 2016, falling further to 6.6% in December.
So we have a nuanced view here which is threefold. Firstly it is welcome to see a decline in the rate of growth. A catch though is that this rate of growth is on inflated levels and is still far higher than other numbers in the UK economy at around quadruple the rate of economic growth and double wage growth. Lastly the peak of November 2016 suggests it was puffed up by the “Sledgehammer QE” and Bank Rate cut of August 2016 a subject the Bank of England would rather not discuss.
Comment
There is a fair bit to consider here but let us start with a welcome improvement in the UK money supply trajectory. I realise this is against the rhetoric we hear from elsewhere but the numbers are what they are. At a time when the world outlook is weak we need to grab every silver lining. The situation is more complex with unsecured credit because whilst the annual rate of growth is slowing some of that is due to it being on a larger amount ( £215.6 billion). Also some of it is due to a slowing of car loans as we see that sector slow due to technical reasons such as the diesel debacle. According to the UK Finance & Leasing Association car finance had 0% growth in November as falls in new car finance were offset by higher used car finance. This is at a time where we continue to pivot towards a rental/lease model as opposed to an outright purchase one.
The percentage of private new car sales financed by FLA members through the POS was 91.2% in the twelve months to November.
Let me end with some good news and a compliment for Governor Mark Carney. It comes from a disappointingly downbeat comment from Katie Martin of the Financial Times.
There’s more trade in the renminbi in London than there is in the euro vs sterling, which is weird/interesting.
Actually that is good news and confirms a conversation I had a while back with one of the managers of the Chinese state body in the City. It is an area of strength for the UK economy and I believe the Bank of England has supported this. Not all areas of banking are bad just some
Thursday, 4 January 2018
Hugely important article on Europe - may or may not be entirely valid (a lot of speculation about the future) but crammed full of useful analysis you can use in essays. Daily Telegraph 4th January:
Eurozone’s fleeting boom is an illusion - Britain won't remain the sick man of Europe for long
Brexiteers must hold their nerve. By a twist of timing, the eurozone is briefly basking in economic glory while Britain languishes in relative stagnation.
It is an illusion of the economic cycle, magnified by Europe’s elastic snap-back from a needlessly severe recession. The EMU sorpasso over recent months looks more meaningful than it really is, yet it is inevitably creating confusion and will colour Brexit talks at a crucial juncture.
We can all agree that the UK economy has long been mismanaged. It needs a radical shift from consumption to investment if it is to avoid falling further behind the US and the rising powers of Asia. But one problem that it does not face is being left behind by the eurozone in any lasting sense.
OECD analysts think the region’s economic speed limit is around 1pc. The eurozone has been able to grow at well over twice that rate in recent quarters without running into trouble only because it has had a legacy output gap to cover. The UK is far ahead in the cycle.
It has been buying €60bn (£53bn) of bonds – down to €30bn this month – pushing its balance sheet to 41pc of GDP, much further than the US Federal Reserve ever dared to go. It has bought €130bn of corporate debt in a direct intervention in the credit markets.
Fiscal austerity has given way to net stimulus. Spain, Italy and France have all been flouting EU spending rules. If this heady cocktail cannot produce a catch-up boom, nothing can.
Yet this burst of growth is ephemeral unless the eurozone uses the opportunity to grapple with its own dysfunctional pathologies – rigid labour and product markets, non-performing loans, zombie companies, warped welfare incentives – and to reestablish the currency union on workable foundations before the next crisis hits. Little of this has happened.
The IMF’s Article IV report on the eurozone for 2017 is one long indictment of structural paralysis. “Unresolved legacy problems are holding back a stronger medium-term outlook. Risks are large and policy buffers remain thin,” it said.
Poul Thomsen, the IMF’s Europe chief, says the fundamental picture is getting worse. Intra-EMU divergences are becoming more extreme. Those countries that had the poorest productivity growth at the launch of the euro are falling even further behind. “The gaps in real per capita income levels have widened rather than narrowed,” he said.
Germany’s real GDP is 14pc higher than its pre-Lehman peak, while Italy’s GDP is still 6pc below and will not recover its previous output until the “mid-2020s” – amounting to two Lost Decades. What is extraordinary is that these two countries are still trying to share a currency union, given their starkly contrasting fates, and the lack of any sign that this is will ever self-correct.
Brussels admits that the eurozone’s slump from 2008-2015 was so deep that it crossed into hysteresis, the point where "cyclical unemployment becomes structural" and causes lasting damage to job skills and economic dynamism. Hysteresis is why austerity policies become inherently self-defeating if pushed beyond the therapeutic dose. They lower trend growth rates decades ahead, making it even harder to bring debt ratios back under control.
Youth jobless rates peaked at 56pc in Spain, and are still 38pc today. The shock was so profound – and went on so long – that a whole cohort of Spanish youth went through their twenties without ever holding a durable job, with subtle macro-economic effects. Variants of this occurred in Italy, Greece, Portugal, and to some extent in France.
There have been episodic bursts of reform in southern Europe and France – usually less than advertised – but the OECD still thinks the currency bloc is so sclerotic that it will hit capacity constraints long before it has reached what would be considered full employment in Anglo-Saxon states. In economic parlance, the "Nairu" floor for unemployment is 8.8pc, exactly where the jobless rate is today. The output gap has essentially closed, and in Germany it is long past closing.
The eurozone boom therefore contains the seeds of its own demise. The stronger the recovery now, the sooner it hits the buffers, and the sooner QE will have to end. ECB board member Yves Mersch warned this week that Frankfurt must be “very careful not to act too timidly and too late, and to fall behind the curve”.
This brings Italy into uncomfortable focus. ECB has bought €319bn of Italian debt and is essentially covering the Italian budget deficit. This has compressed bond yields sufficiently to head off a debt compound spiral. It has been a life-saver but it has not restored self-sustaining viability. The public debt ratio remains stuck above 130pc of GDP, at the outer limits for a country with no sovereign currency.
Italy must refinance debt worth 17pc of GDP next year without obvious buyers. Italian banks and foreign funds have been systematic sellers, rotating the proceeds into accounts in Germany or Luxembourg in what amounts to slow capital flight.
“The end of QE does not frighten us,” says the defiant Italian finance minister Pier Carlo Padoa. Yet it will certainly frighten bondholders if it coincides with the election of a radical anti-euro government in March. The Five Star movement of Beppe Grillo leads the polls at 29pc, while the ruling Democrats are in slow collapse. Five Star is no longer calling for the restoration of the lira but its manifesto flouts the basic rules of monetary union.
Spain is in better economic shape, to the extent that it has clawed back competitiveness by slashing relative wages in an "internal devaluation". But this should not be mistaken for good health. Productivity has not recovered. “Much of the post-crisis growth has been in lower-skill, lower-productivity sectors,” said the IMF.
My guess is that bond yields in both countries will spike high enough by mid-2018 to cause heartburn, and this time Germany will be in a less accomodating mood with the anti-euro Alternative fur Deutschland commanding 94 seats in the Bundestag, and snapping at chancellor Angela Merkel’s heels.
The ECB’s policies are becoming more intolerable for Germany by the month. Negative rates are destroying the business models of the local savings banks that fund the Mittelstand backbone of the industrial economy. QE has pushed the Bundesbank’s net credits through the ECB’s internal Target2 payments system to €880bn. It is becoming a backdoor "transfer union" without democratic consent.
The economy is overheating. The IFO confidence index has reached the highest level since 1969. The Bundesbank expects 2.5pc growth next year, twice the German speed limit, describing it as “clearly above the production potential”.
“It is very clear that monetary policy is too expansionary for Germany by any rule you care to use. The lesson of the past is that the longer this momentum goes on, the more dangerous it becomes, and I see a lot of dangers,” said Professor Clemens Fuest, head of the IFO Institute.
The ECB’s Mario Draghi can push Germany only so far. If he tries to stretch QE even longer to buy time for Italy and Spain, he risks further eroding – and ultimately losing – German political consent for monetary union. Yet what Germany needs is incompatible with what the Latin bloc needs.
IMF officials fear that sooner or later one country will be hit by an asymmetric shock, revealing the EMU system is as unworkable as ever
IMF officials fear that sooner or later one country (Italy) or region will be hit by an asymmetric shock, revealing that the EMU system is as unworkable as ever. There is still no fiscal union, and Germany is unlikely to offer Mr Macron much beyond the symbolism of a eurozone finance minister with no budget. The banking union lacks the genuine backstop needed to avert a repeat of sovereign/bank "doom-loop" that almost engulfed EMU in 2012.
Such a brutal denouement is a story for the next global downturn, not a looming threat for this year. What is likely to become clear in 2018, however, is that boom conditions are much harder to handle than the sluggish Goldilocks growth of early recovery. Deep rifts within monetary union are becoming visible again. The removal of the ECB shield may prove very painful for high debtors.
So if you think Britain looks like the crisis child of Europe right now, just wait a few months. Rivals abound.
This short piece comes from the Woodford Fund. It provides some clarity on three important areas; consider the charts, and how you might incorporate this information into an essay:
UK ECONOMY – DEFIANT GROWTH
Mitchell Fraser-Jones, 20 September 2017
Much has been written over the summer about the consumer debt burden and its
implications for future monetary policy and growth. We are less concerned about this, partly
as a result of the low interest rate environment which we expect to prevail for some time.
The recent inflation data, and the Bank of England’s response to it, don’t change this view.
Clearly, the probability of an interest rate increase in the near future has increased but this
does not, in our view, herald the start of meaningfully tighter monetary policy. Indeed, the
stronger pound that has greeted the recent policy rhetoric, ironically does much to counter
the inflationary forces that prompted the talk of rate hikes in the first place.
We believe consumer debt levels are manageable in the context of household incomes.
Furthermore, as the chart below illustrates, it is evident that the growth in debt that we have
been seeing over the last eighteen months hasn’t really been the result of a pick-up in
consumer borrowing – it is corporate borrowers that have been taking advantage of the
renewed appetite for lending in the UK banking sector.
And, in the context of recent history, although the rate of debt growth has increased as the
banking sector has rehabilitated itself, it remains modest compared to the rates of growth
seen in the early years of the new millennium. Further evidence, as far as we’re concerned,
to suggest that worries about consumer debt are overdone.
Meanwhile, recent revisions to the way that the UK’s household savings ratio is calculated
should also diminish the level of these concerns. Figures released by the Office for National
Statistics last month suggest that UK household savings have been running at 8-10% in
recent years, compared to previous estimates which fell to c. 5% last year. Admittedly, the UK savings ratio has still been on a downward trend, as one might expect in a period when the value of other parts of the balance sheet, such as equities and, most households’ primary asset, the house itself, has been rising. The pace of the decline in savings, however, has been much less sharp than previously estimated.
Overall, official data confirms that the UK economy has remained resilient in 2017, despite predictions that the Brexit negotiations would precipitate a collapse in activity. That never seemed likely to us, and the data, thus far, is supportive of our view. Indeed, recent data, including today’s better-than-expected retail sales numbers, suggest a modest improvement in economic activity in recent months which, alongside renewed growth in money supply, bodes well for UK GDP growth in the second half of 2017 and beyond. We remain positive on the outlook for the UK economy – much more positive than the gloomy prognosis implied by market valuations – and that is reflected in our long-term investment strategy. The evidence that the UK economy is in better shape than many have expected, continues to mount…
Actually the commentary is by one of my favourite bloggers, pulling apart the numbers and Mark Carney's comments. He isn't the best writer, but a) he went to the LSE, and b) he identifies the key problems. His blog is notayesmanseconomics, and I recommend you take a look at it from time to time:
Posted on
Today is a day with plenty of UK economic news and it has started positively with the BDO Retail Sales tracker being publicly released.
consumer spending rebounded in September with sales recording a year-on-year uplift of 2.8% – the best figures for the month of September since 2012,
In terms of a break down then we are told that the drivers of this growth were as follows.
Lifestyle saw an impressive rise of +5.4%, largely caused by an uplift in spending of giftware and stationery items
Although one area of this may fade in England but not Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland.
Some retailers indicated the Rugby World Cup had helped to boost sales.
Some caution is required as the numbers for last month on this series were dire but it does seem to provide an impression of the direction of travel if not the size of the move. So we have an upwards hint for the official retail sales numbers.
Mark Carney
He has been speaking overnight at the International Monetary Fun meeting in Lima. Presumably embarrassed by the continual failure of his Forward Guidance on Bank Rate he decided to indulge in yet more Open Mouth Operations. From Reuters.
“The exact timing of the Fed move is not decisive for the timing of the move by the Bank of England,” Carney said in a seminar at the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund.
He went so far as to point out this.
Carney made the point that in the five rate cycles since Britain adopted inflation targeting, the Bank of England moved before the Fed in two of them.
That is a bit like when a football commentator tells you about results been clubs from 20 years ago when some of the players had not even been born! Of course Mark Carney has the problem of his promises back in June 2014 which were plainly designed to make investors think an interest-rate rise was on its way. This compares starkly with yesterday’s vote of 8-1 against with him being one of those against. Still he thought he would recycle his lines one more time.
“Anybody who states with certainty the timing, is not right, because there are tactical considerations around the timing.”
Actually the main person who has been trying to hint at the timing has been him. After all the crying wolf efforts he finds that markets listen to him now with the Who on in the background.
Then I’ll get on my knees and pray We don’t get fooled again Don’t get fooled again No, no!
Oh and for a man representing an institution which has been badly damaged itself by the Foreign Exchange and Li(e)bor scandals as well as its missed inflation targets this was really from an alternate universe.
FIFA “is a four-letter word,” Carney jokingly told a panel in Lima with IMF head Christine Lagarde and Brazilian Finance Minister Joaquim Levy. “Ultimately it is about accountability to global citizens,” he said. “It’s a pretty mild criticism to say FIFA lost sight of that.”
It’s all about the trade
It was nice of the Office for National Statistics to set the background in today’s release.
In volume terms (chained volume measure) the UK has been running a consistent trade deficit (as a percentage of GDP) since quarter 1 (January to March) 1998.
However the Bank of England chose in its latest meeting Minutes to put a positive spin on all of this.
The revised estimates had shown a smaller current account deficit over the past year. In 2015 Q2, it was estimated to have been 3.6% of nominal GDP, after a peak of 6.3% in 2014 Q4. In the previous vintage of data, the deficit had peaked at 7.1% in 2014 Q3, and had improved only modestly since then.
Actually the numbers are still poor just less poor than they were so let us examine the reason for it.
Around 40 per cent of the improvement over the past six months was a consequence of an increase in the primary income balance………A narrowing in the trade deficit, to 0.7%, had accounted for a further half of the narrowing of the current account deficit since its peak last year.
Okay so the Bank of England welcomes an improvement so in the era of Forward Guidance what happens next?
In the 3-months to August 2015, the trade in goods deficit widened by £1.8 billion to £31.4 billion. Exports decreased by £1.5 billion to £72.4 billion and imports increased by £0.3 billion to £103.8 billion over the same period…… In the 3-months to August 2015, the UK’s deficit on trade in goods and services was estimated to have been £8.1 billion; widening by £1.3 billion when compared with the 3-months to May 2015.
Sadly the more recent position is in fact even worse than that as June had for once virtually no deficit at least by UK standards at £400 million but you get the idea that it was followed by July at £4.4 billion and August at £3.3 billion. So the last two months have been a return to a much worse trend. Should this continue then it will be a drag on UK GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as one of the reasons for the better number in the second quarter was the improved trade performance which looks as though it has faded away.
Imputed Rent
I feel a bit like Brian “class of one” Clough when I venture into this area as elsewhere it barely merits a mention but it has now popped up in the trade figures under “Withdrawal of income from quasi-corporations (cross border-property income)”. Hardly friendly is it? So sorry about that but the numbers published make even less sense than usual.
The impact increases gradually over time with an upward revision to exports of services of £0.5 billion and £3.5 billion in 2014, leading to a reduction in the trade in services surplus by approximately £3.0 billion.
I have pointed out to the ONS that this only makes sense if the £3.5 billion is an upwards revision to imports. There was a time when £3 billion was a lot of money but this is another downside to the UK property boom.
Construction Output
Let me analyse this in the style of the Bank of England Minutes. “On the one hand” it is going rather well. From Markit:
Construction firms enjoyed a strong finish to the third quarter of 2015, as a sustained rebound in new development projects continued to have an impact on the ground.
Meanwhile “On the other hand” it isn’t. From the UK ONS.
In August 2015, output in the construction industry was estimated to have decreased by 4.3% compared with July 2015 and decreased by 1.3% compared with August 2014. This was the first year-on-year fall since May 2013.
The former includes September but it was very positive for August too.
As it would have been the 75th birthday of John Lennon then let me use his words as a summary of how we are left.
Help me, get my feet back on the ground Won’t you please, please help me, help me, help me, ooh
Comment
Things are not going so well for Mark Carney’s Flying Circus are they? Somehow or the other he feels the need to keep the illusion going that he and his colleagues will raise Bank Rate. Today’s official numbers have headed in the opposite direction with us having 2 months of poor current account numbers and the official construction numbers falling. Of course there was a time that we would raise interest-rates in response to poor trade figures (and indeed a house price/rent boom) but such thoughts have long since been erased and redacted from the minds of modern central bankers.
Also my theme of official data being unreliable has had a good day. No sooner had the Bank of England become a cheerleader for the UK trade figures the numbers got worse again! The song lasted a lot longer! The downwards revision to services by £3 billion for 2014 makes you think to say the least especially as it comes via Imputed Rent which usually boosts GDP.
I am glad that I wrote to the Professor Sir Charlie Bean UK Economic Statistics Review about our services trade numbers.
As to the official construction series well I think I will stick to counting cranes in Nine Elms.
National income measures the monetary
value of the flow of output of goods and services produced in an economy
over a period of time.
Measuring the level and rate of growth of national
income (Y) is important for seeing:
The
rate of economic growth
Changes
to average living standards
Changes
to the distribution of income between groups within the population
Gross Domestic Product
Gross
domestic product (GDP) is the total value of output in an economy
GDP
includes the output of foreign owned businesses that are located in a
nation following foreign direct investment. For example, the output
produced at the Nissan car plant on Tyne and Wear contributes to the UK’s GDP
There are three ways of calculating GDP - all of
which should sum to the same amount:
National Output = National Expenditure (Aggregate
Demand) = National Income
(i) The Expenditure Method - aggregate demand (AD)
The full equation for GDP using this approach is GDP
= C + I + G + (X-M) where C: Household spending I:Capital Investment spending G: Government spending X:Exports of Goods and Services M: Imports of Goods and Services
The Income Method – adding together factor incomes
GDP is the sum of the incomes earned through the
production of goods and services. This is:
Income from people in jobs and in self-employment
+
Profits of private sector businesses
+
Rent income from the ownership of land
=
Gross Domestic product (by factor incomes)
Only those incomes that are come from the
production of goods and services are included in the calculation of GDP by the
income approach. We exclude:
Transfer
payments e.g. the state pension; income support for families on low
incomes; the Jobseekers’ Allowance for the unemployed and other welfare
assistance such housing benefit
Private
transfers of money from one individual to another
Income
not registered with the tax authorities Every
year, billions of pounds worth of activity is not declared to the tax
authorities. This is known as the shadow economy.
Published
figures for GDP by factor incomes will be inaccurate because much activity
is not officially recorded – including subsistence farming and barter
transactions
Value Added and Contributions to a nation’s GDP
There
are three main wealth-generating sectors of the economy – manufacturing
and construction, primary (including oil & gas, farming, forestry
& fishing) and a wide range of service-sector industries.
This
measure of GDP adds together the value of output produced by each
of the productive sectors in the economy using the concept of value
added. .
Value added is the increase in the value of
goods or services as a result of the production process
Value added = value of production - value of
intermediate goods
Say you buy a pizza from Dominos at a price of £9.99. This is the retail
price and will count as consumption. The pizza has many ingredients
at different stages of the supply chain – for example tomato growers,
dough, mushroom farmers and also the value created by Dominos as they put the
pizza together and deliver to the consumer.
Some products have a low value-added, for example
cheap t-shirts that you might find in a supermarket for little more than £5.
These are low cost, high volume, low-priced products.
Other goods and services are such that lots of
value can be added as we move from sourcing the raw materials through to the
final product. Examples include designer jewellery, perfumes, meals in
expensive restaurants and sports cars. And also the increasingly lucrative
computer games industry.
GDP by output – the distribution of GDP from
different industries
The UK is an economy where the majority of GDP
comes from the service industries such as banking and finance, tourism,
retailing, education and health. In 2008 less than half of one per cent of our
GDP came from agriculture. Manufacturing accounted for less than 15 per cent of
GDP and construction a further 6 per cent. In contrast, the service industries
now contribute nearly three quarters of national income.
Manufacturing and service industries are not
separate! For example the health of a car exporting business will have a direct
bearing on demand, output, profits and jobs in many service businesses such as transportation,
design, marketing and vehicle retailing. Equally service businesses such as
online banking require plenty of physical inputs such as machinery and infrastructure to be successful.
The main service sector industries in the UK
are:
Hotels
and restaurants, and a range of services provided by local government
Transport,
logistics, storage and communication
Business
services and finance, motor trade, wholesale trades and retail trade
Land
transport and air transport, post and telecommunications
Real
estate activities, computer and related activities, Education, Health and
social work
Sewage
and refuse disposal
Recreational,
cultural and sporting activities
The Share of National Output (GDP) for the UK
Economy
Notice in the chart above how there are long-term
shifts in the value added from the three main sectors – the pattern of GDP
depends on many factors including the stage of a country’s development and the
extent to which a nation has built up industries of competitive advantage in
the world economy.
Gross National Income (GNI)
Gross
National Income (GNI) measures the final value of incomes flowing to UK owned
factors of production whether they are located in the UK or overseas.
Gross
Domestic Income is concerned only with the incomes generated within the
geographical boundaries of the country. Fr example the value of the output
produced by Toyota in the UK counts towards our GDP but some of the
profits made by overseas companies with production plants here in the UK
are sent back to their country of origin – adding to their GNP.
GNI = GDP + Net property income from abroad (NPIA)
NPIA is the
net balance of interest, profits and dividends (IPD) coming into
the UK from our assets owned overseas matched against the flow of profits
and other income from foreign owned assets located within the UK.
There
has been an increasing flow of direct investment (FDI) into and out of the
UK. Many foreign firms have set up production plants here whilst UK firms
have become multinational organisations.
Nominal and Real - Measuring Real National Income
When we
want to measure growth in the economy we have to adjust for the effects
of inflation
Real
GDP measures the volume of output. An increase in real output
means that AD has risen faster than the rate of inflation and therefore
the economy is experiencing positive growth. Consider this example
The money value of a country’s GDP is calculated to
be $4,000m in 2007
In 2008, the money value of GDP expands to $4,500m
but during the year, inflation is 3% causing the general index of prices to
rise from a 2007 base year value of 100 to 103 in 2008.
The real value of GDP in 2008 is calculated thus:
Real GDP = money value of GDP in 2008 x 100 /
general price index in 2008
= £4,500 x 100/103 = $4,369 (measured at constant
2007 prices)
Note here that the real GDP data is expressed at
constant priceswhich mean that we have made an inflation
adjustment. Look for this in the data response questions in the exam.
Total and Per Capita – Measuring Income per capita
How much does each person earn on average? We use
per capita measures to give us a guide to this. Income per capita is a
way of measuring the standard of living for the
inhabitants of a country.
Gross National Income per capita = Gross National
Income / Total Population
Our next chart shows two pieces of economic data
The
level of UK gross national income (GNI) which has been expressed in real
terms (i.e. it is inflation adjusted) and is measured in pounds sterling
The
annual rate of change of real gross national income measured in percentage
terms
The chart shows that real incomes per head of the
population have risen over the years, i.e. average living standards have
improved but that the rate of improvement is not uniform each year. We see that
economic growth in the UK fluctuates from year to year, i.e. there is an
economic cycle with periodic recessions (where the value of real national
income declines.)
Real Gross National Income for the UK Economy – During the recession (2008 to 2009) GDP per head decreased by 5.5 per cent
Remittances and Gross National Income
Remittances are transfers of money across
national boundaries by migrant workers. Despite a dip because of the global
recession, remittance flows have grown in the world economy over the
longer-term as the scale of migration between countries has grown. For many
developing countries, money coming in from remittances is an importance source
of income.
Using data from the World Bank, for the world as a whole in 2010:
Stock
of immigrants: 215.8 million or 3.2 percent of population
Females
as percentage of immigrants: 48.4 percent
Refugees:
16.3 million or 7.6 percent of the total immigrants
Top 10 remittance recipients in 2010 (billions):
India ($55.0bn), China ($51.0bn), Mexico ($22.6bn), Philippines ($21.3bn),
France ($15.9bn), Germany ($11.6bn), Bangladesh ($11.1bn), Belgium ($10.4bn), Spain
($10.2bn), Nigeria ($10.0bn)
Top 10 remittance recipients in 2009 (percentage of
GDP): Tajikistan (35.1 percent), Tonga (27.7 percent), Lesotho (24.8 percent),
Moldova (23.1 percent), Nepal (22.9 percent), Lebanon (22.4 percent), Samoa
(22.3 percent), Honduras (19.3 percent), Guyana (17.3 percent), and El Salvador
(15.7 percent)