Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes

Sunday, 17 January 2016

LSE lecture on the banking system

The Chicago Plan (1930s): "Those guys knew far more about banking than we do today..."



Sunday, 10 January 2016

Something different - Political Economy (the best kind)

The China Narrative That Really Matters by Ben Hunt, Salient Partners

I’m a China bull, let’s get that out of the way first. But like anything connected with the global industrial and commodity complex today, from Emerging Markets to MLPs to oil prices, it doesn’t matter what the Truth with a capital T might be regarding the real world economic or business fundamentals. The story is broken. The stocks are broken.
I’ve written a lot here in Epsilon Theory about what’s happening in China and what it means for the China growth story to break.
Most directly on the topic, read “When the Story Breaks“. It’s a quick read and introduces an Epsilon Theory perspective for how to think about China.
Most recently on the topic, and why the Chinese currency devaluation kicks US equity markets right in the teeth, read “Storm Warning“.
Most fundamentally on the topic, and why the Chinese currency devaluation is an existential issue for the Beijing regime, read “The Dude Abides: China in the Golden Age of Central Bankers”.
There are other notes on China if you’re so inclined, including: “The Donkey of Guizhou“, “Rosebud“, and “The Power of Why, Exhibit 4,512 in a Continuing Series“.
For a related note on the overall Emerging Market story, read “It Was Barzini All Along“. For an Epsilon Theory perspective on oil prices, read “The Unbearable Over-Determination of Oil“.
Now most stories heal themselves over time, and the China growth story is no exception. Or rather, over time these broken stories evolve into a market-supportive story, for example from a growth story into a value story. You see this in market narratives all the time.
But there’s one aspect of the China story that can’t heal itself or transform into something more benign from a market perspective, and that’s the Narrative of Chinese Government Competence. To quote myself in “When the Story Breaks”:
“This is a completely different Narrative than the growth story, and it’s the story that one-party States rely on to prevent even the thought of a viable political opposition. In highly authoritarian one-party nations – like Saddam’s Iraq or the Shah’s Iran – you’ll typically see the competence Narrative focused on the omnipresent secret police apparatus. In less authoritarian one-party nations – like Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore or Deng Xiaoping’s China – the competence Narrative is more often based on delivering positive economic outcomes to a wide swath of citizens (not that these regimes are a slouch in the secret police department, of course). From a political perspective, this competence Narrative is THE source of legitimacy and stability for a one-party State. In a multi-party system, you can vote the incompetents (or far more likely, the perceived incompetents) out of office and replace them peacefully with another regime. That’s not an option in a one-party State, and if the competency story breaks the result is always a very dicey and usually a violent power transition.”
So when I read an article this morning in a famous media outlet owned by famously Beijing-friendly Rupert Murdoch that “the impression left on investors is that Chinese authorities are out of their depth” and that “certainly with respect to the stock market, their reputation for incompetence is well-earned”, I get nervous. 
I get nervous because the next move in China is going to be a political move, and political moves are never well anticipated by markets. The Beijing regime is going to take steps to defend itself, or at least insulate itself, from the growing Narrative that they are incompetent. Heads will roll. Literally, in all likelihood. But the incompetence genie is very hard to stuff back into the bottle, and depending on whose head is on the chopping block, regime stability can deteriorate very quickly. Now that’s what will make me change my bullish stance on China fundamentals, and that’s what will make the US market swoon of last August look like a gentle spring rain.
From an Epsilon Theory perspective, a collapse in the Narrative of Chinese Government Competence is the biggest systemic risk out there right now, and that’s where I’m focusing my risk antennae.

Gosh, lots on exchange rates:

China FX Reserves – The foreign currency reserves of China declined by $107.9 billion to $3.33 trillion, the biggest monthly drop ever recorded—which was primarily driven by increasing concerns regarding the country’s slowing economy.
For the full year 2015, China’s foreign currency reserves fell $512.66 billion, the biggest annual decline on record, according to central bank data on Thursday. Since May, the country’s foreign currency reserves fell every month except one.
Based on the data, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) is spending large amounts of dollars to support the yuan amid the slowing economic growth, the market selloff as well as the start of higher interest rates in the United States.
On Thursday, the yuan slid to a five-year low as the central bank reduced its reference rate to a weak level. Last month, China created a yuan index composed of 13 currencies and stated that the performance of the yuan should not be weighed only against the dollar.
FX reserves China FX Reserves
China FX Reserves

China is becoming an exporter of capital

Oliver Barron, head of research at North Square Blue Oak, an investment bank, said, “It certainly confirms the end of an era. What we’ve been seeing is China now becoming an exporter of capital.”
Chen Xingdong, the chief China economist at BNP Paribas, said, “It’s inevitable: The PBOC is intervening, there are a lot of capital outflows, and the yuan is facing larger depreciation pressure. The PBOC now wants to maintain stability in the yuan index and not versus the U.S. dollar.
Wang Tao, chief China economist at UBS Group in Hong Kong, commented that the Chinese government will “allow more depreciation, use reserves and tighter controls on cross-border capital outflows.”
Wang believes that the yuan will depreciate further against the dollar this year. She estimated that the country’s foreign currency reserve would decline to $3 trillion.

China FX Reserves – Preventing losses in foreign-exchange reserves will be difficult for PBOC

Nathan Chow, an economist at DBS Group Holdings in Hong Kong, noted that Chinese authorities were worried about the country’s economy based on the extent of the reduction of the central bank’s reference rate this week. China’s economy is being challenged by increasing downward pressure.
According to Chen, the long-term trend has not changed considering the weak fundamentals—the yuan will weaken, and capital will leave China.
On the other hand, Zhao Yang, the Hong-Kong-based chief China economist at Nomura Holdings suggested that it would be difficult for the PBOC to stop the losses in foreign-exchange losses when there are capital outflows.
He explained that China suffered a significant decline in foreign currency reserves because the PBOC didn’t want the yuan to depreciate too fast. According to him, the central bank needs a large-scale intervention in the spot market to support the yuan.

China’s gold reserves

The central bank’s data showed that China’s gold reserves have a value of around $60.19 billion by the end of December, up from $59.52 billion in the previous month. The country has 56.66 million fine troy ounces of gold by the end of December, up from 56.05 million in November.
The country’s International Monetary Fund (IMF) reserve position fell from $4.60 billion to $4.55 billion. China held $10.28 billion of IMF Special Drawing Rights in December compared with $10.18 billion in the previous month.

Forex and China - worth reading with Saudi in mind

For stock markets, it’s been a grim start to the year, and it may be that things will get grimmer still before getting better. Everything rests on China, which is engaged in a herculean battle to defend its currency, the renminbi, against a veritable flood of capital outflows. 
For those of us who spent the best part of a decade railing against the iniquities of Chinese reserve accumulation – designed to keep the currency from appreciating and by that means bolster the competitiveness of Chinese goods – this is a somewhat ironic turn of events. 
Well, things have changed, and there is no doubt that it will be very bad for everyone should the renminbi go into free fall, setting off a further round of destabilising competitive devaluation in the region and adding to the already powerful deflationary forces coming out of China. 
You may wonder why these Far Eastern traumas matter to Britain, less than 6pc of whose exports go to China. You may also wonder why we are worrying about defence of the Chinese currency at all when China still has $3.33 trillion (£2.3 trillion) of foreign exchange reserves to throw at the problem. 
The fire power the Bank of England had to play with back in 1992, when it unsuccessfully attempted to defend the pound against speculative attack from the likes of George Soros, looks like a mere pea-shooter against China’s big bazooka. 
Yet the fact is that the Chinese are burning through their reserves at frightening speed. It would only take three or four more months of this before China’s once mighty arsenal looks less than adequate for such a large economy. In the meantime, the foreign exchange reserve sell-off is having a similar effect to a monetary tightening, which is just what the fast slowing Chinese economy doesn’t need right now. 
China is caught between a rock and a hard place. It risks triggering a dollar debt crisis across the region if it allows the currency to fall, but it further accelerates the economic slowdown by attempting to counter it. 
Faith in China’s ability to keep growing at a supercharged rate has always rested on the entirely bogus assumption that because China is a command economy, it can in some way defy the usual laws of economics. Looking at the regime’s incompetent series of policy miscalculations the past year, you would be hard pressed to sustain this view.

Economic shocks, currency wars - good context:

Saudis told to prop up currency amid global devaluation war fears 

Investors are betting the kingdom's dollar peg will soon collapse, but oil giant should deploy the full force of firepower to protect riyal, say World Bank

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Saudis have vowed to defend the peg in the face of dwindling oil revenues Photo: 2015 Getty Images
Saudi Arabia should use its massive foreign exchange reserves to defend the riyal, amid fears the world is descending into a new phase of global currency wars, the World Bank has said. 
The kingdom’s shaky currency peg with the dollar has come under record pressure this week as the price of oil has plummeted to near 12-year lows at $32-a-barrel. 
With the global stock markets in turmoil, analysts fear a Saudi devaluation could spark a new wave of deflation and competitive “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies in a fragile global economy. 
But the world’s largest producer of Brent crude should continue to defend its exchange rate by drawing down on its war chest of reserves, according to Franziksa Ohnsorge, lead economist at the World Bank. 
“For now they have large reserves, and reserves can be used during an adjustment period”, Ms Ohnsorge told The Telegraph. 
Oil accounts for more than three-quarters of Saudi Arabia’s government revenues. But a record supply glut has led to the kingdom burning through its reserves at a record pace in order to defend its 30-year-old exchange rate regime. 
Central bank reserves have dropped from a peak of $735bn to around $635bn this year - a pace of spending which will exhaust the kingdom’s fiscal buffers within five years, Bank of America Merrill Lynch calculate. 
A fresh round of conflict with rivals Iran and a sustained low oil price world would reduce this cushion substantially, said David Hauner at BaML. 
The monarchy has vowed to stick by the exchange regime and is instead planning to strengthen its coffers through the unprecedented flotation of its state-owned oil giant, Aramco.
Concerns about the Saudi peg come as fears that China was engineering on its own covert currency devaluation rippled through global markets this week. 
The S&P 500 endured its worst start to a year since 1928, while European equities suffered their biggest opening year losses for over 45 years. More than £85bn was also wiped off the FTSE 100 in a torrid start to 2016 trading. 
Just as the US and European phases of the financial crisis were eventually curtailed by currency devaluation, the fear is that China might need to do the same 
Goldman Sachs 
Investment bank Goldman Sachs has warned Beijing may soon abandon its support for the renminbi and engineer a full-blown devaluation. 
“Just as the US and European phases of the financial crisis were eventually curtailed by currency devaluation and quantitative easing, the fear is that emerging market economies and even China might need to do the same”, said Peter Oppenheimer at Goldman. 
Faced with declining revenues, the Saudi monarchy has been forced to unveil a radical programme of government austerity to compensate for the 70pc decline in Brent prices over the last 18 months. 
Markets are now betting the kingdom will have to abandon its exchange rate regime - which has fixed the riyal at 3.75 to the dollar since 1986. 
Forward contracts for the riyal have soared to their highest levels in nearly 20 years [NB the number of riyals to the $ is soaring, the riyal is weakening - JB] - a sign that investors no longer believe in the viability of the peg. 
However, Ms Ohnsorge said plans for fiscal consolidation gave the kingdom room to carry on defending the riyal in order to limit the pain on its oil-reliant economy. 
“Saudi Arabia can smooth the adjustment to a future of lower commodity prices, which by our estimates will be low for a long time” said Ms Ohnsorge. 
  Photo: Bank of American Merrill Lynch
The World Bank expects global commodity prices will not return to their post-financial crisis peaks until the next decade, while oil will average around $49-per-barrel in 2016. 
Currency pegs allows nations to keep inflation and export prices stable. But the commodities crash has already swept away currency controls in Kazakhstan and Russia who have both abandoned their exchange rate pegs in recent months. 
Ms Ohnsorge said the Saudi Arabia remained one world's "luckiest" oil exporters on account of its relatively large foreign reserves. 
"Any option is difficult. Having fiscal adjustment is difficult and having an exchange rate depreciation is difficult. It's not like there is one which is an easier way out", she said.

Wednesday, 6 January 2016

Excellent article on monetary policy & productivity




Self-Defeating Monetary Policy by 720 Global

“It’s self-defeating to use the wrong monetary policy.” -Ben Bernanke
  • What is productivity?
  • The Federal Reserve’s flawed growth benchmark
  • Excessive monetary policy is crushing productivity
  • The prescription for sustainable, durable growth – productivity
“Because it is unclear exactly why productivity growth has slowed recently, it is difficult to be confident about what it will do in the future”. –Bill Dudley June 2015
The recent quote from Federal Reserve Bank of New York President and Vice-chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, Bill Dudley, inspired us to write this article and explain what Mr. Dudley cannot; why productivity, the key driver of economic growth, is not only slowing but on the verge of declining.
Bill Dudley and the Federal Reserve (Fed), in their efforts to influence economic growth may have created a speculative and consumption driven environment that is crushing productivity growth. This article explains what productivity is, how productivity has suffered at the hands of poorly benchmarked Fed policies and why those in charge of monetary policy must change their views if America is to economically thrive once again.
Productivity
Productivity is a core economic concept which measures the amount of leverage an economy can generate from its 2 primary inputs, labor and capital. Without productivity, economic growth is purely reliant on the 2 inputs. Given the limited nature of both labor and capital, they cannot be depended upon to produce durable economic growth over long periods of time. Leveraging labor and capital, or becoming more productive, is a function of many factors including innovation, education and financial incentives. In “Innovation – Too much, or too little of a good thing?” we discussed why the plethora of new technologies in the marketplace, are not as productive, especially in the long term, as they may appear. True ground breaking innovation involves time, effort and significant capital and ingenuity. Therefore it is imperative to ask, as we do in this article, is the Fed doing their part and providing pro-innovation incentives?
Labor
Labor, or human capital, is largely a function of the demographic makeup of an economy and its employees’ skillset and knowledge base. In the short run, increasing labor productivity is difficult. Changes to skills training and education take time to enact and produce a meaningful effect. Similarly, changes in birth rate patterns require decades to influence an economy. Immigration policies are arguably much easier to amend to foster more immediate growth, but the likelihood of pro-immigration policies these days is not probable.
Within the labor force, the biggest trend affecting current and future economic activity is the so called “silver tsunami”, or the aging of the baby boomers. This cohort of the population, ages 51 to 69 are beginning to retire. As this occurs, they tend to consume less, rely more on financial support from the rest of the population, and withdraw valuable skills and knowledge from the workforce. The outsized number of people in this demographic cohort makes this occurrence more economically damaging than usual. As an example, the old age dependency ratio, which measures the ratio of people aged greater than 65 to the working population ages 18-64, is expected to nearly double by the year 2035 (Census Bureau).
While the implications of changes in demographics and the workforce composition are numerous, they only require one vital point of emphasis: the significant economic contributions attributable to the baby boomers from the last 30+ years will diminish from here forward. As they contribute less, they will also require a higher allotment of financial support, becoming more dependent on younger workers.
Capital
Capital includes natural, man-made and financial resources. Over the past 30+ years, the U.S. economy benefited from significant capital growth, in particular debt. The growth in debt outstanding, a big component of capital, is shown (black line) in the graph below. The increase is stark when compared to the relatively modest level of economic activity that accompanied it (green line). The red arrows highlight the exponential rise in the ratio of debt to economic growth.
This divergence in debt and economic growth is a result of many consecutive years of borrowing funds for consumptive purposes and the misallocation of capital, both of which are largely unproductive endeavors. In hindsight we know these actions were unproductive as highlighted by the steadily rising debt to GDP ratio shown above. The graph below tells the same story in a different manner, plotting the amount of debt required to generate $1 of economic growth.


Productivity
Since 1980, the long term average growth rate of productivity has stagnated in a range of 0 to 2% annually, a sharp decline from the 30 years following WWII when productivity growth averaged 4%. The most recent productivity report from the San Francisco Federal Reserve shows an annualized decline of .06% versus the prior year. (http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/indicators-data/total-factor-productivity-tfp/)
The graph below plots 10 year average productivity growth (black line) against the ratio of total U.S. credit outstanding to GDP (green line).


Within the graph, note the comparatively weak rate of productivity growth since 1980 and, more importantly, the trend towards zero productivity growth over the last 10 years. Additionally, productivity stagnation started as the debt to GDP ratio started climbing at a faster pace. This graph reinforces the message from the other debt related graphs – over the last 30 years the economy has relied more upon debt growth and less on productivity to generate economic activity.
Given the finite ability to service capital and aforementioned demographic challenges, future economic growth, if we are to have it, will need to be based largely on gains in productivity as reliance on debt and demographics has largely run its course.
The Fed’s Questionable Growth Target
Throughout the last 30 years the Fed has become increasingly proactive in incentivizing economic growth towards their target – the potential economic growth rate. Unfortunately, the Fed’s measure of potential growth rate may be flawed leading to harmful consequences.
To better explain potential growth we quote from an article entitled What Is Potential GDP and Why Does It Matter? Authored by William T. Gavin, Vice President and Economist at the St. Louis Federal Reserve. In the article, Mr. Gavin addresses how the Fed arrives at the potential growth rate as follows: “Instead, they estimate potential GDP by constructing measures of the trend in actual GDP that smooth out business cycle fluctuations”. This concept of relying on prior trends versus future potential is vital to grasp. From the same, article Mr. Gavin further explains: “But why does potential GDP matter? How do we use it? Potential GDP is important because monetary policymakers use the difference between actual and potential GDP—the output gap—to determine whether the economy needs more or less monetary stimulus”.
Said differently, the decisions on how to employ monetary policy are based on a comparison of historical and current economic growth. This method ignores potential changes in growth factors that may cause GDP to deviate from the past.
The graph below shows 7 year averages of the Fed’s potential economic growth vs. actual growth to show the simplicity of the Fed’s potential GDP forecast. Not surprisingly forecasted GDP growth for the next 10 years follows the economic growth trend of the last 10 years.


Unfortunately, one must understand that potential GDP, as measured by the Fed, is not fully factoring in the limited ability to continue to increase debt loads, the demographic headwinds and the fact that productivity growth could likely be negative in the years ahead. The Fed’s measure of potential economic growth is solely a function of past activity and the different environment that produced it.

To better explain the problems of following a faulty trend we compare 2 trends based on baseball legend Barry Bonds career statistics. During Bond’s peak playing years from ages 24 to 35 he posted outstanding statistics which likely would have earned him a seat in Cooperstown. Bonds batting average was consistently .300 or above, as seen below, and he averaged 36 home runs per year during those years. Following his peak years, when most players’ performance drops considerably, Bonds somehow got even better. From ages 36 to 40 his batting average and home run production exploded. During this time frame, Bonds averaged 51 home runs per year. This included his 2001 campaign when he hit 73 home runs, topping Mark McGwire’s then 3 year old record of 70 homeruns and shattering what had been the previous record, Roger Maris’ 61 homeruns in 1961.


As we now know, this incredible feat was not based entirely on his natural potential but was greatly aided by a new factor, steroids. The red and green lines above show 2 potential trend lines that could be used to summarize his performance. The red line represents Bond’s relative consistency during a typical professional players’ peak years. The green line shows the effect that steroids had on boosting performance and extending his career, or the deviation from typical potential. The gap between the trend lines is significant and could easily lead one, unaware of the new factor, to arrive at vastly different conclusions i.e. that Bonds had found some secret to increasing his productivity at a time when the typical player of similar age was declining or retired.
Basis for Monetary Policy
Fortunately, monetary policy is not based off tainted baseball statistics. However, like in the Bonds example, there are new and changing factors in an economy that alter its potential growth rate. By failing to consider these factors and how such factors could alter their benchmark, the Fed runs the severe risk of conducting inappropriate monetary policy.
The following graph illustrates how an erroneous potential growth rate would greatly change the Fed’s perception. Assume the true annual potential growth rate since 2000 was 0.50% less than the official Fed potential growth rate. Under this reasonable scenario, economic growth as measured by GDP (red) would have exceeded the hypothetical potential growth rate for 4 consecutive years prior to the financial crisis of 2008/09 and again over the last 3 years. When actual growth is above the “true” potential of an economy, the economy is pulling forward consumption from the future. When the future comes consumption needs have already been met and slower growth is inevitable.


Let us now consider that economic growth has failed to reach the Fed’s measure of potential GDP (blue line) since 2007. This is despite unprecedented stimulus in the form of a zero interest rate policy and the quadrupling of the money supply. One must question whether or not the target is correct. Maybe the so called “new normal” sluggish economic growth is the economy’s real potential and not the higher growth rate of years past.
We believe the potential growth rate is less than that which is targeted by the Fed. To what extent, is unclear. The widely followed Taylor Rule supports our analysis, to some degree, as it currently shows a glaring discrepancy between the current Fed Funds rate (.25-.50%) and that prescribed by the rule (2.92%). If the Taylor Rule and our thesis are correct, the potential growth rate of the U.S. economy may be much lower than the Fed thinks, and therefore monetary policy is not just “accommodative”, as described by Chairwoman Janet Yellen, but egregiously excessive.
The Fed, by chasing an erroneous GDP growth target may have generated economic growth beyond that which would have otherwise been produced by keeping interest rates too low for too long and performing multiple rounds of quantitative easing. These actions increased the Fed’s measure of potential growth, creating a vicious cycle in which they repeatedly over-stimulate to meet an erroneous target. As this continually occurs, the gap between true potential and the Fed’s measure widen, leading to larger and larger policy errors.
Excessive Stimulus is Crushing Productivity
Worse yet, Fed monetary policy used to promote economic growth relies upon changes in interest rates and money supply to increase debt and drive consumption. Lower interest rates and QE have also spurred a strong preference for speculative investments, such as stocks, real-estate, and junk bonds, at the cost of productivity generating investments. Recent bubbles in technology, real estate, and stock valuations, to name a few, are signs of the speculative fever the Fed’s actions enabled. Low interest rates have also encouraged corporations to use valuable assets or borrowed funds to buy back stock instead of investing in growth-enhancing innovation. Globally, low rates in the U.S. led many investors to borrow in dollars to fund questionable projects over-seas. In other words, trillions in capital has been misallocated with little benefit to productivity growth. While such actions may have caused one-time increases to GDP, they are neither producing sustainable economic gains nor has the debt incurred been paid down.
If we are correct and the Fed is overestimating the potential growth rate, then by default they are also applying excessive stimulus to the economy.

Prescription for Real Growth
There are many reasons productivity growth has stagnated, and the Fed is certainly not solely responsible. Yet Fed officials, as witnessed by Mr. Dudley’s comments, treat productivity as an uncontrollable residual of capital and labor. They would be well-advised to take a different tack and use their enormous power to have a positive effect on productivity. Without productivity growth, economic growth in the future will be extremely limited as capital and labor cannot contribute nearly as much as they have in the past.
The Fed, along with government, needs to properly incentivise productivity. The Fed should start this arduous task by removing excessive stimulus which will take the speculative fervor out of markets and allow asset bubbles to deflate. Although painful in the short term, it will allow capital to flow to more economically, productive uses that have been starved of capital. Congress, for their part, should reconsider current Fed mandates and discuss means in which the Fed can incentivise productivity growth.
Ingenuity, not debt, made America an economic powerhouse. If we are to resume down that path we need the Fed to end their “self-defeating” policies and in its place we must demand ingenuity from them.