Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes

Tuesday, 23 January 2024

Trades, apprenticeships and government targets

 

author-image

Britain can’t build without a trades revolution

Both parties must address the woeful shortage of skilled labour or their promises of 300,000 homes a year are empty

The Times

In the coming general election campaign, 300,000 will be one of the magic numbers, constantly on the lips of candidates throughout the land: 300,000 is the number of new homes a year that everyone agrees needs to be built, to keep up with population growth and young people being able to find somewhere to live. It is the government’s target, although they have actually managed about 200,000 a year. In particular, 300,000 is the number Sir Keir Starmer is sworn to make reality by “bulldozing” through regulations and mandating new building on the green belt.

Yet the truth is that no one in the near future is going to be building 300,000 homes a year. Even if the green belt was declared to be a giant New Town, and Nimbyism was made illegal, and anyone who thought of putting up a house was instantly given planning permission, it is very unlikely that such a number could be reached. Regulations could be bulldozed, councils mandated to hit targets, developers forced to get on with it, and still there would not be 300,000 new homes per year. At present it is a fantasy.

This is because we do not have in this country the electricians, plumbers, bricklayers, plasterers, tilers, scaffolders, bathroom fitters and roofers who would be needed to build 300,000 homes every year. Their skills cannot just be conjured up, but need training and apprenticeships that can take years. They are the very skills that will also be in demand to retrofit existing homes with heat pumps, change cladding that should never have been installed, and work on big infrastructure projects such as HS2. And they are skills that we — we as a society, including industry and schools, as well as ministers of all parties — have not been producing in sufficient numbers for a long time.

Brexit has not helped: the number of construction workers from EU countries has fallen sharply. Last year the government had to put a wide range of building skills on the shortage occupation list to allow in more migrants with relevant expertise. Ministers have been busy trying to fill the obvious gaps in the nation’s skills, pushing forward with Institutes of Technology, announcing skills bootcamps and a local skills improvement fund, all of which are very good initiatives. They have tried for years to improve apprenticeships, with mixed results. But moving the dial on construction skills, and moving it quickly, will still prove very difficult despite all these efforts.

One reason it is so difficult is the great scale of the problem. The Construction Industry Training Board forecasts that an extra 225,000 workers will be needed by 2027. Kingfisher has estimated that the UK will lose £98 billion of output due to a shortage of tradespeople. An analysis of OECD data by the think tank Onward suggests that building and construction is the sector in which we have the biggest skills shortfall, with mechanical and engineering skills not far behind. By contrast we have a surplus of skills in clerical work, sales, accounting and human resources. The number of new, trained building workers would need to be many tens of thousands each year, particularly as one in five of the current workforce is over fifty.

Another reason is cultural. We have for decades celebrated a university education and looked down on practical but vital skills. In the Kingfisher survey, only 13 per cent of 16 to 25-year-olds said they had been encouraged at school to consider trade career options, even though 42 per cent of them would have liked more information on such roles before deciding on their career. Young women in particular are unlikely to be given encouragement or relevant information. Deep-seated attitudes in careers advice and teaching will need changing.

A further and crucial obstacle is the way in which a very small business actually works. Many people in this industry are sole traders. Training an apprentice for two years is a cost and commitment that may extend further than an order book, and for the apprentice means lower pay, for a time, than alternative jobs. To have some hope of filling the huge gap in future skills, government policies would need to change the incentives at this micro level.

Yet if policies could be drawn together of sufficient scale, reaching deeply into the nation’s culture and changing the calculations of sole traders, the prize is huge. Unlike many European countries where populations have begun to fall, Britain still has an expanding population, bringing investment in housing, energy and infrastructure if we can supply the skills. Those acquiring the right skills will have a job for life: however impressive artificial intelligence programmes become they will struggle to install the electrical wires in your bathroom, guarantee they are safe and connect the right wires to the fuse box. Such jobs will be better paid than the national average. They will generally be a source of pride and satisfaction — part of the answer to a YouGov finding in 2015 that 37 per cent of British adults said their jobs were meaningless.

We really ought to be able to crack this problem. Rishi Sunak talks passionately about skills and was doing so on Monday. The many fresh efforts by ministers need drawing together in a major national drive to equip the country for housebuilding and energy transition. The Labour Party no doubt has similar good intentions, but as it finalises its manifesto it will need to focus heavily on this issue if promises about houses are to have any credibility.

There is no shortage of ideas for what to do. More apprenticeships could be fully funded or allowed tax credits. A one-stop advice service could help tradespeople through bureaucratic complications. Schools could give much greater prominence to tradespeople, particularly to female role models. There could be a new national online platform for work experience, a social media campaign to highlight lifelong skills, virtual reality educational technology to inspire young people to be part of building things for the future, and a new employment brokering service for construction and trades.

All these and other proposals have been made by think tanks, employers’ organisations or MPs.
Everybody in Britain knows it can be difficult to find an electrician or plumber. In one survey, a fifth of respondents said they had postponed a project in their home because they could not find people to do it. It is one of the factors holding our economy back. Voters would welcome some big and serious answers in the party manifestos. And in the endless interviews and debates to come, no candidate should be allowed to claim they will build 300,000 homes a year without explaining where they will find the skills to do it.

Sunday, 21 January 2024

How does the government spend its money? Not very carefully...


author-image

The unlikely villain of the Horizon scandal? Tony Benn

The Post Office scandal goes back to procurement blunders perpetrated in the 1960s. We’re still making the same mistakes

The Sunday Times
Share

There are many villains in the Horizon scandal. But one of the crucial figures has mostly escaped public censure — and even attention. I am referring, of course, to Tony Benn.

In the 1960s the Wilson government had a problem. No one wanted to buy the products Britain was making. So it decided to form giant new national champions that could conquer the export markets, by merging a host of existing companies at gunpoint. This was the process that gave us British Leyland. And, thanks to Benn, then minister for technology, it also gave us Britain’s answer to IBM — International Computers Ltd, or ICL.

Over the years, ICL had some successes. But it had more failures. In 1981, crippled by the expense of trying to keep up with IBM and others, it axed its main R&D programme and bought in better tech from Fujitsu. Eventually, the Japanese took over completely.

What does this have to do with Horizon? Well, Benn didn’t just shower ICL with grants. He gave it first refusal on government contracts. Even into the 1980s, any computer above a certain size had to come from ICL. Which was a problem, because ICL’s computers weren’t very good. “It would be fair to say,” recalled Sir Peter Gershon, who worked at the firm, “that most of the customers were not very happy.” Not least because the products those public servants were forced to use, as he euphemistically recalled, “had quite a lot of technical challenges”.

ICL wasn’t good enough to beat IBM. So it made most of its money from the British government. But that left the government with computers that weren’t good enough. In 1981, when ICL was facing bankruptcy, Margaret Thatcher wanted to let it die. But, says Gershon, “some very very brave civil servants … stood up and basically persuaded her, and Keith Joseph, that … if ICL went bust, the government would grind to a halt.” ICL was, like the banks in 2008, too big to fail. So a rescue was arranged. The tie-up with Fujitsu was critical to that process, because ICL’s customers actually trusted the Japanese tech.

ICL lost its monopoly status, but throughout its complicated corporate history it remained deeply embedded in the British state, which continued to provide the lion’s share of its revenue. In the 1980s it got the contract for the state pension database. So it was the natural choice when, in 1995, the government decided to automate the entire benefits system.

That project, called Pathway, was awarded jointly by the Department of Social Security and the Post Office. It was a disaster, and in 1999 it was abandoned with nine-figure write-offs. But it was agreed that ICL (by then fully owned by Fujitsu, which knew a captive market when it saw one) would get another massive contract: to use the Pathway technology to computerise the Post Office branch network. The project’s name? Horizon.

An anonymous member of the Horizon team, speaking to Computer Weekly in 2021, said that “everybody in the building … knew [the software] was a bag of shit. It had gone through the test labs God knows how many times, and the testers were raising bugs by the thousand.” But according to evidence submitted to the official inquiry, Fujitsu executives told the Blair government that if it didn’t sign the deal, ICL would collapse, with catastrophic implications for the services it was already running. As in 1981, it was too big to fail. And the sub-postmasters paid the price.

This is an incredibly depressing story. But it teaches all manner of important lessons. Beware of politicians who think they know more about industry than industry does. Beware of “national champions”. Beware of monopolies, both public and private. Beware of the way that bad decisions cascade through the generations, not least because the people who built the shoddy software are often the only ones who know how to maintain it.

But the ICL/Fujitsu story also reminds us of something else: how very bad the British state is at spending money. In 2020 the procurement expert Peter Smith published a book called Bad Buying. A disproportionate number of his examples involved the British state: HS2, PFI, Blair’s NHS IT programme, the lease rip-off that left a Suffolk primary school owing £500,000 for 125 laptops.

But the anecdotes were even worse. Smith had been appointed commercial director of a huge government project that involved paying a large consultancy firm more than £600,000 a week. He asked to talk to the person managing the contract. There wasn’t one. Whitehall officials “didn’t think it was worth it” to pay someone £30,000 to £40,000 a year to oversee a deal worth a thousand times that. So Smith looked at the invoices himself. He found that the 100 “full-time” staff the contractor was providing included the partners’ personal assistants. And that the firm had charged full whack for the day of its Christmas lunch. “An unfortunate error,” the consultants said.

Our procurement systems were designed to prevent officials from just giving contracts to their mates. But the result has been a process that too often revolved around ticking the right boxes and offering the lowest headline price, rather than actual performance.

David Halpern, founder of the government’s Behavioural Insights Team (aka the Nudge Unit), tells a Fujitsu-related horror story. The company built a system for No 10 and the Cabinet Office to work on highly classified material. But it was a living nightmare: just booting it up took half an hour. The minister in charge got so fed up he refused to use it.

Eventually the system was dumped — prompting Fujitsu to sue for breach of contract. But, even as the Cabinet Office was decommissioning the software, another branch of government was buying the same product. How on earth could that happen? Well, partly because of EU rules, government procurement policies banned departments from telling one another about their experiences with a given supplier or system, lest it should prejudice future buying decisions or disadvantage new suppliers.

The results could be absurd. In 2017 Halpern’s team asked a sample of public sector buyers to rate their suppliers on a five-star scale. But when they showed the minister the results — which did not exactly match up with the number of contracts those firms received — there was a heated debate over whether he could legally see the company names. Because if he knew who was doing a good or a bad job, it might inform decisions on future contracts. And everyone would be sued.

Which answers the question, asked by many, many people, of why Fujitsu kept getting contracts after Horizon. The government was legally prevented from taking Horizon into account.

Thanks to the efforts of various Whitehall reformers, this flaw is being addressed. The Procurement Act, passed last year, makes it easier for past performance to be considered. But Britain’s poor public procurement is ripping all of us off. We need to give it a hell of a lot more attention.

Tuesday, 16 January 2024

Consider this when you hear arguments about foreign aid:

 


CHINA IS TYING THE GLOBAL SOUTH TOGETHER INTO A NEW FORCE

A Long March to the South

compactmag.com

China’s Belt and Road infrastructure-building initiative has transformed the economies of the Middle Kingdom and the Global South, says David Goldman. What’s less appreciated in the West is the “profound impact” of what Chinese officials call the Digital Silk Road: Beijing’s efforts to “penetrate the Global South’s digital infrastructure”, using artificial intelligence, “thus reshaping entire regional economies to its preferences”. 

BIG TECH IS A BLESSING

Three-fifths of global employment is “informal, outside the margins of the world market, insecure, excluded from government services and miserably poor”. Digital technology, though, is changing everything. A cheap smartphone might cost 30% of the monthly income of the world’s 2.5 billion poorest people, but it connects them to the world economy. Impoverished people trapped in subsistence agriculture and barter can then become entrepreneurs. Once internet penetration reaches a threshold of 60%, business formation in the Global South booms. 

Real per-capita income in Southeast Asia, for example, has doubled since 2010 and has the world’s highest growth rate and fastest rate of business formation. This is the fruit of Beijing’s efforts. China “may do many things badly”, but it did “one big thing well”: it took a country of subsistence farmers with a per-capita GDP of $184 in 1979 and turned it into a country of industrial workers with a per capita GDP of $12,700 in 2021. It is poised to deliver similar outcomes across the Global South. 

China has the “manufacturing muscle to wire the developing world”, and the result will be game-changing. Digital payments on cheap smartphones give marginalised people access to the financial system. They allow for the collection of sales taxes and help stabilise government finances. They also help suppress corruption and boost productivity. Little surprise, then, that perceptions of China in the Global South are “largely, often overwhelmingly, positive”. 

Western policy to restrain China has had scant effect on this “Long March into the Global South” – if anything, it has accelerated it. China’s economic domain is “expanding from the 1.4 billion people of the People’s Republic to a tightly integrated trading bloc of perhaps twice as many”, bound together by Chinese digital technology and physical infrastructure. This may be “the great economic event of the 21st century”, which the US has ceded to China by default. That may turn out to be the “biggest mistake” the West ever made.

Friday, 12 January 2024

Your current monetary policy topic just got a boost from China:

 

China central bank set to cut key rate, boost liquidity Monday to aid economy

China's central bank is expected to ramp up liquidity injections and cut a key interest rate when it rolls over maturing medium-term policy loans on Monday, as authorities try to get the shaky economy back on more solid footing.

Expectations of monetary easing have heightened after major Chinese commercial banks lowered deposit rates late last year, paving the way for further reductions in policy rates at a time when persistent deflationary pressures also warrant additional stimulus.

A protracted property crisis, cautious consumers and geopolitical challenges are also pointing to another bumpy year for the world's second-biggest economy.

In a Reuters poll of 35 market participants conducted this week, 19 or 54.3% expected the People's Bank of China (PBOC) to cut the borrowing cost of one-year medium-term lending facility (MLF) loans.

The central bank last cut the MLF rate in August 2023 by 15 basis points (bps).

Thirty, or 85.7% of all respondents, predicted the central bank would inject fresh funds into the financial system exceeding the maturing 779 billion yuan ($108.73 billion) of MLF loans due this month.

"Inflation could be of higher priority for the PBOC to prevent a negative feedback loop between deflation and activities," Citi analysts said in a note.

"We reiterate our view for a policy rate/LPR cut as early as in coming weeks within January.. We maintain our expectations of 50-basis-point reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cuts and 20-basis-point MLF rate cuts for the whole year."

The interest rate on MLF loans currently stands at 2.5%. As it serves as a guide to the loan prime rate (LPR), markets mostly see the rate as a precursor to adjustments in the LPR. China is due to announce the monthly LPR fixing on Jan. 22.

"I think the central bank should take action as early as possible: it should lower both interest rates and RRR as early as the beginning of the year," said Wang Tao, chief China economist at UBS.

However, she added that the PBOC might be rather cautious as it has to pay close attention to U.S. Federal Reserve and dynamics of interest rate movements in global markets.

Wang expects a total of 10 to 20 bps of rate reductions and 25 to 50 bps points of RRR cuts this year.

Investors' expectations for an RRR cut also rose after Zou Lan, monetary policy department head of PBOC, highlighted reserve requirements as one of monetary policy options to support credit growth, according to a state media report this week.

This article was wfrom Reuters and was legally licensed through the Industry Dive Content Marketplace. Please direct all licensing questions to legal@industrydive.com.

Wednesday, 10 January 2024

Good stuff on tax changes from Paul Johnson (Fiscal Policy next)

 

Tax changes could point to a policy shift ahead of the election

The chancellor’s recent adjustments will be welcomed by those of working age on average and somewhat above-average earnings

The Times
Share
Save

The two big announcements from last year’s budget and autumn statement are just starting to take effect. They tell us rather a lot about how this year’s election campaign may pan out. They also suggest something rather counter to the accepted narrative about where this government’s priorities might lie.

No doubt you’ll be aware that the national insurance cut, announced in November, came into effect on Saturday. The 2p cut in the employee rate will benefit the average earner on £35,000 a year by about £450. Anyone earning £52,250 or more will gain £754. Gains are less for lower earners.

All very welcome. The less welcome news, of course, is that we are in the middle of a much bigger income tax increase. The national insurance cuts will cost the Treasury about £9 billion. Six years of planned freezes to income tax allowances and thresholds will raise more than £40 billion. The chancellor is giving back less than a quarter of what he is planning to take. This year’s freezes alone will outweigh the effect of the national insurance cuts for all those earning less than about £29,000.

The other big announcement came in the March budget. It’s about 20 years too late for me, but last week working parents in England (so long as neither earns more than £100,000) were able to start applying for 15 hours a week of free childcare for their two-year-old children. The actual entitlement kicks in from April. From September it extends to children, in working families, aged nine months and over. And from September 2025 the number of free hours will double to 30 hours a week. This will pretty much double the amount that the government spends on free childcare provision.

Here are two popular policies, a tax cut and a substantial extension to the scope of the welfare state, both no doubt nice in themselves, but I suspect you are starting to see the tension here. Or at least the hidden costs of such retail offers. The national insurance cut is accompanied by some rather bigger, but less salient, income tax increases. The extra spending on childcare has been accompanied by eye-wateringly tight spending plans for other public services. The only way that Jeremy Hunt can make his numbers add up is by planning another period of austerity for many parts of our already struggling public realm.

I expect a conspiracy of silence about all this from both main parties. Confront the problems of local authorities struggling to provide statutory services, of ever-rising NHS waiting lists, of backlogs in the justice system, of prisons full to overflowing and you have to admit the need for tax rises. Undo the tax increases that have already occurred or are planned and you have to make explicit where you are going to reduce spending. Much easier to pretend you are cutting taxes when you’re not and to make nice new offers of spending without saying what will happen to core public services. Or, if you are the opposition, it’s easier to pretend that trivial changes to taxation of private schools and of “non-doms” will make all the difference, while supporting the national insurance cuts, than to confront the reality of what will be needed simply to prevent public services deteriorating further.

Note, though, the particular set of choices embodied in these policies. When it came to tax, the chancellor chose to spend £9 billion cutting national insurance specifically. That only helps people of working age, in work. His childcare package also helps only a particular group of people of working age, in work. Neither policy helps the poorest. Neither is of any benefit to pensioners. That’s rather counter to the established narrative that this is a government bending over backwards to support the old at the expense of the young.

That narrative has some solid foundations, most notably in the continuation of the pension triple lock and the maintenance of other pensioner benefits, whilst cutting many working-age benefits. The continued failure to effect a radical transformation of the planning system or to meet housebuilding targets also has hurt the young. Meanwhile, monetary policy (not under government control) has benefited the older and wealthier by supporting asset prices.

Yet look at other choices and that narrative starts to look too simplistic. The cut in the national insurance rate comes off the back of a big increase in the point at which national insurance starts to be paid, another policy helping only those in work and of working age. Admittedly, that threshold, too, is being frozen now, but the relative burden of tax has moved away from workers.

Jeremy Hunt has brought in extra help for childcare costs that benefit working families
Jeremy Hunt has brought in extra help for childcare costs that benefit working families
STEFAN ROUSSEAU/WPA POOL VIA GETTY IMAGES

Even more striking is what has happened to the income tax personal allowance over a longer period. A six-year freeze in its value is unprecedented. But don’t forget that it was increased, at huge expense, during the 2010s. For those of working age, the present freeze will undo only between a half and two thirds of that increase. Pensioners, though, used to get an enhanced tax-free allowance. George Osborne took that away. Recent freezes mean they already have a lower tax-free allowance than they did back in 2010.

Put that together with the extra money for childcare and you see a different sort of priority emerge, one of support, at least in relative terms, for those of working age on average and somewhat above average earnings. There is a degree of the accidental about this. The national insurance threshold was raised only as a partial offset to the new-fangled health and social care levy — effectively an increase in the national insurance rate. The threshold increase remained despite the levy’s abolition being one of the few things to survive the ill-fated Liz Truss mini-budget.

Accidental or not, perhaps this is a sign that, peeking through the broader fog and obfuscation, some new distributional priorities are beginning to emerge.

Paul Johnson is the director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies

Sunday, 7 January 2024

Would long-term fixed rate mortgages improve our housing market?

 


author-image
RYAN BOURNE | COMMENT

State-backed, long mortgages at fixed rates are not the answer

The latest idea to stimulate demand in the housing market would involve government support to encourage long-term fixed-rate low-deposit mortgages

The Times
Share
Save

Our government will go to truly remarkable lengths to avoid allowing significantly more housebuilding to increase homeownership. The latest idea to stimulate demand instead would see government support (read: subsidies) to encourage long-term fixed-rate low-deposit mortgages, as seen in the United States. This policy, from the Conservatives’ 2019 manifesto, lost appeal as interest and mortgage rates soared, but now, with rates falling again, it’s being discussed as a potential election vote-winner for young families.

The government’s logic is straightforward: 30-year fixed-rate mortgages safeguard holders against rising interest rates while allowing them to benefit from any house price inflation. Consequently, a government guarantee for these mortgages (implicit or explicit) could reduce the bite of regulatory “stress tests” — assessments of a borrower’s ability to withstand higher mortgage rates — thus expanding affordable mortgage access to more families with lower deposits.

I didn’t have to travel far to find an expert sceptical of this idea. Mark Calabria, my Cato Institute colleague, previously was director of the US Federal Housing Finance Agency, the regulator for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and other federal home loan banks. When asked about the wisdom of the British government wading into state-backed long-term mortgages, he grimaced, before highlighting three truths that the Tories must bear in mind.

First, interest rate risk will always exist. Government-backed 30-year fixed-rate mortgages simply aim to make mortgage holders bear less of it and lenders more. In the United States, mortgage holders can refinance to capitalise on lower rates, yet remain insulated as rates rise. The catch? Surging interest rates cause substantial financial losses for mortgage providers. Households, as taxpayers, then often become exposed to massive contingent liabilities through bailouts and crises (see, for example, the 1980s’ American “savings and loan crisis”).

Next, government-backed long-term fixed-rate mortgages make macroeconomic stabilisation policy more difficult. Typically, mortgage rates fall in a spending downturn and rise when the economy overheats. This acts as an automatic stabiliser for the broader economy. Falling rates boost mortgage holders’ disposable incomes when aggregate demand is too low and rising rates reduce their income when demand is too high. Long-term fixed-rate mortgages obviously weaken this mechanism, making the Bank of England’s job at stabilising spending more difficult.

Which brings us to the distributional implications. The Conservatives want to help people they think could afford mortgage payments but who would struggle with deposits. In general, though, homeownership and having a mortgage are positively correlated with income. So this would subsidise the relatively lifetime-affluent, paid for by taxes or risks also borne by poorer households. The costs of monetary tightening, in particular, inevitably would fall more heavily under this policy on interest-rate-sensitive sectors, such as construction.

At the moment, the American property market is suffering from people being unwilling to move, precisely because more than 70 per cent of mortgages have 30-year fixed rates and new mortgage rates are much higher than most mortgage holders enjoy at the moment. Sales of existing homes have fallen by more than 15 per cent this past year to their lowest level in a decade. That, of course, harms first-time buyers who could otherwise afford properties, the very people the Conservatives say they want to help.

Prioritising long-term mortgages over housebuilding does not address the problem of housing supply
Prioritising long-term mortgages over housebuilding does not address the problem of housing supply
MATT CARDY/GETTY IMAGES

Although a government-backed 30-year mortgage clearly would be attractive to many homebuyers, then, it risks exacerbating Britain’s broader housing market dysfunction. Even outside proponents, such as the Centre for Policy Studies think tank, concede that without increasing the housing supply through planning reform, easier mortgage finance would mainly inflate house prices rather than homeownership rates.

Indeed, mortgage providers are at liberty to offer long-term fixed rates already, and some do. But the reason they are uncommon is these inherent risks. Paying for those risks should be the responsibility of the mortgage holder, not British taxpayers as part of an electoral giveaway.

Ryan Bourne is R Evan Scharf chair for the public understanding of economics at the Cato Institute