Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes

Saturday, 31 October 2015

The financialisation of our economy - please read before Wednesday

This encapsulates John Kay's thoughts contained in his book, Other People's Money , which I am currently reading. This provides a very strong counter argument to the idea that we should be relying on financial services to help drag our economy forward, and although it talks about the US, London is very similar:

The Financialization of the Economy
John Mauldin | Oct 28, 2015
Roger Bootle once wrote:
The whole of economic life is a mixture of creative and distributive activities. Some of what we ‘‘earn’’ derives from what is created out of nothing and adds to the total available for all to enjoy. But some of it merely takes what would otherwise be available to others and therefore comes at their expense.
Successful societies maximise the creative and minimise the distributive. Societies where everyone can achieve gains only at the expense of others are by definition impoverished. They are also usually intensely violent….
Much of what goes on in financial markets belongs at the distributive end. The gains to one party reflect the losses to another, and the fees and charges racked up are paid by Joe Public, since even if he is not directly involved in the deals, he is indirectly through costs and charges for goods and services.
The genius of the great speculative investors is to see what others do not, or to see it earlier. This is a skill. But so is the ability to stand on tip toe, balancing on one leg, while holding a pot of tea above your head, without spillage. But I am not convinced of the social worth of such a skill.
This distinction between creative and distributive goes some way to explain why the financial sector has become so big in relation to gross domestic product – and why those working in it get paid so much.
Roger Bootle has written several books, notably The Trouble with Markets: Saving Capitalism from Itself.
I came across this quote while reading today’s Outside the Box, which comes from my friend Joan McCullough. She didn’t actually cite it but mentioned Bootle in passing, and I googled him, which took me down an alley full of interesting ideas. I had heard of him, of course, but not really read him, which I think may be a mistake I should correct.
But today we are going to focus on Joan’s own missive from last week, which she has graciously allowed me to pass on to you. It’s a probing examination of how and why the financialization of the US and European (and other developed-world) economies has become an anchor holding back our growth and future well-being. Joan lays much of the blame at the feet of the Federal Reserve, for creating an environment in which financial engineering is more lucrative than actually creating new businesses and increasing production and sales.
There are no easy answers or solutions, but as with any destructive codependent relationship, the first step is to recognize the problem. And right now, I think few do.
What you will read here is of course infused with Joan’s irascible personality and is therefore really quite the fun read (even as the message is sad).
Joan writes letters along this line twice a day, slicing and dicing data and news for her rather elite subscriber list. Elite in the sense that her service is rather expensive, so I thank her for letting me send this out. Drop me a note if you want us to put you in touch with her.


John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
JohnMauldin@2000wave.com

The Financialization of the Economy
Joan McCullough, Longford Associates
October 21, 2015
Yesterday, we learned that lending standards had eased and that there was increased loan demand from institutions and households, per the ECB’s September report. (Which was attributed to the success of QE and which buoyed the Euro in the process.)
This has been bothering me. Because it is a great example of the debate over “financialization” of an economy, i.e., is it a good thing or a bad thing?
The need to further explore the topic was provoked by reading this morning that one of the larger shipping alliances, G6, has again announced sailing cancellations between Asia and North Europe and the Mediterranean. This round of cuts targets November and December. The Asia-Europe routes, please note, are where the lines utilize their biggest ships and have been running below breakeven. So it’s easy to understand why such outsized capacity is further dictating the need to cancel sailings outright. G6 members: American President, Hapag Lloyd, Hyundai Merchant Marine, Mitsui, Nippon and OOCL. So as you can see from that line-up, these are not amateurs.
We have already discussed in the past in this space, the topic of financialization. But seeing as how the stock market keeps rallying while the economic statistics have remained for the most part, punk, time to revisit the issue once again. Is it all simply FED or no FED? Or is the interest-rate issue ground zero and/or purely symptomatic of the triumph of financialization over the real economy?
Further urged to revisit the topic by the seemingly contradictory developments of the ECB banks reportedly humming along nicely while trade between Asia and Europe remains obviously, significantly crimped.
Let’s make this plain English because it takes too much energy to interpret most of what is written on the topic.
Snappy version:
Definition (one of quite a few, but the one I think is accurate for purposes of this screed):
Financialization is characterized by the accrual of profits primarily thru financial channels (allocating or exchanging capital in anticipation of interest, divvies or capital gains) as opposed to accrual of profits thru trade and the production of goods/services.
Economic activity can be “creative” or “distributive”. The former is self- explanatory, i.e., something is produced/created. The latter pretty much simply defines money changing hands. (So that when this process gets way overdone as it likely has become in our world, one of the byproducts is the widening gap called “income inequality”.)
You guessed correctly: financialization is viewed as largely distributive.
So now we roll around to the nitty-gritty of the issue. Which presents itself when business managers evolve to the point where they are pretty much under the control of the financial community. Which in our case is simply “Wall Street”.
This is something I saved from an article last summer which ragged mercilessly on IBM for having kissed Wall Street’s backside ... and in the process over the years, ruined the biz.
... “And of course, it’s not just IBM. ... A recent survey of chief financial officers showed that 78 percent would ‘give up economic value’ and 55 percent would cancel a project with a positive net present value—that is, willingly harm their companies—to meet Wall Street’s targets and fulfill its desire for ‘smooth’ earnings.... http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2014/06/03/why-financialization-has-run-amok/
IBM is but one possible target in laying this type of blame where the decisions on corporate action are ceded to the financial community; the instances are innumerable.
You probably could cite the well-known example of a couple of years back when Goldman Sachs was exposed as the owner of warehouse facilities that held 70% of North American aluminum inventory. And how that drove up the price and cost end-users dearly. (Estimated as $ 5bil over 3 years’ time.)
First link: NY Times article from July of 2013, talking about the warehousing issue.
Second link: Senate testimony from Coors Beer, complaining about the same situation.
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm? FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=9b58c670-f002-42a9-b673- 54e4e05e876e Well, here’s another from the same article which makes the point quite clearly:
... Boeing’s launch of the 787 was marred by massive cost overruns and battery fires. Any product can have technical problems, but the striking thing about the 787’s is that they stemmed from exactly the sort of decisions that Wall Street tells executives to make.
Before its 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas, Boeing had an engineering-driven culture and a history of betting the company on daring investments in new aircraft. McDonnell Douglas, on the other hand, was risk-averse and focused on cost cutting and financial performance, and its culture came to dominate the merged company. So, over the objections of career-long Boeing engineers, the 787 was developed with an unprecedented level of outsourcing, in part, the engineers believed, to maximize Boeing’s return on net assets (RONA). Outsourcing removed assets from Boeing’s balance sheet but also made the 787’s supply chain so complex that the company couldn’t maintain the high quality an airliner requires. Just as the engineers had predicted, the result was huge delays and runaway costs. ... Boeing’s decision to minimize its assets was made with Wall Street in mind. RONA is used by financial analysts to judge managers and companies, and the fixation on this kind of metric has influenced the choices of many firms. In fact, research by the economists John Asker, Joan Farre-Mensa, and Alexander Ljungqvist shows that a desire to maximize short-term share price leads publicly held companies to invest only about half as much in assets as their privately held counterparts do.” ...
That’s from an article in the June, 2014, Harvard Business Review by Gautam Mukunda, “The Price of Wall Street’s Power” also cited in the Forbes article. This is the link; it is worth the read though you may not agree with parts of the conclusion: https://hbr.org/2014/06/the-price-of-wall-streets-power
The upshot to this type of behavior is that the balance of power ... and ideas ... then migrates into domination by one group.
Smaller glimpse: Over-financialization is what happens when a company generates cash then pays it to shareholders and senior management which m.o. also includes share buybacks and vicious cost cutting. This is one way, as you can see, in which the real economy is excluded from the party!
Part of the financialization process also includes ‘cognitive capture’ where the big swingin’ investment banking sticks have the ear of business managers.
And the business managers/special interest groups, in turn, have the ear of the federal government. See? The control by Wall Street is still there, but sometimes the route is a tad circuitous! The clandestine formulation of the TPP agreement is a perfect example of this type of dominance. (Congress shut out/ corporate lobbyists invited in.)
So the whole process goes to the extreme. Therein lies the rub: the extreme.
So that business obediently complies with the wishes of these financial wizards. Taken altogether, over time, our entire society morphs to where it assumes a posture of servitude to the interests of Wall Street.
An example of that? John Q.’s sentiment meter (a/k/a consumer confidence) is clearly known to be tied most of the time to the direction of the S&P 500. Which of course, is aided and abetted by the foaming-at- the-mouth Talking Heads who pretty much .... dictate to John Q. how he is supposed to be feeling.
Forty years on the Street, I am still agog at the increasing clout of the FOMC to the extent where we are now hostages to their infernal sound bites and communiqués. Another example of the process of creeping financialization? I’d surely say so!
This is not an effort to try and convict “financialization” as indeed it has its place. When it is used prudently. Such as to facilitate trade in the real economy! Sounds kind of Austrian, eh? You bet. The simplest example of this which is frequently cited is a home mortgage. The borrower exchanges future income for a roof via a bank note.
And so it goes. Financialization humming along nicely, facilitating trade in the real economy.
Unfortunately, along the line somewhere, it got out of hand. Which is where the World Bank comes in: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS as they have the statistics on “domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)”
Why do we wanna’ look at that? Well the answer is suggested by yet another institution who has studied the issue. Correct. The IMF. Which espouses the notion that:
... ““the marginal effect of financial depth on output growth becomes negative ... when credit to the private sector reaches 80-100% of GDP ...
Does the above sound familiar? Right. Too much financialization crimps growth.
That’s when we turn to the above-referenced World Bank table. Which shows the latest available worldwide statistics (2014) on domestic credit to private sector % of GDP.
Okay. Maybe we oughta’ read this bit from the World Bank before we get to the US statistic:
... “Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. ...
The financial corporations include monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations ...
Examples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange companies.” ...
Clear enough. Again, the IMF suggests that 80 to 100% of GDP is where it gets dicey in terms of impact on growth:
In 2014, the US ratio stood at 194.8. In 1981 (as far back as the table goes), our ratio stood at 89.1.
For comparison, also in 2014, Germany stood at 80.0; France at 94.9. China at 141.8 and Japan at 187.6. Which is suggestive of what can be called “over-financialization”. So what’s the beef with that, you ask?
For all the reasons mentioned above which led to increasing dominance by the financial sector on corporate and household behavior, the emphasis leans heavily towards making money out of money. Which I’d like to do myself. You?
But when massaged into the extreme which is clearly, I believe, where we find ourselves now ... at the end of the day, we create nothing.
By creating nothing, the economy relies on the financialization process to create growth. But the evidence supports the notion that once overdone, financialization stymies growth.
“ ... The whole of economic life is a mixture of creative and distributive activities. Some of what we “earn” derives from what is created out of nothing and adds to the total available for all to enjoy. But some of it merely takes what would otherwise be available to others and therefore comes at their expenseSuccessful societies maximize the creative and minimize the distributive. Societies where everyone can achieve gains only at the expense of others are by definition impoverished. They are also usually intensely violent.” ... Roger Bootle quoted here: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=5537
In short, corporate behavior is dictated by Wall Street desire which in turn results in a flying S&P 500. Against a backdrop, say, of a record number of US workers no longer participating in the labor force.
So instead of cogitating the entire picture and all of its skanky details, we have so farbeen willing to accept a one-size fits all alibi for stock market action where financialization still dominates; the only choice is what financialization flavor will trump the other: “FED or no FED”.
I now wonder if when Bootle said a few years back ... “they are usually intensely violent”,if this wasn’t prescience. Which can be applied to the current political landscape in the US where the financialization of the economy has so excluded the average worker ... that he is willing to put Ho-Ho the Clown in the White House. Just to change the channel. And hope for relief.
As you can see, I am trying very hard to understand how as a society we got to this level.
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World economic outlook October 2015

from the excellent Pearson blog/website:

http://pearsonblog.campaignserver.co.uk/?cat=315&paged=2

What’s the outlook for the global economy?

The International Monetary Fund has just published its six-monthly World Economic Outlook (WEO). The publication assesses the state of the global economy and forecasts economic growth and other indicators over the next few years. So what is this latest edition predicting?
Well, once again the IMF had to adjust its global economic growth forecasts down from those made six months ago, which in turn were lower than those made a year ago. As Larry Elliott comments in the Guardian article linked below:
Every year, economists at the fund predict that recovery is about to move up a gear, and every year they are disappointed. The IMF has over-estimated global growth by one percentage point a year on average for the past four years.
In this latest edition, the IMF is predicting that growth in 2015 will be slightly higher in developed countries than in 2014 (2.0% compared with 1.8%), but will continue to slow for the fifth year in emerging market and developing countries (4.0% in 2015 compared with 4.6% in 2014 and 7.5% in 2010).
In an environment of declining commodity prices, reduced capital flows to emerging markets and pressure on their currencies, and increasing financial market volatility, downside risks to the outlook have risen, particularly for emerging market and developing economies.
So what is the cause of this sluggish growth in developed countries and lower growth in developing countries? Is lower long-term growth the new norm? Or is this a cyclical effect – albeit protracted – with the world economy set to resume its pre-financial-crisis growth rates eventually?
To achieve faster economic growth in the longer term, potential national output must grow more rapidly. This can be achieved by a combination of more rapid technological progress and higher investment in both physical and human capital. But in the short term, aggregate demand must expand sufficiently rapidly. Higher short-term growth will encourage higher investment, which in turn will encourage faster growth in potential national output.
But aggregate demand remains subdued. Many countries are battling to cut budget deficits, and lending to the private sector is being constrained by banks still seeking to repair their balance sheets. Slowing growth in China and other emerging economies is dampening demand for raw materials and this is impacting on primary exporting countries, which are faced with lower exports and lower commodity prices.
Quantitative easing and rock bottom interest rates have helped somewhat to offset these adverse effects on aggregate demand, but as the USA and UK come closer to raising interest rates, so this could dampen global demand further and cause capital to flow from developing countries to the USA in search of higher interest rates. This will put downward pressure on developing countries’ exchange rates, which, while making their exports more competitive, will make it harder for them to finance dollar-denominated debt.
As we have seen, long-term growth depends on growth in potential output, but productivity growth has been slower since the financial crisis. As the Foreword to the report states:
The ongoing experience of slow productivity growth suggests that long-run potential output growth may have fallen broadly across economies. Persistently low investment helps explain limited labour productivity and wage gains, although the joint productivity of all factors of production, not just labour, has also been slow. Low aggregate demand is one factor that discourages investment, as the last World Economic Outlook report showed. Slow expected potential growth itself dampens aggregate demand, further limiting investment, in a vicious circle.
But is this lower growth in potential output entirely the result of lower demand? And will the effect be permanent? Is it a form of hysteresis, with the effect persisting even when the initial causes have disappeared? Or will advances in technology, especially in the fields of robotics, nanotechnology and bioengineering, allow potential growth to resume once confidence returns? 
Which brings us back to the short and medium terms. What can be done by governments to stimulate sustained recovery? The IMF proposes a focus on productive infrastructure investment, which will increase both aggregate demand and aggregate supply, and also structural reforms. At the same time, loose monetary policy should continue for some time – certainly as long as the current era of falling commodity prices, low inflation and sluggish growth in demand persists.
Articles
Uncertainty, Complex Forces Weigh on Global Growth IMF Survey Magazine (6/10/15)
A worried IMF is starting to scratch its head The Guardian, Larry Elliott (6/10/15)
Storm clouds gather over global economy as world struggles to shake off crisis The Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (6/10/15)
Five charts that explain what’s going on in a miserable global economy right now The Telegraph, Mehreen Khan (6/10/15)
IMF warns on worst global growth since financial crisis Financial Times, Chris Giles (6/10/15)
Global economic slowdown in six steps Financial Times, Chris Giles (6/10/15)
IMF Downgrades Global Economic Outlook Again Wall Street Journal, Ian Talley (6/10/15)
Questions
  1. Look at the forecasts made in the WEO October editions of 2007, 2010 and 2012 for economic growth two years ahead and compare them with the actual growth experienced. How do you explain the differences?
  2. Why is forecasting even two years ahead fraught with difficulties?
  3. What factors would cause a rise in (a) potential output; (b) potential growth?
  4. What is the relationship between actual and potential economic growth?
  5. Explain what is meant by hysteresis. Why may recessions have a permanent negative effect, not only on trend productivity levels, but on trend productivity growth?
  6. What are the current downside risks to the global economy?
  7. Why have commodity prices fallen? Who gains and who loses from lower commodity prices? Does it matter if falling commodity prices in commodity importing countries result in negative inflation?
  8. To what extent can exchange rate depreciation help commodity exporting countries?
  9. What is meant by the output gap? How have IMF estimates of the size of the output gap changed and what is the implication of this for actual and potential economic growth?
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Friday, 30 October 2015

Share buybacks - some extension material




“No one really wants to talk about it, but there is a humongous contradiction at the heart of the ongoing share buyback mania.” — Deutsche Bank on buybacks. 
The latest issue of Deutsche Bank’s Konzept magazine takes a look at share buybacks and the effect that they’re having on the financial system, questioning if companies really should be spending their hard earned cash buying back stock. 
Over 400 companies in the S&P 500 repurchased stock last year, spending a total of $575bn in the process. That is about 3% of the index’s market cap and is up 14% from 2013, nearly matching the $600bn record set in 2007. What is more, the Buyback Index (a subset of 100 companies with the highest buyback ratio) has outperformed the S&P 500 by almost a third since 2010, as well as over most periods since 2000.
But despite the market’s love of buybacks, you don’t have to look far to find a criticism of this method of cash return to investors. Common criticisms are; buybacks do not add shareholder value or they destroy it; companies are hurting themselves and the economy by not using the cash to invest; companies buy high rather than low and are hence terrible investors; buybacks enable executives to manipulate earnings and compensation. 
On the other hand, supporters of buybacks argue that they’re a more flexible and tax-efficient way for companies to return excess cash to investors and offset dilution from stock or option grants.

Buybacks and dividends
Value of buybacks and dividends by year

Buybacks: Common misconceptions

Some common misconceptions surround the buyback argument. For example, Konzept points out that it is ridiculous to suggest that buybacks make a firm more valuable. Similarly, it is entirely wrong to argue they have led to less investment. 
So what’s the truth behind the argument? Well, there are many different factors that all influence the effect of buybacks. Tax advantages really do provide an incentive for companies to buy back stock. Dividends are taxable to investors who receive them whereas share buybacks are taxable as capital gains only to investors who sell their shares. Furthermore, if debt is used to finance share buybacks, the interest expense is tax-deductible, which may reduce the firm’s weighted average cost of capital. 
In general, investors often cheer when buybacks are announced, Konzept suggests that they do this because investors are generally suspicious of what companies will do with excess cash. Buying back stock and effectively returning cash to investors removes the risk that the company may waste it on unsuitable acquisitions. 
“This could alter valuations more than theory or tax policy would predict by reassuring investors that management is acting in their interests (alleviating what text-books call the agency problem).
This is no theoretical concern. In 2011, for example, Hewlett Packard’s operating cash flows were $13bn with dividend pay outs of $840m and share buybacks worth $10bn. It also bought Autonomy for $11bn in stock but post-due diligence most of the purchase price was written off. Subsequent buybacks dropped to $1.5-2bn. It was not that HP had not paid out a lot of cash – it just did so to Autonomy’s shareholders rather than its own.
RadioShack and Blackberry provide another perspective. RadioShack came under severe criticism as it headed for bankruptcy having spent some $1.5bn on buybacks between 2005 and 2011 – worth roughly three-quarters of its total assets in 2005. The maker of the iconic Blackberry device, was similarly criticised for spending $3bn between 2010 and 2012 – roughly 30 per cent of its assets. Perhaps both could have soldiered on a bit longer had they instead paid wages or invested the money.” — Deutsche Bank on buybacks. 
Nevertheless, in general, companies are struggling to find a use for all the extra cash they’re generating. According to Deutsche Bank’s figures, America has worked relentlessly to cut costs and improve margins across most sectors. Last year the S&P 500’s operating cash flow margin hit 15%, one of its highest levels ever. Companies have further increased free cash flow by refinancing debt at significantly lower interest rates.

Capital spending still rising

America isn’t scrimping on capex to pay for additional buybacks. US non-residential investment (a proxy for corporate capex) is running at 12.8% of output in nominal terms, or 13.3% in real terms, matching the 2007 peak and well above the highest levels of the 1980s and 1990s after adjusting for inflation. But that’s not all, companies have shifted their capex spending from investing in structures to investing in high-tech equipment, software and various kinds of intellectual property all of which have seen prices fall over the past 15 years. However, prices for structures are some three times higher than the personal consumption price index since 2000.
Share Buybacks
All in all, after adjusting for inflation and the type of capital equipment being purchased, companies are spending more than ever before on capex, despite record buyback levels. Home Depot is a great example of this change:
“Home Depot is a good example of a company that drastically shifted its capex strategy in response to market changes. Before the crisis, the company spent about 55-60 per cent of its operating cash flow on capex as new superstores were built. But with the growth of internet-related retail activity, Home Depot no longer needs more physical stores. The resulting shift in focus to its online capabilities has cut capex to about a fifth of operating cash flow. The company has used the freed-up cash to resume a large share buyback program. What if it had kept the cash instead? Would critics of buybacks be happy knowing the money might get ploughed into more and potentially redundant super stores? Or would they prefer management diversify within the big-box retail sector, perhaps by buying Sears; or how about turning that excess retail space into cloud computer server farms?” — Deutsche Bank on buybacks. 
This brings the buyback argument onto the issue of debt. Of the 329 non-financial companies that repurchased stock during the past twelve months, net cash flow only covered 93% of the buybacks. 7% of the total buyback spend was funded with debt, about $40bn in dollar terms. About one-half of repurchasing companies had insufficient net cash flow to cover their share repurchases, for this set of firms 60% or $175bn worth of buybacks were financed with debt.

Other factors to consider

With so many companies using debt to bulk up repurchases, Deutsche concludes that the buyback binge is no longer about just using up excess cash. So what is the reason behind the leveraged buyback strategy so many companies now have in place? Apart from the obvious benefit of a lower cost of capital, Deutsche floats the thesis that many companies believe that their stock is trading below intrinsic value. Although, buybacks generally tend to be pre-cyclical, so it’s unlikely that this is the case. 
The most likely driver of the buyback boom is executive compensation. A number of studies have shown a strong link between buybacks and bonus arrangements. This also ties in with the above motivation that companies can use buybacks to hit earnings targets. 
“To conclude, there is no tractable way to sort out the extent to which share buybacks are used primarily for constructive purposes, such as returning excess cash, versus serving as a tool to enhance executive pay. This is not a one-size-fits-all issue – rather the answers vary by company. The problem, unfortunately, is that misinformation abounds and rather than participate constructively in the debate most companies have instead piled on the buybacks while they can. Boards would help their cause by eliminating any link between buyback activity and executive compensation. The debate over inequality will rage on, but at least companies can offset the negative perception of buybacks to ensure the tool remains in place.” — Deutsche Bank on buybacks. 

Tuesday, 27 October 2015

Long term unemployment in the EU

Hysteresis: Europe's disease of permanent unemployment is spreading

Startling new labour market figures reveal how the eurozone is struggling to save a lost generation 

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Bleeding talent: In Europe, around 15pc of unemployed people have not had a job for more than four years 
 
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Europe's unemployment crisis is the biggest threat to the social fabric of its moribund economies. 
For all the talk of a cyclical upturn in the single currency - buoyed by record low oil prices, unprecedented quantitative easing, and low interest rates - joblessness strikes at the heart of the eurozone's political and economic malaise. 
Unemployment in the currency bloc rose slightly in August to 11pc. And now new data from statistics body Eurostat lays bare the extent of Europe's battle against persistent joblessness. 
Of the eurozone's near 18 million unemployed in the first quarter of the year, only 18.6pc - or 4.1 million - managed to find work over the subsequent three months. Nearly two thirds - just under 65pc - remained luckless in their attempts to rejoin the labour force. 
The numbers are just another glimpse of the chronic problem of long-term joblessness that plague the eurozone. 
Hysteresis - when prolonged unemployment can become permanent 
Defined as being out of work for more than a year, long-term unemployment is a dangerous development that keeps economists awake at night. It is rising despite the euro's recent revival in fortunes. In Europe, around 15pc of unemployed people have not had a job for more than four years. 
This gradual loss in valuable skills needed to re-enter the workforce, leads to a phenomenon economists have dubbed "hysteresis". This is when periods of prolonged unemployment can become permanent.
The Eurostat figures show that Greece in particular seems to have succumbed to hysteresis. Only a pitiful 8.6pc of unemployed Greeks managed to find work in the second quarter of the year, compared to three months prior. That's lower than some of the poorest parts of the non-EMU Europe - Bulgaria, Poland and Macedonia. 
The numbers reflect a particularly tumultuous period in the country's eurozone future, when crisis talks bought the economy to a halt.
'A sclerotic process takes hold in economies in a state of perma-recession'
But the longer-term trend is clear. Athens and its environs also hold the ignominious title of the long-term unemployment capital of Europe.
Hysteresis is a sclerotic process that takes hold in economies in a state of perma-recession. Greece is arguably the best example in the eurozone – having suffered a downturn of greater magnitude than the US Great Depression of the 1930s.

Permanently depressed growth

Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney has warned western policymakers to engage in a "race against hysteresis". Mario Draghi of the European Central Bank has surmised it as the process when "cyclical unemployment becomes structural".
But persistent unemployment is not merely a scourge to those who suffer being shut of the workforce.
The euro area is vulnerable to negative shocks and prolonged low growth, with negative spillovers
IMF
Larry Summers - who has revived the notion of "secular stagnation" - has spoken of hysteresis in the same breath as the long-term decline in potential growth rates across the developed world.
They are two sides of the same coin.
The forces of hysteresis are "a shadow cast forward on economic activity” according to Mr Summers. By heightening a natural rate of unemployment, this then has spillover effects which can destroy the future growth of an economy in years to come. It is a self-reinforcing cycle of stagnation and labour force ruin.
Potential growth in the eurozone is now estimated to average just 1pc over the medium term, according to the International Monetary Fund. This "is well below what is needed to reduce unemployment to acceptable levels in many countries," warns the Fund.
How recessions have hit growth potential: Real GDP growth in the US and eurozone (base = 2000)  Photo: IMF
"Because growth prospects are subdued and policy space is limited, the euro area is vulnerable to negative shocks and prolonged low growth, with negative spillovers," says the IMF.

Saving a lost generation

The problem is not new. Similar forces gripped the US during the Great Depression and were seen in Europe during the stagnant 1970s and 1980s.
More than three decades on, they beset the Continent once again. This time round, it has left policymakers scratching their heads. According to European Central Bank's own calculations, the near 11pc unemployment rate is here to stay. Even in an optimistic case, it will only fall to 9pc in 2020 when the eurozone's economic slack has been used up, according to the IMF.
Both Mr Summers and the IMF have called on eurozone authorities to deploy fiscal tools to fight off hysteresis. But the prospect of mass fiscal expansion is not on the cards in an EMU still fixated on hitting budget targets as the best way to insulate it from a new global crisis. 
As for monetary policy, academic economists theorise over raising central bank inflation targets and adding an unemployment mandate to the ECB's single focus on price stability. Yet such debates are divorced from the political reality of the eurozone, where it took years of institutional wrangling for the ECB to carry out its limited foray into QE. 
But Europe's new hysteresis disease is setting in. The longer it stays, the harder it will be to save another lost generation.