Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes

Friday, 22 November 2024

If you are interested in the Google/anti-trust case this is a broad look:

 

Why Western capitalism is under threat

Without competition, capitalism withers away, says Denise Hearn, author of two books on the subject. She talks to Matthew Partridge about industrial concentration, patents and US antitrust legislation

Child in a sweet shop
There is far less choice for consumers than there appears to be

Matthew Partridge: The basic argument of your first book, The Myth of Capitalism, which you co-wrote with Jonathan Tepper, was that American capitalism, and by implication, capitalism in the rest of the West, is under threat owing to a lack of competition caused by increased industrial concentration and the use of regulation to hamper rivals. 

Denise Hearn: Yes, the book argues that capitalism without competition is not capitalism. When it came out in 2018, many people didn’t recognise just how pervasive concentration was across so many different industries. To take two examples we gave in the book: four airlines completely dominate airline traffic, often enjoying local monopolies or duopolies in their regional hubs, while over 75% of households have no choice when it comes high-speed internet, only having access to one provider. My current book, The Big Fix: How Companies Capture Markets and Harm Canadians, written with Vass Bednar, focuses on the competition problems that Canada faces, especially with companies that dominate multiple industries. But the same scenario applies to the US, EU and the UK.

MP: So which sectors do you think are currently especially affected by this lack of competition, is it particularly prevalent in sectors such as technology – and does this issue hurt the entire US economy?

DH: We’ve seen waves of mergers and acquisitions across nearly every industry imaginable and in the US that’s happened in everything from veterinary practices and magic-mushroom facilities to dentistry. You could argue that some of the digital industries possibly lend themselves to economies of scale. But there’s also been a lot of consolidation in highly localised services, such as funeral services.

MP: Does this lack of competition result in higher prices and what are the other negative effects?

DH: There’s definitely a sense that American business has become less dynamic. Data from both the US Federal Reserve and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) show that in recent decades there has been a decline in the number of firms entering (and exiting) various sectors. There’s also a sense that it’s harder for little guys to get a foothold, especially when there is a gatekeeper, such as Amazon or Google, blocking their access to markets by demanding a large chunk of their revenue, or by pushing up the cost of advertising. We often think of small firms needing access to capital, but we don’t consider their access to fair markets as key to becoming challengers.

MP: Do you think that this kind of lack of competition is partly responsible for the fact that polls say younger people are much more hostile to the idea of capitalism and free enterprise than they used to be?

DH: I think so. It almost seems that the social contract that existed for my parents’ generation, whereby you went to school, got a good job, could afford to buy a house and raise a family, doesn’t work that way anymore. While there are many reasons for that, one is the increasing realisation that everything from veterinary practices to the sweets they buy at the grocery store is really all owned by just a small number of firms that have incredible market power, with consumers rendered relatively powerless.

“There has been consolidation in industries ranging from dentistry to magic-mushroom facilities”

MP: In the past few years, we’ve seen a more activist competition policy, led by people such as Lina Khan, head of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Is this having an impact?

DH: Mergers have dwindled over the past two years, and while this was partly due to higher interest rates, another reason was stronger antitrust enforcement under the Joe Biden administration, with Khan at the FTC and Jonathan Kanter at the Department of Justice antitrust division. Both have been much more aggressive about blocking mergers and taking on anti-competitive conduct. But it is structurally difficult to stem the tide, because the capital markets like firms in concentrated industries: these conditions make it easier for firms to deliver consistently high, repeatable returns. Research by the NBER estimates that the average mark-up above production cost went from 18% in 1980 to 67% in 2017. The OECD has found a similar trend globally.

MP: How do you see the antitrust case involving Google and the other big technology firms panning out? And do you think that if Alphabet is forced to make some major changes to the way it runs it would be a good thing for consumers?

DH: The agencies had been dormant for decades, so the fact that the Google case is taking place at all is a historic win for the Department of Justice. The rumours are that it’s looking seriously at a break-up, or a “structural separation” that would divide core business lines in a way that would massively disrupt the company. However, those who are arguing that this will be bad for the tech sector need to realise that companies break themselves up all the time. One third of merger-and-acquisition (M&A) activity actually comprises divestitures. Companies are adept at breaking themselves into component parts, and often they do so because they recognise that they’ll be more valuable independently than they are together. So, a conglomerate such as Google may end up being more valuable if it is broken into smaller units.

MP: What further policies would you like to see implemented in the future to increase competition?

DH: Well, I’d like them to continue with some of the historic policies that we’ve recently seen in the US (and even Canada). That includes steps such as the updated merger guidelines in the US, which have made it easier to challenge mergers on competition grounds. The executive order on competition that Biden put forward has prompted the whole of government, rather than just the antitrust agencies, to think about competition issues. Governments now need to adopt a more holistic approach, including understanding that supporting so-called “national champions” is not always in the public interest, and actually can sometimes lead to less resiliency and less innovation.

MP: It’s interesting you mentioned that as several people, especially Michel Barnier in Europe, have argued that we need big national champions to compete with China, which, of course, is the absolute opposite of antitrust and competition. Do you see that as a big threat to antitrust?

DH: Yes, I think those who advocate national champions tend to overlook the fact that most of these big firms are global firms with global shareholders, and they will go against the national interest if and when it suits them. What’s more, trying to create a few national champions can make supply chains more fragile. For instance, the US Department of Defence, prompted by Biden’s executive order on antitrust, looked at its supply chain and realised that it was reliant on only a few suppliers for major sources of parts; that actually amounted to a national security risk.

“Pharma companies buy rival drugs just to take them off the market” 

MP: One area you talked about in The Myth of Capitalism is patent law, primarily regarding companies being granted overly broad patents. You also point out that even when patents have expired regulations have made it hard for drug companies to get generic versions of drugs approved. Do you think there’s scope for reform in patent law?

DH: It certainly appears so. Companies can use core intellectual property (IP) to restrict the freedom of other firms to operate, or they can act as gatekeepers charging high tolls for access. There are patent wars across the world on everything from AI to pharmaceuticals. There have even been cases of drug companies engaging in “killer acquisitions”, whereby they acquire a rival drug just to take it off the market to eliminate a competitive threat. A 2021 study based on two decades of data estimated that between 5% and 8% of pharmaceutical acquisitions are undertaken explicitly to remove a rival drug from the market. So there are cases where drugs or innovations aren’t actually reaching the market because there are established firms that have an incentive to make sure that they aren’t available.

MP: Vice president-elect J.D. Vance has been surprisingly positive about Khan’s work at the FTC. Do you think that this is just rhetoric and that the new Trump administration will undo some of the good work Biden has been doing?

DH: I think that an underappreciated element of the antitrust movement has been its bipartisan nature in some cases, particularly in the tech industry. So I believe that J.D. Vance is being serious when he says that Khan is Biden’s best appointment. Some of the tech cases  were actually brought under the Trump administration. So I think that while the pace may slacken, you will see continued pressure on the tech firms under the new Trump administration.

After all, there are a number of Republican constituencies such as farmers or small business owners who are very supportive of increased antitrust enforcement. What’s more, while everyone pays attention to the federal cases, the states can also bring antitrust cases. There have been multi-state coalitions bringing cases together in agriculture, tech and other areas. That sort of bipartisan collaboration will continue regardless of what happens at the federal level.

I think competition policy can sound obscure and technical, but it’s crucial. It looks at where power manifests itself in markets and how that power is wielded against economic stakeholders, including consumers, citizens, workers, small business owners, and so on. If we get it right it can create more wealth and lead to fairer outcomes without any further government intervention. That is worth fighting for.

Denise Hearn is a Senior Fellow at Columbia Center of Sustainable Investment. She co-wrote with Jonathan Tepper “The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition”, published by Wiley. Her latest book, “The Big Fix: How Companies Capture Markets and Harm Canadians”, with Vass Bednar, is published by Sutherland House Books.

Ignore the headline, interesting stuff about financing business

 

Europe’s deep creativity crisis

In the US, small companies become big ones. On this side of the Atlantic, they don’t, says David C. Stevenson

Mario Draghi
Mario Draghi has bemoaned lacklustre European innovation

Europe is undergoing a crisis of creative confidence. The recent report by Mario Draghi , the former president of the European Central Bank, on Europe’s competitiveness revealed a poor innovation record. He noted that “EU companies spent around €270bn less on research and development [R&D] than their US counterparts in 2021, largely because we have a static industrial structure dominated by the same companies and technologies as decades ago”. 

His solution was to focus on more venture-capital (VC) investing in high-risk projects, as a lack of VC has meant start-ups have been more reliant on bank loans, which are unsuited to financing such ventures. He noted that “the core problem in Europe is that new companies with new technologies are not rising in our economy. In fact, there is no EU company with a market capitalisation over €100bn that has been set up from scratch in the last 50 years. All six US companies with valuations above €1trn have been created in that period of time. Innovative companies that want to scale up in Europe are hindered at every stage”.

Booming Britain 

The key phrase here is scale up. It’s all very well having lots of ideas, but if you can’t turn them into money-making global technology leviathans like the Americans, there’s a problem. Draghi’s hand-wringing has sparked schadenfreude across the English channel. Analysts have pointed out that the UK innovation and start-up scene seems to be in much better shape. Britain is currently the third-largest venture capital market in the world, behind only the US and China; it has overtaken India to claim this position. 

The UK is also the largest venture-capital market in Europe, accounting for more than a third of investment, and UK companies raised £72bn in total venture capital investment between 2021 and 2023. In 2023 alone, UK start-ups raised $21.3bn, the third-highest total on record. Britain’s share of global VC investment rose from 3.4% to 5.8% between 2021 and 2023. London continues to be a major hub, driving 70% of total UK VC investment in the last few years.

“Investment in British early-stage firms has slid to a six-year low”

Still, it’s not all good news. According to The Times, investment in early-stage firms has fallen to a six-year low. In the three months to September there were 32 fundraising rounds for start-ups, the lowest number since 2018 and down from 75 in the previous quarter, according to VenturePath, a group of investors who channel capital into early-stage firms. Companies raised only £162m in the past three months by offering shares to external investors for the first time, also the lowest figure in at least six years.

A more damning critique of the UK’s long-term record of innovation record comes in a joint report by the Tony Blair Institute (TBI) and the centre-right think tank Onward. It points the finger at the City of London: “London was once the world’s largest stock exchange, and today, it ranks sixth… Last year 76 firms delisted from the London Stock Exchange’s (LSE) growth market, Aim… up 62% on the previous year. And… leaders of the UK’s most vibrant companies have publicly stated that they would not consider listing on London’s exchanges. Low liquidity, diminished confidence among investors and a shrinking pool of capital available are compounding the exodus”.

The report went on to say that the implications are severe: not only will our failing capital markets undermine our status as a global financial hub, but they could also “extinguish Britain’s potential to be the home of the next wave of world-leading science and tech companies, hindering its growth prospects for decades”. 

Propping up the market

The study’s solutions include closing down Aim and creating a rapid route to listing on the LSE’s Main Market with similar, but time-limited, tax and regulatory benefits; and expanding and enhancing the capacity of the UK’s investment sector. To that end the UK state should earmark £1bn of funding to invest in five growth-focused venture funds, crowding in institutional capital to create a generation of UK-based, large-scale growth investors. The report also highlights the need to cut regulatory red tape and governance burdens on asset managers and listed companies. 

Those intimately involved in the complex world of funding innovation paint a more nuanced picture. Take Ken Wotton of fund manager Gresham House. His firm is uniquely positioned to understand the link between private- and public-market funding of innovation-led companies. Funds range from venture-capital trusts (VCTs) and enterprise investment schemes (EIS) to public market strategies for small and mid-cap stocks via the successful Strategic Equity Capital investment trust. 

Wotton thinks the financial support system for innovation in the UK has been transformed over the last 15 years, with a burgeoning angel and early-stage VC sector supported by tax breaks such as EIS and VCT schemes. He accepts that the current cyclical funding environment is weak, but the solution, he argues, is not to kill off Aim. 

This alternative market might not have “generated amazing returns for investors in aggregate, but has been pretty effective at raising capital for smaller businesses”. The real problem is that the dismal cyclical backdrop means that UK equity valuations are low, and thus few entrepreneurs will plump for the UK if they’ll only get poor valuations via flotations. One concrete example of where the UK outperforms is in the business-software sector, especially in software as a service, or SaaS. Yet Wotton points out that these listed tech businesses are “all trading at massive discounts to the valuations that my private colleagues are putting money into. There are many publicly quoted high-quality SaaS businesses trading at between 1.5 and three times the sales. By contrast, in private markets, you’re putting money into businesses at five times plus”. 

Leaving the market

Unsurprisingly, low valuations for the few UK tech businesses that do list quickly prompt takeover interest. However, that brings up the most acute challenge facing the UK and its innovation sector: Draghi’s point about scaling up. There are plenty of smaller-cap growth stocks in the tech sector with potential and even more that are private. But very few of them remain British for an extended period of time. 

That translates to just one pure-play tech firm in the FTSE 100, Sage, which in turn results in the main UK equity benchmarks boasting very low exposure to tech growth sectors that global investors are keen on. It’s not that we don’t have the ideas or fast-growing businesses. It’s just that we don’t have the funding available for them to transition from being small caps to becoming large global large caps. They succeed, and then either go private or are taken over by larger global firms. 

“The dismal cyclical backdrop in the UK implies low valuations  for listings”

One industrial-policy expert, Rian Whitton, argues that the British should emulate the French, who have kept hold of many major innovative businesses via a more plutocratic, family-ownership structure of global businesses. Whitton says that “Fundamentally, wealthy French industrialists… are bigger players at home than their counterparts in Britain”. They retained control as their firms scaled up, keeping ownership in France. 

A more modest proposal comes from Wotton at Gresham House. It focuses on giving incentives to business leaders, tomorrow’s Elon Musks or Mark Zuckerbergs. He says the remuneration model for listed UK businesses is a factor deterring entrepreneurs and quality managers from choosing PLC entities as opposed to US businesses or even private equity-backed concerns. 

“There needs to be more tolerance of value  creation equity schemes (like private equity’s sweet equity schemes) as long as [they are] aligned to long-term shareholder value creation and less reliance on  the proxy agencies, such as ISS, which are black  boxes on governance and not fit for purpose for  scaled-up businesses.”

Thursday, 21 November 2024

Quite surprised so many countries peg their currencies:

 And I'm not sure about all the conclusions herein, but some of it is very interesting:

The US dollar is losing its influence. Many countries are ready to embrace a multi-currency global future.

In recent years, global politics have undergone considerable shifts. The COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with Russia’s war in Ukraine, has intensified the polarization of nations across the globe. Once seen by Western countries as a difficult yet possible partner, Russia’s standing drastically changed after Putin’s decision to invade a sovereign nation—first Georgia in 2008, then the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014, and finally the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which continues to this day. The last invasion marked the boldest attempt to alter European borders since World War II, cementing Russia, alongside China, as a principal and immediate geopolitical adversary to the West.

This growing polarization, worsened by mismanaged Western sanctions and delayed aid to Ukraine, has prolonged the conflict. Meanwhile, BRICS and potential members, many of whom are authoritarian regimes, have been strengthening alliances between each other. While Egypt and the UAE are US allies, most BRICS members see Western nations as adversaries.

What is going on global market:

Currently, the US dollar makes up 58 percent of global currency reserves and 54 percent of export invoicing. Together, the US and EU dominate over 80 percent of global reserves. Since the war in Ukraine, however, the renminbi has overtaken the dollar as Russia’s most traded currency, and Russia now holds renminbi and gold as its primary reserve assets. In the past two years, China and Russia have expanded currency swaps to boost trade, and Russia increasingly relies on CIPS (China’s Cross-Border Interbank System) after being cut off from SWIFT.

US dollar and Euro Share of Global Foreign Exchange Reserves, %. 2016-2024

(Source: International Monetary Fund)

Since the 1990s, China’s economic expansion has been nothing short of extraordinary. By 2001, it had overtaken Japan, which had long held the position of the second-largest economy. China’s growth didn’t stop there; in 2017, it surpassed the United States when measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), a significant milestone that underscored its rapid rise on the global stage. Although the US economy is still 54 percent larger when measured in nominal terms, evaluating economies through the lens of PPP also provides a good comparison of their size and standard of living for the population. This method adjusts for differences in price levels between countries, offering a more realistic perspective on what the two economies can produce and afford. Consequently, while the US maintains its nominal lead, China’s position in terms of PPP highlights its significant global influence and the shifting balance of economic power.  

China – new global power?  

GDP of China, United States, European Union, Russian Federation and Japan. PPP (Constant International $), billions. 1990-2023

(Source: World Bank)

It is true that nominal GDP reflects a country’s ability to buy goods internationally and we should also look at those GDP statistics. But it also shows that if the current trend continues, the US will lose the first place to China in the near future.

GDP of China, United States, European Union, Russian Federation and Japan (Current US$), billions. 1990-2023

Recent sanctions from The United States and western allies highlighted the vital role of gold as the most secure and stable asset a country can maintain in its reserves. When Western nations imposed sanctions on Russia, freezing assets like foreign currency reserves and restricting access to global financial systems, gold emerged as the one resource they couldn’t confiscate or block Russia from using. This emphasized gold’s unique position as a safeguard against sanctions and geopolitical uncertainty, offering protection in times of increased global tension.

As a result, many authoritarian regimes, particularly within BRICS nations, have been boosting their gold reserves as part of a broader effort to shield their economies from potential external threats. This trend reflects the growing understanding that, in an era where economic sanctions are frequently employed as geopolitical leverage, holding large gold reserves ensures a degree of economic independence. Consequently, these countries are focusing on gold as a way to reduce their reliance on the US dollar-based financial system and secure their financial resilience against future sanctions or global market upheavals.

Does the future lie in gold?

Gold Holdings. 2018=100
(Source: Atlantic Council, World Gold Council)

The shift toward gold and de-dollarization appears more plausible if we exclude countries that lack independent monetary policies and are interested in joining BRICS. Currently, only 35 percent of countries have an autonomous monetary policy. Most other nations have currencies that are either fully pegged to, or managed in relation to, major global currencies like the US dollar, euro, or Swiss franc. This indicates that many countries might be inclined to peg their currency to the renminbi, gold, or even adopt a new BRICS single currency if they aim to join BRICS and reduce their economic dependence on Western nations. Currency pegging though, has several advantages. It gives a country an exchange rate stability, that reduces currency fluctuation and is good for international trade and investment. Second, inflation is much lower, because developed countries and strong currency in general have much less inflation than developing countries who have independent monetary policy. The third benefit of the currency peg is investor confidence, because it excludes uncertainty factors in economy and business.  

Currency Regimes for BRICS members and countries that expressed interest or officially applied for joining the Alliance.  

(Source: International Monetary Fund. (2023). Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions)

BRICS and its potential size:

So, who are the countries who expressed their interest or officially applied to join BRICS? There are 43 countries from the Middle East, Asia, Africa and South America 

To see this chart properly click on the article heading (in blue) to go to the website

Countries that expressed interest or officially applied for joining into BRICS

#Expressed InterestRegion#Officially AppliedRegion
1AngolaAfrica25AlgeriaAfrica
2CameroonAfrica26SenegalAfrica
3Central African RepublicAfrica27ZimbabweAfrica
4CongoAfrica28BoliviaAmericas
5DR CongoAfrica29CubaAmericas
6GhanaAfrica30VenezuelaAmericas
7LibyaAfrica31AzerbaijanAsia
8NigeriaAfrica32BahrainAsia
9South SudanAfrica33BangladeshAsia
10SudanAfrica34KazakhstanAsia
11TunisiaAfrica35KuwaitAsia
12UgandaAfrica36MalaysiaAsia
13ColombiaAmericas37PakistanAsia
14El SalvadorAmericas38PalestineAsia
15NicaraguaAmericas39Saudi ArabiaAsia
16PeruAmericas40TurkeyAsia
17AfghanistanAsia41ThailandAsia
18IndonesiaAsia42YemenAsia
19IraqAsia43BelarusEurope
20LaosAsia   
21MyanmarAsia   
22Sri LankaAsia   
23SyriaAsia   
24VietnamAsia   
(Source: European Parliament. (2024). Briefing. Expansion of BRICS: A quest for greater global influence?

How large are the current and potential BRICS? If all the proposed nations were to join BRICS today, it would become the largest political and economic bloc globally. This expanded BRICS group would account for over 50 percent of global GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP, International $) and represent roughly 71 percent of the world’s population.

GDP Current US dollars and GDP PPP Current International dollars, Trillion. BRICS, US & Allies (Canada, UK, EU, Japan, Korea Rep., Australia), Potential BRICS (Countries that expressed interest or officially applied for joining into BRICS). 2023.
(Source: World Bank. (2024). World Bank Data)

What kind of future does the world have?

Are advanced democratic nations losing their global influence? Could this decline be attributed to years of accommodating authoritarian regimes, coupled with domestic welfare and monetary policies that have stifled wealth creation? Are demographic challenges, such as falling birth rates, aging populations, and growing migration issues, further exacerbating this shift? Is the world, as a result, moving toward a new bipolar dynamic — not between capitalism and socialism, but democracies and authoritarian governments or their semi-democratic allies. One we know for sure, is that US dollar is losing its influence, and this is aligned with US global political power also. The data indicate that while the US dollar faces challenges, countries not typically aligned with Western allies are actively contributing not only to de-dollarization but also to expanding their influence in the global economic and political arena. Will a multipolar future emerge soon?  

(Map created by the author)