Quote of the day

“I find economics increasingly satisfactory, and I think I am rather good at it.”– John Maynard Keynes

Saturday, 12 December 2020

OBR on fiscal outlook - lots in here

INTERVIEW

Spending watchdog sees warning lights flashing

Sir Charlie Bean’s time in Threadneedle Street gives him rare insight into Britain’s economy

Charlie Bean spent 14 years at the Bank of England ending up as a deputy governor
Charlie Bean spent 14 years at the Bank of England ending up as a deputy governor
MATT LLOYD FOR THE TIMES
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Sir Charlie Bean, board member at the Office for Budget Responsibility and former deputy governor of the Bank of England, is a rare creature among economists in public life. At 67, with a stellar career behind him and still playing a key role as arbiter of what the government can afford at its spending watchdog, he’s not afraid to speak frankly.

“With my OBR hat on, I am not allowed to say anything about the appropriate fiscal course of action,” he says when I ask which taxes Rishi Sunak should raise. “We crank the numbers, we don’t say what the chancellor should do.” But, of course, he does have an opinion, which he is happy to share.

“If you have to raise taxes, it makes more sense to raise them on things that are bad, which is the argument for sin taxes,” he says. “A tax on things that create global warming produces better economic outcomes as well as raising revenue. So one can certainly see the attractions of doing that.” It’s pretty clear that a carbon tax would be on Sir Charlie’s list of proposals to the Treasury if he was allowed to submit one.

We are talking taxes because the OBR forecasts at last month’s spending review left the chancellor little option. Its outlook was full of superlatives, just the wrong kind: the deepest recession since 1709, a contraction of 11.3 per cent; record peacetime borrowing of £394 billion; the highest level of national debt in 60 years at over 100 per cent of GDP.

Sir Charlie is in no doubt that “it was the right thing to do to let borrowing take up the slack” this year. The difficult bit is what comes next. “The financial crisis and now the coronavirus crisis are like wars in the sense that they are both justifications for temporarily higher deficits,” he says. “But it will obviously make sense once the crisis [has] passed to get back to normal settings to build up space for the next shock. Given we’ve had two bad shocks in the space of a little over ten years, I don’t think one should count on there not being further ones.”

Again he veers towards giving the chancellor advice. “One shouldn’t be content with simply stabilising debt-to-GDP,” he says. “If that was all you did during peacetime, when you have a succession of bad shocks the debt-to-GDP ratio just keeps on ratcheting up. So it does seem sensible to have a more ambitious target of gradually bringing it down.”

It is this observation that brings us on to tax because, as the chancellor said at his spending review, “underlying debt is forecast to continue rising every year” of this parliament, which he described as “clearly unsustainable”. Recent experience has been exactly what Sir Charlie fears. Since the financial crisis hit in 2008, debt has ratcheted up every year bar three, rising from 34 per cent to 85 per cent of GDP last year despite austerity, before leaping once more to 105 per cent, near levels for which Treasury officials would once reprove Italy.

The OBR’s forecasts suggest taxes will need to rise by roughly £30 billion just to stabilise the debt even after the £10 billion of spending cuts Mr Sunak unveiled last month that push the government up against the limits of its promise to “end austerity”. Sir Charlie’s recommendation suggests that £30 billion won’t be enough.

For him, the question is not whether debt should be falling but how fast to bring it down. That “depends upon your assessment of the likelihood of future shocks and things like the level of interest rates relative to growth”.

R


ight now, rates are low but that does not give Sir Charlie comfort. Inflation is a real risk, he says, only manageable if it is driven by an upward shift in the underlying growth rate. But “that’s the holy grail” of better productivity, which has eluded Britain for a decade. More likely is a spike in inflation during a cyclical rebound from the crisis, in which case the Bank of England would have to raise rates.

“Policy is highly stimulative at the moment,” he says warily, in reference to the £450 billion of quantitative easing this year and government spending spree planned for next year. A 1 per cent rise in both interest rates and the cost of government borrowing would add £17 billion to debt servicing. Inflation of 3 per cent would add another £6 billion. Paying for that small increase in debt servicing would mean 4p on income tax.

Sir Charlie expects the Bank, where he spent 14 years as chief economist and deputy governor, to keep rates low next year to drive the recovery but he supports proposals to start selling off the £875 billion QE portfolio soon. This year’s £450 billion of QE was “much more of a financial stability operation” than “conventional monetary policy to boost aggregate demand”. The Bank was acting as “market maker of last resort”, not trying to get people spending. “You’d be crazy to try to get more people to go to shops when the consequence is you get more infections,” he says.

As such, the intervention was similar to the £10 billion of corporate bond purchases done alongside QE in 2009. “As soon as the market came back, we sold those off,” he recalls. “That helps to realise that it would make sense to start unwinding QE before Bank rate got back up.” The unwind could begin next year if the economy recovers quickly, he says.

He is “not a huge fan of negative rates”. They hammer bank profit margins, which “can be counterproductive both in reducing the supply of credit and producing financial stability risks”. He would take a different approach; to impose negative rates not on deposits, as is the conventional understanding, but on “the rate at which the Bank lends” to high street banks. Or to put it another way, “paying the lender to borrow . . . effectively providing a public subsidy [to commercial banks]”.

“There is nothing to stop the central bank from saying we’ll pay you 5 per cent a year to take this money from us provided you lend it out,” he says. As a subsidy, however, it would require Treasury approval.

One thing is certain. He does not want to go through another forecasting round like the last, with staff holed up at home during the second lockdown, interrogating Treasury officials over Zoom. “I’m not sure whether we could expect the staff to go quite as far next time. I think some would be pretty close to breaking point.”

Challenging read - QE, exchange rates, dilemmas

 

ECB adds another half trillion in QE, even as Italy eyes debt cancellation

The central bank is in effect holding the fort through the worst of the crisis and shielding vulnerable states from markets until late 2021

The European Central Bank has stepped up pandemic emergency stimulus by another €500bn to counter a double-dip recession, but stopped short of ‘shock-and-awe’ measures to reverse a corrosive slide into deflation.

Bond purchases will be stretched out to 2022,  clearing the way for the ECB to mop up three quarters of all fresh debt issuance by eurozone governments next year. This further obliterates the line between fiscal and monetary policy, and pushes the ECB’s balance sheet beyond 70pc of GDP. 

The central bank is in effect holding the fort through the worst of the pandemic and shielding vulnerable states from the markets until the EU’s €750bn Recovery Funds starts to feed through in late 2021. 

The package of measures amounts to Japanese-style "yield control", sending a message to markets that the ECB will hold down long-term interest rates across the board and for the foreseeable future, regardless of underlying credit worthiness or moral hazard. 

The policy was signalled weeks ago and has set off a speculative ‘convergence play’ as funds rush to buy southern European debt and reap quick gains on capital appreciation. 

“The ECB is telling us that their job is to keep borrowing costs as low as possible and these bonds are an absolutely safe investment. We’ve never had that kind of explicit message before,” said Marchel Alexandrovich from Jefferies. 

Yields on 10-year Spanish bonds touched zero for the first time on Thursday. Italian bonds were trading at negative yields on maturities out to five years, even though Italy’s debt has rocketed to nosebleed levels of 161pc of GDP this year and the country is implicitly insolvent.

Professor Moritz Kraemer from Frankfurt’s Goethe University said the ECB has already pushed QE long past the point of diminishing returns and that further purchases will gain little economic traction. “Its strategy has stopped stimulating credit and demand. The only thing that it is achieving now is pushing yields even lower and blowing bubbles,” he said.Any benefits may be overwhelmed by the surging euro, which is fast turning into a terms of trade shock . The trade-weighted euro index has jumped 7pc this year and is flirting with an all-time high.

This is vastly complicating the ECB’s attempts to stave off deflation, with all the destructive pathologies that come in its wake. Headline inflation has dropped to minus 0.3pc and core prices may go negative over the winter. 

Christine Lagarde, the ECB’s president, said the bank is monitoring the exchange rate “very carefully” but attempts to talk down the euro are likely to fail.

The ECB lacks the tools to fight appreciation in the face of a structural bear market for the US dollar and other currencies linked to it, directly or indirectly, including the Chinese yuan. Europe risks being the region that ends up holding the unwanted parcel that everybody else manages to pass on.

Frankfurt resisted the temptation to cut interest rates further below minus 0.5pc, knowing that Washington would deem this to be thinly-disguised currency manipulation. The Bank of Japan was warned in harsh terms when it tried to play this game.

In any case, negative rates have serious side-effects and erode the bread-and-butter business model of banks. The ECB has sought to blunt this with a technical device known as ‘tiering’ and has now extended ultra-cheap loans to commercial lenders at rates of minus 1pc for another year.  

Nevertheless, there are signs of an incipient credit crunch in Europe as the delayed effects of the Covid recession become apparent and moratoria expire. Banks have begun to choke lending. They are demanding more collateral to protect themselves from a cascade of defaults. 

The European regulator warns that bad debts in the banking system could hit €1.4 trillion, dwarfing the damage from the global financial crisis in 2008 and leaving many lenders under water.

The ECB’s blanket of QE has bought time but it has also made the system inherently more unstable. It has induced banks to feast on eurozone sovereign debt, two-thirds of it issued by their own national governments. Holdings have surged by €400bn this year to a record €1.86 trillion.

The unresolved ‘doom-loop’ of sovereigns and banks - each dragging the other down in times of stress  - is now bigger than ever. EU leaders vowed eight years ago to sort out this systemic design-flaw but lost interest after the debt crisis faded. They never completed the banking union and there is still no pan-EMU deposit insurance. 

The ECB is in an invidious position. It cannot easily stop buying Club Med bonds without risking a financial chain-reaction. Italy, Spain, or Portugal could turn to the EU bail-out fund (ESM) for support in extremis but they would not do so lightly given the conditions attached. Any move to push Italy into this sort of troika regime might destabilize the current pro-EU government and set off fresh calls for a return to the lira.

For now Germany is going along with ever more QE. It has reshuffled €140bn of its own internal debt to make the latest move easier. This sleight of hand allows the ECB to keep buying more bonds without deviating so visibly from its sacred capital key. 

While the details are abstruse, the political signal is not. Chancellor Angela Merkel has clearly opted to let the ECB continue carrying the load for the whole EMU system - faute de mieux -  even if that stores up large problems for the future. 

However, it is an open question whether this implicit strategy will pass muster at the German Constitutional Court - or the anti-elite  ‘people’s court’, as the chief justice called it after its last thunderous ruling against QE.  

There is a strange dissonance to extra bond purchases at a time when Italian leaders and politicians are calling ever more loudly for cancellation of the ECB’s existing holdings. Demands for debt forgiveness on pandemic QE come from across the political spectrum, including close aides of premier Giuseppe Conte. 

Matteo Salvini’s Lega party says the digital debt is an accounting fiction and should be wiped clean with the click of a mouse. The European Parliament’s Italian president David Sassoli is flirting with the idea. The demands have reached the front page of Avvenire, the voice of the Italian Catholic bishops’ conference.

Holger Schmieding from Berenberg Bank said the concept is lunacy and would backfire horribly. “People calling for this either don’t understand what they are asking for, or there is really something else behind it, and that is what could set off a run on the debt markets,” he said.

Legally and technically, it is the Bank of Italy that would be on the hook for most of the €550bn of Italian debt bought under the various QE schemes, not the ECB as such. One branch of the Italian state would therefore be forgiving another branch. The Italian treasury would have to issue extra debt to recapitalize a bankrupt Bank of Italy.    

Mr Schmieding said investors would see the gambit as a “trial run for a broader debt restructuring at their expense”. Risk spreads would soar and Southern Europe would be thrown back into a debt crisis.

For Italy, such a radical move would make sense only if it was part of a much larger debt restructuring and a lira redenomination. That would entail a partial default by the Bank of Italy on its €520bn of Target2 liabilities to the ECB under the principle of Lex Monetae. This would be a financial earthquake for Europe and the world. 

For the time being, the ECB is doomed to keep sinking deeper into this debt trap even though everybody knows that QE has become a disguised monetary bail-out for insolvent states. In other respects it probably has no more economic potency at this juncture than a rain dance.

Wednesday, 9 December 2020

A look at economic data across economies, and...

 A long, hard look at the China data. This is a challenging read, but it does explain some of the reasons you cannot compare headline Chinese data with the rest of the world:


There Is No Chinese Economic Miracle

TAGS Economic PolicySocialism

12/04/2020

Listen to the Audio Mises Wire version of this article.

The year 2020 will be an extremely tough year for the European economy. Added to an unprecedented drop is a strong impact in the fourth quarter due to the new lockdowns. Morgan Stanley estimates that the eurozone’s GDP will fall by 2.2 percent in the fourth quarter, a 7 percent drop in the full year 2020. In addition, the investment bank has lowered the outlook for 2021, with a rebound of only 5 percent in the average of the euro area, delaying the recovery of 2019 GDP to 2023.

The “jobless recovery” is even more worrying. The apparently spectacular rebound data for the third quarter resulted in zero job creation. Unemployment in the eurozone in September stood at 8.3 percent and in Spain at 16.5 percent, not counting the millions of furloughed jobs in Europe.

In this environment, the United States’s recovery seems much stronger. GDP recovered in the third quarter to just 3.5 percent below 2019 levels. Unemployment has fallen to 6.9 percent in October but remains well above the record employment levels of 2019.

However, the data from China is apparently spectacular. The manufacturing and services index already shows an enviable expansion. GDP for the first three quarters is already growing at 0.7 percent after an expansion of 4.9 percent in the third quarter. Urban unemployment in China is 5.4 percent after shooting to a paltry 6 percent. What is behind the Chinese miracle compared to the poor eurozone?

A planned GDP. The GDP of China is dictated by production, not demand. It is not an observed GDP, but rather planned by the federal government together with the provinces. For this reason, many analysts scrutinize the data and deduct various factors, including the increase and valuation of inventories. It is not by chance that inventories of iron ore, automobiles, and finished goods have risen to the highest level in seven months as the economy recovers. If the economic situation were in the announced expansion, inventories would be falling rapidly when sold. Much is produced that is then not sold and remains in warehouses. Thus, it is not surprising that industrial prices fell 2.1 percent in September, export prices 0.9 percent, and the country’s debt soared 13.5 percent amid an apparently miraculous recovery. Industrial business profits have fallen 2.4 percent between January and September and, furthermore, factory door prices fell faster than expected in September and were at risk of deflation. These are signs of a slowly recovering economy, like all others, but not of a growth miracle.

In most economies, inventories are valued at market prices, while in China they are valued by the authorities and adjusted later. Constant methodological and base changes also lead to doubts regarding annual growth, despite the evident increase in transparency in recent years. Another difficult factor to analyze is the growth of construction activity in a country where overcapacity is evident and ghost cities and white elephant uneconomical projects are multiplying.

The reduction in urban unemployment also hides a more complex reality. Unemployment in China is close to 11 percent on average, according to the "Long Run Trends in Unemployment and Labor Force Participation in China" study (NBER Working Paper No. 21460) and probably well above 13 percent in the midst of the covid-19 crisis. 

According to Capital Economics, Nomura, or HSBC University of Beijing, another important challenge is calculating GDP with a realistic deflator. By using a deflator—the impact of prices on GDP—that is much lower than the observed one, GDP appears artificially higher than it really is. In an economy where inflation is underestimated, nominal wages, which grow at an official 3.6 percent, lose purchasing power almost every year due to the real cost of living, especially in food and daily expenditures, which are much higher than the official ones.

In a recent study ("A Forensic Examination of China’s National Accounts" [2019]) the authors concluded that China’s GDP may have been exaggerated by around 2 percent per year between 2008 and 2016, showing that China’s real GDP is probably 18 percent lower than the official figure. China’s GDP is never revised, and the December figure simply stands and is consolidated without question. This is an important factor that the Chinese authorities have tried to correct with greater transparency and adjustments by the NBS (National Bureau of Statistics). The problem is that provinces have accelerated their race in the effort to provide spectacular figures and the magnitude of the corrections of the national office does not compensate for these “exaggerations.”

Another problem is that annual revisions compute for growth but are not revised in the GDP figure for the year. The calculation base is reduced. For example, according to independent consultancy China Beige Book, gross capital formation for the third quarter of 2019 has been revised down by ¥2.3 trillion. As the 2019 figure falls, the growth on the same data for 2020 seems spectacular. That same review was made with the retail sales figure: those for August 2019 were revised down by ¥50 billion and the growth figure for 2020 seems miraculous. However, a revision of such depth in the base calculation of figures for 2019 did not generate a downward revision of the GDP for that year.

These methodological problems are added to the survey used for the calculation. The government uses a list of companies that generate a minimum amount of revenue. That list grows and shrinks, creating homogeneity problems that the NBS tries to adjust for.

In the United States, each daily, weekly, and monthly data is analyzed by different independent entities and each data point is impossible to manipulate by a government authority. That is why the GDP is constantly revised. China’s GDP is the only one that is not revised. It is published and consolidated.

It is a shame because the reality observed by companies and citizens in China is that the economy is recovering slowly and unevenly, but it is recovering, probably with a year-on-year drop of 2.5 percent, which would be, in any case, a very positive figure. Falling into planned overcapacity and excessive triumphalism on the part of some provinces competing to provide better data than others ends in questioning the reality of the improvement in the economy.

Beijing has pledged to bring the data up to IMF standards, but lack of independent scrutiny and the competition between provinces when it comes to providing positive and spectacular figures continue to generate inconsistencies between sales, inventories, consumption, and profits. The recovery of the real economy in China is happening, but it is not dissimilar to that of many of the leading Asian countries.

Author:

Daniel Lacalle

Daniel Lacalle, PhD, economist and fund manager, is the author of the bestselling books Freedom or Equality (2020), Escape from the Central Bank Trap (2017), The Energy World Is Flat (2015), and Life in the Financial Markets (2014).

Monday, 7 December 2020

Is the Green Agenda worth it?

 Analysis, not propaganda:


If Boris’s green agenda is to fly, it must deliver UK jobs and growth

A UK green revolution is ambitious, but suddenly the geopolitical backdrop makes the venture less risk, more reward

First to approve a vaccine to counter the pandemic, and now ahead of the pack too in the scale of its ambitions to tackle climate change.

Is the apparent largesse of Britain’s so-called “Nationally Determined Contribution” - the emissions reduction commitment announced last week for the COP26 UN Climate Change summit in Glasgow next year - just more vacuous, nationalistic boosterism, primarily designed to stir the patriotic juices by seemingly making Britain more environmentally saintly than anyone else, or is this a genuine show of world leadership in tackling the other supposed great global crisis of the age?

A bit of both seems to be the answer.

An unkind joke about Theresa May’s premiership is that her legacy is precisely zero - the legally binding target to net zero carbon emissions by 2050, that is.

Yet it is a goal that Boris Johnson seems equally keen to embrace. The manifesto promise to increase offshore wind to 40 gigawatts by 2030, the ban on sales of new petrol and diesel powered cars and vans from 2030, and now the pledge to lead the way globally by slashing emissions by 68pc by the end of the decade - thick and fast the environmental commitments keep coming.

On this front at least, there would be no need for the level playing field provisions demanded by the EU in free trade agreement negotiations; the UK is already some distance ahead of Europe.

To some it looks insane. At a time when the UK economy needs to become more economically competitive to meet the challenges of Brexit, the Prime Minister seems intent only on ramping up the scale of the UK’s climate change obligations.

It’s all very well to adopt a world leadership role in saving the planet, yet if it destroys the economy in the meantime, he’s unlikely to get much thanks for it at the ballot box.

But here’s the point; it’s not going to destroy the economy. Much more likely is that it is end up part of the economy’s salvation.

A little context. The more ambitious “Nationally Determined Contribution” is in fact only what is needed to keep the UK on track to meet the wider net zero by 2050 target.

The pre-existing NDC had been set at a time when the overall 2050 target was less ambitious - an 80pc reduction in emissions by 2050, not today’s 100pc. So in order to meet the new target, the NDC has to be more ambitious too.

All Boris Johnson is doing is rubber stamping what was in any case going to be the Climate Change Committee’s recommendation on how to update the NDC. As a serious advocate of the need for radical action on climate change, he would have been in some trouble had he rejected it.

All the same, the new commitment, which is to ramp up emissions reduction from 57pc of 1990 levels to 68pc within a decade, is a huge ask. As yet, there is still little in the way of clarity on how to get there. Nonetheless, it is good to see the UK take the lead on a matter of such global significance.

I have to admit to feeling a little ashamed of the national triumphalism on display last week at being the first to approve a Covid vaccine, a “Britain is best claim” made all the more ridiculous by the fact that the vaccine in question was developed by Turkish immigrants in Germany and is manufactured in Belgium.

Full marks to June Raine, head of the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the body that authorised the vaccine, for moving so swiftly. In doing so she helps sustain Britain’s reputation as a home for trustworthy pharmaceuticals regulation and expertise now that the European Medicines Agency has been lost to Amsterdam.

But as with climate change, this should never be seen in terms of a global race. Commendably, the Prime Minister stayed out of the childish gloating among some of his ministers.

“These are global efforts, you’ve got scientists around the world coming together to make this possible. It’s a truly international thing and very, very moving to see,” he said. Quite so.

I doubt whether fast tracking the vaccine is going to give the UK much of a heads start in terms of economic recovery. Any “heads start” looks in any case as if it will be foiled by teething problems in supply.

The US and Europe are at most only weeks behind. For the UK economy to prosper, the global, and yes the EU, economies need to prosper too.

Growth booster
Line chart with 3 lines.
Vaccines should help global growth recover, according to UBS
The chart has 1 X axis displaying values. Range: 2014.93 to 2022.07.
The chart has 1 Y axis displaying % change year on year. Range: -6 to 8.
Source: World Bank, UBS
End of interactive chart.

In pushing the boundaries on climate change commitments, the UK perfectly captures the global dimensions of today’s economic challenges.

It was always possible to argue that there was little point in the UK making the effort as long as China and the US, the world’s two biggest emitters, refused to take the issue seriously; whatever Britain did would be like spitting against the wind.

But now China has committed to net zero by 2060, and Biden’s America to 2050. South Korea and Japan similarly so. Indeed, Biden has gone a step further than the UK in also committing to making the power network carbon neutral by 2035.

There is generally reckoned that to be carbon neutral by 2050, the power system has to get there at least 10 years beforehand.

We can therefore expect the UK to follow Biden’s lead shortly. In the spirit of international co-operation on these issues, the UK will also shortly be announcing plans to mirror the European Emissions Trading Scheme with its own independent, but linked, trading scheme for post-Brexit Britain. For the time being, this will be sold as an alternative to more overt carbon taxes.

As for the US, don’t assume that its renewed commitment to climate change goals is greenwashing flam. Biden’s nominated Treasury Secretary, Janet Yellen, supports the idea of both revenue neutral carbon taxes and carbon border adjustment taxes on imports from countries that refuse to make the switch. She’ll be pursuing these goals with vigour.

Ambitious targets are one thing; for the UK economy, the important thing is to tap into their economic potential. The explosive growth of offshore wind is already an outstanding British success story, neatly substituting for the expertise and jobs in offshore engineering that used to be occupied by now semi obsolete North Sea oil. Yet many of the components are still foreign made. A strategy for promoting local content is urgently required.

“The more specific you are about your targets”, says Adair Turner, co-chair of the international Energy Transitions Commission, “the more certain industry can be about the future, and the higher its investment in local innovation, manufacturing and supply”.

Efforts to stem climate change have developed seemingly unstoppable global momentum. Whatever the merits of their case, climate change sceptics have lost the argument.

They have become no more than faintly eccentric, lone voices crying in the wilderness, as irrelevant to the future as Extinction Rebellion, with its focus on impoverishing life-style changes, is to pragmatic pursuit of a carbon free world. That goal will only command majority support if it also offers a plausible path to economic prosperity.